

Aristotle in Coimbra

The *Cursus Conimbricensis* and the
education at the College of Arts

Cristiano Casalini

Translated by Luana Salvarani

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Aristotle in Coimbra is the first book to cover the history of both the College of Arts in Coimbra and its most remarkable cultural product, the *Cursus Conimbricensis*, examining early Jesuit pedagogy as performed in one of the most important colleges run by the Society of Jesus in the sixteenth century.

The first complete philosophical textbook published by a Jesuit college, the *Cursus Conimbricensis* (1592–1606) was created by some of the most renowned early Jesuit philosophers and comprised seven volumes of commentaries and disputations on Aristotle's writings, which had formed the foundation of the university philosophy curriculum since the Middle Ages. In *Aristotle in Coimbra*, Cristiano Casalini demonstrates the connection between educational practices in a sixteenth-century college and the structure of a Scholastic philosophical commentary, providing insight into this particular form of late-Scholastic Aristotelianism through historiographical discourse.

This book provides both a narrative of the historical background behind the publication of the *Cursus* and an analysis of the major philosophical and educational issues addressed by its seven volumes. It is valuable reading for all those interested in intellectual history, the history of education and the history of philosophy.

Cristiano Casalini teaches the history of education at the University of Parma. He has worked on critical texts and commentaries of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century classics of education, especially in and around the Jesuit order. With Claude Pavur SJ he co-edited *Jesuit Pedagogy (1540–1616): A Reader* (2016). He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Jesuit Studies and a Visiting Professor at the Lynch School of Education, both at Boston College.

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Foreword

Almost from the first moment of its founding the Society of Jesus exercised a seemingly insatiable fascination for religious apologists and polemicists. The institution, though obviously traditional in many ways, somehow projected an image that demanded defence or incited attack, sometimes vicious. Aside from an image of either a company of saints or a company of devils, the Society, born amid the ferocious religious controversies of the sixteenth century, soon got labelled as the premier “agent of the Counter Reformation”. Even though fighting the Reformation was far from uppermost in the mind of Ignatius in the founding of the order, that is how the Jesuits soon began to present themselves and that is how they were understood by others. As the Catholic narrative of what happened during the Counter Reformation developed, it easily propagated the belief that divine providence raised up Ignatius of Loyola to lay low his slightly older contemporary, Martin Luther.

Only in the last several decades have these historical clichés been effectively toppled and a new era opened for the historiography of the Society of Jesus. There are several remarkable features of this new approach to Jesuit history. First among them is the large number of scholars engaged in the enterprise and the diversity of disciplines they represent. Relatively few are Catholics. Almost as remarkable is the international character of the enterprise, in which Italian scholars have recently taken the lead. We now have a larger, more comprehensive and more balanced picture of the history of the Jesuits than ever before.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of these new approaches to the Jesuits is the change in the questions being asked about them. Although scholars continue to be interested in the Jesuits as “agents of the Counter Reformation”, the basic question they pose for all aspects of Jesuit history is a neutral one: “What were the Jesuits like?” And then come the logical follow-up questions: “How were they similar to and how dissimilar from their contemporaries?” And “How did they fit into their different cultural milieus?”

Questions like these, obvious and bland though they might seem, have helped transform our understanding of the subject. The questions are not predisposed to ensure a particular outcome. The results have been good. They

have shown the weaknesses and the strengths of the Jesuit enterprises, and in so doing they have reshaped our understanding of them.

One long dominant image of the Society they have shattered is that of an organization fully formed at the moment of its approval by Pope Paul III on 27 September 1540, which from that moment forward remained substantially unchanged. That picture no longer holds. No doubt, through its history the Society of Jesus displays an extraordinary coherence in the basic premises out of which it has operated and in its fidelity to them, but that does not mean that it did not, like all long-lived institutions, undergo profound changes.

What Ignatius and his companions had in mind in 1540 was a band of roving preachers of the gospel, according to their image of how Christ and the apostles spent their days travelling from one place to another in order to spread the Good News. Prominent in this image was the apostle Paul, who crossed the Mediterranean in his zeal to make the name of Christ known. To imprint that image on their lives, Ignatius and the others imposed upon themselves and on future members of the Society a special vow to be missionaries, to travel anywhere in the world for the sake of the gospel, especially when ordered to do so by the Supreme Pontiff – their famous “fourth vow”.

But within a few years they made a decision not in the least foreseen at the outset. They began to operate schools for young laymen whose future lay not in the priesthood or a religious order but “in the world”. Although the Jesuits did not fully realize it, this decision changed them to an extraordinary degree. To the goal of being itinerant preachers was now added that of being resident schoolmasters. As schoolmasters, the Jesuits had to be just as proficient in literature, theatre, philosophy and similar subjects as they were in theology and Scripture. They became writers on these secular subjects and published an impressive number of books on them. Along with its religious mission, therefore, the Society of Jesus now took on a cultural mission. In the Jesuits’ mind these two missions were closely related, perhaps even inseparable, but we historians today must be aware of the distinction between them and exploit it to the utmost if we are to understand the Society of Jesus.

A great deal of recent scholarship on the Jesuits has done precisely that. It has examined the Jesuits as architects, as poets, as playwrights, as cartographers, as musicians, as political theorists, and so forth. The list is long. What must not be lost sight of is that the decision to operate schools for lay students explains how and why the Jesuits undertook these many and varied careers. Had it not been for the schools the Jesuits would have entered our history books with a profile little different from the Dominicans and Franciscans, upon whom they, in a somewhat updated form, originally modelled themselves. It was the schools that gave the Jesuits their identity as scholars of broad and even worldly culture.

It is surprising, therefore, that, despite the vast amount of excellent scholarship today on the Jesuits’ activities in different areas of culture, so very little attention has been paid to the schools *as such*. We now know incomparably more than previously about what the schools directly or indirectly produced,

but we know very little about what went on in them on a day-to-day basis, very little about how in specific instances they came into being and managed their affairs, and very little indeed on just what was taught and how it related to larger cultural trends and controversies. We know very little about how they produced their books, especially those that were, like the *Cursus Conimbricensis*, collaborative works produced over a number of years by an unidentified team of authors.

For that reason Cristiano Casalini's book is particularly welcome. It comes at just the right time and fills an important gap. As the author shows, Coimbra was, according to the Jesuits, a jewel in their academic diadem. The city was the cultural capital of the nation where the Jesuits received their warmest welcome from the monarchy, where they at first prospered most expansively and from where they launched some of their most important overseas missions, beginning with St Francis Xavier. Portugal was also, however, the site of their first big internal crisis of authority in the struggle between Ignatius and Simão Rodrigues. The school itself, as we learn in these pages, itself became entangled in controversies of various kinds.

The centre of this book is the school and especially the *Cursus* the school produced, a multi-volume commentary on the works of Aristotle. Casalini depicts in illuminating detail how the project was conceived and how carried out. For all the individualism supposedly characteristic of the Jesuits, they were capable of working together on a common cause extending over a number of years. They were also indefatigable letter writers and have left a paper trail that has enabled Casalini to reconstruct the story of the collaboration and the goals the Jesuits had in mind.

In the first decade of the seventeenth century the works of Aristotle retained their hegemony, even though challenges to them were ever more common and by the middle of the century would deal them deadly blows. For the Jesuits they had a special role in their intellectual programme because they undergirded the theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas, whom the Jesuit *Constitutions* designated the official theologian of the order. Moreover, the Jesuits were doing little more than reproducing and reducing to print the philosophical programme that universities had long ago codified. In these pages Professor Casalini takes us through the *Cursus*, with a lucid and convincing analysis and shows us how it fitted in the philosophical, theological, and even political battles of the era. The *Cursus* neither was nor wanted to be a groundbreaking work. It was, rather, a work symptomatic of the state-of-the-question on many issues that concerned the early modern era. In that regard it is as important as it has been neglected by scholars. I do not believe we could have a better guide through it than we have here in *Aristotele in Coimbra*.

John W. O'Malley

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Introduction

The *Cursus Conimbricensis* is an eight-volume set of philosophical commentaries which the Jesuit College of Arts in Coimbra (Portugal) published between 1592 and 1606.

It enjoyed popularity for at least thirty years, was published several times in different countries, and was adopted as the manual of philosophy in many colleges in Europe and abroad, no matter whether they were run by the Society of Jesus or not.

As no author is mentioned in the titles of the volumes (except for two inserts), the *Cursus* constitutes one of the very first examples of a collective work marked with the brand of an institution, designed for prestige in the European field of higher education.

The Coimbran commentary on the *Physics* appeared in 1592, bound in a volume with other books on natural philosophy, as the first of series. Since neither the traditional didactic order, nor the structure of the Aristotelian corpus considered physics as the first discipline to be taught, this fact is evidence of the vitality and complexity of this work, which has appeared another boring and monochrome product of late Scholasticism so far. Contrary to this caricature, the *Cursus* has a very lively history: it became the battlefield where professors wrestled in order to become team leader; it was then composed in a hurry, after the dramatic delay of its first author, running after the didactical problems of the college; and, finally, some volumes were added and published when a plagiarized version of the *Cursus* began to circulate in Germany.

As a multi-authored work (at least in its initial schedule) and *work in progress*, it bears the scars of difficult navigation by a crew of scholars and others, post-Trent theology, two intellectuals (Pedro Fonseca and Luís Molina) in disagreement and Aristotelianism. The *Cursus* aimed at becoming a philosophical brand, a sort of trademark of the College of Coimbra in the world; the same ambition had been already fulfilled by the textbooks on grammar and rhetoric. Yet the elephantine, eight-volume *Cursus*, in spite of its Europe-wide success, never attained the practicality, portability and lightness of Soares's *Rhetoric* and Alvares's *Grammar*. We know it first from Descartes, who complained, in a well-known letter to Mersenne about the redundancy

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and pedantry of the *Cursus* as a compulsory textbook in his college years. Something contradictory, strikingly unresolved lingers around its structure and the cut of the questions. The Jesuits of Coimbra, more or less consciously, had hit the body of their contemporary culture where it hurt.

The *Cursus* sprang from the didactic practices of the College of Coimbra. Modern scholars of late Aristotelian philosophy have been attracted by its structured commentaries with *disputationes*; as one of the first Jesuit works, it has been used as a source for the early modern history of (Roman) Catholicism.¹ What it lacked was an educational perspective on the subject, searching for its relevance in fashioning the personality, values and cultural background of its students, its aims and objectives, the social and political skills it promoted and the *forma mentis* it moulded and legitimated. This is the aim of this book, and this is the reason why the history of the *Cursus* is mainly a history of the College of Coimbra itself: of the political reasons for its foundation, of the men that ruled it and of the conflicts that structured it.

From this perspective the surface of the text, in itself pale and somewhat glassy like a detached fresco, recovers in its context its landscape and space: i.e. the human and scholarly conflicts around its composition. Therefore this study will not be a history of education in the College of Coimbra, but a history of the *Cursus*, which needs contributions from historiographical, philosophical and pedagogical methods in order to be narrated. A comprehensive study of the subject should also cover other disciplines, such as the aforementioned grammar and rhetoric, and the “college jargon” of the time, which is composed of idioms, rhythms and allusions to Latin texts, literary examples sprinkled in all classes and manuals. This jargon was for decades the real European intellectual language, the code of culture and power, of passions and transcendence, witnessed in a parodical (but legitimizing) manner in many of the *Essays* of Montaigne; a jargon that in college life was exploited in disputations and festive speeches, and most of all on the stage of the college theatre. As a study of the whole curriculum would have been impossible, this book focuses on philosophy of education, whose analysis is necessary to understand the goals of the *Cursus* as a didactic object/instrument, and its reflection on education. This perspective implies a choice in the contents of the *Cursus* that is arbitrary in its own nature. A question I found unavoidable is that of the teacher: i.e. verifying the presence or absence in *Cursus Conimbricensis* of an educational theory answering the question “what is teaching?” This is the opening question of Augustine’s *De Magistro* and, centuries later, of Aquinas’s *De Veritate* XI. We will not find a Conimbrican *De Magistro*, because the question is not openly posited in the *Cursus*, but we will find an educational theory based on the conceptual diptych *doctrine–discipline*, with which every commentary on *Posterior Analytics* traditionally begins, and is widespread in the *Cursus* and not only in the late *Dialectica* (1606). Indeed, knowledge here is connected to and circumscribed in the act of its transmission, where the function of the teacher and his reasoning techniques, a maieutic way to elicit the approbation of the pupil, acquire a leading

role that Aquinas never dared to conceive. The creative space of individual *invention*, with its connections to Platonic gnoseology, grows narrower and narrower; a new space is made, where all knowledge is learnt empirically and the construction of the pupil's knowledge depends on the teacher (*in manu mediatoris*). The Jesuit college cannot have a stronger legitimacy.

It is also necessary to broach the problem of cause and causation, because upon the answer to this question relies the profile of this theory of learning and, more generally, that of the function of teaching. We will see what the Conimbrican answer was. The concept of cause, far from being a marginal subject of dispute, is indeed at the crossroads of many questions worrying sixteenth-century Aristotelians and Roman Catholic theology: the relationships between God and man, natural law and the supernatural (miracles), metaphysics and theology, metaphysics and natural philosophy, moral responsibility of man and free will: all these problems surround the issue of cause. Bacon and Descartes based their attack on Aristotelianism from this standpoint, denying the reality of the Aristotelian system of four causes – upon which was grounded, more than Aristotelian physics, the structure of western thought – and, by doing so, turning the course of the history of science. The Jesuits of Coimbra seem to catch the spirit of the time: they feel the system is crumbling, and they shrewdly try to reaffirm the Aristotelian code with findings (such as *causa exemplaris*) whose paradox is in stunning contrast with Aristotelian tradition.

Was it a weak defence tactic by second-line scholars, or merely Jesuit arrogance? Dominicans had no doubt: they were among the first to notice and report these and other contradictions. A quick look at the names concealed under the Conimbrican brand makes the second hypothesis preferable: Luis Molina and Pedro Fonseca, in their argument about the paternity of the *scienza media* theory which was the main target of Dominican attacks, had a principal role in the building of the *Cursus*. Therefore an inquiry about the *Cursus* should necessarily deal with Molina's *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis* and Fonseca's *Dialectica* and *Metaphysica*. Many papers and books have been written on these works, but studies on the relationship between Fonseca, Molina and the *Cursus* are still scarce. There are, of course, the pioneering enquiries of Fr Giacon in the mid-fifties, and a local tradition of remarkable studies in Coimbra, especially those of the Department of Philosophy, of which we give an account in the Bibliography. Several comparative studies on particular themes or topics in the *Cursus* have led to clear insights: for instance, the logical inquiries of Jennifer Ashworth outline the differences between Fonseca's thought and the *Dialectica* of the *Cursus*; John Doyle studied the theory of signs; and Dennis Des Chene and Helen Hattab have scrutinized natural philosophy.

In this book, philosophy is treated as a sort of access point for the meaning of Conimbrican didactics, as well as an elevated perspective from which to see the wider picture: is the *Cursus* a fossil of a late Scholasticism to be shortly wiped away by sensism, rationalism and experimental sciences, or

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has its metaphysical framework, full of compromises with the mutability and insecurity of human destiny, still much to say? The irreconcilable contradictions of the Jesuit spirit, the heroic calling to ambitious endeavours, wide travel and great martyrdom, are represented in the tear-jerking monologues of college boys transformed into prima donnas: on the one hand, the practical disposition to mediation, adaptation, good business and international diplomacy; on the other, doesn't the origin of this spirit dwell in education? A study of Conimbrican education could offer new keys for unlocking history and understanding events too paradoxical to be explained by way of strategy and on which early modern Europe seems to feed covetously, a dish fit only for gourmet diners.

Note

- 1 Here it is impossible to give an account of the debate around Catholic reformation or counter-reformation. John W. O'Malley suggests "early modern Catholicism" as a neutral term and I will follow his suggestion.

1 The Gouveia affair

The origins of the *Cursus* are more confused than obscure. Underneath the somewhat dry philosophical prose, a historical stratification bares different events whose subjects alternately may change or intersect, often merging, making almost undecipherable “what” and “who” are behind the edition of a renowned textbook from the whole *corpus Aristotelicum*, signed for the first time by an entire college, and proudly presented as a prominent product of Jesuit culture.

The history of this book, just like the history of the Society of Jesus, begins in the crowded university town which was Paris at the beginning of the sixteenth century. And among the multitude of colleges that constituted this *universitas*, Sainte-Barbe’s enjoyed a prominent position. Numerous scholars have noted that the history of Jesuit education relies upon the *modus parisiensis* and that the *Ratio Studiorum*, the result of an extraordinary and laborious process on the part of the entire Society, relied heavily upon the model of Sainte-Barbe. But it has not been noted previously that this pedagogical tradition was modified by its Principals (or their substitutes). These personages, with very few exceptions, all had the same surname, Gouveia. The pioneering ideas of Diogo Gouveia, who transformed Sainte-Barbe into a real “Portuguese institution for education”,¹ and of his nephew André, an innovator and future principal of Coimbra, were and remained irreconcilable. Determining their influence on Sainte-Barbe’s pedagogical practices, and unravelling the history of this Portuguese family, consisting of educators, theologians, poets and diplomats, entails identifying the main lines along which Jesuit education developed, in addition to clarifying the complex tangle of the birth of the Society.

Ignatius of Loyola arrived in Paris in 1528. He had studied in Alcalá and in Salamanca,² but neither of these prestigious universities gave him “basic knowledge” (according to what he writes in *A Pilgrim’s Journey*). This student who had not completed his studies went first to Montaigu College and then to Sainte-Barbe, hoping to obtain his degree. In line with Parisian tradition, he had to start over studying with “the children”.³ He took advantage of this situation, teaching his spiritual exercises, which in a very short time became very famous among the clerics attending the

College of Arts. When three of these students, Peralta, the bachelor Castro and the Basque Amador who lived in Sainte-Barbe, decided to leave their studies in order to live on charity, the other students assaulted St Jacques's Hospital, where the three students had gone, to bring them back to their senses.

This is the first occasion on which Jesuit sources quote the Principal and teacher of Sainte-Barbe, the Portuguese Diogo de Gouveia, the elder, who did not sympathize with the novelties introduced by Loyola into college life. Ignatius wrote in his *Journey*: "Our teacher de Gouveia affirmed that [Ignatius] had caused Amador, who lived in his college, to go mad, and swore that on his first visit to Sainte-Barbe he would 'order him to be whipped in the main room' as a seducer of students."⁴

Diogo de Gouveia, who also served as Rector of the University of Paris,⁵ had been one of the first Portuguese students in Paris and had completed all his courses, up to theology, in the same years in which the works of Erasmus were circulating widely among students. Moutaigu College had hosted the Dutch humanist thanks to one of the two scholarships which Jan Standonck had offered to King Manuel I; and Diogo also served as a diplomat for the sovereign between 1512 and 1521. Gouveia was not attracted to northern humanism and its philological consequences in exegesis: on the contrary, it seemed to him to be the prelude to Protestantism; and despite the good relations between Erasmus and the Portuguese court,⁶ Gouveia, unlike his nephew André, always opposed his teachings. In 1520, Diogo, in the name of the King, negotiated the purchase of the college for the Portuguese students. The matter was concluded with some difficulty because of the opposition of the owner, Robert Dugast, but in the end Sainte-Barbe College was rented and Diogo was appointed its Principal.

His management of the institution was brilliant: the period of Gouveia's directorship was a time of the greatest growth for Sainte-Barbe. In spite of his opposition to Erasmian methods, under his direction, the College of Sainte-Barbe became one of the most important seedbeds of humane letters in Paris.⁷ Gouveia considered classical studies a cornerstone of the religious and cultural field, but only if placed at the service of Catholic theology and Parisian Scholasticism, and for this purpose he worked on the organization of studies, rendering them more effective. In this specific regard, the consequences of his years as director were both exciting and disappointing at the same time: exciting because of the number and quality of the students, disappointing regarding student desertions at the conclusion of the arts programme. The best students were less ardent than Diogo in mortifying rhetoric and dialectics with Scholastic theology.⁸

When he started to govern Sainte-Barbe, the great generation which filled the sixteenth century with its ideas was beginning to attend classes. The desire of reaching perfection in every field burned in these youthful hearts, and so many were those students who strove to surpass their masters. Gouveia's merit lays in his fostering of the students' fervour, something that generally

did not interest his colleagues. This attracted excellent teachers and students to Sainte-Barbe and the college became a nursery for great men.⁹

The prestige of Sainte-Barbe and its appeal to large numbers of students would transform it into a model for the future organization of Jesuit colleges. It is well known that the *protocollegium* in Messina, as the first educational institution for men not belonging to the Society, was inspired by the Parisian model mediated through Spain.¹⁰ Similarly, it is possible to trace the Coimbra College of Arts to Sainte-Barbe, by way of Bordeaux. Sainte-Barbe College was, to a large extent, the incubator of the Society.

During Ignatius's time at the college, his first companions were Francisco Xavier, Simão Rodrigues, Diego Laínez, Alfonso Salmerón, Bobadilla and Pierre Favre, who, although the youngest, was already studying theology. The encounter with Diogo de Gouveia was crucial for Ignatius and for the six who founded the Society on Montmartre, 15 August 1534. Teófilo Braga writes in his *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*:

The first step for Ignatius was to be admitted to the College of Sainte-Barbe, where Diogo de Gouveia the elder treated him kindly. Gouveia was definitely a Pyrrhonist, and knew very well that the Reformation was spreading in Europe, especially thanks to the novelties brought about by the study of Greek; his sympathy for that hallucinated Spaniard, who coupled mystical passivity and the military discipline of a former soldier of King Ferdinand, was as high as the faith and zeal with which he wanted to fight with a firm hand the Reformation. Loyola learned that the strict discipline of Sainte-Barbe could be a powerful way for an association intent on religious propaganda.¹¹

Braga errs badly when he attributed a sceptical attitude to Diogo; however, he correctly demonstrates that Diogo, who was a supporter of Parisian Scholasticism as far as education is concerned, made a great mistake in feeling some affinity with Ignatius, the mystic organizer and missionary. In spite of the confusion he introduces between Diogo's culture and that of his nephew André (the latter was actually a humanist), the picture painted by Braga is a good example of the dichotomy in the "secular" historiography of the subject: on one side were the Pyrrhonist humanists, basically liberal, and on the other the Jesuits, future masters of order, discipline and repression. Of course, the juxtaposition is too simple and does not explain the dizzying sequence of alliances, breaches, sensible matches and burning debates that forced Gouveia first to discredit his own nephew, and then to send before the Inquisition the *crème* of the teaching staff of his college and, in the end, destroy what he had created. But let us proceed in order.

Diogo de Gouveia was Ignatius's Principal and it may be that his acquaintance from 1528 to 1538 with this charismatic Basque and his spiritual exercises promoted in the master an indulgent attitude in his regard. It is very likely that Diogo de Gouveia's feelings went beyond a simple *benignidade*

(kindness), because he started nurturing altogether higher ambitions for his (now former) students.

We have three letters written between 1538 and 1540, a crucial time span for the Society moving towards its official constitution, that provide evidence of Diogo's diplomatic importuning of John III and Pedro Mascarenhas, the King's ambassador in Rome, so that the kingdom of Portugal might be made aware of the advantages offered by these *clerigos letrados* (learned clerics), especially in the evangelization of the Indies.

These letters, moreover, cast more light on the missionary attitude of the first Jesuits. Diogo de Gouveia wrote to John III on 17 February 1538, suggesting that the sovereign should contact a group of his former students from Sainte-Barbe and in particular Ignatius, Pierre Favre and the Portuguese Simão Rodrigues, perfect, according to him, for the evangelization of the American natives: "They are the right persons for this purpose and if his Royal Highness desires to do what He has always demonstrated, I believe that it is impossible to find anybody else better suited to convert all of India."¹²

Sainte-Barbe's Principal considered the newborn Society an essentially missionary instrument: he claimed that it was easier to convert the *Indians* than the *Moors* ("their hearts are kinder and less obstinate than those of the *Moros*") and he also deemed that the original purpose of Ignatius and his followers, to serve the Pope in the conversion of the Turks in Jerusalem, had to be adapted to the modern needs of evangelizing the peoples discovered in the New World. Gouveia's plan emphasized one of the initial vocations of the Society; this vocation was one of the strongest motivations for the many sons of aristocrats who in the first hundred years after its founding tried to join the Society. Gouveia did not consider these *clerigos letrados* a Counter-Reformation weapon in Europe, even though he had demonstrated a strong commitment against Lutheranism (and Erasmianism, which he considered the prelude to the Reformation).¹³

Pierre Favre, for one, was of a different opinion. Gouveia wrote to inform him about what he had recommended to John III. Favre replied to his old teacher on 23 November 1538, thanking him also in the name of his companions, and adding that he appreciated the idea of "working with your natives", but only the Pope was entitled to make the final decision:

We are at the disposal of the Supreme Pontiff and he will decide if we should leave or not, but a short time ago we were very close to being sent to the Indies that the Spaniards are subduing for the King: they had already talked with a Spanish bishop and with the royal ambassador, but they let us know that the Pope did not want us to go.¹⁴

Subsequently, Favre would be sent by Paul III, with Laínez and Salmerón, to the Council of Trent, but he died before reaching it.

John III, who was interested in Gouveia's project,¹⁵ wrote on 4 June 1539 to his ambassador to the Holy See, Pedro de Mascarenhas, asking him to

intercede with Paul III in order to confirm the institution and permit them to be sent to Portugal and then to the Indies.¹⁶ Mascarenhas answered the King on 10 March 1540, reassuring him about the conversation with the Pope and about the Jesuits' imminent mission. While Favre and Lainez were proceeding to Parma and then to Northern Europe,¹⁷ Ignatius appointed Francisco Xavier (in place of Bobadilla, who was indisposed) and Simão Rodrigues. The two arrived separately in Lisbon at the end of June. As we know, the former left promptly, paving the Society's way to the Indies,¹⁸ the latter remained in Portugal in order to found the Portuguese province, the first established by the Society.

In the meanwhile, Paul III, under pressure to convoke the Council, was concerned about the unstable political relations between Francis I and Charles V. The only completely neutral European power at that time was Portugal. John III cunningly struggled to maintain good relationships with Charles V, his brother-in-law, and with Francis I, the husband of his stepmother, Queen Eleanor, don Manuel's widow. For these reasons Paul III considered Portugal a valuable intermediary which could have defended him in case of conflict. Unsurprisingly, then, the Pope issued the bull *Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae* on 27 September 1540, in which he confirmed the Society. Three new companions had joined the first seven: Claude Jay, who had completed his studies at Saint-Barbe in 1535 and who was then sent to Austria; Pasquier Brouet, who helped to found the college at Clermont, later called *Louis-le-Grand* (in future this institution would absorb the old Sainte-Barbe); and the third, Jean Codure, who became Margaret of Parma's confessor for a short time (he died in 1541).

Only Francisco Xavier, one of the first ten companions, died in the Indies. Despite the explicit mention of the Indies in the *Formula* of 1540, they did not all share the idea of transforming their role in Jerusalem into a mission to distant territories. However, Xavier's enthusiastic commitment to the cause of evangelization and his *reportages* from India, Malabar and Japan created a literary genre that became, especially during the leadership of Claudio Acquaviva, an extraordinary weapon of propaganda and recruitment: "Sent to India in 1540 by Ignatius, who was acting upon a request from King John III of Portugal, Xavier wrote letters back to Europe that electrified his brethren and everyone else who read them with the extent of his travels and news of the strange places in which he labored."¹⁹

The original Society (the ten men named in the papal bull) with their different personalities, with opposing ideas and views about the future of the order, occasionally provoked real crises, such as the one between Ignatius and Simão Rodrigues discussed below. If the Society subsequently turned towards the missionary field and education, it was thanks to the political action of one man: Diogo de Gouveia, and the imprint imparted to the early members by the College of Sainte-Barbe.

The college in the Society's formative years, roughly between 1526 and 1539, was marked by a pronounced Portuguese presence (and by a specific

sense of identity that deserves to be highlighted): under Gouveia as principal, Sainte-Barbe became a Portuguese outpost within the Parisian university, a fundamental place where the citizens needed by John III as government officials and envoys to the colonies could be educated; but it also was an opportunity for the University of Paris, which, thanks to John III's fame, solidified its universal attraction for students and faculty, precisely at a time when it was being accused of obsolescence by humanists such as Erasmus and Vives (who dedicated his *In Pseudo-dialecticos* to the Parisian pedants). Between the mid-fifteenth and the end of the sixteenth century, the University of Paris underwent a major transformation: educational life increasingly became centred on the colleges and, at the same time, concentrated greater authority in the hands of the Rector of the university: "Concentration of teaching within the colleges, and a system for internal students: these are the two most distinctive traits of the Parisian formula. The result of this would be a third phenomenon, which became another distinctive trait of the Parisian method: the grip of the university on the colleges."²⁰ The moment in which this process and the shift towards a regime of internship became irreversible occurred at the time of Cardinal d'Estouteville's reform (1542), through which the university by means of the churchman's visitors and censors took on itself the full control of college life, its administration, discipline and teachings. As for its effect on Coimbra College and its most famous product, the philosophical *Cursus*, d'Estouteville's reform should not be underestimated, either from an administrative or management perspective, nor from that of didactic practices.

After this reform, the geography and educational characteristics of the Parisian colleges situated in the thickly populated *rive gauche* underwent a number of changes. First of all, Sainte-Barbe was one of the first colleges to be fully funded by the students' stipends: besides the scholarships established by King John III, Sainte-Barbe lacked subventions dating to its founder. *Estudiantes del Rey*, boarding pupils, and the so-called *martinets*²¹ formed the student body of the college, highly diverse in social status and nationality. The prevalence of Spaniards stoked the rivalry between the students of Sainte-Barbe and those of Montaigu (attended by Frenchmen and Flemings), greatly improved by Standonck's reforms at the beginning of the century.²²

Sainte-Barbe College was directed by a *Principalis* (the *Rector* was the corresponding figure in the Italian colleges and then in all the Jesuit institutions), but his power was softened and mediated by a series of functionaries (*officiales*, teachers, pedagogues) who staffed the school and with whom the Principal was not perfectly acquainted (especially in the case of *galoches* and *martinets*). Moreover, the *Principalis* was elected by the community of fellows receiving scholarships (a custom that was not adopted by the Society, which preferred to see the *Rector* chosen by the Superior General). The diffusion of internships and the regular allocation of teaching assignments in the classrooms – dating to the end of the fifteenth century – gradually weakened the excesses of the *rue du Fouarre*, where students from all the colleges

gathered to attend classes and, later, to obtain the bachelor's degree. The intemperance of student life and the consequent problems for public order led university legislators and reformers to pay obsessive attention to the supervision of students.²³ What an older educational historiography, perhaps misinterpreting Foucault, considered a Jesuit invention, namely "the rule of consciences" employed inside the *collegium* as a "total institution", should instead be connected to the organizational needs of the university a century before, no longer able to fulfil the designs of the royal families, for whom the *Studia* were a cultural expression and instrument. We must admit, however, that this explanation also contains some controversial elements. The excessive emphasis given to the procedures of "institutional informing" that were encouraged in the statutes of all the Parisian colleges similar to Sainte-Barbe, and to the modes of punishment (we have already seen one that Ignatius of Loyola managed to escape), suggests a division among teachers, *officiales* and students that does not wholly correspond to reality. First of all, the hierarchy of authority, even in a *Universitas magistrorum* such as that of Paris, does not prove in itself (and often prevents) the actual exercise of a moral *auctoritas* of teachers over their pupils: many sixteenth-century texts testify to the cruel jokes of students at the expense of their teachers, but also – just to stick to Jesuit educational history – show the reluctance or refusal by some of the Society's members to assume any teaching role in the colleges, because they feared possible harassment from the students (many of whom were noblemen).²⁴ The law is more often the sign of a violation than the opposite.

At the end of the fifteenth century, students were no longer those whose clashes had often covered the hill with the wounded and the dead. College discipline had had a beneficial influence on the habits of the young. None the less, the residues of hot tempers and indomitable savagery lingered on and emerged in quarrels and games.²⁵

Second, the clear division between the community of the student and that of the teacher unifies and simplifies a universe of small communities that were created by the teacher or the pedagogue with "his" circle of students, where roles became blurred in the long days of classes, games, pastimes and meals taken in common. The process towards the homogeneity of the college system and the "interiorization" of the educational life is recognizable, but we should not forget that the college was not in itself a socially homogenous entity.

As we saw, in addition to manners and morals, the *Principalis* had responsibility over and monitored religious opinions: we shall see below the problems that André de Gouveia, Diogo's nephew and his substitute in Sainte-Barbe for a short period, encountered because of theories too freely followed by some teachers in his college. The whole situation became particularly acute for the *Principalis* in the sixteenth century, when the teachings of Luther and Calvin (who had been student at Montaigu) began to circulate.

Among the various prohibitions recalled, e.g. by Antonio Possevino SJ in his *Coltura degl'ingegni* (1598), the college statutes insisted mainly on these: bringing weapons inside the building, gambling, wearing garments

other than the uniforms of the college. There is no mention about the prohibition of teaching on Sunday. Even though Sunday was consecrated to worship and rest, in the College of Sainte-Barbe, and in the University of Paris as a whole, it was possible to organize extra classes and exercises such as disputes and repetitions on that day: “Dominicis diebus, et martis, et jovis remissiones habeant; sint semper tamen lectiones, nec ulla dies, Apellis pictoris instar, absque linea transeat”, claims Goulet’s *Heptadogma*.²⁶

This tradition was especially important for the history of Coimbra College (before the Jesuits came), because the Inquisitorial trial faced by three former Sainte-Barbe teachers, Diogo de Teive, João da Costa and George Buchanan, included the accusation of teaching on feast days. The teachers admitted the charge, appealing to the Parisian tradition.

Coimbra maintained, with the arrival of the Jesuits, the annual schedule of the Parisian courses. Classes commenced, in fact, on 1 October, unlike Bologna, which started on Saint Luke’s day (18 October), while the summer *vacationes*, understandably, had to be slightly postponed. The daily timetable was a more complex matter, and Conimbricenses disagreed about it for a considerable time: waking at the fourth hour of the morning, which in Sainte-Barbe announced the beginning of classes for arts students (“Si fuerint artium lectiones, hora quinta incipiantur. Hora vero sexta praecise dicatur sacrificium”²⁷), followed by Mass and a “breakfast” (“detur portionistis jentaculum semipanis vel parvuli integri”), appeared to Conimbricenses detrimental to the students’ attention span during the other two hours of classes (from around eight to eleven o’clock in the morning), followed by disputes and repetitions (for one hour in Sainte-Barbe) before lunch. As a rule, Paris held afternoon classes from three to five o’clock, followed by *quaestiones* and *repetitiones* for another hour.

Reading the *modus parisiensis*, the teaching method offered in Sainte-Barbe and other colleges in the first half of the sixteenth century, more closely, we discern the pedagogical elements that will lead to the publication of the *Cursus Conimbricensis*. The medieval *lectio* by the teacher (which according to the Quintilian tradition should be called *praelectio* in order to distinguish it from the direct reading of the text by the student) had been subdivided into an introduction about the author (*praelectio*) and then an exposition and glossing (*expositio*) of the text, performed by the *magister* during the first section of the course. The reading would raise *quaestiones* from teacher and students, who would follow the *exposition* in the form of disputes and alternate exercises.

This is the crucial point of the *modus parisiensis*: the focus on exercising on the text rather than glossing it. *Disputationes*, *reparationes*, *repetitiones*, *variationes*; themes, i.e. *declamationes*, *themata*, *compositiones*; even plays and the so-called *enigmata*: in Sainte-Barbe, as in Paris, the prevalence of the system of exercises over listening to the teacher’s word contributed to put into practice the educational motto: *Usus, non praecepta*.

Exalted during Scholasticism, excogitated as an educational tool with their own specialized jargon and a code of diverse and complex practices, disputations remained the core of the *modus parisiensis* even into the sixteenth century, when humanists such as Erasmus, Vives, Ramus and Montaigne accused it of being basically unproductive and of fuelling the taste for useless subtleties. This practice was invented by the university and followed its destiny: all who were interested in the existence of the university and believed in its necessity knew, even during the period of humanism, that disputations were vital for the system. Among them we find outsiders such as Giordano Bruno, constantly on the move but searching for opportunities to dispute so as to measure himself against teachers throughout Europe; but also Juan Huarte de San Juan, the Spanish physician, author of *Examen de ingenios*, who was never admitted to any university faculty. Disputations can reasonably be defined the mainstay of Renaissance academic life. “La dispute était le moyen d’instruction le plus efficace qu’on connut. Aussi, à mesure qu’on avançait, prenait-elle une place plus grande dans les études.”²⁸

This explosion of educational practices (themes, variations and repetitions) in respect to the text – that from arts and theology later invaded courses in grammar and humanities – clearly posited a practical problem: the duration of the classes. This was the question that transformed first the Parisian and then the Jesuit academic world. It was necessary to strike a balance between textual exposition and exercises, so that the latter would not be detrimental to the learning process of the *Auctor*. During lunch and dinner, students constantly repeated lessons and this practice helped them in the memorization of the subject matter so that it could be used in the exercises.

The scheduling of the disputations (one hour or half an hour after class), the choice between the dictation of the *expositio* or its live enunciation by the teacher, the increase and distribution of exams over the entire year in addition to the traditional ritual of the degrees, the appearance and slow diffusion of the *classi* numbered in progression, the widespread circulation of *loci communes* and miscellanies containing excerpts from many authors for use by rhetoric and philosophy students: all these were the core issues in the development of the educational culture of the time. A good example is the discussion concerning the length of the arts course (three and a half years or less), but also – as we have already seen – with the placement of all classes and of scholastic life within the individual colleges, where a distinction will be made later between minor and major courses: this is what we could call the birth of the secondary school system.

Cardinal d’Estouteville’s reform intervened in favour of the prohibition of dictation, a policy already enforced for almost a century in the University of Paris:

Teachers are prohibited from reading the questions word by word: they should strive in their teaching so that they may be able to impart the lessons on their own, and teach enough to their students, whether dictating

or not, even though the old Statute forbids dictating. We exempt them from this rule; each teacher should create his own lesson, so that it seems the result of his own knowledge and personal research.²⁹

D'Estouteville thus confirmed and legitimized a practice that had not disappeared despite the prohibition.³⁰ Actually, the custom of dictation was destined to lapse in the next century: of course, the invention of printing with movable type changed books as objects and freed students from the affliction of having to copy, eradicating a *business* that meanwhile had increased in “classrooms”, but also because of pedagogical considerations. Possevino gives us examples of both processes:

Whoever took more pains to dictate the lessons to the students, than to judge the students in the aforesaid way of the ancients, fell into that failure to cultivate knowledge, to which we alluded just before: therefore while we busy ourselves copying and the teacher dictating, he too borrowing from the written word, which he carries about with him, he cannot by the spoken word (which, as St Jerome said, has some hidden energy) transform the subject matters in the ears of the students, and those who rely on so much copying, certainly incur great difficulties.

What are they: first, trusting more in writings than in understanding things, so that what is proclaimed in that simple but true verse often comes to pass: “When the paper falls, wisdom also falls ...”

It also follows thereby, that from Masters, and from Lecturers we take away the opportunity to treat subjects accurately, thus, whatever is the fountain so shall be the water that issues from it. Moreover, many slow down not only from the study of the best exegetes, and (what is more important) from the consideration of the text, but at the end having left school, it suffices to send them someone who copies the lectures, which they either never see, or, even if they cast a glance at them, remain without the profit of the repetitions, the disputations, the lectures; and, in conclusion, the seed lies in the granary on the surface of the earth, out of which being neither tilled, nor covered, what sort of crop can it hope to produce? [Qualunque attese più a dettare a' scolari le lettioni, che a iudicar gli scolari per la detta strada degli antichi, cadde in quel mancamiento della coltura degl'ingegni, la quale poco dianzi accennammo: percióché mentre si attende a scrivere, e il Maestro a dettare, togliendo anco esso dalle carte scritte, le quali per lo più porta con seco, non può con atto di viva voce (la quale, come disse S. Geronimo, ha non so che di nascosta energia) trasfondere negli orecchi de' discepoli le discipline: e coloro, i quali si appoggiano a tanto scrivere, certamente incorrono in molti inconvenienti.

Quali sono: Prima l'affidarsi più a' scritti, che all'apprendere le cose: laonde bene spesso segue ciò che in un semplice, ma vero verso si disse: “Cadde la carta, & cadde la sapienza ...”

Segue anco, che a' Maestri, e a' Lettori si toglie l'occasione di trattare delle materie accuratamente, laonde qual'è il fonte, tale conviene poi che sia l'acqua che ne deriva. Di più molti si rallentano non solo dallo studio de' migliori interpreti, e (quel che più importa) dalla consideratione del testo, ma al fine lasciate le scuole, basta loro mandare uno che copi le lettioni, le quali anco, o non veggono mai, o se pur danno loro un'occhiata, restano senza il frutto delle repetitioni, delle dispute, delle conferenze; e in somma giace il seme nel granaio sopra la superficie del terreno, il quale non essendo né arato, né dappoi coperto, quale ricolta potrà sperarsene?]³¹

Possevino, moreover, tells us that this was one of the reasons why the *Cursus Conimbricensis* was written and published:

To ours, certainly, to whom some continuous dedication to study has brought some information about this fact, every passing day begins to show us the necessity of a suitable temperament for this effort: and our Portuguese, who are in the principal universities in Portugal, since God has granted to them great diligence in the good arts and disciplines, and in instructing the Auditors, thus they have with great merit to the glory of who administers all true wisdom accomplished a large part of the philosophy course, and have printed it so as to do away with the labour of copying. There still remain in connection to this course for diligent minds large possibilities to perfect themselves and conduct exercises. [A' nostri certo, a' quali qualche continua professione de' studi ha apportato alcuna notitia di questo fatto, comincia di giorno in giorno più a mostrarsi la necessità di temperamento di tale fatica: e i Portughesi nostri, che sono nelle principali università di Portogallo, sì come Dio loro ha concesso molta diligenza nelle buone arti e discipline, e in instituir gli Auditori, così hanno con molto merito in gloria di chi somministra ogni vera sapienza fatto grande parte del corso della filosofia, et istampato per togliere la fatica dello scrivere; sopra il quale corso però resta a gl'ingegni diligenti larga materia per aguzzarsi, e per essercitarsi.]]³²

The same happened with the system of classes based on competence levels, introduced at first by Montaigu College (where they were called *regulae* or *lectiones*).³³ The structure at Montaigu consisted of seven classes, each of which was assigned its textbooks by statute, in a progression that, according to Codina Mir, is the true distinguishing element of the *modus parisiensis* in the organization of studies.

This system of classes did not apply in philosophical courses, even in those colleges where philosophy was taught: classes came into being as a subdivision of the teachings of grammar and rhetoric, on the basis of a principle of their growing complexity. Each class had a teacher. Around 1537 there were ten classes in Sainte-Barbe, including classes in literature and writing.

According to the usage at Montaigu, the classification followed a reverse numbering, where the first class corresponded to rhetoric. We shall see below how the slippage of arts towards the lower courses led to the inclusion of the teaching of philosophy within the system (this also happened in Guyenne and then in Coimbra). This progressive method adopted in Montaigu and then diffused throughout Europe thanks to the Jesuits, made necessary the elaboration of a corresponding system of tests and promotions between levels, beyond the final certification with which a student could accede to philosophy and beyond the bachelorship, which allowed access to the higher faculties. From this followed the diffusion of the “exam” that could be annual, biannual or weekly.³⁴ Before the sixteenth century there were no actual pass/fail examinations, but they served in the same manner as the exercises in debating and disputation, as checks on each student’s actual progress. From Standonck on, instead, we can begin to talk about real exams leading to promotions. In addition, it might also occur that examination results might be transformed into a merit ranking (recorded on apposite *rotuli* (rolls), as it was for doctoral grades) that corresponded to a different physical position of the individual student within the class. The specific definition of the competence level of students had thus become, in Parisian colleges during the sixteenth century, an indication of the quality of teaching. This was the purpose of the college admission examination or the examination for admission to the philosophical course, in which the student was severely tested on his competence *in grammaticalibus*: a well-known victim of this process was Ignatius de Loyola, who, after he arrived in Paris, was rejected and forced to undergo a year of rudimentary grammatical study.³⁵

Grammar leads us to the last significant issue concerning the Parisian colleges during the sixteenth century: the connection between the minor disciplines and the length of the philosophical course. The *Modus parisiensis* generally called for a length of study of three and a half years, during which a student attended lectures in logic, dialectics, ethics (in the first two years) and physics (in the last year and a half). Colleges like Sainte-Barbe offered many grammar and rhetoric courses, followed by just as many philosophy courses, in addition to public lectures, open to all students and even outsiders. Greek, mathematics and theology might be among the subjects offered. The attendance at courses can be seen as a pyramid: from the lowest classes of grammar (very popular) to arts degrees (few awarded). philosophy was the focal point, and even though it was described as “the discipline of all disciplines” it was, as a matter of fact, an obstacle (sometimes insurmountable) in the path of the student.

The problem emerged at the time “humanist” culture began to penetrate the universities. Such men as Erasmus and Vives did not only attack the disputation as a didactic tool or the presence of counter-educational practices in the colleges, but they questioned the entire curriculum to its core, the epistemological function of dialectics, deemed inappropriate for a society entering the so-called *âge de l'éloquence*. More and more people considered a three-year

course in philosophy exaggerated, especially since it consisted primarily of copying out dictations and attending countless captious disputations. Sainte-Barbe began to sense the rising tide of this intellectual current in about 1540, when Diogo de Gouveia the Elder reclaimed his position as Principal, after ten years in which his nephews André de Gouveia and Diogo de Gouveia the Younger had held the post. It was a philosopher from Sainte-Barbe, Nicolas de Martimbos, elected Dean of the university on 6 July 1540,³⁶ who suggested a one-year reduction in the philosophy course, unleashing strong reactions leading to the famous debate between Antonio de Gouveia and Peter Ramus:

It was a Gouveia's idea. We know that André had already put it in practice in the College of Guyenne, and that Diogo the younger had already outlined it in his plan for a reform of the Academy.³⁷

Martimbos, promoter of a Gallican reform that had accepted some of Calvin's ideas³⁸ (who himself had been a student at Sainte-Barbe³⁹ before moving on to Montaigu), struck a blow in support of the humanists' criticisms aiming at the drastic reduction of disputations scheduled for the school year. The text and its explication should be the centre of the class: "It is certain that condensing in two years the classes which last three, will result in spending all the time in teaching the necessary subjects, and no time will remain for disputing and *quodlibets*."⁴⁰

The proposal was accepted so broadly that the Faculty of Theology had to appeal to the city's Parliament, to avoid the overturning of the traditional curriculum. The discussion within the university soon turned into a debate over the educational freedom of the Faculties, and theologians failed to obtain the majority during the Assembly convoked to deal with the issue. Finally the Assembly decreed the reform of the philosophical course in accord with Martimbos's proposal even though the theologians' appeal threatened to annul it. In this period, Peter Ramus published two treatises against the logic being taught on the basis of Aristotle's *Organon*, triggering a general reaction in the academic world and, in particular, arousing theologians' indignation. Ramus's attack on Aristotelian logic was understood as a product of the same culture that had shortened the philosophy course by a year and, in general, was considered hostile to the university itself. Thus, the decree, which had already been promulgated, now lacked the initial motivation that had made it possible, and Martimbos's reform "was relegated for a half of a century more among the number of the dangerous utopias".⁴¹ Ramus's provocative act, at any rate, went forward to the point of catching the interest of Francis I, who, at Bishop Duchastel's suggestion, convened the famous debate mentioned above: Ramus, along with Jean de Bomont and Jean Quintin, versus Antonio de Gouveia with Pierre Dannès and Francesco Vimercati. Ramus withdrew on the third day and Antonio de Gouveia returned to Sainte-Barbe in full glory, welcomed as Aristotle's saviour, honoured and celebrated at the expense of the Faculty of Arts.⁴²

The two Gouveias were therefore decisive in determining the future direction of Sainte-Barbe. The quality of the teachers and students (among the former we should remember Latomus, Cordier, George Buchanan, Postel, Strebèe and Fernel) was guaranteed thanks to the person who replaced Diogo de Gouveia the Elder, the aforementioned André. Unlike his uncle, he demonstrated a particularly “modern” and liberal attitude in directing the college, as his further responsibilities in Bordeaux and in Coimbra would confirm. André replaced Diogo *de facto* during the early thirties, when his uncle was engaged in his diplomatic work for John III.⁴³ The disagreement between uncle and nephew probably dates to that time: André did not agree with Diogo’s ideological approach, because for the former Scholastic theology was an impoverished inheritance of the medieval university. The salient moments of his career as Principal are not sufficiently documented, except indirectly: for example, through the quality and notoriety of students and teachers during those years, as well as in the measures André later adopted as Principal of the Guyenne College. However, in a letter of 11 July 1537, to Fernandes de Almada, where he described his cultural approach to teaching and the order of the disciplines he would have followed in Bordeaux, he declared that he counterposed “a theology which one learns through Holy Scripture and the Holy Doctors of the Church” (the reference to Diogo is clear) to “his sophistic theology which one learns through Tartaretus and Durand”.⁴⁴

We have interesting testimony (often quoted in local historiography) about the situation of Guyenne College while André was there. It comes from Michel de Montaigne. In his *Essais*, in the course of recounting his father’s educational failures in his regard, he recalled that, after some unusual attempts to teach Greek and Latin – which today would be called “progressive” – “he sent me when I was about six, to the Collège de Guyenne, which was then very flourishing and the best in France”.⁴⁵ Historiography (not just the provincial variety) leads us to the conclusion that Montaigne, who at the time was also mayor of Bordeaux, exaggerated his scholastic experience.⁴⁶ It is true that Guyenne College was created thanks to the migration of teachers, especially from Sainte-Barbe, attracted by Gouveia’s authority, by Mathurin Cordier’s friendship (the first person whom Gouveia had persuaded to come) and by the promise of funds from the wealthy city of Bordeaux. It is also true, as we shall see, that Gouveia created a programme and a statute that was indebted to the best practices of Sainte-Barbe, but tested in a monopolistic educational regime that André proposed to the Bordelaises as a precondition for his employment. However, it has to be said that Montaigne’s writing is always double-edged and his praises for the college are aimed at confirming the inadequacy of the collegial model.

My Latin promptly degenerated, and since then, for lack of practice, I have lost all use of it. And all this novel education of mine did for me was to make me skip immediately to the upper classes; for when I left the

school at thirteen, I had finished my course (as they call it), and in truth without any benefit that I can place in evidence now.⁴⁷

These pages are precious because they list all the young Montaigne's teachers in Bordeaux, and relate his positive opinion for Gouveia:

I played the leading parts in the Latin tragedies of Buchanan, Guerente, and Muret, which were performed with dignity in our Collège de Guyenne. In this matter, as in all other parts of his job, Andreas Goveanus, our principal, was incomparably the greatest principal of France.⁴⁸

What are some of the features of Sainte-Barbe that André replicated at Guyenne? Those which he could test far from Paris, where the university's hold on the varied and very competitive universe of colleges had hindered their development? Beyond the standard historiography,⁴⁹ we have the Guyenne programme of study and the statute drawn up by André de Gouveia, collected and published by Élie Vinet in 1583 (with the authorization, among other city authorities, of Michel de Montaigne, *Regii ordinis Eques, Major*).⁵⁰

In the Introduction, Vinet recalls André de Gouveia as "homo ad juventutem recte instituendam factus" (a man made by nature to educate youth): having contacted Mathurin Cordier, Claude Budin and, thanks to them, other teachers "ejusdem rei peritissimi" (everyone perfectly skilled in his field), he organized his college with the best rules "et exacta ratione docendi informaverat" (and provided it with a perfect plan of studies). Thanks to the programme, which was published fifty years after Gouveia's term as Principal and thus may include some inaccuracies,⁵¹ we know that the College of Guyenne was structured like a boarding school, consisted of ten grammar and rhetoric classes, limited the philosophy course to two years and had on its faculty two public professors who taught Greek and mathematics. Thus, Gouveia had opened a college that offered (primarily in French) the rudiments of grammar to boys (*pueri*), the only ones who were not obliged to speak Latin. And in French (until the second class) weekly themes were offered ("Sabbatho, proponitur pueris thema Gallicum ex Epistolis Ciceronis"). Montaigne confirms this, claiming that, before college, he had known only Latin:

If as a test they wanted to give me a theme in the manner of the school, it was given to the others in French, but to me it was given in bad Latin, which I had to turn into good.⁵²

When the grammar classes ended (in the first year the course opened with rhetoric), students entered the two-year course of philosophy. In Vinet we have some interesting information about the Aristotelian texts, which (with only one exception) we shall find again in Coimbra and in the *Cursus*:

There are two philosophy tutors and they teach students who have completed the grammar course and seem inclined to this discipline. They end in two years. In the first year they are called, together with the students, *Dialectici* or *Logici*, in the second year *Physici*, thanks to the name of the discipline studied. They start from Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Then they add Aristotle's *Categories*, *Peri Hermeneias*, both the *Analytics*, the *Topics*, *Sofistica Elenchoi*, *Physics*, the *De Coelo*, and other things that are usually studied in philosophical schools. Nothing but Aristotle, except Porphyry's introduction that I have already mentioned and Nicholas Grouchy's precepts of *Dialectics*; unless somebody wants to start his course from the beautiful and learned compendium of the work that was called by ancients *Organon*, and which has been made for the adolescents of the philosophical course.⁵³

A detailed regulation of exercises follows: themes and disputations (culminating with the *Ludovicalia* on 25 August) remained the main Parisian elements in the educational system of Guyenne, in addition to the exams for promotion from one class to another. There are two aspects in Gouveia's direction of the college that are specific to him: Vinet highlighted, predictably, that the Principal had carefully sought out the best teachers in France, not only for their scholarship but also for their morals; he noticed also that the Principal wanted every teacher to feel he was of the same rank as the others, so that they would all have equal authority in class. This measure established order not only in the world of students and teachers, but also among the pedagogues who swarmed (out of control) inside the Parisian colleges, making it difficult for the Principal to exercise his authority. Gouveia's Statute admonished: "Paedagogi pueros suos in officio contineant" (Educators should keep pupils constrained to their office). And also: "They should not teach or give anything to study but the things that have already been taught at school. Otherwise, they will confuse, weigh down and overwhelm children's talents, and, above all, they will destroy what learned instructors had previously built, which is the worst of the things."⁵⁴

Gouveia's reforms in Bordeaux did not necessarily fully correspond to the Sainte-Barbe tradition. More precisely, Gouveia's experimentations in Guyenne tested some practices traceable in some way to Sainte-Barbe, but not necessarily its strictest tradition.

The general definition "*modus parisiensis*" risks overshadowing the important differences in the management styles of each individual and in the various periods in the life of each institution, especially in the case of Sainte-Barbe. André's and Diogo the Elder's directorships diverged in some main points, including the length of the philosophical course. This is the main element in the attempt to distinguish between them: Diogo was more traditional and Scholastic; André was open to the inspiration of northern humanism (Erasmus, Budé, Ramus).⁵⁵ The philosophy course continued to be shortened

or extended on the basis of the humanists' anti-dialectical demands and the conservative reactions coming from the universities.

The evolution of the relationship between uncle and nephew has not been clarified up to this point in all its particulars: Diogo, preoccupied with diplomatic concerns, summoned André to replace him, and under the latter's direction the college grew, despite some unpleasant episodes of a religious sort.⁵⁶ In spite of Mário Brandão's detailed reconstruction of events, the reasons that impelled André towards Bordeaux, aside from the economic and religious, have not been explained, nor whether Diogo played an active part in the matter (and what his role might have been). The same lacunae exist concerning André's move from Bordeaux to Coimbra, when he was called by John III to manage the new royal college: did the King prefer him to his uncle? Did the selection cause a rift in this already tense relationship? Brandão's reconstruction is based on the premise that Diogo's disaffection with his nephew, provoked by André's Erasmianism, which Diogo opposed from both a religious and cultural point of view, turned into a real grudge when André moved to Bordeaux: "André de Gouveia's departure from Sainte-Barbe finally turned the old doctor's aversion into inextinguishable hatred."⁵⁷ The Bordeaux college would thus become a rival of Sainte-Barbe's and, because of the departure of the best teachers together with André, Diogo's college promptly began to decline. Brandão's theories about Diogo's hatred for his nephew over their cultural and ideological differences are not convincing: why did Diogo, during his absences, ask André to replace him in Sainte-Barbe? He had other choices inside his own family, after all. Clearly, the matter cannot be confined to the vicissitude of two scholastic principals in the sixteenth century: finding an answer would entail progressing in our study of the two cultures inherent to Sainte-Barbe's, represented by the two Gouveias.

Between these two cultures, John III chose André's⁵⁸ for the College of Arts in Coimbra, created by the King, obviously inspired by the experience of the *Collège Royal*, founded by Francis I at the urging of Guillaume Budé, to give an impulse to the recent reform of the university.

John III began to think about founding a new College of Humanities about the year 1543, clearly because of his dissatisfaction with the teaching provided in the university and monastery of St Cruz. André de Gouveia, Principal of the Guyenne College, enjoyed a good reputation: the Bordeaux college had recovered from the economic problems left behind by the former Principal, Jean Tartas, and many students now attended its classes. The teachers were renowned, even though their religious views were sometimes suspected or even openly questioned. Many of them enjoyed vast popularity among the students: Nicolas de Grouchy, whom Montaigne mentioned as the famous author of *De comitiis Romanorum*, although he is best known for his translations of Aristotle's work (he basically corrected Périon's version), Guillaume Guerente, George Buchanan, Élie Vinet and João Gélida (who would become Gouveia's successor as Principal in Guyenne).⁵⁹ *Sub-principalis* was João da Costa, who together

with Diogo de Teive and Buchanan underwent a famous trial at the hands of the Portuguese Inquisition. Despite all the innuendos and suspicions concerning the teachers' orthodoxy in Guyenne, certainly fanned by Diogo de Gouveia the Elder and by other Portuguese,⁶⁰ John III began to negotiate his return with André. Diogo was deeply vexed by this: on 3 February 1544, he wrote to the King denouncing his nephew as a thief and heretic, and proposing Diogo Jr, who was the other, "more reliable" nephew who had directed Sainte-Barbe for a short time. André twice travelled to Portugal (1543, 1546)⁶¹ to discuss his employment and the recruitment of other teachers. He dealt actively with the Bordeaux Parliament to facilitate the transfer of its best teachers. On 21 January 1547, Gouveia made his final attempt to "steal" Gélida from Guyenne, but the opposition from that quarter and resistance from Bordeaux prevented it.

In March of that year, two groups of teachers left France for Coimbra: Buchanan, Arnaldo Fabricio, Grouchy and Guérente in the first, João da Costa, Diogo de Teive, Antonio Mendes and Vinet in the second.

Situated in the lower city, on Santa Sofia street, the *Real Colégio das Artes* inaugurated its classes on 21 February 1548, with an allocution by Arnaldo Fabricio. According to Brandão and Gomes dos Santo, "there were two kinds of high expectations about the Bordeaux teachers: the reputation of these teachers' scientific proficiency and the news about their reform tendencies".⁶² The long delay caused a boom in applications (as we shall see, the register of first-year students was a feature of the *mos italicus* followed in Coimbra); on 30 April 1548, the *sub-principalis* João da Costa wrote: "they are already more than one thousand, and a day does not pass that someone doesn't asks for admission".⁶³

The reform tendencies themselves, which concerned both a specific educational method and the humanist culture emanating from Bordeaux, precipitated a sudden crisis among the teachers of the college. André de Gouveia died the same year as the inauguration (obstinately refusing the last rites it was reported during the trial of João da Costa) and the teachers divided in factions, pitting *bordolenses* against *parisienses*.⁶⁴ The struggle ended with the flight of the former and the Inquisitorial trial against João da Costa, George Buchanan and Diogo de Teive. The history of these three proceedings has already been written and documented by Brandão.⁶⁵ For our purpose, it is worth noticing that the instigators of the trial are not known: Braga is certain that they were Simão Rodrigues and the Jesuits, but they are cleared, at least seemingly, by the judicial documents in which the declarations made by members of the Society do not support the thesis that they intended to take over the College of Arts. Henriques, transcribing the trial records at the beginning of the twentieth century, asked himself: "Who was the real promoter of the proceedings against Buchanan?" and he answered blaming the Dominican Joam Pinheiro and Diogo de Gouveia the Elder. As evidences, Henriques presented the depositions made by the indicted:

Pinheiro, in Costa's opinion, was but an instrument; the real enemy was Diogo de Gouveia, furious at having been dismissed from the post of Principal of the College at Coimbra, and thirsting to be revenged upon his successor. Gouveia, says Costa, was quite cunning enough to pull the strings without letting himself be seen. ... In another part of the Records, Teive, now almost furious, again attributes everything to Diogo de Gouveia, the Elder, and to his hatred of his nephew André; adding that the aged Principal had threatened him (Teive) and Costa, that he would kill them, and had even gone to the extent of taking a sword under his gown, for that purpose, when he went to the College.⁶⁶

The trial, which was not short of safeguards for Buchanan in particular, ended on 29 July 1551, with the abjurations of all the indicted. They had been confined in monasteries and then freed. João da Costa and Diogo de Teive returned to the College of Arts, Buchanan went back to France and ended up in Scotland, where he embraced the Reformation.

What did Bordeaux "reformism" mean at that time in Coimbra? Which facts or attitudes of the teachers coming from Guyenne supported the battle of the *parisienses* to elect as Principal one of Sainte-Barbe's old scholarship holders, Paio Rodrigues de Villarinho, thereby confirming their dominance over the direction of the Royal College? There is no doubt that, if we interpret "reformism" as a different curriculum in grammar, rhetoric and arts, the culture of Bordeaux had been marked by André de Gouveia's directorship, consistent with the most progressive currents of the Parisian *Collège Royal*. However, this clashed with the Conimbric reality, less inclined to question the traditional educational system (with a Parisian imprint). On 16 September 1547, John III published the *primeiro Regimento*⁶⁷ of the *Colégio das Artes*, while the teachers were occupied in a strenuous journey through Castile to reach Coimbra. In this statute the King established, "à la manière de Sainte-Barbe", as we are told by Quicherat, that the college should function in the manner of the colleges in which students paid: the structure had to support itself with the fees of the boarding students. The *Regimento* also took into consideration "external" students, and among them those Jesuits who attended the newly founded Jesus College in the upper city. As in the Guyenne statutes drawn up by Gouveia, even in Coimbra the Principal held absolute educational and juridical power over the direction of the college. This official was employed by the university but exempted from its jurisdiction:⁶⁸ he directly organized the teaching, scheduled the timetables for the classes and appointed instructors at his pleasure, *à son gré*.⁶⁹

The *Regimento* called for eight teachers in reading, writing and Latin rudiments; eight in grammar, rhetoric and poetry; one each in Greek, Hebrew and mathematics and three in arts. André de Gouveia had obtained from John III a clause calling for a monopoly in education: the *Regimento* banned all the other schools except for the instruction in Hebrew, mathematics, Greek and

moral philosophy, held at the university, and the courses in which the members of religious orders taught within their convents.

André de Gouveia published the College Statutes in 1548, which included the three-and-a-half-year extension for the arts course, without trying to reduce it to two years as he had done in Guyenne. A new attempt to do so, however, took place between 1549 and 1550, and we may suppose it was done out of respect to the deceased André, but the cut concerned only the six months after the third year, and by the next year this cut was abolished. Even in Coimbra Gouveia played the role of “principal innovator” and he gave special importance to the institution of exams, especially in regard to confirming Latin sufficiency (*sufficiencia*). In 1548 a royal decree imposed attendance of the first two years of college as a prerequisite for enrolment in the Faculty of Canon and Civil Law:

No one can be admitted to the Law or Canon Law without the written declaration by the Principal of the College of Arts, attesting that the student has attended a year of Logic; similarly, nobody is to be admitted to Theology or Medicine without a certificate from the Principal attesting that he has attended an entire course of Arts in the aforesaid College.⁷⁰

The prior attendance in the College of Arts before enrolment in the major courses, legitimated by an enduring juridical concern until the reign of King Philip, overturned the relationship between the college itself and the university: the college in effect became the real educational centre in Coimbra.

This process fitted in with the more general picture of the birth of the secondary school and of the demand for more autonomy from the university sought by the minor courses in Paris and in Coimbra. Diogo the Elder himself, questioned by John III in 1544 about the statutes of the University of Paris, wrote to the King: “According to what I have seen, I think it would be a very good thing to separate the Faculty of Canon Law and Law from the Faculty of Arts: the first is magnificent and grand, the Arts, on the other hand, are much frequented but very poor.”⁷¹ During the sixteenth century, this transformation did not occur without conflicts and ambiguities, especially in Coimbra. Having secured the monopoly over the secondary school system for the college of *Mestre André* and after establishing the requirement of compulsory attendance at the courses taught there, the Rector of the University of Coimbra found himself *de facto* a Principal in the academic body with absolute power over the student body enrolled in the major courses.

Despite the partisan enthusiasm with which Teófilo Braga treated the eight years of the college’s life (before it was turned over to the Jesuits), the path towards the juridical privilege of the college and the seeds of contention between the university and the college were sown precisely here. Subsequently, the Society of Jesus continued playing the legal card to reaffirm the centrality of the minor courses that André de Gouveia had established for them. As a matter of fact, the problem was not only a didactic one: for some fifty years,

it would also include a concern about income and the economic support of which the college was in constant need in view of the growing educational demand; also at stake was the privileged position of the university, which strove with all its might to prevent the financial restrictions imposed by the kings, including those who followed John III, for the support of the minor courses.

André was a shrewd Principal, capable of using to the advantage of the college (whose construction was assigned to Diogo de Castilho) John III's esteem for the teachers from Bordeaux. When André died (9 June 1549), his position was given to Diogo de Gouveia the Younger⁷² for a short period. He was dismissed after a few months because he was unable to reconcile the contending factions.⁷³ João da Costa succeeded him, but on 19 October 1549, the Portuguese Inquisition (lead by *Cardinal-Infante* Henrique), began the inquiry that would accuse him of holding erroneous doctrinal views. On 8 November, João da Costa, foreseeing the Rector's and the academic staff's hostility in regard to complete autonomy, achieved the incorporation of the college with the university and a new *Regimento*.⁷⁴ On 18 November, John III ordered the Dean, Diogo de Murça, to make a visitation to the college every six months. In the meantime, the atmosphere of innuendos and suspicions surrounding the Bordeaux teachers became unbearable and in the same year Arnaldo Fabrício and Élie Vinet, followed by Grouchy and Guerente, left Coimbra and returned to France. João da Costa, Diogo de Teive and George Buchanan remained and on 15 August 1550 were jailed in Torre do Tombo. The trial made manifest, aside from the theological issues (for example the defendants' disapproval of monastic life, a point held in common with the Protestant world), a web of conflicts only set free by the final abjuration: the internecine struggles within the college, the competition of the Society of Jesus which was teaching in the upper city, the conflict for powers and privileges with the university represented by Diogo de Murça.

On 2 May 1551, the role of Principal was finally awarded to a *parisiensis*, Payo Rodrigues de Villarinho, "homem de confiança do rei"⁷⁵ but also Diogo de Gouveia's representative⁷⁶ and special commissioner of the college from December 1550. Beginning in January 1551, the King had already exempted the college from the Rector's semi-annual visit. During Villarinho's directorship a new *Regimento* was written: it was dated 20 May 1552 and listed the disciplines that had to be taught in the arts course and the texts that had to be studied. Contrary to what Braga has stated, this document did not present particular novelties in the general picture of the philosophical teaching of Aristotle in the European colleges,⁷⁷ but it is interesting because it restored the three-and-a-half-year course and because of the modalities it prescribed for the teaching procedures.

The aforementioned teachers should mainly follow the interpretations of the Latins and the different issues and doubts that the different interpreters give to the text: so that the students can better understand

what they hear and can better practice in the *academiae* and disputations carried out upon the lessons. ... The teachers of the second and third year, on Tuesdays and Thursdays or during the evening lesson, should read in their class at the same time as the other teachers, each one in his classroom; after an hour the porter will give a signal with the bell so that teachers will stop reading and will assemble with their students in a common room, assigned to the disputations of the Artists, and here they will dispute for an hour in the following way: a second year-student introduces an argument from the topic to be disputed to another student: the latter will recite a chapter or two of Aristotle's *Logic*, according to what the teacher has asked him, and after this repetition, the second student will answer the proposition that had been placed before him at the start; and then the third-year teacher, teachers and all graduate students who want to dispute can discuss the same issue. Similarly, on the other day of disputation, a third-year student will repeat and answer on the *Natural Philosophy*, and against him another student and the second-year teacher will dispute, but also any other teachers and graduate students who would like to join the disputation. In this way and in this order the first-year teacher will enter with his students from Easter on and he will be the first to dispute after Easter, then he will dispute against the second-year teacher and then against the third-year teacher. In this way he will dispute every day for the whole period in which the disputations are held.⁷⁸

Finally, it is interesting to note the clause by means of which the 1552 *Regimento* imposed on teachers the Aristotelian translation that was chosen by the Principal. Since the flowering of editions and translations of the *Corpus* during the second half of the sixteenth century was vast and diverse, choosing a translation meant establishing which Aristotle, among the many, would be taught. Villarinho's directorship had to face the problem of the diaspora of the Bordeaux teachers who had left the college, and the resulting financial problems that the crown would have to face to cover the new teachers' salaries. These expenses were one of the causes that persuaded John III to turn the management of the college over to the Society of Jesus, which, unlike the secular teachers, taught without compensation. The short-lived directorship of Diogo de Teive, who returned to Coimbra after the difficult period of the Inquisitorial trial and replaced Villarinho, corresponded to the final phase in the life of the *Colégio Real*. On 10 September 1555, the King appointed Leão Henriques, former *Rector* of Jesus College, as Principal of the College of Arts. Jesuits thus made their entrance in an illustrious college, founded on the tradition of Sainte-Barbe which they knew well, but possessing a progressive educational character, that of André de Gouveia and Guyenne, which had left indelible marks on the arts course.

Notes

- 1 Cf. M. Brandão, *A Inquisição e os professores do Colégio das Artes*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1948.
- 2 According to Codina Mir, Cardinal Cisneros grounded the Statutes of the University of Alcalà on the *modus parisiensis*: “L’Université de Cisneros constitue une fondation unique dans son genre, tranchant par son caractère avec toute la tradition des autres Universités hispaniques, en particulier celle de Salamanque. Alors que celle-ci suivent l’archétype bolonais, Alcalá relève de la tradition parisienne, cette filiation étant pourtant mêlée de certains éléments de la plus pure empreinte espagnole, qui lui confèrent une puissante originalité. Cisneros ne cache pas dans ses Constitutions le modèle dont il s’est inspiré avant toute autre: ‘... in hac Universitate, quae ad imaginem scholae Parisiensis instituta est’.” G. Codina Mir, *Aux sources de la pédagogie des Jésuites. Le “modus parisiensis”*, Rome: IHSI, 1968, p. 18.
- 3 After he arrived in Paris, Ignatius, who was very poor, lived in the hospital of St Jacques and attended Montaigu College to study the humanities; aware that he lacked the basics, he studied “with the children following the Parisian method”. Ignatius of Loyola, *Racconto di un pellegrino*, Rome: Città Nuova, 2004, p. 120.
- 4 Ignatius of Loyola, *Racconto di un pellegrino*, pp. 123–124. See also Ribadeneira, *Vita Ignatii* (ch. VI), and J. Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe: collège, communauté, institution*, Paris, 1860, pp. 192–194.
- 5 Thus stated his epitaph in Lisbon Cathedral, although it is not confirmed by Du Boulay (C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris 1670). Cf. Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 123, and Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 40.
- 6 Erasmus dedicated his *Chrysostomi Lucubrationes* of 1527 to John III. Cf. M. Bataillon, *Études sur le Portugal au temps de l’humanisme*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1952.
- 7 Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 34.
- 8 “Diogo de Gouveia Sénior, que em poucos anos erguera Santa Bárbara à categoria de um dos melhores colégios parisiensies, buscou assegurar-lhe a prosperidade transformando-a numa verdadeira escola oficial portuguesa, destinada à preparação, nos estudos de humanidades e artes, de futuros teólogos, de acordo com o sonho de ainda um dia ver em Paris uma ‘fundação’ para os estudantes portugueses da ciência sagrada.” Ibid., p. 145.
- 9 Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, pp. 127–128. Quicherat emphasized the special friendship Gouveia had for the Jesuits: “L’avantage le plus direct que le compagnons d’Ignace de Loyola aient retiré de leur séjour à Sainte-Barbe fut l’amitié de Jacques [Diogo] de Gouvêa” (p. 202).
- 10 John W. O’Malley has clarified and partly corrected Codina Mir’s view that the *modus parisiensis* is nearly identical to the “Jesuit way”, emphasizing the role of the Roman College and its practices in Jesuit education. He did not, however, deny the French influence on early Jesuit education, also in Messina. J. W. O’Malley, *The First Jesuits*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 215.
- 11 T. Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra nas suas relações com a instrução publica portuguesa*, vol. II, 1555–1700, Lisbon 1825, pp. 11–12.
- 12 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (henceforth ARSI), *Monumenta Ignatiana*, I (16), pp. 132–134. Cf. S. Leite, *Cartas dos primeiros jesuítas do Brasil: 1538–1553*, São Paulo: Comissão do IV centenário da cidade de São Paulo, 1954, I, p. 95, and P. R. Hernandez, “A Companhia de Jesus no século XVI e o Brasil”, *Revista HISTEDBR On-line*, 40 (2010), p. 227.
- 13 As we shall see, the one who paid the price for Diogo’s attitude would be the nephew, André himself, when he was tried by the Inquisition together with other Coimbra College teachers, before it was turned over to the Jesuits. Diogo Barbos,

in his *Bibliotheca Lusitana* (I, p. 656), states that Gouveia had written a manuscript treaty against Luther's errors.

- 14 Leite, *Cartas dos primeiros jesuítas*, p. 100.
- 15 Braga states: "Como foi levado o rei a este acto quasi de fundação, estando até esse tempo preocupado ardentemente para conseguir o estabelecimento da Inquisição? Sabe-se que D. João III tinha uma absoluta confiança em cousas de religião e de ensino no velho Doutor Diogo de Gouvêa, e este exaltado inimigo do protestantismo, Principal do Collegio de Santa Barbara, onde tivera por discipulos os instituidores da Companhia, recommendou-os por uma fôrma calorosa a D. João III, pedindo-lhe a cooperação do seu valimento soberano. É natural que levasse o rei pela idéa das missões na India." *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 16.
- 16 Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu (henceforth MHSI), *Monumenta Ignatiana*, I, Appendix I, pp. 737–739.
- 17 Having travelled to Parma with Cardinal Filonardi, Favre would go to Germany and only later visited Coimbra, in 1543, going from Louvain to Madrid, via Lisbon. Cf. P. Favre, *Mémorial*, ed. M. De Certeau, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2006.
- 18 Francis Xavier left for the Indies on 7 April 1541.
- 19 O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, p. 30.
- 20 Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 59.
- 21 The college students were not only fellows with a scholarship and boarding students, but also *cameristi* who enjoyed a room and kitchen use, and were attached to a preceptor, in groups of five or six. External students were *martinets* (as was Ignatius in Sainte-Barbe at the beginning), who met the Principal only when they received their degree or other certification, or *galoches*, "free" students uninterested in the final certification, often adults or elderly men. Cf. Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, pp. 74–75.
- 22 The influence of the *brethren* and of Flemish culture of the *devotio moderna* on Standonck has been widely studied. The reforms in Montaigu borrowed heavily from the statutes of Sainte-Barbe and, while Standonck was still alive, the competition between the two colleges did not prevent reciprocal attendance at classes. Under Diogo de Gouveia, instead, there were strong tensions, lawsuits and real clashes, in part also because the two colleges were on the same street.
- 23 "La surveillance serrée à laquelle Collèges et écoliers sont soumis à cet egard est quelque chose de très caractéristique de la manière de Paris. Outre les visiteurs ou réformateurs nommés d'office par l'Université pour se renseigner sur la bonne marche des Collèges, chaque Principal est tenu de contrôler, personnellement ou par d'autres, l'état de son établissement" (Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, pp. 64–65). D'Estouteville stated in 1452: "Iniungimus, & autoritate Apostolica committimus atque mandamus, ut singula Collegia atque Pedagogia, in quibus commorantur Artistae, visitent, ibique sedulo ac diligenter inquirant, quae sit vitae & conversationis honestas, quae communitas victus, quae docendi solertia, quae regendi modestia, quae denique Scholastica disciplina servetur" (Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, V, p. 571). And also: "Item monemus omnes & singulos Pedagogos praesentes & futuros in virtute sancate obedientiae, ut sic intendant regimini suorum domesticorum Puerorum & Scholarium, ut coram supremo Iudice de profectu eorum tam in scientia quam in moribus exigendam ad eis reddere possint rationem" (ibid.).
- 24 Cf. O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, p. 229. Another interesting witness is Antonio Possevino: "Now what Satan could not accomplish by means of heresy and false philosophy, he managed to do it by five other means, namely ... by provoking factions among the students and carnal behaviour, to which even most wickedly were added, that the very walls of the Schools, just like the lowest taverns and brothels

- became sullied with shameful writings, or with filthy figures or drawings; and so those tender beings which going had come innocent, left the schools more polluted and soiled by carnal vices, than educated by the disciplines, going forth as an enemy of God.” [Or quel che Satanasso non puote compire per mezo dell’Heresia, e della falsa Filosofia, procurò con cinque altre strade di porlo in effetto, cioè ... co’l suscitare fattioni fra scolari, e colle carnalità, alle quali anco sceleratissimamente si aggiunse, che l’istesse mura delle Scuole, come di infimissime taverne e prostiboli, se imbrattassero con vergognose scritture, e con sporchissimi segni, o pitture: e così quella tenera età, la quale venuta era innocente, si parte dalle scuole più polluta e macchiata di vitii carnali, che formata dalle discipline, sì che anco se ne va già fatta a Dio nimica”]. A. Possevino, *Coltura degl’ingegni*, ed. C. Casalini and L. Salvarani, Rome: Anicia, 2008, p. 216.
- 25 Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 79. Possevino said: “Against these efforts by Satan and the World, the Kings themselves of this era, after the Emperors Charles V and Ferdinand his brother, and the Emperor Rudolph, and along with other excellent Princes and Republics, have resorted to various remedies establishing Universities and Catholic colleges which approved by Holy Church, carry the sign that they are from God. And of those kings who involved themselves in such ventures, their memories are still fresh, not to mention the presence of some of them who are still living, since Philip the Catholic King, that of Portugal, Henry II and Charles IX King of France, Sigismund II and III and Stephen King of Poland, committed their authority and generosity liberally” [“Contra questi sforzi però di Satanasso e del Mondo, gli stessi Re di questo secolo, dopo gl’Imperatori Carlo V e Ferdinando suo fratello, e Rodolfo Imperatore, e dopo altri Principi ottimi e Republiche, hanno posto alcuni rimedi istituendo Università e collegi Catolici, i quali da Santa Chiesa approbati, portano con loro il segno che sono cose da Dio. E di que’ Re, che a tale impresa si accinsero, sono fresche le memorie, per non dire la presenza di alcuni ancor vivi, poiché Filippo Re Catolico, quel di Portogallo, Henrico II, e Carlo Nono Re di Francia, Sigismondo Secondo e Terzo, e Stefano Re di Polonia, v’impiegarono la loro auttorità e liberalità copiosamente”]. Possevino, *Coltura degl’ingegni*, p. 216.
- 26 *Heptadogma seu septem pro erigendo gymnasio documenta ad generosos prudentesque dominos et cives eximios, litteratorum amicissimos, super universitate nova vel veteri restauranda subitaria responsio*, capitulum IV. Reproduced as an appendix in Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 325, with the title: “Instruction en sept points pour l’établissement d’un collège dans le genre de Sainte-Barbe – Avant 1518”.
- 27 The *Heptadogma* thus continues: “licet (quod non improbo) in optimis quibusdam collegiis hora sexta pro grammastis parva lectio fiat, ut aptius congregentur in sacello et hora septima praecise celebretur” (cap. III, “De modo Parisiensis universitatis observando, et victitando cum omni honestamento”).
- 28 Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 87.
- 29 “Regentibus inhibemus, ne legant de verbo ad verbum in quaestionibus alineis, sed intendant labori & studio taliter quod per seipsos sciant & valeant lectionem facere, & discipulis tradere sufficientem, sive legant ad pennam sive non, nonostante antiquo Statuto de non legendo ad pennam, super quo dispensamus; dummodo ita suas componant lectiones, quod ex eorum scientia & labore per exquisitionem librorum procedere videantur.” Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, V, p. 572.
- 30 Ibid., IV, p. 333: “Hujusce Statuti meminit Petrus Ramus, qui Nominationem ad pennam volebat quoque ab Universitate arceri, revocarique antiquum morem, ut Magistri viva voce omnia exceptis paucis, nempe quibusdam notulis, explicarent. Sic autem Statutum brevius complectitur. Philosophiam continua voce & perpetua raptim praelegito. Ne tractim nominato & dictato. Discipulus Magistri

verba mente capito. Manu & penna ne exarato. Notabilis tamen sententiae dictandae & excipiendae facultas esto. Rector, Baccalarius, Licentiatus, in hanc Legem jurato. Qui praemissa violaverit, poenas duplas & quadruplas luito. Addit Ramus Cardinalem Tutavillaeum anno 1452 pennam quam lex seu Statutum praedictum ademisse videbatur, neque sustulisse, neque imperavisse sed tantum permisisse.”

31 Possevino, *Coltura degl'ingegni*, pp. 167–168.

32 Ibid.

33 Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 101. The *Heptadogma* (1517) quoted above is the first document in which the group of students, homogeneous as to competence, is called “class”.

34 Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 107.

35 The student career of Ignatius ended as it began: his degree, signed by the Chancellor of Sainte-Geneviève, on 13 March 1533, reported that he was only thirtieth in the *rotulus* of the session.

36 T. Amalou, *Une concorde urbaine. Senlis au temps des Réformes (1520–1580)*, Limoges: Pulim, 2007, in part. pp. 116–118.

37 Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 270.

38 Cf. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, p. 968: “Nicolaus Martinbos ... theologus ecclesiae sylvanectensis qui cum flagrante calvinismo voluisset catholicos cum haereticos conciliare.” Cf. Also the *Histoire Ecclesiastique*: “Un docteur de Sorbonne, nommé Nicolas Martimbaux, pourveu de la prebende theologale en l’église cathédrale de la dite ville. Cestui-cy donc, contraint pas sa conscience, comença de prescher Iesus Christ plus ouvertement beaucoup qu’on avoit iamais ouy là au paravant; et qui plus est, fournit plusieurs des principaux de la ville de plusieurs bons livres: entre autres du *Catechisme françois* et de l’*Institution chrestienne* de Calvin: ce qui en édifia plusieurs. Mais la fin descouvrit que ce docteur ressembloit la chandelle qui luit aux autres et ne voit goutte elle mesme. Car estant venu au point de la Cene il commença de nager deux eaux, voulant accorder l’eau et le feu et finalement descheu du tout, se voyant poursyvi par l’evesque et les chanoines” (cf. Amalou, *Une concorde urbaine*, p. 116).

39 The presence of Calvin at Sainte-Barbe is asserted by Beza but today is under discussion. It is nevertheless a certainty that Calvin studied with Cordier, who taught at Sainte-Barbe at the time.

40 Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, p. 270.

41 Ibid., p. 272.

42 Soon after, Gouveia published his *Antonii Goveani responsio adversus Petri Rami calumnias ad Iacobum Spifanium, gymnasii parisiensis cancellarium*, Paris, 1543.

43 Cf. Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 135.

44 Letter quoted *ibid.*, p. 36.

45 *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame, Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 129.

46 Also according to Romão the relationship between Montaigne and Portugal is ambiguous: “étrange et singulier, en même temps proche et lointain”. Rui Bertrand Romão, “Montaigne, le Portugal et les Portugais”, *Journal de la Renaissance*, 3 (2005), pp. 247–256.

47 *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, p. 130.

48 Ibid., p. 131.

49 E. Gaullieur, *Histoire du Collège de Guyenne*, Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1874.

50 The document appears in Louis Massebieau, *Schola Aquitanica. Programme d’études du collège de Guyenne au XVIe siècle*, Mémoires et Documents Scolaires 7, Paris: Delagrave, Hachette, 1866. The translation by Massebieau (with parallel text) has unfortunately many errors and misreadings.

51 This is the opinion of Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, pp. 198–199.

- 52 *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, p. 129.
- 53 “*Philosophiae Doctores*. Philosophiae praeceptores duo sunt, et ex prima classe Grammaticorum pueros exeuntes excipiunt, quo anno professionem suam auspiciantur. Curriculum suum biennio conficiunt. Priore anno Dialectici seu Logici, posteriore Physici a disciplina, quam profitentur, ipsi et discipuli vocantur. Professionem suam ab Isagoge Porphyrii incipiunt. Cui Aristotelis categoriae, περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, Analytica utraque, Topica, Σοφιστικοὶ ἐλέγχοι, Physica, de Coelo, et reliqua in scholis philosophorum enarrari solita, subjiciuntur, nihil cujusquam alterius, quam Aristotelis, praeter eam, quam diximus, Porphyrii Isagogen, et Nicolai Gruchii praeceptiones Dialecticas: sicui forte videtur ab iis suum stadium incipere, compendio ad Sapientiae organum, quod antiqui vocaverunt, pulcherrimo doctissimoque, omnium, quae nostra aetate in adolescentium philosophiae studiosorum gratiam, sint edita.” Massebieau, *Schola Aquitanica*, p. 26.
- 54 “Nihil praelegant, nihil discendum praescribant, nisi quod ipsis in gymnasio praelectum fuerit. Sic enim puerorum ingenia plerique misere confundunt, onerant, obruunt, et quod gravius est ferendum, quod a doctis praeceptoribus aedificatum fuerat, illi destruunt.” Ibid., p. 40.
- 55 The most recent scholarship on the subject has taken a moral turn: “Sous Diogo de Gouveia, Sainte-Barbe reste un lieu très conservateur, dans la lignée du collège de Montaigu voisin, citadelle de l’esprit ancien où la défense de la scolastique rime avec humiliation des élèves, bien loi de l’esprit nouveau, incarné par le collège du cardinal Lemoine avec Lefèvre d’Etaples. Diogo de Gouveia, qui déclenche les sarcasmes de Robert Estienne par ses critiques virulentes d’Erasme et du réformisme, contribue à ce que Sainte-Barbe devienne l’un des berceaux de la Compagnie de Jésus. ... André de Gouveia est un adepte des idées religieuses les plus avancée et fait vite basculer Sainte-Barbe du côté de la réforme humaniste.” A. Pellerin, *Les Portugais à Paris au fil des siècles & des arrondissements*, Paris: Chandeigne, 2009, p. 47.
- 56 Cf. Quicherat, *Histoire de Sainte-Barbe*, pp. 255–267.
- 57 Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 202. Brandão also sees personal enmity behind the cultural disagreements: “É bem nótório o ódio, o verdadeiro rancor manifestado por Diogo de Gouveia Sênior a seu sobrinho André – sentimento gerado, como adiante demonstraremos, no desacordo ideológico entre ambos sobre os grandes problemas religiosos que dilaceravam a Europa, mas agravado, também, por o teólogo se reputar espoliado pelo sobrinho” (p. 12).
- 58 Authors who emphasize the role of “humanist” culture behind André de Gouveia’s appointment as Principal of Coimbra College, talk about a similar “humanist” inspiration in John III. They cite as evidence letters from Erasmus (the previously cited *Elucubrationes Chrysostomi*), Vives (*De disciplinis*), and Thournhout (*De Ecclesiasticis Scripturis et Dogmatis*). The impulse given by John III to the *Collège Royal* (later *Collège de France*), whose teachers were almost all humanists, acts as a confirmation. Cf. D. Maurício Gomes dos Santos, “Buchanan e o ambiente coimbrão de século XVI”, *Humanitas*, Coimbra, 15–16, 1963, pp. 261–327.
- 59 Montaigne writes: “And Nicholas Grouchy, who wrote *De comitiis Romanorum*, Guillaume Guerente, who wrote a commentary on Aristotle, George Buchanan, that great Scottish poet, Marc-Antoine Muret, whom France and Italy recognize as the best orator of his time, my private tutors, have often told me that in my childhood I had that language so ready and handy that they were afraid to accost me. Buchanan, whom I afterward saw writing on the education of children and Brissac, told me that he was writing on the education of children and that he was taking my education as a model; for he was then in charge of that Count de Brissac who later showed himself so valorous and brave.” *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, p. 129.

- 60 See Brandão, *A Inquisição*, pp. 464–480.
- 61 Cf. Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 262.
- 62 Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 521; Gomes dos Santos, “Buchanan e o ambiente coimbrão”, p. 266.
- 63 Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 268.
- 64 According to Brandão, the division between the men from Bordeaux and those from Paris was basically what separated the supporters of Diogo de Gouveia the Elder from those of André’. Cf. *A inquisição*, pp. 549–551.
- 65 M. Brandão, *O processo na Inquisição de Mestre Diogo de Teive*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1943; M. Brandão, *O processo na Inquisição de Mestre João da Costa*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1944; Brandão, *A Inquisição*.
- 66 G. J. C. Henriques, *George Buchanan in the Lisbon Inquisition*, Lisbon, 1906, p. xi.
- 67 A.-J. Teixeira, *Documentos para a história dos Jesuitas*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1899, pp. 4–11.
- 68 The *Regimento* stated: “E quero qua a pessoa que hade ter o cargo e governança do dito Collegio se chame Principal d’elle, e que o Reitor da dita Universidade, nem outra alguma pessoa tenha superioridade sobre o dito Collegio e Principal.” See Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 264.
- 69 Ibid. See also Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 209; and P. Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, Lisbon: ICALP, 1992, pp. 15ff.
- 70 “Pessoa alguma seja d’aqui em diante recebida a ouvir Leis ou Canones, sem certidão do Principal do *collegio das Artes*, de como nelle ouviram um anno de Logica; e assim não será nenhum recebido a ouvir Theologia ou Medicina sem mostrar certidão do dito Principal, de como no dito collegio ouviu o Curso inteiro de Artes.” Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 267.
- 71 “Pollo che tenho visto me parece que seria grande bem se a faculdade de leis e canones estivesse separada em outro lugar, porque elles todos são de muita pompa e liberdade, e as Artes, até serem muitos, de muita subieição.” Ibid., p. 264.
- 72 The Elder, according to Gomes, *Os conimbricenses*, p. 15. According to Braga, it was Diogo Jr, “sobrinho do grande pedagogo, mas criatura nulla” (*Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 269). Agreeing with Braga is Teixeira, *Documentos*, and D. Barbosa Machado, *Bibliotheca Lusitana. Historica, critica, e cronologica*, I, Lisboa Occidental: Antonio Isidoro da Fonseca, 1741, pp. 656–657.
- 73 His dismissal was spurred by João da Costa, who wrote to the King beseeching him to replace the Principal, mainly because of the very bad economic conditions of the college. João da Costa’s initiative would be prejudicial to him, as we will see later.
- 74 The one in which the Arts course lasted three years.
- 75 Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 276.
- 76 See Brandão, *A Inquisição*, p. 244.
- 77 Following the order of the Aldine edition (1495–1498), in the first year the course established the reading of the *De terminorum Introductione*, *Dialectica* and of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, and then the *Predicamenta*, *De Interpretatione* (*Peri hermeneias*), the first seven books of *Topics* and four of *Ethics*; in the second year, the *Analytica Priora*, the eighth book of *Topics*, the *Analytica Posteriora*, the other books of *Ethica*, *De Sophisticis Elenchis* and the first two books of *Physics*; in the third year, the remnant of *Physics*, *De coelo*, *De generatione*, four books of *Meteorologicum*, the first two books of *De anima* and the first two of *Metaphysica*. In the fourth year, i.e. in the remaining six months (the classes ended in March, as the *Regimento* of 1565 will state), the course established the reading of the third book of *De anima*, *Parva naturalia* and the other books of *Metaphysica*.
- 78 Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 286.

2 A province committed to education

If the *Cursus* bears the name of a place instead of an author, it is because of the sense of identity and belonging bestowed to a given place in a given time. By speaking of a “sense of identity” I mean the awareness on the part of a group of men of their mission in the world, starting from a town endowed with a twofold symbolic value: on the one hand the town is famed as a cultural centre in a country growing quickly in wealth, and seen as a bridge to the unknown; on the other, groups of men living there strengthen this reality, nurturing this image and reinforcing it in the eyes of the outside world. It was something like the creation and promotion of a brand.

The town is sixteenth-century Coimbra and the men are Portuguese Jesuits. The *Cursus* is first of all *Conimbricensis*: that is to say, it is not only the product of an excellent team of teachers of the College of Arts, but also the product of a town, of a self-conscious and proud community, and of a nation, Portugal, whose role as world leader was seriously vacillating in these times.¹ So it is necessary to retell the history of the Society of Jesus in Portugal and of its college, because it should not be considered extraneous to or accidental to the text of the *Cursus*, but rather essential to it. Thanks to it we shall discover a considerable number of references to the actual life of the Coimbra professors, who are concealed behind the scholastic, seemingly flat language of the commentaries.

Simão Rodrigues arrived in Lisbon in 1540, and almost immediately understood that he was alone in the arduous task of finding a space for Jesuits in the context of Portuguese society. Xavier had left almost at once for the Far East, with the enthusiasm of the explorer, and perhaps to seek a noble martyrdom. Jesuit chronicles contain letters to Ignatius (too few to give a faithful account of the reality) in which Rodrigues expresses all his annoyance at having been compelled, by the General himself and the King, to remain behind. Loyola simply answered that the Society needed further consolidation in Europe, and somebody had to take on the work. He repeated this in 1553, but for the opposite reason, i.e. to remove him from Portugal. Rodrigues had in fact executed his instructions far too well and in thirteen years had achieved great power for the Society (and for himself), much more than the General could tolerate.

But let us proceed in order.

The College of Santo Antão-o-Velho was the first educational institution created by Portuguese Jesuits.² The Society took possession of it on 5 June 1542, but the college did not begin to offer public classes until 1552, to either members of the Society or to external students.³ On 9 June 1542, Rodrigues and twelve other Jesuits arrived in Coimbra to find a place where a college might be established near the university. They were put up at the monastery of Santa Cruz for few days until Diogo de Castilho assigned a building in the upper town to them, on mount Ribela. On 13 July the *Colégio de Jesus*, for young Jesuits only, was created and, as Gomes stated, “it was unmatched by any other institution as the most important seedbed for such renowned missionaries”⁴. But the building soon proved too small, and Rodrigues had to construct a new edifice: its foundation was laid on 15 April 1547, few days before the arrival in town of the *bordoleses* of André de Gouveia. The college at first seemed to have modest ambitions: for lectures the residents went to the university, which – as Rodrigues wrote to Ignatius – was unexpectedly prosperous and culturally strong. After receiving this news Ignatius sent some members of the Louvain community to Coimbra to strengthen the Jesuit presence there, but their bad Portuguese (they were ridiculed as *Franchinotes*) only earned them a bad reputation. Jesuit chronicles speak about the difficulties of the handful of students (very few the first year, but rapidly increasing in the following) who trudged up and down Coimbra to listen to the lectures at the university, whose privileges were granted to them by a royal decree on 26 August 1544. However, because of the growth of residents in the college and of the Jesuits overall, Rodrigues enacted a rule, in 1545, which established classes in grammar, philosophy, theology *in via Thomae* and drills in the college itself: “The Rules established by Rodrigues ... clearly had been conceived to coincide with the schedules, lectures and exercises followed by the young Jesuits at the university.”⁵

Applications arrived unexpectedly *en masse*, and Rodrigues was compelled to select the applicants himself.⁶ “Many of its recruits were humble artisans, contrite businessmen, retired soldiers, government bureaucrats, and worn-out adventurers.”⁷ But the prestige of the Society was guaranteed by its success among young aristocrats. This appeal was enhanced by a relationship with the royal house which the Society did not acquire anywhere else in Europe.

In Portugal, the Society experienced its affinity with power, the reason for its strength in the seventeenth century and of its misfortunes in the eighteenth. The patronage of King John, of Queen Catherine of Austria, of the *Cardinal-Infante* Henrique and later of Sebastian I, made Portugal a Jesuit political testing ground, where the enterprising Rodrigues and the schemer Gonçalves da Camara would weave their webs, training the order for court life (for expansion but also for mere survival). The process of introducing the Jesuits into the political and social order was neither easy nor peaceful: on several occasions the General had to ask the Portuguese Provincial to show more prudence, curtailing the rapid rise of the order, frequently obtained

at the expenses of other orders and so exposed to innuendos or even formal accusations.⁸ Nevertheless, the activity of Simão Rodrigues and the first Portuguese Jesuits confirmed the benevolence of John III towards the order. As we can see in the documentation collected by Teixeira, in 1542 the King recommended Rodrigues and the twelve Jesuits, who had come with him to study, to the Chancellor of the University of Coimbra; in 1544 the King granted to the Jesuit college the privileges of the university; John's foremost endeavour in the field of education, the *Colégio Real*, was turned over to the Society, which also received the incomes of several monasteries and payments on the part of the university. Indeed, in 1552 John wrote to the Pope asking for the monastery of St John of Tarouca to be joined to the college of the *Freires de Christo* in Coimbra, stating that monasteries and cloisters could not be managed and directed satisfactorily except by religious *doctos* and *let-rados*; three years before assigning the college to the Jesuits, he wrote:

It is my desire to build a monastery and college for *reformed friars* of that Order, learning and becoming men of letters in Coimbra, where His Highness instituted and organized a general Studium and a University rich in teaching posts and teachers, of Bible and Theology, of Canon Law and Law, of Medicine, Philosophy, Arts, Latin and Greek, providing great salaries; and now the University of Coimbra is one of the good and prosperous Universities of the Christian world, and in Coimbra there are many religious colleges: the College of Hermits of Saint Augustine, and another of Carmelites, and another of Friars of St Bernard, and another of the Friars of St Jerome, and another of Dominicans, and another College of Observant Friars of St Francis, and two colleges of secular clerics of the Order of St Peter, and a very large and crowded College of the Society of Jesus, where there are many members of the Order who are excellent men of letters, and they preach and confess, and bring many advantages to Christianity and to the Church in Portugal, and many of them go, commanded by the King, to the Far East and to Brazil to spread and teach the faith.⁹

The collection of incomes to benefit Portuguese colleges and the problems connected to the selection of the unexpectedly numerous applications for admission to the order were among the causes of one of the worst crises to hit the Society in its early years. In the time between the generalships of Ignatius and of Acquaviva, centrifugal forces weakened the unity of the Society on many occasions, putting at risk the very survival of the Order itself. The crises found their most fertile terrain where the Society was stronger, namely in Portugal and Spain. There is a difference, however, between the problems faced by Ignatius and by Acquaviva. The former had to deal with two of the first members, Rodrigues and Bobadilla, who did not approve of the transformation of the order into a hierarchical structure with centralized political control.¹⁰ The confrontation was between men and personalities. Acquaviva, instead,

had to face a political network, the Spanish *vera Compañia*, which sought to sunder the Spanish and Italian branches of the Society. It was a clash between factions. In both cases, the Generals won, and at the end of Acquaviva's long generalship the Society had assumed the definitive shape of a solid body, organized through a pervasive bureaucracy: this is the history of the Jesuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The first and most serious of these confrontations occurred between Ignatius and Simão Rodrigues,¹¹ first Provincial of Portugal, and, according to Braga, the dispute was over the incomes of the colleges. Rodrigues had shrewdly obtained various sources of income benefiting Jesuit colleges and houses. The independence with which Rodrigues governed the Province did not please Loyola: "The prosperity of the province in numbers and reputation was due in part to royal favor but also to Rodrigues's charm and ability. From the beginning Ignatius received fewer letters from him than he liked, and he began to get reports from others about inconsistency and arbitrariness in governing."¹² Rodrigues had become the confessor to the royal family, and the King did not allow him to be recalled to Rome by Ignatius. The latter reacted in 1547 with a letter in which he asked students to abstain from potentially outrageous practices (such as the public penances he had heard about) and encouraging them to study.

Ignatius then summoned the Provincials to Rome in 1551, for the purpose of publishing the *Constitutions*, and this time Rodrigues came and stayed for a month.¹³ The General wanted to discuss the draft of the *Constitutions*, and he appears to have expressed the intention of keeping for himself the power of transferring the income of a richer college to a poorer one, thus undermining the work of Rodrigues. The latter vehemently opposed the proposal. Ignatius's rule was approved, although in a weaker form (the King had to agree and also the *socios*), but at the end of 1551 and with the *Constitutions* ready for publication, Ignatius discharged Rodrigues¹⁴ and replaced him with Diogo Mirão, who, in turn, assigned the direction of Coimbra College to Manuel Godinho.¹⁵ The discipline and strictness imposed by the two provoked a revolt among the Portuguese Fathers, who asked for the return of Rodrigues. Mirão and Godinho wrote to Ignatius complaining about the situation and stating that the presence of Rodrigues in Portugal would prevent every attempt at reform.

Ignatius named as Visitor Miguel de Torres, who arrived at the Portuguese court with a letter designating Rodrigues as Provincial of Aragona (a wholly new province). Under pressure also from John III, Rodrigues was compelled to leave. The visitation by Torres, meanwhile, was conducted with extreme strictness: the choice was between accepting the position of Ignatius (and the hierarchical structure of the order) or leaving the Society. Polanco called the result of this move a "tragedy": a large number deserted the order. Nadal stated that sixty people left just from Coimbra College.¹⁶ Because the conflicts and the desertions continued, Rodrigues, claiming a health problem, returned to Lisbon (but was not allowed to stay in Santo Antônio College).

On 25 May 1553, Ignatius ordered him to leave Portugal and return to Rome. Rodrigues obeyed, but arrived in Rome only after a long journey. A commission of four Fathers was appointed to adjudicate his conduct. He had to face many accusations and charges, shrewdly circulated by Luis Gonçalves da Camara:¹⁷ excessive admissions to the Society had made its control and discipline impossible; the Provincial had strengthened his relationship with the King to the detriment of other orders, making the Society unpopular among the people; Rodrigues had disobeyed the General. The commission acknowledged that some accusations (mainly the ones emanating from Gonçalves da Camara) were exaggerated, but condemned him to perpetual exile from Portugal. Rodrigues retired to Bassano and Nadal was not able, in spite of all his efforts, to reconcile him with the General. Rodrigues was able to return to Portugal once again only with the election of Mercurian as fourth General of the order, in 1574. He died few years later (1579).

When, in 1552, John III wrote the aforementioned letter to the Pope, the *clerigos reformados* to whom he wanted to assign the college were engaged in an internal war, which pitted Rodrigues against da Camara, the counsellor of Ignatius and future preceptor of Prince Sebastian. The conflict between the Provincial and the General was being waged alongside a bitter struggle for the control and future of the Portuguese Province (and Assistancy). Oddly enough, this hostility, instead of weakening the political and cultural cohesion of the Province, would strengthen its identity: in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Province would maintain a strategic position within the Society, not limiting itself to a role representative of the interests of the Portuguese community. One could debate the greater or lesser importance of the Portuguese Province in the overall political geography of the order, where Italy and Spain (two giants in numbers and organization) would always hold the supremacy, but the unity of Portuguese Jesuits in their relationships with other Provinces, in every General Congregation and, most of all, in their daily communication with the Generals, is irrefutable.

When Nadal arrived in Portugal in 1553 to publish the *Constitutions*, there were still a number of uncertainties. He had to confront many questions, among which was the situation of Coimbra College, with regard to the negotiations initiated by the *Infante* Luís for the management of the College of Arts.¹⁸ Indeed, Jesuits, who according to their *Regimento* had to attend the lectures outside their own college, descending the streets of Coimbra to *rua de Santa Sofia*, and then to the university or the Royal College, had long before begun to attend lectures inside their college in the upper city. Rodrigues, as we have noted, had to organize, in addition to drills, courses of grammar, Thomist theology and even philosophy. This could have been a problem for John III, who was dissatisfied with the *Colégio Real* (improperly managed by all its principals down to Teive), but the Society had to faithfully observe the directives given by the King himself. Probably in the perspective of the acquisition of the College of Arts proposed by the *Infante* Luís, Nadal (this is a hypothesis, based on an interpretation of Ignatius's wishes) wanted to

restore the tradition: “The philosophers and humanists attend classes at the Royal College, where philosophy is taught, according to the order of Father Nadal.”¹⁹ Nadal would visit the College of Arts again five years later: his knowledge of the Conimbricán situation and of the teachers working there brought him to support, in 1561, the first proposal for a printed edition of a *cursus*, promoted by Torres.

Meanwhile, the peace-making activity of Nadal and Torres was producing good results: a quarter of the members had deserted, but the Society was still strong enough to acquire the management of the *Colégio Real*. As we have seen, on 10 September 1555 John III notified Diogo de Teive of his substitution by a Jesuit principal (henceforth called *Reitor*), Leão Henriques.

Among John’s reasons for this act, the economic factor must not be underestimated.²⁰ The salaries of the teachers were not paid out of university incomes, but with funds from the *Fazenda Real*. John needed to reduce public expenditure, and Jesuits taught for free. Anyway, the Society invested its best cultural resources in the project: the original formula of the *Colégio Real*, boasting the finest teachers from France and the most advanced teaching methods, was to be preserved.

On 1 October 1555, a discourse by Pedro Perpinhã from Valencia inaugurated the academic year, and the next day the College of Arts commenced its lectures. The college had sixteen teaching posts, some of them assigned to Jesuits who would be influential for the grammatical, rhetorical and philosophical education of students from all over Europe: Manuel Alvares, author of a *Grammatica* that would become compulsory according to the *Ratio Studiorum*; Cypriano Soares, author of a celebrated *Rhetorica*, used as a textbook in many colleges up to the eighteenth century; Ignacio Martins (author of the *Cartilha do Mestre Ignacio*); and Pedro Fonseca, later the author of a commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and of the *Institutiones Dialecticae*. The teachers were illustrious and John promoted their careers with decrees that were not appreciated by the university community.²¹

The relationship between the two colleges, *del Gesu* and the College of Arts (later combined by the Society in a new edifice uptown), and the university would always remain confrontational:²² the university would try to resist the balance of power that now favoured the colleges. John continued to favour the Jesuits, in spite of the privileges that he himself had granted to the university at the time of his reforms, before he began to organize the college system in Coimbra. After the university left Lisbon in 1537, the King intervened with a reform in 1544, writing new Statutes and vying to attract to Coimbra the best Italian jurists (Alciato, Socino, Giulio Radino) as well as teachers from Salamanca and Alcalá. The Statutes of 1544 rationalized in a significant way university life and regulations.

In the sixteenth century many universities were eager to reform their Statutes (Salamanca, for example, was reformed in 1538, 1548, 1561, 1587, 1594, 1604 and 1625). The same was true for Coimbra, whose deans were also designated as *Reformadores*. On 11 October 1555, Balthazar de Faria was appointed to

visit and reform Coimbra, and he proclaimed new Statutes in 1559. Cardinal Henrique, when he was regent for Sebastian, appointed as dean Martim de Gonçalves da Camara, brother of Luís, by *motu proprio* on 16 June 1563, without authorization from the university. In 1564 a new Visitor and reformer of Coimbra was appointed, the humanist Antonio Pinheiro, Bishop of Miranda, who enacted reforms in line with the Council of Trent.²³ Since the university had not been consulted, it met *in claustro* and, declaring the new Statutes *rigorosos*, wrote to the Cardinal asking for their suspension, in order to have them corrected. On 15 December 1576, the Dean appointed by Henrique returned from Lisbon to Coimbra with a long list of corrections to the Statutes of 1565. The Jesuits obtained from Sebastian in 1572 an *alvará*, in which the College of Arts was exempted from any university reform. The series of visitors would continue under Philip II: the Statutes of 1583 favoured the Jesuits (the Visitor was Manuel de Quadros), while those of 1592 (Antonio Vaz Cabaço) cancelled some exemptions, but were corrected in 1597.²⁴ After the publication of the *Ratio Studiorum* the Statutes had to be reformed again, and the new Visitor of Coimbra (Francisco di Braganza, 1604) asked for *Addimentos* to the Statutes, which were approved in 1611 by the *claustro* (Dean Francisco de Castro) and confirmed in 1612.

On the death of Ignatius (1556), the Portuguese Fathers gathered at Almeirim and elected Luís Gonçalves da Camara and Gonçalo Vaz de Mello to accompany the Provincial Miguel de Torres to the General Congregation, and with them the procurator of the Portuguese province, Manuel Godinho, and the procurator of Brazil and the South American provinces, Jorge Serrão. John III paid the travel expenses, and this was his last act in favour of the Portuguese Jesuits. The King died on 17 June 1557, and the throne passed to his son Sebastian; because of his youth, the regency was given to the Queen Mother, Catherine, who was, according to Braga, “*serva submissa dos Jesuitas*”.²⁵ To fulfil a final desire on the part of John III, Catherine recalled from Rome Father Luís Gonçalves²⁶ and entrusted him with the education of Sebastian. The Queen continued the politics of John, patronizing the Society and especially the college. On 26 August she issued a decree in which, because there were students in Coimbra not enrolled in the university and, most of all, because they had no degrees from the College of Arts (as John had prescribed), she imposed on the rector, teachers, delegates, and counsellors of the university and the college a duty to exercise strict control over the form and frequency of the lectures.²⁷ A year later, the Queen decreed that “from now on, the examinations of bachelors and doctors in Arts should be made in the College of Arts”.²⁸ In 1559, the year of the publication of the University Statutes, Catherine exempted the College of Arts from the rules contained in the University Statutes;²⁹ in 1560, she twice repeated that Jesuits were exempt from the obligation to obtain their degrees from the University of Coimbra:

All the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, who have graduated in Arts elsewhere than in the University of Coimbra thanks to the privileges that

the Apostolic See grants to the Society, or received the degree of Masters in Arts in any other University than Coimbra, even if it was outside our realm, are allowed to lecture, set examinations, preside, confer degrees, and exercise any other act and prerogative of the teachers of the College of Arts of the aforementioned town and University.³⁰

Although the management of the College of Arts by the Jesuits cost the Crown nothing, shortly after the death of John the Society asked the Queen for an endowment of 400,000 réis, similar to what had been previously given to the *Colégio Real*, but the funds were not to come from the *Fazenda Real* but from the university. Thus, the university was compelled to pay 200,000 réis every year (collected by the Jesuits for their “free” teaching at the college). The Society enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with the university: it strove for the incorporation of the college within it (obtained on 5 September 1561), but it also always claimed freedom of action for itself (exemption from the authority of visitors, deans, etc.). On 2 January 1560 the Jesuits obtained permission for anyone holding a degree from the College of Arts to be admitted to a university degree *gratis* and without the obligation to take the oath; and that all Fathers of the Society who had obtained their degrees in other universities should be considered as graduates of Coimbra. The Queen established on 13 August 1561 that no student without a licence granted by the College of Arts could attend the lectures on canon law and law at the University of Coimbra. A royal decree of 24 September 1561, following the incorporation of the college within the university (5 September), decreed that the director of the university and of the College of Arts should be the same person. Later, under the regency of the *Cardinal-Infante*, whose patronage had allowed the Jesuits to found the second Portuguese university in Évora, the Society continued to enjoy the favour of the Crown.

In 1565 the College of Arts received new Statutes. They provided for a literacy class, ten classes of Latin and Rhetoric, a public course in Greek and one in Hebrew.³¹ Four regents in the arts were confirmed: their courses each corresponded to a year of the overall curriculum. The college maintained a monopoly over higher education, while in the town other schools to teach reading and writing could be opened. The Statutes were especially prescriptive concerning the structure of examinations and the degree ceremonies – along the lines of the founder Gouveia and of the Jesuits: “No student is allowed to attend a class or change it without examination and having permission from the Rector or the Prefect of Studies.”³² Earlier decrees concerning the priority of examinations and certificates issued by the College of Arts were confirmed, in order to permit access to the major courses, and no student could attend the lectures in Canon Law and Law without having demonstrated fluent Latin or having followed the arts lectures for at least one year.

The length of the Arts programme was confirmed as three and a half years.³³ The syllabus mandated dialectics in the first year; Logic, Physics and Ethics in the second; Metaphysics in the third together with the *Parva*

Naturalia; in the last semester, *De Anima*. The Dean had full control over the choice of the interpretation of Aristotle, but a note specific to the Society was added: “Concerning the explanation of Aristotle, teachers should follow the authors and commentaries that the rector thinks to be the best, *according to the rule of Society of Jesus*.” This addition was probably prompted by the publication of the Ignatian *Constitutions*, and specifically of its fourth part, in which the pedagogical mission of the Society was stated. The Dean’s freedom, so important for André de Gouveia, was confirmed as far as administration was concerned, but limited in regard to teaching content by the general direction of the Society. The *Constitutions* stated:

The doctrine of Aristotle must be followed in Logic, Natural and Moral Philosophy, and Metaphysics; and as for the other Arts, and commentaries of other authors and of the Humanities, once chosen, they must be prescribed to the students and also to the teachers. The Dean, in all his decisions, should conform to the decisions that the Society will judge most suitable to the glory of God.³⁴

Aristotle and Aquinas started to permeate, with all the ambiguities and nuances in which the rule had been conceived, the educational fabric of the order, creating a typical Jesuit contradiction: on one side, the duty to follow the “most certain” doctrines, and the “most Christian” authors (Aristotle!); on the other, the fact that these doctrines and names were nothing more than empty vessels, linguistic codes to which any college could give a “local” character.

In the Statutes of 1565 the disputation was still the central didactic tool in the Arts course: a detailed set of regulations concerning modalities and the calendar, joined to another on examinations and degrees, renewed the fundamental institutions of *modus parisiensis*. This *modus* had been adopted by the order, with the only difference that the degree ceremonies, traditionally paid for by the students, had to be free of charge.³⁵

A first occasion for conflict between the Jesuits and Philip II presented itself under the regency of Cardinal Henrique. It was the marriage of Sebastian. Philip II, indeed, had sent three proposals to the future king, who (perhaps advised by Luís Gonçalves da Camara) did not reply. After the fourth letter, Sebastian answered that he would accept any proposal coming from Philip II. The latter wrote back to the Portuguese advising him to remove Gonçalves da Camara, as he was to him *por extremo suspeito*.³⁶ Anyhow, the failure to conclude marriage arrangements with Margaret of Valois, *irma* of Charles IX, resulted in the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. When Sebastian’s acceptance letter arrived at the French court, Marguerite was already married to Henry of Navarre, and the hurried marriage is considered a ruse on the part of the future Henry IV to attract all Huguenot leaders to Paris and kill them.

A year later, five Portuguese Jesuits left for Rome to participate in the Third General Congregation, called to choose a successor to the deceased Francisco

Borgia. The Portuguese Assistancy had elected a commission mainly comprising renowned teachers of the Coimbra faculty: Pedro Fonseca, Ignacio Martíns, Miguel de Torres and Leão Enriques. The Congregation would elect Mercurian as General, and the choice of a Fleming as successor to Ignatius was prompted by the intervention of Pope Gregory XIII, who asked the Society to avoid the election of a “New Christian” as General of the order. To this pressure, expressed at the Congregation by the Cardinal of Como,³⁷ the Society at first reacted by emphasizing its prerogatives and its freedom from external influences (even that of the Pope), but the final choice of Mercurian against the favourite candidate and “New Christian” Juan de Polanco satisfied both the Pope and King Sebastian, who had written to Gregory XIII to endorse his admonition. The Portuguese delegation, often considered almost irrelevant, struggled against the election of a “New Christian”, even if it is plausible that the opposition to Polanco was dictated by an anti-Spanish attitude, where many Jesuits of “unclean blood” occupied important positions (the renowned case of Láinez was often recalled by opponents to the admonition). The *limpieza de sangre* question would be a burning issue for the Society for many years to come: the fifth Congregation (1592), the first in the history of the Society to be called without the necessity of electing a new General, wanted a final resolution of the issue, preventing admission to the order of anyone who could not demonstrate the absence of a Jewish ancestor in their family tree. The Portuguese Province was always uncompromising on this subject, an issue that calls for further study. At any rate, the election of Mercurian was a victory for the Portuguese, who hastened to communicate it to the Province.³⁸

The 1570s were, for that Province, years of redefining the leadership after the exile of Simão Rodrigues. His memory continued to be alive in the colleges and professed houses, and his “relaxed” discipline was remembered with particular fondness. This had been one of the accusations he had to respond to in front of the Roman commission: lack of rigour in the control of behaviour and in the admissions process had weakened the solidity of the Society and had opened it to criticism on moral grounds.

As we have seen, since the Province had been put under receivership many Fathers dropped out, and discord arose between two currents, which, in Rodrigues’s absence (under Henriques and Serrão, from 1565 to 1574), continued to alternate between rigour and laxity. In the first current we find the opponents of Rodrigues, among them Gonçalves da Camara, Martíns, Pedro Fonseca and Manuel Álvares.³⁹ In the second, faithful to Simão, was Manuel Rodrigues, who blamed the strictness of Henriques and Serrão (and the prohibition, established in 1572, on accepting new members under eighteen)⁴⁰ for the continuous decrease in vocations. The style of government of the Province caused the first occasion of tension between Pedro Fonseca and Luís Molina (a Spaniard, teacher in Évora and then in Coimbra), whom we shall find later quarrelling over the invention of “middle science” in theology and over their role in the composition of the *Cursus Conimbricensis*.

The election of Mercurian, even if it was cheerfully received by the Portuguese group (whose members belonged mainly to Gonçalves da Camara's camp), did not satisfy the expectations of the rigorists: the new General allowed Simão Rodrigues to return, after years of exile, to Coimbra College. Rodrigues arrived on 24 September 1573. Greeted with honours by all the leaders in the Province, including Gonçalves da Camara, whose aim was to see if he could still influence local politics,⁴¹ Rodrigues clearly had the mandate from Mercurian to verify the health of the Society and suggest to Rome how the internal wars might be ended and, with them, the desertions. The old Provincial demonstrated his ability once again: he wrote to the General that a new Provincial should be neither a rigorist nor a foreigner; Manuel Rodrigues, the Dean of Coimbra College, seemed to be the right choice.⁴² Mercurian agreed, and appointed Rodrigues the new Provincial of Portugal.

One of the questions confronted by Rodrigues was the Jesuit commitment in education: twenty-four teachers in Coimbra College (1579) for 1,500 students represented a notable effort; and considering also the other educational institutions of the Province, the students taught by Jesuits amounted to about 5,000. Rodrigues wrote to Mercurian to find a solution, because the rigorist current asked repeatedly for a lighter commitment to teaching. Mercurian, conversely, encouraged the educational mission of the order; perhaps the decision to proceed to a printed *cursus* resulted from the need for a more rational educational organization.

In fact, what was missing was a philosophy textbook, a printed commentary on the *Corpus Aristotelicum* to help both teachers and students to better manage their time in the arts course, and which could be at the same level of utility and value as other products of Conimbrican culture. The course, as we have said, had already been requested at the time of Nadal's second visit to Portugal, when it was planned to print the notes of a philosophy teacher (perhaps Pedro Fonseca) and the latter had encouraged the project. The negotiation, as we shall see, was protracted, and Fonseca, instead of leading the project, had committed himself to another task, and saw through the press *his* commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: a noteworthy work, but considered useless by the Coimbra teachers, because of its difficulty for use as a textbook. It was beyond the level of secondary school students. Mercurian, asked for his opinion by the Province, gave his assent to its publication, and Acquaviva agreed as well in 1580. The *Cursus* was published only twenty years later, with the authorship of all Conimbricenses, although written by one man only, Manuel de Góis (or Sebastião do Couto for the *Dialectica*).

With the election of Manuel Rodrigues as Provincial, the first phase of the Portuguese Society's history drew to a close. The return to Portugal of Simão Rodrigues in 1573 was simply an honour being paid to a father of the nation, and on 15 March 1575 the other pre-eminent leader of the order, Luís Gonçalves da Camara, died. He had resigned from his office at court and was replaced by Mauricio Serpe in 1574, abandoning the controversial double

role of *éminence grise* of the state and of the Society. Gonçalves was accused of being responsible for the conflict between Queen Catherine and Cardinal Henrique, the failure to proceed with the marriage of Sebastian and even the posthumous guilt for the Ksar el Kebir disaster in 1578, where Sebastian led himself and the Portuguese aristocracy to their death. Actually, the confessor had tried in vain to dissuade the King from attempting a first African expedition (1574), which seemed prompted only by juvenile ardour. The old confessor died, and the new one, Maurício Serpe, would follow the King to Africa, where he too died on 4 August 1578.⁴³

Sebastian's succession would provide a second cause of misunderstanding between Philip II and the Portuguese Jesuits. The latter would always resist any incorporation of Portugal by Spain, even if they generally adapted their politics to the general course of events. Braga recalls that Philip II used to say: "Of all the religious Orders the Jesuit is the only one I cannot comprehend."⁴⁴ Portugal would be annexed to Spain under Philip in 1580. With the death of Sebastian, because Cardinal Henrique was not allowed to produce an heir, three parties remained, competing for the throne: Philip II, who in Spain had subjugated the Society to the Inquisition;⁴⁵ the illegitimate Antonio, *Prior do Crato*, supported by the King of France; the House of Braganza, advancing the claims of Duchess Catharine. The Jesuits at first patronized Braganza (thereby pushing the *Cardinal-Infante*, hurt by Jesuit ingratitude, towards Philip II); then, with the death of the Cardinal in 1580, they opposed the Prior of Crato, wittingly supporting Philip II's stratagem.⁴⁶ Among the supporters of the Prior of Crato were the majority of Coimbra lawyers, who fuelled the hostility of Don Antonio towards the Society:

The large degree of consent that the Prior got among the teachers of the University of Coimbra was mostly due to the revolt of the corporation of professors against the Jesuits, to whom the corporation had seen its privileges submitted during the times of Catherine, the *Cardinal-Infante*, and Sebastian.⁴⁷

The Coimbra students preferred the Prior of Crato, because the illegitimate son of Don Luiz reminded them of the Mestre de Aviz, symbolically seen as saviours of the nation when a dynasty becomes extinct. Don Antonio, moreover, had come back from imprisonment in Africa, attracting popular sympathy to himself. When the Jesuits ceased to support the Braganzas they started to disparage Antonio, claiming he was of Jewish origins, being the alleged son of a "New Christian", Violante Gomes, a *pelicana* (a term evoking the 1506 massacre).

After the death of Cardinal Henrique, the courts met in Almeirim to negotiate the succession. João Nogueira was sent to Coimbra, ordered by the governors of the kingdom to ask the teachers for their opinion on the claims of the different courts to the succession. The lawyers met in *claustro* on 29 February 1580, and shunned the Procurator, saying they had already given

their opinion. The Prior of Crato by acclamation had himself proclaimed as King of Portugal in Santarém and on 20 June he wrote to the university, communicating this fact. The university gathered immediately *in claustro* to read the letter brought by the Procurator, João Rodrigues de Vasconcellos, and the ceremonial followed that recognized him as King of Portugal. The Dean, Nuno de Noronha, was appointed to go to Santarém to pay homage to the new king, and beseech him to declare himself *Protector* of the university. Subsequent events compelled the Dean to return to the *claustro* on 23 December 1580, to bitterly declare the elevation of Philip II. There was nothing to do but to once again appoint Nuno to the same embassy, but this time to Philip.

Predictably, a time of purges followed in the university for persons who had not openly supported the cause of Philip II. Whoever had favoured the Braganzas fared better than those who had supported Antonio. Pedro de Alpoim of San Pedro's College, lecturer in *Codigo*, was beheaded; Luiz de Souto Mayor, a Dominican, was dismissed from his teaching post in Holy Scripture (but reinstated later); Agostino da Trindade, an Augustinian, was dropped from his assignment lecturing on Scotus; he emigrated to France and taught theology in Toulouse. João Rodrigues de Vasconcellos, who had been the bearer of Don Antonio's letter, died in prison.

Mercurian's leadership was a time of smoothing the internal tensions for the Portuguese Society. The Flemish General died on 1 August 1580, and the Society proceeded towards the long and decisive leadership of Claudio Acquaviva, who was still very young at the time. Acquaviva would transform the order, giving it its definitive structure and fixing its enduring public image: a cohesive and solid body, obedient and effective, undyingly faithful to the Pope and the General. Acquaviva conducted this work *ab imis* with cold determination. To borrow from Machiavelli, he acted to reduce the visibility of the "barons" who strutted too prominently on the stage: the *baroni* who, among the first Jesuits, had sparked the true growth of the order. Barons of the second generation, after Rodrigues and Bobadilla, retained their restlessness and reluctance to acquiesce to governance. Acquaviva would subdue this festering situation with a shrewd, many-pronged strategy, one of the pillars of which was, of course, the publication of the *Ratio Studiorum*, which, for a missionary and educational order spread all over the world, sought to serve as the first, true certification of Jesuit distinctiveness.

The Fourth General Congregation, which elected Acquaviva as General in 1581, also appointed a commission of twelve Fathers *ad conficiendam formulam studiorum*. Among them, representing the Provinces, were two theologians, Gaspar Gonçalves and Pedro Fonseca. It was the first step towards the composition of the *Ratio Studiorum*. Previously, the rules governing Jesuit colleges were contained only partially in drafts and outlines that were faithful to the spirit of the Ignatian *Constitutions*, but had not succeeded in becoming the universal norm for Jesuit education in the world. The project was completed in 1599 under Acquaviva, becoming that programme which, in its

complexity, established the Jesuit educational paradigm, including in the universities they managed (even if they were a minority of all Jesuit schools). The final version was the result of a continuous revisions that occupied the Society for more than another twenty years.

The commission of the twelve did not complete its work, in part because of the ambiguity in defining the role of the *Ratio*: was it to be a system of organizational and didactic rules for all the colleges or should it prescribe also homogeneous teachings for the arts and theology courses? The debate stuck on this first distinction, resulting in a very short regulation (only six articles) intended to help in the interpretation of the teachings of Aquinas, the favourite theologian of the fourth part of the Ignatian *Constitutions*.

Due to the failure of this project, Acquaviva, revived the commission and gave it a more specific assignment: turn the *Ratio* into a work in two parts, the first concerning doctrine and the other didactic practices. It was the year 1583, and

from the most remote Provinces some of our men were summoned to Rome: from Spain Giovanni Azor, from Portugal Gaspare Gonzalez, from France Giacomo Tirio, a Scotsman, from Austria Pietro Buseo, from northern Germany Antonio Guisano, in Rome dwelled Stefano Tuccio, all men of long experience in the realm of study and the schools, learned in almost all the disciplines, equally expert in the things pertaining to them in their Provinces. ... These found themselves in Rome and were presented to Gregory XIII by Claudio Acquaviva our General so that they might receive from God benediction from the hand of His Vicar; after His Holiness had praised so useful and grand enterprise, he urged them to use all diligence to accomplish it.⁴⁸

It became clear at once that the *Delectus Opinionum*, the section of the *Ratio* establishing the official doctrines of the Society, would present difficulties.⁴⁹ The commission prepared 597 propositions drawn from the *Summa*, with a commentary that should have guided the reading of the selection. Together with the draft of the “practical” section, it was given to the General in 1584. According to the process established by Acquaviva, the work was examined by the teachers of the *Collegio Romano* (who rejected the draft),⁵⁰ and then in 1586 sent to all the Provinces, where it provoked a lively reaction. Every Province forwarded its observations. The Portuguese Province appointed a commission – Pedro Fonseca, Serrão, Ferrer, Luis Molina, Alvar Lobo and Manuel de Góis – all of whom had been involved in the composition of the *Cursus Conimbricensis*. Unlike the Fathers of the *Collegio Romano*, who, expounding their arguments against the *Delectus* had said that “so many propositions of this kind will fuel arguments and dispute between professors, between themselves and the prefects of studies and superiors”,⁵¹ the Portuguese Fathers thought that the draft should be only slightly revised. Nevertheless, some of the rules in the *Delectus*, like the admonition not to

follow new opinions, unless allowed by the Provincial, fostered a core doubt: “It is unclear [*ambiguum est*], what it means for ‘new’ opinions [*quas opiniones novas appellet*].” And they asked themselves: “Are they the opinions that just now are being taught in that Province; or are they those that contradict the sentences transmitted from the teachers who had taught in the same school?” The Fathers’ conclusion was dictated by common sense: “In any case, it is not a good idea to force theology teachers into such a labyrinth.”⁵² The problem, for the Portuguese was not Aquinas’s authority, but that of his interpreters. How could a gradation of merit be established? Why should the ability to understand the *Summa* be denied to more recent scholars? “Why should others be obliged to follow the path of those who before them have embraced this or that opinion?”⁵³ And more:

It happens that in different colleges of the same province, as in Évora and Coimbra Colleges, or in different provinces, as in Rome or in Portugal, our teachers have taught different opposing doctrines. Which of their judgments should we adopt? Whose opinion will serve as guide to posterity?⁵⁴

The problem in the interpretation of Aquinas was not only one of the authority of the interpreter, a quality Fonseca and Molina certainly possessed. A philological question was also involved, and we shall have to examine it because it is another element that will recur transposed from theology to philosophy, in the question of the *Cursus*. The fifth rule of the *Delectus* prescribed that the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas be followed with few exceptions (*paucis exceptis*). But the question for the Portuguese was: “Can we can ask ourselves: of all the things that Aquinas taught to us, which should be considered true and which not?” Molina argued with the other members of the commission, but we deduce from the *observationes* that the Spaniard’s was not a majority view. When they came to analyse the section of the *Delectus* containing the opinions *liberae et definitae*, everybody, except Molina and Manuel de Góis, wanted the difficult propositions and obscure sentences to be explained and clarified with the help of the slim commentary attached by Acquaviva to the *Delectus*: “To all, except to Father Molina and Father de Goes, it has seemed proper to propose that, if it would useful to better understand the doctrine, a little commentary should be compiled on the fundamental principles, where it should be clearly stated which of them should be followed or avoided; most of all the more complicated and recondite.”⁵⁵

A barrage of objections that finally sank the *Delectus* project accompanied the observations of the Portuguese Fathers. Tuccio was appointed by Acquaviva in 1588 to review the draft, in order to find a synthesis of the many corrections proposed and the doubts raised by the entire Society. Tuccio’s revision was harshly criticized, once again, by the *Collegio Romano*, before being swept away by the Holy Office in 1590 with the words, “There is no need to print this booklet” (*Nullam esse necessitate imprimendi hunc libellum*).

With the Fifth General Congregation, the Society would abandon the speculative section of the *Ratio*, remaining faithful to the Ignatian principle of following Aquinas's teachings, but without specifying *which* of his many doctrines: as the Holy Office expressed itself, "not abbreviated, not mutilated, but in its entirety" (*non concisam, non mutilatam, sed integram*). The principle was established that Aquinas could not be reduced to a textbook, nor synthesized under the aegis of an entire Society. Thus, what was the *true* Aquinas, the Aquinas of the Society, was not established: the operation had been too dangerous and, most of all, did not follow the speculative spirit of the Jesuits. Teófilo Braga observes, with reason, that the Society under Acquaviva abandoned Aquinas, but the statement should be clarified by adding that Aquinas (like Aristotle) was at the time more a linguistic code than a consistent system of doctrines.

The abandonment of the *Delectus* meant surrendering the idea of an officially defined metaphysical structure; the Society actually could not consent to having embraced the culture of adaptation, accommodation, and probabilism (categories that it would formalize later, but that were already present in early Jesuit culture). The reasons behind the dismissal of the *Delectus* were those that helped to bring about the *Cursus Conimbricensis*: the utility of an Aristotle summarized for the classroom and the necessity of promoting the "Coimbran" brand.

The organizational section of the 1586 *Ratio* received many comments from the Provinces, but this time mainly over details.⁵⁶ The prescription of Álvares's *Grammatica* was unanimously well received, also by the Portuguese Fathers;⁵⁷ they expressed their opinion mostly over a few rules, for example, about homework (*in gymnasio potius, quam domi scribenda esse, et ratio et experientia docent*), the composition of the commissions for exams (*in examine tres esse examinatores non possunt, ubi tantus est discipulorum numerus quantus Conimbricae*), holidays and the length of rhetorical exercises,⁵⁸ timetables and so on. The Portuguese commission debated at length over the structure and order of the philosophy courses, expressing doubts about their duration, the practice of dictation and the organization of disputations. Following the Coimbra tradition,⁵⁹ influenced by French humanist practice, as we have noted, the duration of philosophical studies should be as brief as possible. Among the reasons for this reduction, the Commission included respect for the spirit of the fourth part of the *Constitutions* and the opportunity thereby to attend more academies: but a four-year course in philosophy was inappropriate most of all because

many auditors in Philosophy will run away, as soon as they hear of the four-year term; ... theologians will arrive sooner at the aim of their course if Philosophy lasts only three years, so we will have more of them; because anything you can explain in three years and a half can be also explained in three years only, with the addition of a preparatory course in Mathematics, cutting away many questions in Logic where our teachers

are accustomed to lose much time; and, most of all, abolishing dictation, *after the publication of the Commentaries that our teachers are writing in this Province* [italics in original].⁶⁰

The possibility of shortening the course to three years was connected to the abolition of dictation, an old question, as we have mentioned, in Parisian colleges. For the Portuguese, dictation in philosophy was not a problem in itself (as it was in theological courses), but a restriction that could be avoided with the publication of an official course, declared as forthcoming in 1586.

A number of teachers would like to abolish dictation in Theology in this Province. ... However, it should not be abolished from Philosophy at all, until we publish the *Commentaries in Aristotle* that are being compiled in this Province at the order of the General; of which our students and teachers can make use instead of the ordinary commentaries, which up to now were dictated. ... In the meanwhile, nothing must be changed in relation to dictation in Philosophy; otherwise it could be a disaster for the Philosophy course, because the effort and difficulty in understanding without dictation the things explained by the teachers in the preparatory courses would frighten the students.⁶¹

The Commission also established the philological approach to Aristotle, and which edition and translation would be suitable for Jesuit schools, concluding: "One version should be chosen from many, such as the one published by Manutius or the one published in Basel. And once this is joined to the ones we have in Rome, Florence and Paris, it should be emended, in case." Therefore, the *Observations* contained all the elements that would lead to the publication in 1592 of the first part of the *Cursus*, written by one of the less famous among the commission members, Manuel de Góis, but presented as a work of the whole Coimbra faculty.

The extraordinary mass of observations on the *Ratio* was sent to Rome from the Provinces in 1587, and Acquaviva once again appointed Tuccio and the other Fathers to write a new version of the document that would improve both the original and the revised version of 1586, in order to obtain the final text. The new version was tried in the colleges for three years, starting in 1591, but the reactions were negative. Acquaviva, at the end of this period, appointed a new commission for the final revision of the *Ratio*, entirely composed of Italians: Tuccio, Gerolamo Brunelli and Orazio Torsellini, author of a new *Grammatica*, partially drawn from Manuel Álvares's *De Institutione Grammatica*, that would replace the original.⁶² The *Ratio* was published in 1599 and remained substantially unchanged, after some touching up in 1616, until 1773.

While the *Ratio Studiorum* was being completed, the Portuguese Province proceeded to publish the *Cursus Conimbricensis*, commencing in 1592 and completing the process only in 1607 with Sebastião do Couto's *Dialectica*.

The work thereby satisfied one of the requests contained in the *Ratio*, i.e. uniformity and efficacy in the teaching process through an official textbook.⁶³

The *Cursus* covered the entire secondary school curriculum, together with Alvares's and Soares's manuals: the series was published in Coimbra and was a consistent product of Conimbrican educational culture. The college would follow the rules established by the *Ratio* and use its own textbooks for centuries, until Enlightenment culture closed the College of Arts and the history of the *Cursus*.

Notes

- 1 We do not agree with the usual presentation of the *Cursus* as a project of the Coimbra and Évora teachers. Authors and "ghost writers" had travelled to both cities, but the product was meant to present only the name of Coimbra, whose college enjoyed greater fame in the world than the recently founded Évora.
- 2 Cf. B. Teles, *Chronica da Companhia de Jesu na Provincia de Portugal*, 2 vols, Lisbon: Paulo Craesbeeck, 1645–1647; F. Rodrigues, *História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal*, 4 vols, Oporto: Livraria Apostolado da Imprensa, 1931–1950; D. Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise. The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540–1740*, Stanford University Press, 1996. On Portuguese Jesuits in Mercurian times: N. da Silva Gonçalves, "Jesuits in Portugal", in T. McCoog (ed.), *The Mercurian Project: Forming Jesuit Culture, 1573–1580*, Rome/St. Louis, MO: IHSI – The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2004, pp. 705–744.
- 3 The Society abandoned Santo Antão-o-Velho, which had become too small, in 1579 and began the construction of Santo Antão-o-Novo, opened fourteen years later. The Jesuits sold the old college to the Augustinians. In a letter from Loyola to Rodrigues we find some information about educational and organizational models: "Na carta de 1 de Dezembro de 1552 para que Simão Rodrigues proceda à abertura de escolas em Lisboa, Évora e noutras cidades, ele recomenda, não o modelo parisiense, mas o modelo do *Colégio Romano* que a sua Companhia fundara em Roma e que, alfim, numa aliança com as determinantes parisienses, constituiria o quadro metodológico do que nominaremos de *método jesuíta*." Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 22.
- 4 Ibid., p. 11.
- 5 Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 215. The students were compelled to repeat the lesson from 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. and from 8 to 9 p.m. According to the *modus parisiensis*, disputations were held at the Jesuit College for two hours on Sunday.
- 6 "In 1546, for example, Simão Rodrigues took in thirteen applicants but rejected another 40. By 1552, scarcely eleven years after Rodrigues and Xavier first reached Lisbon, the province counted 318 members. ... By 1560, the Society's membership reached 350; within another fourteen years it had increased to 522. By 1579 there were 550 members, more than twice as many as in the German provinces, and better than three times as many as in the Austrian province." Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, p. 36. The four Spanish provinces had 1,747 members in 1587, but the population was approximately six times larger than Portugal's.
- 7 Ibid., p. 35.
- 8 Braga, with his usual polemical tone, describes the establishment of the Society in Portugal as prompted by greed. A letter of General Mercurian, indeed, qualifies the Jesuits themselves as *rapaz de Coimbra*. "A accção dos Jesuitas em Portugal consistiu na aquisição de riquezas por meio de pleitos, doações ilícitas, expoliações de abbas e antigos mosteiros, incorporando as rendas nos Collegios, onde ministravam a instrução gratuita." *História da Universidade de Coimbra*, pp. 192–193.

- 9 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 192.
- 10 O'Malley speaks about a passage from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*: *The First Jesuits*, p. 329.
- 11 Cf. J. Vaz de Carvalho, "The Rehabilitation of Simão Rodrigues", in McCoog, *The Mercurian Project*, pp. 421–435, and J. Vaz de Carvalho, "Simão Rodrigues 1510–1579", *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu*, 59 (1990), pp. 295–314.
- 12 O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, p. 330.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 331.
- 14 Before taking the decision, he asked the opinion of some member of the Province, as well as of John III and of Queen Catherine, who (according to O'Malley) had become "less protective" of Rodrigues.
- 15 According to Vaz de Carvalho, Godinho, who represented the "strict" faction and was on good terms with the Crown, was actually the person who governed the province, concealing himself behind Mirão. Vaz de Carvalho, "The Rehabilitation of Simão Rodrigues", p. 424.
- 16 O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, p. 332. The desertions can be estimated at between 20 and 25 per cent of the members.
- 17 A letter from Cipriano Soares to Mercurian focuses on Gonçalves da Camara's role (ARSI, *Lus.*, 66, f. 54r). "Precipitous and immoderate by temperament, he dedicated himself to denigrating the reputation of Simão Rodrigues with such extreme passion that the very sound of Rodrigues's name so infuriated him that he lost all reason. To achieve his ends, Gonçalves da Camara did not hesitate to twist facts, vilify his adversaries, and exaggerate his praise of those who deserved censure instead." Vaz de Carvalho, "The Rehabilitation of Simão Rodrigues", p. 425.
- 18 "O Infante D. Luís entabulou negociações com o Padre Jerónimo Nadal, as quais se prolongaram no decurso de 1554 e o que mais favorecia a intenção do Infante era a dificuldade de arranjar novos professores." Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 18.
- 19 *Litt. Quadr.* II, 686 (16 May 1554); quoted by Codina Mir, *Aux sources*, p. 215. "Le fait que certains exercices pratiqués par les jésuites dans leur propre Collège – 'conclusions' des jeudis et des dimanches, par exemple – semblent doubler à partir d'un certain moment les exercices prescrits en principe au Collège des Arts, pourrait vraisemblablement indiquer que, dans ce dernier Collège, tous les exercices prévus par le règlement n'avaient réellement pas été appliqués."
- 20 "El Rey nosso senhor escusa o grande gasto que co'elle tinha antes que o tivesse a companhia, asi pollos grandes salarios dos mestres que S. A. mandava dar, como pollas muytas merces q' era necessario fazerlhes, tudo acusta de sua fazenda, alem do que della se despendia nas obras & fabrica, & ordenados de muitos officiaes que avia. Alem disto os companhia servem muiyto o Reyno no dito collegio ensinando com muyto cuidado, deligencia & exaccas as Artes, & Letras de humanidade, aos estudantes q ali acodem de todo o Reyno que ao presente com ser principio das licoes sao mil afora dugentos & quorenta que no mesmo collegio aprenden a leer & escrever. Escolhendo & ensinando o bo' dos livros, & evitando que nao ve fao o mao & nocivo, porque na idade tenra q nao tem disquericao & juizo pera se guardar, nao bebas a peconba q nelles ha. & asi se sabe manifestamente q depois que a companhia te' este collegio, fae delle to dollos anos grandes artistas, & da mesma maneira nas classes de latim em breve tempo se faze muitos muy bons latinos & muito aproveitados em prosa & verso." ARSI, *Collegia*, 1403/40/8, Coimbra (19), "Information del studio della Comp.a di Coymbra, et del frutto che n'esce". Cf. also Gomes, *Os conimbricenses*, on the crisis at the *Colégio Real* during the discord between *bordoleses* and *parisienses*: "a côrte preocupava-se principalmente com a existência de um corpo docente" (p. 18).
- 21 In 1556 a royal decree compelled the Dean to accept the college's teachers in the University of Coimbra faculty: "Por alguns justos respeitos, que me a isto movem, e pela boa informação qe tenho das letras e sufficiencia dos padres, Marcos Jorge, Pero da Fonseca, Sebastião Moraes, Pero Gomes, Jorge Serrão, Domingos

Cardoso, e Ignacio Martíns, do collegio da companhia de Jesus, dessa cidade, hei por bem e me praz, que sejam admittidos nessa Universidade, ao grau de mestres em Artes, e lhes seja nella dado o dicto grau, sem fazerem auto algum dos que mandam os estatutos.” Teixeira, *Documentos*, p. 217. An *alvará* followed on 30 January 1557 (p. 199).

- 22 Cf. M. Brandão, *A Universidade de Coimbra. Esboço da sua história*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1937; M. Brandão, *Documentos de D. João III*, 4 vols, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1937–1941; M. Brandão and L. Cruz (eds), *Actas dos Conselhos da Universidade de 1537 a 1557*, Coimbra: Arquivo da Universidade, 1941–1976; Aa.Vv., *História da Universidade em Portugal*, Coimbra: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997.
- 23 The Statutes mandated the *Professio Fidei* and the swearing of obedience to the Council every 1 October, opening classes. As Braga explains: “A submissão da Universidade a esta corrente de retrogradação manifestava-se na visita do bispo de Miranda, que levava uns novos Estatutos, redigidos sem conhecimento d’aquella corporação docente; e o predomínio jesuitico, que se preparava e empolgar a Universidade, é evidente na repugnancia invencivel de D. Sebastião em prestar o juramento de Protector, que, segundo vimos conforme o espirito da Edade média, obrigava o Poder temporal dos reis a defendel-a contra as invasões da auctoridade ecclesiastica. Sem o protectorado real, a Universidade ficava exposta a todas as tropelias.” *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 57.
- 24 Pedro Fonseca sent a letter to Acquaviva on 11 July 1592, beseeching him to refuse the submission of the college to the King’s and the university’s visitors. Cf. ARSI, *Lus.*, 71, f. 179r and v.
- 25 After the death of John III (1557), Queen Catherine was regent until 1562, followed by the *Cardinal-Infante* Henrique until 1568, when Sebastian was fourteen. Sebastian’s teacher was Amador Rebello SJ, his confessor Gaspar Mauricio SJ and *director absoluto do seu espirito* Luiz Gonçalves da Camara SJ. His brother, Martim Gonçalves da Camara SJ, would have been a *de facto* governor of the kingdom. The Queen complained about this situation in a letter to General Borgia (19 March 1571): “Todo o mundo sabe que os males, com que este reino está afflicto, tem por auctores alguns dos vossos Padres, que tiveram a maldade de aconselhar e El rei meu neto, que me fizesse levar e tirar fóra dos seus estados – O Padre Luiz Gonçalves he o principal auctor de todos os males de que eu me queixo.” Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 223.
- 26 The Venetian ambassador Tiepolo gives a description of the preceptor in a report: “É de idade de 50 anos, di brutta presenza, sem um olho, e semi-gago, instruido em theologia, e de vida mui devota. É odiado de todo o reino.” See *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- 27 Cf. F. Taveira da Fonseca, “The Social and Cultural Roles of the University of Coimbra (1537–1820). Some Considerations”, *e-JPH*, 5, 1 (2007), pp. 1–21. For a comparison with the Spanish context, see R. L. Kagan, *Students and Society in Early Modern Spain*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
- 28 The *alvará* (1 February 1558) was confirmed by Philip I in 1591 and Philip III in 1634. The decree prescribes also the composition of the exam commissions: “[O]s examinadores dos bachareis em Artes sejam sempre tres: a saber, dous da companhia de Jesus, quaes o reitor do dicto collegio das Artes ordenar, e um do corpo da Universidade, qual para isso for elegido conforme aos estatutos della, e que os examinadores dos licenciados em Artes sejam sempre cinco: a saber, tres da dicta companhia, quaes para isso der o reitor do dicto collegio, e os dous da Universidade, que forem elegidos da dicta maneira.” See Teixeira, *Documentos*, p. 403. The university wrote a letter of complaint to the Queen, to which she replied (13 May 1558) confirming all the privileges granted to the Jesuits by John III.

- 29 See Teixeira, *Documentos*, p. 410.
- 30 “Todos os religiosos da companhia de Jesus, que forem agraduados em Artes fora da Universidade da cidade de Coimbra pelos privilegios que a dicta companhia tem da sé apostolica, ou receberem o dicto grau de mestres em Artes em qualquer outra Universidade, ainda que seja fora de meus reinos possamo ler, examinar, presidir, dar graus, e exercitar quaesquer outros autos e ministerios pertencentes á dicta faculdade no collegio das Artes da dicta cidade e na dicta Universidade.” Ibid., p. 412.
- 31 Eight years later, Jorge Sarrano wrote to Acquaviva from Coimbra (2 May 1573), explaining the structure of the course, including “undici classi di latino, quattro corsi di reggenti di teologia, uno di casi, uno di greco e di ebraico”. ARSI, *Lus.*, 65, f. 191r.
- 32 *Estatutos de D. Sebastião para o Colégio das Artes*, in Teixeira, *Documentos*, p. 420.
- 33 “E os tres annos se lerá pela manha, e a tarde; e nos seis mezes do 4º anno se lerá sómente duas horas á tarde.” Ibid., p. 421.
- 34 *Quarta Pars, cap. XIV, art. 3*. Cf. M. Barbera, *La Ratio Studiorum e la Parte Quarta delle Costituzioni della Compagnia di Gesù*, Padua: CEDAM, 1942, p. 107.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 108–109.
- 36 “The most serious accusation leveled against Gonçalves da Camara was his alleged responsibility for Sebastian’s failure to marry. According to his detractors, he had prevented the King’s marriage so that he could retain his own influence at court. ... But as Rodrigues demonstrated, the Jesuit not only did not oppose the marriage but strongly urged that it should take place without delay. He was, in fact, one of the strongest proponents of a royal marriage. In spite of the urgency, the royal wedding was repeatedly postponed for different reasons, among them the intrigues and negligence in diplomatic and political negotiations and the presence of a supposed ‘secret disease’.” N. da Silva Gonçalves, “Jesuits in Portugal”, in McCoog, *The Mercurian Project*, p. 733.
- 37 See the chronicle of the Congregation written by Antonio Possevino as secretary (MSS ARSI, OO.NN., 333).
- 38 Cf. Silva Gonçalves, “Jesuits in Portugal”, p. 710. The author reports the joy of the King at Mercurian’s election: “For his own part, King Sebastian, in a letter sent from Évora on June 11, 1573, congratulated the new general and renewed his commitment to support the Society: ‘Your election to the office that the Lord wanted you to occupy was the source of tremendous personal joy. ... You can rest well assured that, due to the exceptional devotion I have for the Society and for you as its general, I will be most pleased to assist it in everything and to demonstrate my goodwill towards you in whatever may arise’” (pp. 710–711).
- 39 Portuguese rigorists thought that the indulgent attitude was a defect of the Society also outside the Province. A letter of the adjunct Dean of Santo Antão refers to a sentence by Fonseca that was *muy celebrado* among the Fathers: “Quelas cosas de la Companhia sequerian llevadas por blandura.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 65, f. 185. For the scholastic consequences, see O’Malley, *The First Jesuits*, pp. 244–253.
- 40 This prohibition was discussed at length in Provincial congregations. Against the prohibition, promoted by Luís Gonçalves da Camara, Luís Molina (teacher in Évora and, later, in Coimbra) wrote a letter to Acquaviva on 23 March 1573, beseeching a change in leadership for the Province (ARSI, *Lus.*, 65, ff. 167–170).
- 41 According to Vaz de Carvalho, the rigorists feared the consequences of this comeback. “The most disturbed was Gonçalves da Camara, who, according to Serrão, was ‘melancholic and worried at the return of Fr Master Simon’ [ARSI, *Lus.*, 66, f. 294v]. Despite everything, he and his partisans charitably and skillfully dissimulated their displeasure and frustration.” Vaz de Carvalho, “The Rehabilitation of Simão Rodrigues”, p. 430.

- 42 Simão Rodrigues to Mercuriano, Braga, 30 June 1574, in MHSI, *Bröet*, pp. 769–771 (quoted in da Silva Gonçalves, “Jesuits in Portugal”, p. 717, n. 34).
- 43 “On 4 August 1578, the forces led by a determined but inexperienced and reckless young monarch, Sebastian, suffered what one historian has termed ‘the most disastrous battle in Portuguese history’, a battle that cost the nation its king and its independence.” Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, p. 81. With Serpe, Ignacio Martíns and thirteen other Jesuits left for Africa. Six of them were captured.
- 44 Braga, *História da Universidade de Coimbra*, p. 72.
- 45 In Spain Dominicans were closer to the Crown than Jesuits: “Philip’s attitude toward the Jesuits, which was consistently one of hostility toward their activities in Europe but supportive of their efforts overseas.” Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, pp. 91–92. “Because the three Philips were served by Dominican rather than Jesuit confessors, Portuguese Jesuits did not have access to the same quality of confidential information at court as their predecessors, nor were they in positions to influence royal policies” (p. 91).
- 46 Opposition to the Prior of Crato was a consistent Jesuit position during all the campaigns around the succession: “António was even more angry with the Jesuits and, indeed, with greater cause. Members of the Society never supported his succession, not only because they rejected his claim but also because they believed that he lacked the necessary qualities and, perhaps, because of his evident antipathy towards them. Among other accusations, António blamed the Jesuits for Cardinal Henry’s annulment of his legitimacy, complaining to Pope Gregory XIII that Henry made this decision as a result of Jesuit pressure.” Silva Gonçalves, “Jesuits in Portugal”, p. 737.
- 47 Braga, *Historia da Universidade de Coimbra*, pp. 80–81.
- 48 Possevino, *Coltura degl’ingegni*, pp. 200–201. Chapter 38 of the book (“Diligenza, che si usò nello stabilire il modo de’ studi de’ Collegi della Compagnia di Gesù”) is in fact the first history of the *Ratio Studiorum*.
- 49 Ibid., p. 201.
- 50 “Il ‘Delectus opinionum’, che pure era stata operazione estremamente laboriosa, andò incontro ad una critica demolitrice. Non solo l’eccesso definitorio era giudicato inutile, ma controproducente: non giovava alla dottrina teologica, né contribuiva a creare l’auspicata armonia tra i docenti; oltre tutto era impraticabile. Era necessario semplificare quella che appariva una disorganica e confusa congerie.” M. Zanardi, “La *Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Iesu*: tappe e vicende della sua progressiva formazione (1541–1616)”, *Annali dell’Educazione e delle Istituzioni Scolastiche*, 5 (1998), p. 151.
- 51 *Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Iesu* (henceforth *MP*), VI, p. 31.
- 52 “Utcunque regula haec intelligatur, non videntur theologiae professores in eas angustias coercendi.” Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 “Accedit, quod in diversis eiusdem provinciae collegiis, ut in eborensi et conimbriensi, vel in diversis provinciis, ut in romana et lusitana, nonnunquam praeceptores nostri contraria docuerunt. Quorum ergo iudicio standum erit? Aut quam sententiae ducem posteriores sequentur?” Ibid., p. 82.
- 55 “Omnibus, excepto patre Ludovico Molina et patre Emmanuele Goes, visum est proponere ut, si expedire videtur, ad maiorem doctrinae facilitatem, separato aliquo commentariolo nostris conscripta tradantur praecipua fundamenta opinionum, quae ipsis fugiendae vel sequendae particulatim designatur; earum praesertim, quae magis reconditae et implicatae sunt.” Ibid., p. 84.
- 56 An interesting document in ARSI, undated but probably of 1586, contains nine observations on the draft, where the practices of Coimbra College did not comply

with the prescriptions from Rome. For example: “Nec item observantur id ... quod studiosis philosophiae et Theologiae in memoriam reducetur quod cum ad domos venerint, studijs absolutis, in omnibus facultatibus, quibus operam dederint, sunt examinandi.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 56r.

57 *MP*, VI, pp. 319–332.

58 “Duobus extremis anni mensibus ita languent studia in hac provincia, tum propter aestivos calores, tum simul ob auditorum in patrias abeuntium paucitatem, ut incommodum atque inutile omnino sit eo tempore rhetoricae praecepta discipulis tradere; ideoque compendium rhetoricae ex Cypriano in classibus humanitatis a principio martii explicari solet.” *Ibid.*, p. 385.

59 “Nec conimbricense nec eborense collegium philosophiae cursum triennio absolvit; hoc enim transacto, adhuc philosophi semestri spatio unam audiunt philosophiae lectionem per duas horas a prandio.” *Ibid.*, p. 270.

60 “quia hac ratione plures habebit philosophia auditores, quos quadriennii nomen deterret, et ab eloquentiae gymnasio ad iuris prudentiam trasmittit ... – quia redacta ad triennium philosophia, citius theologi sui cursus metam attingent, eritque proinde etiam maior numerus. – quia omnia quae nunc tribus annis et dimidio explincatur, triennio absolvi poterunt, addita praelectione mathematicae; resectis multis logicae quaestionibus, quibus nostrates magistri tempus terunt; ac praesertim amota dictatione, postquam commentaria, quae nostri in hac provincia moliuntur, in lucem prodierint.” *Ibid.*, p. 270.

61 “Interim nihil, quod ad dictandi morem in philosophia spectat, immutandum videtur in hac provincia; alioqui vehementer timendum est, ne in ea magnam faciat philosophia iacturam, et labor difficultasque excipiendi sine dictatione, quae a praeceptoribus praeleguntur, studiosos deterreat.” *Ibid.*

62 “In the 1599 text of the *Ratio* it was granted that the first edition of Álvarez could be replaced by the so-called ‘Roman’, printed in 1584 and edited by Orazio Torsellini, at that time a professor in the *Collegio Romano*. In this version the second part, dealing with syntax, had been reformulated in line with the grammatical tradition followed in the Italian schools” [“Nel testo del 1599 della *Ratio* si concedeva di sostituire la prima edizione dell’Alvarez con la cosiddetta ‘Romana’, stampata nel 1584, a cura di Orazio Torsellini, allora professore al Collegio Romano, in cui la seconda parte, riguardanti la sintassi, era stata riformulata secondo la tradizione grammaticale in uso nelle scuole italiane”]. A. Bianchi, “Introduzione”, *Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu. Ordinamento degli studi della Compagnia di Gesù*, Milan: RCS, 2002, p. 51.

63 The adoption of a textbook for the study of Philosophy meant lowering Philosophy itself to the level of a high-school discipline, even though the *Ratio* considers it one of the major courses, with theology and scripture. In the seventeenth century the Society continued to compile and publish textbooks, manuals and compendia. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

3 The *Cursus*

The *Cursus Conimbricensis* was meant to be a comprehensive set of textbooks. It consists of the serial publication of eight volumes containing commentaries on the complete works of Aristotle, except for the *Metaphysics*. The Conimbricenses published these volumes between 1592 and 1606 and, with the exception of the insertion of the treatise *De Anima Separata* by Alvares and a small treatise by Magalhães in the commentary on the *De Anima*, they were presented as a collective work without any indication of authorship. They were intended as textbooks for the Colleges of the Arts: that this was their purpose should be emphasized, because it implies all the difficulties that the authors encountered during its thirty- or forty-year gestation.

First of all, why Aristotle? Because Aristotle, though no longer considered “the Philosopher” after the fifteenth century, never ceased to be considered the *lexicon* of philosophy. The philosophy of classes, colleges and universities, one could argue, but none the less the structure, background and toolbox for those “scientists”, psychologists, linguists and others who continued to frequent the classrooms of Padua-Paris-Alcalá, well beyond the age of Galileo. Aristotle is *the* philosophy course. It is discipline, even before being science. The programme followed for three and a half years by the arts students is marked by the reading of his texts.

The sixteenth century, which opened with the decline of Aristotelianism – taken by surprise and virtually struck down by the banking-manorial culture of the Platonists of the Medici court – would generate a new Aristotle, Greek and Neo-Latin, thanks to the success of the humanistic return *ad fontes*. So editions and commentaries, new translations and skilled copy-and-paste techniques will act as bellows to the almost cold embers of the medieval Aristotle, who will continue to smoulder in the universities, igniting debates and setting off endless discussions. We will see later how the *Cursus* fits into this story, which for years has no longer been considered decaying or decayed, up to the invention (or importation) of the telescope. To summarize the question, the *Cursus* does not speak *of* Aristotle, but *with* Aristotle. And this Aristotle must be suitable for college students (i.e. the College of Arts). That is, the “*modus parisiensis*” of *lectio*, *repetitio*, exercises and disputations, training

efficiency and teaching practice which reaches Coimbra with Ramus's wind in its sails: because philosophy is preparatory, it must be made easier, adapted to the level of competence, it would be said today.

Therefore, a *Cursus*. No more time wasted in dictating. The duration of the arts course must be shortened, and the students' attention must be focused on the processing phase rather than on the assimilation phase. The entirety of Aquinas's educational system (as many traces of it as we can find) shatters to pieces. School time is intended for exercises: *themata* in class for rhetoric students, disputations and *quaestiones* also on feast days for philosophy students of all years, all the way to their degrees. Therefore, the text and its explanatory glosses cannot be the core of the curriculum. The centre of the class is the disputation, which follows the reading and moves away from it.

It would be wrong, however, to think that insistence on the disputation was designed by the Conimbricenses at the expense of philology: the strengthening of the scholastic exercise, on the contrary, merged with a typically humanistic attention towards conveying Aristotle's "true" text. And, along with the text, the *Cursus* was to meet the Catholic need to confirm a solidly Christian Aristotle against (or along with) the interpretations of those first great Greek commentators whose texts had returned to Europe from Byzantium via Florence, and which Manutius and Froben had been printing for about fifty years, distributing them to all the universities.

We shall see (with the testimony also of a very special pupil, Descartes) if this operation did in fact lead to an enhancement of the students' ability to speculate or, on the contrary, to its mortification, and if the result of a Christian doctrinal unity in Aristotle was reached. Anyway, these were among the strongest educational needs which led to the development of the *Cursus*. António Manuel Martins, referring to the letter with which Nadal ordered the edition of the *Commentaries* to commence, stated:

It was intended in this way that the two principal strategic goals would be reached: 1) to significantly alter the teaching and learning process by putting the emphasis on assimilation of contents through the more active methods of interpretation and the discussion of themes; 2) to guarantee with more efficacy the doctrinal unity in the sense of excluding preliminarily that which was judged incompatible with church doctrine.¹

We find the first testimony of the genesis of the *Cursus* in a letter which the Provincial Miguel de Torres wrote to Rome on 9 February 1560, stating that a professor in the College of Arts had already prepared a good part of his dictations for a possible printing.² The fact that the anonymous professor was actually Pedro Fonseca is proved by the convergence of objectives between the following letter by Nadal, in 1561, and the Preface to the *Institutiones Dialecticae*, published in 1564 by Fonseca himself. Referring to the practice of dictation, Fonseca writes:

Actually this way of teaching, although it was far better and more useful than the one used before, none the less, due to the continuous writing, meant incredible bother and difficulty for the student (not to mention the teachers). In fact, the time that could have been more usefully employed in teaching and debating, not without great inconvenience was lost dictating.³

Fonseca's Introduction echoes Nadal's letter, in which the Visitor of the Portuguese province wrote:

To avoid the hassle of writing as much as is written today, provision should be made to print a written course and Father Fonseca should take chief responsibility for this.⁴

Nadal appointed Fonseca, with a committee of three: Marcos Jorge, Cipriano Soares and Pedro Gomes.⁵ "Once the course is printed, the students must not write, unless the teacher intends to take note of a difficult passage, or something notable; and then the teacher may read in this manner."⁶ Fonseca was thus entrusted with a task on which he had already been working for some time and, contrary to what is usually stated in the literature, he accepted the responsibility with the enthusiasm of someone who was to lead a research *équipe*.⁷ Of course, time was still a problem: Fonseca was engaged in drafting the *Institutiones Dialecticae*, which would see the light of day in 1564, while Soares, the most prominent name in the group, would publish his *Rhetorica* in 1562. On 14 January that year, Fonseca wrote to Nadal reporting the status of the work: once the committee met to discuss how to proceed, Fonseca had immediately highlighted the lack of texts and recent literature on Aristotle at their disposal. He had then suggested that, while waiting to receive the books purchased in Venice by Father Adorno, the commission should initiate a preliminary study of the problems to be treated, with the collaboration of some teachers and theologians who would be requested to give specific suggestions on the work ahead. The preparatory phase of the research, basically aimed at delving into issues and possible disputes, rather than at studying the text (a task which Fonseca probably wanted to reserve for himself), reveals from the start the pragmatic character of the work plan. Fonseca thus explained to Father Gonzaga the mandate with which he had been entrusted: "Meanwhile, let us discuss the subjects, let us raise doubts, so that everything becomes clearer, and I will give you a memorandum for teachers and some theologians, so that in the meantime each could write down in their notebooks doubts and everything else that comes to mind in the course of their studies."⁸ The letter also bears witness to the extreme organizational tenacity which Fonseca had allotted to work schedules and the distribution of tasks: he would dedicate two hours a day, Soares one, Marcos Jorge half an hour, in proportion to the responsibilities and other occupations that each had.⁹ Soares was to devote himself to the mathematical aspects present in Aristotle, providing geometry

examples and demonstrations, quotations related to disciplines such as cosmography, astrology and perspective: this implied reading *De Coelo*, *Meteororum*, the fourth chapter of Sacrobosco's *De Sphaera*, but also Pliny's *De Origine Fontium* and perusing Cicero's philosophical writings. While Marcos Jorge would make a selection of issues raised by Duns Scotus, and other natural issues in Seneca and Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fonseca "já que V. R. [Nadal] me dava a parte maior no assunto" would dedicate his time to the collation of Aristotelian literature.

Martins believes that Aquinas's absence from the list of commentators is not significant; on the contrary, the selection of commentators is in fact indicative of the doctrines which will prevail in the commentaries: Scotism, for example, is the key by which today the most attentive scholars of the Conimbricán *De Signis* read the dialectics of the *Cursus*. On the other hand, the methodology adopted by Fonseca in carrying out his task leaves no room for doubt: reading all of Aristotle "apontando as dúvidas e as boas exposições com dois ou três graves intérpretes como por cifras".

Jorge was left with substantial freedom of choice in the vast panorama of natural issues, and yet the three *graves interpretes* (Scotus, Seneca and Alexander of Aphrodisias), whom Fonseca recommends, represent readings which are well removed from Aquinas. It must be remembered that the *via Scoti* was considered to be such a radical alternative to the Thomist current that the University of Padua was persuaded to create two different teaching posts. And while Seneca was in some way a reflection of Pliny in the work of Soares, Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the other hand, represented the *nouvelle vague* of turn-of-the-century Padua, where Pomponazzi had radically questioned the immortality of the soul with his Alexandrian *odorat immortalitatis*. These were authors, therefore, highly controversial for a philosophical work designed to be distributed in the colleges of an entire Society, authors suggested by Fonseca and (obviously) related to his preferences.

Fonseca firmly believed in the sharing of the labours which he had suggested to the commission, and was overly optimistic when he wrote to Nadal that "within two or three years, if we proceed as I suggest, and the other teachers and theologians will help us, the subject will be disposed of in such a way that we will complete the entire course in a short time, and with the commitment, practically, of a single person".¹⁰ The *Cursus*, in fact, would see the light of day only many years later, as a result of the work of another Coimbra professor, Manuel de Góis, after Fonseca had abandoned the project.

Within two years Fonseca, instead, finished his *Institutiones dialecticae*, in the Introduction to which he retraced – pleased, but with a guilty conscience – the situation which had brought about his assignment:

It necessarily had to happen that not all books designated for the Philosophy curriculum would be concluded, and that the practice of the disputation was not to be such a frequent and daily occurrence as we had hoped. And so to provide for the students work, and to repair the damage

done to Philosophy studies, the Superiors of our Society, to whom nine years before this Royal College of Liberal Arts had been entrusted by the Most Christian King John III, decided that I should dedicate a few years to a Philosophy, through which to expound with brevity and perspicuity those books of Aristotle that were usually explained to Philosophy students.¹¹

Fonseca, therefore, presented his *Institutiones* as the first instalment of a work that clearly went beyond the time limits that he had set for himself:

They believed that in this way, and with my diligence, and through the work of the printers, not only would the strain on students decrease, but also some light and utility would be given to these studies. Indeed, since I was cognizant of the frailty of my intelligence, inasmuch as I was allowed by obedience this weight, which I felt overburdened my shoulders, I was forced to refuse it. However they, in whose voice I recognize Christ, moved by the desire to benefit others rather than by my wit (or rather weakness), wanted to make an attempt, so that I would not disregard any opportunity to do my duty. Therefore, because I cannot refuse this commitment imposed on me, I will work with the utmost diligence, so that as far as I am concerned, should I not satisfy the desires of others, at least I will not miss the summons of those to whom I have entrusted my life. In the meantime, however, as I write commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, I offer these *Dialectical Institutions* as a token of our agreement, and as something necessary to those who want to be admitted into the chambers of Philosophy.¹²

The *Cursus* project continued to plod on even after the publication of Fonseca's work, also because of the intrusion of other interlacing assignments, such as teaching elsewhere (Fonseca read theology at Évora from 1564 to 1566) and becoming Rector of Coimbra, and because of the scant commitment on the part of the other commissioners to fulfilling their assigned tasks (as Gomes confesses to General Borgia in 1569). This does not mean that drafts or material were not available for a possible printing, which, by the way, Rome began to solicit. What was missing, paradoxically, was a clear line of coordination, with Fonseca obviously lacking organizational skills or, more likely, a real desire to conclude.¹³

Proof of this is the fact that since the publication of his *Dialectics*, Fonseca's contribution to the drafting of the course resembled a voice becoming ever less distinct, despite the growing pressure being brought by Provincials and Generals to finish the work. Thus, Fonseca was relieved of his position as Rector, and he could now devote himself to assembling the material (which in the meantime had become quite extensive), writing glosses in painstaking detail. The work was beset by interruptions since, as we have seen, in 1573 Fonseca left with the Portuguese delegation for the General Congregation

which elected Mercurian Superior General. The prolonged delay irritated the Provincial, Jorge Serrão, who urged Fonseca's return, at least to complete what he obviously considered to be that part of the *Cursus* to which the teacher had devoted himself for some time: the commentary to the *Metaphysics*. Fonseca, in fact, had, curiously, chosen this section of the work, but for a personal reason that eluded the Provincial: the first volume of the *Commentarii in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* would in fact be printed in 1577, not as a collective Conimbricatan work, but with Fonseca as the sole author. The operation had been subtly anticipated by the author himself, when, having conceived the idea before leaving for Rome, he had asked the Provincial Luís Gonçalves da Camara for authorization to modify the publication sequence of the volumes, commencing precisely with the *Metaphysics*.

This proposal modified the traditional order of the Aristotelian canon¹⁴ (to which the arts courses conformed), according to which metaphysics should have been placed at the end; none the less, Fonseca had obtained permission from the Provincial. The successor of Gonçalves da Camara, Jorge Serrão, under pressure from Rome, had relied on the *Metaphysics* in his reply that, yes, the first volume would be published shortly, but at the same time he expressed concern for the continuation of the work. The result was both exciting and disappointing: Manuel Rodrigues, who had been appointed Provincial for Portugal by the newly elected Mercurian in contrast to the rigorist movement which had united Gonçalves da Camara to Fonseca and Ignacio Martíns, had the opportunity to read the glosses in advance. He found the commentary very learned, but unsuitable for the ears of arts students. This criticism must have spread and reached Fonseca's ears, if he felt compelled to return to the topic in the Preface to the second edition of his *Institutiones Dialecticae* (1574):

Since there is no type of Philosophy student to whom the books of the First Philosophy, which are called *Metaphysics*, should not be familiar, such as those mentioned everywhere by tutors, and to whom a thorough dissertation of the most common problems, that occur in the other Philosophy books, is often denied: so I believed it to be a simpler method, for me to write and for Philosophy students to understand, if I first presented those things, which contain all the principles of Philosophy, and almost the fundamentals. After assimilating these, other things will be more easily understood by them ... and more clearly and briefly explained by me, as is evident to anyone.¹⁵

The difficulty understanding the commentary on the *Metaphysics* (which after all will ensure Fonseca's reputation as an intellectual) is the result of two basic tensions in the relationship between Fonseca and the *Cursus*: on the one hand, the fame-seeking professor working on texts designed for the community of learned men; on the other, the textbook that should make easier and shorter the student's path towards knowledge of a basic Aristotle, on which to exercise

his dialectical skills. For this reason, Fonseca's *Dialectics* and *Metaphysics*, in some way the beginning and end of an ideal course, do not suit the purpose of the royal school: the *Cursus* will actually exclude both from its publication project, considering them already completed by its coordinator, but always treating them as external, non-communicating, foreign bodies.¹⁶ The first volume of the *Commentarii Petri Fonsecae d. theologi Societatis Iesu in libros methaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae* came out in 1577, and Fonseca immediately set the record straight:

In the explanation of those books which contain the inferior disciplines [the *Institutiones Dialecticae* and the comment on Porphyry's *Isagoge*], and which are almost schoolbooks [lit.: *classici*], and which are normally explained in class for a given and limited amount of time, we had refrained from discussing those difficulties that belong to the First Philosopher, and that would require a greater intellect on the part of the students and a longer disputation: not a few of these are, nowadays, and even in preparatory philosophy studies, discussed by many, with great harm to youth. When it is necessary to mention them elsewhere (which happens often), it would be best to refer to this book, in which we believe we have explained them more accurately.¹⁷

Fonseca's *Metaphysics* was therefore of scant utility from a pedagogical perspective, and the Portuguese Province returned to pressure the Superior General into urging a final draft of the *Cursus*, probably hoping that Fonseca would be dismissed from the task.¹⁸ Mercurian acceded to the request, but in the same year he died, and the new Superior General, Acquaviva, was immediately faced with the issue of replacing Fonseca.

At this point Luís Molina, in those years serving as a teacher in Évora and Lisbon, appears on the scene to renew a Portuguese tradition: the succession of pairs of Jesuits in conflict with each other for supremacy, whether in the realms of power or culture. Acquaviva writes to the Portuguese Province ordering a review of the material already available for publication, which he augured would be imminent. In the mind of the Superior General, therefore, the realization of the work went beyond the Portuguese border and was a matter for the entire Society. Acquaviva's letter caught the Portuguese off guard: orphaned by Fonseca, leader of the project until recently, there is no material ready for printing. Molina, a few years younger than Fonseca and, moreover, a Spaniard on Portuguese soil, takes the first of many steps which will annoy the former head of the *Cursus* project: he writes directly to Acquaviva suggesting the idea of printing the dictations of the arts course between the years 1563 and 1567, in other words the course he himself had taught.¹⁹ This attempt to nominate himself, to which the wise Acquaviva gave no heed, started the long *querelle* between Fonseca and Molina, who for a full twenty years will find a way to be at odds with one another over the *Cursus*, on a theological find (but a very fortunate one), over the drafting of the *Ratio*

Studiorum. Even if dismissed from the task, Fonseca will actually never cease to oversee the work, with a tenacity that, however, will not discourage the good intentions of his successor Manuel de Góis.

Molina described himself to the Superior General as the authority for many Portuguese Fathers to resolve their doubts regarding philosophy and theology:²⁰ his fame had increased and, in his opinion, the Coimbra course could have been printed under his name. As Gomes relates, “Era a luta por uma autoria nominal, em contra do projecto colegial. Repetia – se com Molina o que em parte determinara Pedro da Fonseca – a predominancia do nominal afrontando o comum.”²¹ Acquaviva, obviously in tune with the Portuguese Province, which was hoping through the *Cursus* to enhance its own reputation among the colleges of the Society in Europe and in the world, decided to nominate one of the leading philosophy professors of the time: Manuel de Góis, a teacher since 1574. Acquaviva chose him. This selection did not please Molina, who took the opportunity to fully express his frustrations to the Superior General: the Portuguese treated him as a foreigner and cultivated a nationalist jealousy over the ownership of the *Cursus* project. Molina, Spanish and blatantly ambitious, was being criticized for the quality of his Latin and continually hindered in the drafting of his personal *cursus*: Fonseca had to be the person inspiring these innuendos, since “muchos años ha que siento en el Padre Afonseca aversion, y disfavor a mis cosas”.

The hostility between the two is not surprising. We have already seen that, apart from the nationality issue, Fonseca and Molina were on opposite sides also with respect to the way the Province should be governed: the former was close to Manuel Rodrigues, the latter to Gonçalves da Camara. The division was therefore political and extremely serious, precisely during the years in which Mercurian had to put in order the internal government of the province and the Portuguese Jesuits were struggling with the troubles related to the defeat at Ksar el Kebir. Clearly, the race to be assigned the authorship of the Conimbrican *Commentaries* coincided with a race for intellectual supremacy within the Portuguese Society. Fonseca and Molina immediately accused each other of plagiarism: the latter felt defrauded of his glosses, which – with the appointment of Manuel de Góis – ended up in material which would not bear his name. On the other hand, Fonseca would suffer the same frustrations as a result of Molina’s international success following the publication in 1588 of his famous *Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis*.

The case is well known. The years in which Molina battles to impose his dictations on the *Cursus* are the same years in which he is drafting the book that will make him famous in the history of the Church. In 1586, in fact, the Provincial Sebastião de Moraes, probably exhausted by Molina’s persistent pressures, makes the gesture of asking Acquaviva’s consent for the publication of Molina’s *cursus*. Moraes did not want to leave himself vulnerable to Molina’s criticism: Molina, as he himself declared, without that gesture would have considered Moraes an opponent along the same lines as unspecified “others”. Soon afterwards, however, Moraes once again wrote to Acquaviva

requesting that Molina be removed, because “dá-nos cá bastante incómodo, e ele só nos embaraça muito com suas coisas e opiniões”.²² Acquaviva will comply with this request in 1591, ordering Molina to return to Spain, and finally freeing the *Cursus* for a final resolution.²³ The *Cursus* in the meantime had been properly organized by Manuel de Góis, but had been lying idle because of Molina’s criticism since 1584.

In 1588 Molina, while publishing his *Concordia* in Lisbon, had in the meantime launched one of the most famous and bitter controversies between religious orders after the Council of Trent, the *de auxiliis* dispute.²⁴ He had done so not without striking a blow at Coimbra. In fact, on the title page Molina refers to himself as belonging to Évora, and it is this university which he mentions when, in the letter of dedication to Cardinal Albert of Austria, Viceroy of Portugal on behalf of his uncle Philip, he wrote: “Accipe igitur, Princeps Serenissime, placido hilarique vultu laboris nostri primitias, *non intempestivos* Academiae Eborensis fructus” (italics in original).²⁵ Might not the expression *non intempestivos*, apart from the routine reverence being paid, hint at the still unfulfilled efforts of the Coimbra *Cursus*, where the college, or its eminent professors, had the result at their fingertips and had not followed through? But the gibe might have gone unnoticed if the *Concordia* had not suggested a *new* theological solution to the question of the relationship between human free will and divine omnipotence, which would turn it into a publishing sensation throughout Europe.

The issue, raised by the Lutheran *sola fide* and by the theory of predestination connected to it, was at the centre of theological debate during the first period of the Council of Trent (1545–1547); the Church had emerged from it with a series of canons and decrees which had the intention of guaranteeing merit to actions, but none the less had not yet finally clarified the outline of the relationship between the power of man and the knowledge of God. In light of this ambiguity, which was both cultural and legal, from that moment there was a vast output of Catholic literature, which circulated widely from theology classes to theatrical representations. Faithful to the postulate of the Fifth Lateran Council,²⁶ Catholic intellectuals plunged into unravelling an inextricable tangle, that of the definition of grace, in which the differences between the proposed solutions had to be more of emphasis than of substance, but that soon turned into a fratricidal struggle in which excommunications became a common weapon: some of the contenders were branded as Erasmians, Lutherans, unrepentant Calvinists; others as Pelagian heretics. The Church’s theological borders were often determined by the power relations and political boundaries already established between orders and families. The *de auxiliis* controversy, which opposed Dominicans to Jesuits, was the most salient example.

The first fires of the controversy were lit in Spain, where since 1567 the Dominican Domingo Bañez had been taking a series of public actions in opposition to the theories of the Jesuit Prudencio Montemayor and Friar Luis de Leon: at issue was whether the merit of Christ was enhanced, or not,

by the fact that he had willingly fulfilled his divine obligation to die on the cross. Behind the positing of the problem was the question of the “human” freedom of Christ, and, in view of his exemplary causality, of the possibility for man to cooperate with divine providence. The disputed point opened an abyss between the defence of a theological doctrine of rationalistic stamp, which smacked of Pelagianism, and a revival of a voluntaristic theology (curiously supported by the order of Aquinas), heir to the pre-Albertus Magnus tradition and, in the sixteenth century, not far removed from the scandalous Luther. In the Spain of the Dominican Inquisition, Prudencio of Montemayor and Friar Luis de León were not blessed with good luck: the Inquisition pronounced sentence in 1582, and the two were forced to give up teaching theology.

When the *Concordia* appeared in 1588, the embers were still glowing, although Molina, for his part, had an advantage: his ideas had been condemned in Spain, but not in Portugal. The work is presented as the first true systematization of ideas already affirmed by Montemayor, and, ultimately, the first real in-depth theological work. The Dominicans from the start claimed that it resembled ideas already condemned in Spain, but in this case the Society responded by appealing to Rome, to avoid the issuance of a second sentence against one of its members which would have risked involving the rest of the order.

Pope Clement VIII took the case upon himself and imposed silence on the parties, even if, at the insistence of Philip II, who believed the Spanish Inquisition to be the most appropriate venue for resolving the dispute, he agreed that the censures of the *Concordia* should be drawn up in Spain. Domingo Bañez took it upon himself to compile the most detailed collection of observations in criticism of Molina, the *Apologia fratrum praedicatorum ... adversus novas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludovici Molinae nuncupati*, and sent it to Rome in 1598, along with other censorious material.

Clement VIII, unhappy about the condemnation of Molina’s theories, urged both Dominicans and Jesuits to discuss the matter privately, prohibiting public mutual recriminations, but the debate became so fierce that he was forced to create a new body in the Roman Curia (1602), the *Sacra Congregatio de Auxiliis*, and to preside over its sessions. Pope Aldobrandini died in 1605, suffering a stroke during one of these sessions, and the controversy went on for another two years, until in 1607 Pope Paul V decided to terminate the activities of the Congregation, stating that both doctrines, Dominican and Jesuit, should be considered orthodox. As Echevarría recalls: “Los jesuitas, exultantes ante el fallo, aclamaron a Molina *victor* y lo celebraron con festejos públicos, que incluyeron fuegos artificiales, músicas y corridas de toros.”²⁷

The acclamation for Molina placed even more emphasis on the political importance of the theology proposed by the *Concordia*. But what innovation had Molina introduced in theology? The *Concordia* intended to defend man’s free will in relation to his salvation. Given the heresy of Pelagianism, which sustained the possibility for the righteous individual to save themselves

without the assistance of divine grace, Molina intended to defend, as far as possible, human beings' freedom to act and their merits in the presence of God. Molina opposed the one justifying grace of Lutheran ancestry, which saved humanity without merit and before all time, and proposed a wide range of graces, increasingly toned down in relation to the splendid power of God, of which "sufficient grace" was the extreme and almost diaphanous shade: the one that no one can say they do not have. The guarantee of a sufficient grace contributing to one's own contrition (the act of retreating within ourselves which allows us to prepare for the supernatural intervention of God) or even just to the slightest sign of attrition, opened for humans the space of free will, and therefore the obligation to perform good deeds to deserve heaven.

It was, however, a matter of describing a mostly rational God, and a mostly human reason: the one judging had to be similar to the one judged. This was a pride that Luther, faithful interpreter of the Letter to the Romans, had excluded as deeply sinful. But the profile of God's attributes, which until then had fluctuated between Thomistic rationalism and Augustinian voluntarism, was not the only problem to solve for the *Concordia*. Free will, being free also from that physical predetermination affirmed by Bañez which somehow "forced" humanity to self-determination, opened a gap in God's omniscience, which in free will seemed to meet an insurmountable barrier. Aquinas had tried to solve the problem by distinguishing, in divine knowledge, two sciences: the science of *essences*, before the divine act of will and the science of *vision*, subsequently. With the former, God knows the essential and all of the possible, since it is the science of simple intelligence, and concerning all things regardless of their existence. The science of vision is on the contrary a science of existence, and thus concerns, in consequence of the divine act of will, everything that happens in time: God knows, among all of the possible, what will actually take place. With the science of vision, God cannot know the opposite of what he knows according to it. In this system, Molina introduces the concept of *middle science*, which deals with the so-called conditioned future, not absolute nor merely possible. With it, God sees in his essence how any entity, endowed with free will, will operate in each of the infinite orders of things and circumstances in which God's will could place it.²⁸ Such a science is *middle*, in the sense that not only is it between the science of simple intelligence and the science of vision, but also because it shares (and, on the other hand, stands out from) the attributes of both natural science (which precedes the divine act of will and cannot contradict itself) and those of free science (which accompanies the act of God and, by deciding on a chain of circumstances, actually also makes decisions regarding free will).

According to Molina, God therefore does not force humans to act in a certain way, but "es el hombre quien determina el influjo divino, que siempre es necesario para que una potencia se actualice".²⁹ For this reason, the human act is always the result of a double causality, or simultaneous causality that sees God and the individual contributing on the same level and at the same time. It was this simultaneity that Bañez did not accept. On the other hand,

the concept of sufficient grace, true cornerstone of the Molinist theology, was derided by Bañez (sufficient grace was actually insufficient, requiring the concurrence of another in order to be implemented) and by all those who over the centuries would have looked with suspicion at Molinism. Among these, the Pascal of the *Provincial Letters*, which fifty years later would oppose the *très révérend père* Annat, and the Jesuit morality of Molinist descent, with the Augustinianism of Port-Royal.

Thanks to the *Concordia*, Molina would become, in history, the theological (theological and moral) symbol of the Jesuits. From time to time, probabilism, laxity, regicide, etc.: doctrines, styles, or moral attitudes attributed to the Society would carry, in the mouths of accusers of the Jesuits, the name Molina. As for the middle science, even the traces that one can find in the ideas affirmed by Prudencio of Montemayor or by Luís de Leon were always referred to as “pre-Molinist”. This helps us understand the degree of tension between the youngest Spanish theologian and Fonseca, the so-called *Aristóteles português*,³⁰ who considered the *Concordia* a plagiarism of the doctrines he himself taught at Coimbra.

The two engaged in a struggle fought by means of introductions and prefaces, with which each author tried to convince the reader that he had been the first to talk about middle science, and the question of dates has long been a thought-provoking problem for historians of the issue.

Fonseca, in the third volume (Évora, 1604) of his *Commentaries* on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* wrote:

Thirty years before this work (we are in fact writing in the year of the Lord 1596), when we faced the theme of divine providence and predestination in public lectures, and we came across the many serious difficulties it implies, we felt there was no easier way and method to explain them than to establish that distinction, which we set forth above, of the dual status of those contingents which are the absolute futures and the conditioned futures, and affirm the certainty of divine knowledge regarding them, in both conditions: first in the conditioned, then in the absolute. ... *There was no one else who reconciled in this way the freedom of our will with the divine foreknowledge and providence, clearly, and (as they say) within these terms* [italics in original].³¹

Conversely, Molina says in the *Concordia*:

I have lingered over this dispute more than I wanted, and I fear that repeating certain things might disturb the reader. However, since the issue is very current and very slippery, and as it seems to me that this way of reconciling freedom of will with divine predestination has never been proposed by anyone, I decided to explain the issue a little more thoroughly.³²

This is one of the rare cases in which the historian's pedantry does not exceed the object of his study: Fonseca and Molina blamed each other continually.³³ For a long time the older of the two was thought to be in the right, since Molina was a philosophy student in the College of Coimbra precisely in the years in which Fonseca taught there. However, it has been demonstrated³⁴ that Molina did not attend Fonseca's courses, and therefore, except for the direct testimony of both authors that antedates their personal encounter with the theme of divine knowledge, there is no evidence to support either one.³⁵

From the clash of these titans of late Scholasticism, emerged, instead, a lesser-known philosophy professor, Manuel de Góis, who was designated to take charge of the project and bring it to a successful conclusion. He had taught two full courses at Coimbra, from 1574 to 1582, and had probably already prepared much of the material on the *Physics* and the *De Coelo* at the time of his appointment. This explains the impatience that in 1585 Manuel de Góis expressed to the Provincial regarding the prohibition to publish separate parts before the *Cursus* was completed and carefully reviewed.³⁶ The Superior General, Acquaviva, with the intention of coordinating the edition of the *Cursus* with that of the *Ratio Studiorum*, had in fact revoked the permission granted by Mercurian to publish excerpts from the course, and Sebastião do Morães, the Portuguese Provincial, had written to him on 9 July 1585 guaranteeing strict surveillance on the issue.³⁷ On 14 October of the same year, however, Morães asked the General to suspend the prohibition, complying with the pressures of a zealous Manuel de Góis, who in the meantime was about to conclude the commentary on the *De Generatione (De hortu et interitu)*.³⁸

To Acquaviva's silence, Moraes replied with a new letter, dated 16 February 1586, in which all of the Provincial's difficulties regarding how to contain the insistence of the *Cursus* author are clearly visible: "So Father Manuel de Góis strongly wishes, and here we wish it just as much, that the *Physics* books could start to be printed, and since *Vuestra Paternidad* recently wrote to me that the entire course had to be completed first, *I told him to write to Your Paternity giving the reasons for doing so*" (emphasis in original).³⁹

In the long run Acquaviva gave in: the *Cursus* could be printed in separate volumes, provided the material for each single issue was carefully reviewed and refined. According to Dinis, the General's change of opinion was in response to Pedro Fonseca's advice,⁴⁰ who, between 1589 and 1592, was appointed Visitor of the Portuguese Province and in 1593 would take part in the Fifth General Congregation. And it was Pedro Fonseca who prepared on behalf of Acquaviva (subtle and shrewd, as always in these cases) the *imprimatur* to the first volume of the *Cursus*, the *Physics*, which was finally released in Coimbra in 1592. The *Facultas Generalis* is a compendium of the thirty-year editorial vicissitudes of the work, and who better than Fonseca could know the genesis, interruptions, delays and circumstances?

What many had been wanting for a long time, that the handwritten common commentaries of Philosophy, which were dictated, with the daily

effort of those who had to put them into writing, in the Conimbrican College of Arts entrusted to our Society, be revised, and, augmented and enriched, be printed; exactly this, some years ago had been established by our Father Superior General Claudio Acquaviva. But since the affair had lasted more than is proper, it was entrusted to our care so that we could honour the province in his name; and we did not believe that such a relief for students and teachers should be further delayed.⁴¹

After these ambiguous statements, Fonseca addressed the issue of the order of the volumes, which naturally also involved the *Dialectics*:

In fact, not much effort was spent so that part [of the *Cursus*] in which the *Physics* books are explained, be prepared for the press, through the effort, the work, the examination and correction of the brilliant intellect of the teachers, and that the remaining commentaries be completed as best as possible: because what were awaited were those regarding dialectics, so that the printed edition of the entire Philosophy curriculum could begin with them; and so only after those were written, would these be corrected and completed.⁴²

On behalf of the Superior General, therefore, Fonseca granted the *imprimatur*. It was 10 November 1591 when Fonseca wrote to the Professed House of San Rocco, in Lisbon. The *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagirita* were released at the beginning of 1592, by the university printer, Antonio à Mariz. Manuel de Góis, apparently galvanized by the early result of his work (despite the fact that it did not bear his name on the title-page), hastened to inform Acquaviva that the textbook had already been adopted for the current academic year by the College of Arts and other colleges of other orders, and that even the University of Alcalá had expressed its intention to use it.⁴³ Now it was a matter of streamlining the procedures for the remainder of the course, because Góis claimed to have already finished and arranged all the material for the other volumes, so that the following instalments could be released in an orderly succession, but that the muddle of the mechanism (i.e. the “proofreaders”, probably including the fearsome Fonseca) threatened to prolong the publication of the complete work for another ten years or more.⁴⁴

Historians have often juxtaposed the activism of Manuel de Góis against the obstacles that Fonseca placed in the path of the *Cursus*: the latter, despite losing primacy over the project, continued to carefully monitor Góis’s successes. This has sometimes led us to think that the delay with which the edition was finally completed (fourteen years after the release of the *Physics*) was due, once again, to an internal struggle between Fonseca and Góis to have their names appear on the title-page of the volumes. It was after all Fonseca who fuelled these rumors: “este padre [Góis] todo su sentimiento es no salir esta obra en su nombre, y sin isto ninguna cosa

lo contentará, y siempre hará por mostrarse em todas ocasiones autor della”.⁴⁵ If, however, it is very unlikely that Góis’s name did not circulate in those academic circles where the *Cursus* was adopted, and that Góis himself concealed the real identity of the author of the *Physics*, it is just as likely that Góis had accepted the mark of the College of Coimbra without considering it a vexation; quite the opposite is true, in fact. He considered it a protective shield that would safeguard his teaching and his fame, entrusted to the oral diffusion of his name in the university *élites* of the Iberian peninsula.⁴⁶

In the same year in which the *Physics* appeared (28 March 1592),⁴⁷ the review and censorship of other Conimbrican commentaries was completed, which would be printed the following year by Simão Lopes in Lisbon. These were the commentaries on the *De coelo*, *Meteororum*, *Parva Naturalia*, which were released simultaneously⁴⁸ and, as we have seen, were in fact the wealth of materials “prepackaged” by Góis in his first three years on the *Cursus* assignment. The Inquisitorial commission, consisting of Bartholomeus Ferrera, Nicolaus Pimenta (Rector of the College of Coimbra), Ludovicus de Soto Maior and Rodericus Goes, recognized not only the opportunity but the duty to publish the volumes, *ob eximiam utilitatem & fructum, quem bonarum atrium studiosis ubique allaturi sunt*.⁴⁹

That same year, 1593, also witnessed the initiation of the publication process for the commentaries on the *Ethics* and the *De Generatione*, but fate had different plans for these volumes: the former was printed in the same year together with the other commentaries in Lopes’s typography, the latter received the *excudatur* only in 1595, and was printed in Coimbra in 1597, by the university printer Maríz (who had published the commentaries on the *Physics*). Curiously, the commentaries in *Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum* are the only ones of the series that do not bear the college’s name on the title-page, although reference to the Conimbrican course remains (the title continues “*aliquot Conimbricensis Cursus Disputationes in quibus Praecipua quaedam Ethicae Discipline capita Continentur*”). Maríz would later print, in 1598, the commentary on the *De Anima*, prepared by Manuel de Góis, to which two short treatises were attached, however, both indicating the author’s name: the *Tractatus de Anima Separata* by Baltazar Álvares and the *Tractatio aliquot Problematum, ad Quinque Sensum Spectantium* by Cosme de Magalhães (who actively collaborated in drafting the entire volume). The former gave the philosophy course in Coimbra during the years the *Cursus* was published (1594–1598), the latter taught theology and humanities in the College of Santo Antão in Lisbon.

With the publication of the *De Anima*, Manuel de Góis’s work seemed to be coming to an end: the massive effort of the *Cursus* was declared closed at the conclusion of the book: “All that remains now to the Conimbrican College of the Society of JESUS, which put its hands, thanks to collective work, to the publication of the entire philosophy curriculum, is to offer thanks to God, who inspired it to begin, and led it to the much-desired end.”⁵⁰

In truth, the incompleteness of the work escaped no one's attention (least of all the Provincials): the *Logic*, with which the *Cursus* should have begun according to tradition, and the *Metaphysics* were both still missing. The disciplines still lacking were the ones jealously monitored and guarded by Pedro Fonseca, who, although acknowledging the difficulty of his speculation for school use, hesitated to leave the field to others; least of all to Góis, who had managed to complete his task despite everything.

The Provincials had already expressed their intention to continue the *Cursus*, and in 1592 the idea emerged of calling upon Fonseca to prepare a simplified summary of his *Metaphysics*. The Provincial, Francisco de Gouveia,⁵¹ however, wrote to Acquaviva weighing the problems and opportunities linked to awarding the assignment to Fonseca or Góis. It seems that the latter had offered to finish the work in spite of still having to print the other volumes, and in pleading his case, had expressed his intention to expound commonly held opinions, unlike the personal (and thus debatable) positions Fonseca would have presented, which were in line with the commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, the edition of which he was in the meantime revising. In 1598, however, with the death of Manuel de Góis, the *Metaphysics* lost its only possible author.⁵²

It was decided, therefore, to assign to another Coimbra teacher, Sebastião do Couto,⁵³ holder of the philosophy professorship between 1597 and 1601, the preparation of the *Logic* volume, and probably after 1598 he was also put in charge of organizing the material for the *Metaphysics*. Despite the death of Pedro Fonseca, in 1599 during the Provincial Congregation in Lisbon, the *Metaphysics* was abandoned once and for all, and the *Logic* would have met the same fate if an editorial exigency had not arisen which directly involved the good name of Coimbra College. The year 1604 saw a simultaneous release in Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, Basel and Venice of the *Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu commentarii doctissimi In universam logicam Aristotelis, nunc primum editi* printed by Froben: a vast commercial operation that clearly appealed to the reputation of Coimbra, but that in fact was an editorial fake based on the collation of Gaspar Coelho's Évora classes.⁵⁴ This work, which came to be called *Lógica Furtiva*, drove Coimbra College to react, and Sebastião do Couto found himself having to complete the *Commentarii ... in universam Dialecticam* in a very short time.⁵⁵ The last volume of the *Cursus*, therefore, was released by the Coimbra University press (now run by Didacus Gomes Loureiro) in 1606, and was – once again – an opportunity to apologize for the delay:

A risk of theft occurred in that time lapse that preceded this edition of the REAL CONIMBRICAN LOGIC, that we had delayed for a long time beyond everyone's expectations: thus, time, master of all things, and the ongoing discussions of many opinions, whose advocates we will make clear in this book, could more deeply discern the truth, than the immense fertility of our times assailed with such a multitude of men and books.⁵⁶

The *Cursus* of the College of Arts ended with the *Logic*, that is to say it ended with the text with which it should have begun. In the meanwhile, the dialectics classes in Coimbra in all likelihood read Fonseca's *Institutiones*, despite the numerous issues which must have been very difficult to confront during the school year and a methodological approach that not everyone shared within the circle of Jesuit logicians.⁵⁷ Fonseca's institutional authority had impacted deeply in the cultural fabric of the Society, and his work remained a text officially recommended by the *Ratio Studiorum*. Couto himself, while introducing the Conimbrican dialectics, referred those who wanted to delve into the intricacies of the *Topica* and *Elenchorum* to the work of the *Aristóteles português*: "In order not to entangle the reader in the labyrinth of Topicals and Lists, we decided to compose a summary in the manner of a compendium, and refer the curious seekers of such subtleties to the Introduction by P. Pedro Fonseca in our Society, whose doctrine, first milk of the Dialectics, the Academy instils in its students."⁵⁸

In the vast panorama of fifteenth-century Aristotelian literature, the *Cursus* stands out as an exemplary product. First, for the variety of its composition: all volumes, except the *Ethics*, are commentaries for use in arts courses, but not all offer the complete Aristotelian text; the foreign editions (mostly printed in Lyons and Cologne) display the Greek text opposite the Latin translation, while the Coimbra and Lisbon originals present only the Latin version; those volumes that do not offer the original text consist of *quaestiones* without *explanationes* or *explicationes*. Second, the *Cursus* is exemplary for the accurate choice of the Aristotelian text it has chosen to comment on. If, on the one hand, it complies with the Scholastic model of the commentary, with glosses that revolve around brief portions of text, on the other, the care for philological explanation of the text and the focused choice of a specific translation is indicative of a humanistic sensitivity that mingles and hides with the ostentatious Scholastic finality of the editorial product.

As shown by Schmitt, Lohr and Copenhaver,⁵⁹ Aristotelian literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is a continuously evolving universe. Texts, translations, commentaries (in prose or verse), texts with commentaries, *quaestiones* or disputes, *scholia*, monographs, compendia, orations and *vitae*, dichotomous *tabulae*, *problemata* and *florilegia*, spelling books, indices of words, in Greek, Latin or the vernacular: there was no literary or paraliterary genre which eluded the pedagogy of Aristotelianism.⁶⁰ The literary genres accompanying the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century editions of Aristotelian texts are divided into a rich catalogue, in Latin and the vernacular, adaptable to the needs of refined humanists, sophisticated arts professors, shrewd students in search of good grades and ordinary readers interested in a generic moral education of a Peripatetic stamp: all that revolves around the commentaries, such as the plates and indexes, was intended for the university, while vernacular translations (chiefly of the *Ethics*), *Florilegia* or *Secreta Secretorum* ended up in the homes of ordinary readers. The invention of movable type turned this literature into a flood. In addition to literary genre,

the reception of the works by and on Aristotle can be classified by environment: while ordinary readers and humanists favoured the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Poetics*, the academic world continued to request mainly the *Physics*, the *De Anima* and the *Logic*. This is to say that it continued to follow the path of medieval Scholasticism, studded with a crowd of commentaries that covered, in the form of glosses and *quaestiones*, the text read (and pre-read by the teacher) in school.

John Doyle⁶¹ proposes a division of the scholastic commentaries into three genres: the *expositiones per modum commenti*, such as the commentaries by Avicenna and, in the Latin context, those by Albertus Magnus;⁶² the *expositiones per modum quaestionis*, such as those by Averroes and Aquinas; the *quaestiones subtilissimae*, such as those by Duns Scotus, whose method was essentially an evolution of the Thomistic *quaestiones*: the progression of the text was interspersed by “customary questions” that emerged from the reading.⁶³ According to Doyle, the commentaries of the Conimbrican *Cursus* belong to this latter category. The division, of course, simplifies and distorts a general phenomenon, that of medieval Scholasticism, and labours to force it into consistent criteria, even if just in terms of style. The same authors cited as examples, in fact, have written works of a different nature: to mention just one, Aquinas’s commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus* probably should be inserted in the Scotist manner. Moreover, trying to place the *Cursus* within one slot is forcing the issue: while the *Physics*, the *De Coelo* and the *De Anima* may fit without significant distortions, the *Dialectics* could conform only for a few of its books, and this applies also for the *Parva Naturalia*, *De Generatione* and *Meteororum*, while the *Ethics*, which consists only of *aliquot Disputationes*, fails to fit at all.

The distribution in three kinds (or methods, as Doyle calls them) has the merit, however, of providing fairly precise coordinates of the space within which the medieval commentary moves, and that the Renaissance academic commentary mostly continues to follow, of which the *Cursus* volumes are – as we said – an exemplary instance. The *Cursus* in fact merges some of the structures of the Scholastic tradition (in the Renaissance variants highlighted by Lohr in his bibliography): certain volumes of the *Cursus* do not concern a single book by Aristotle, but rather a group of books (for example the *in universam Dialecticam* commentary); the *Ethics* volume makes explicit the division of the Aristotelian discipline in *disputationes*, reproducing in the progression of the commentary the lively teaching of the scholastic dimension, as in the *quaestiones*; as was the case with other *cursus* the Conimbrican *Cursus* embraced the complete works of Aristotle (except for the *Metaphysics*, which was indeed perceived as a lacuna in the project).⁶⁴ Despite these variants, the structure of the scholastic commentary that the *Cursus* recalls and reproduces shows signs, in the late sixteenth century, of a satiated appetite. In other words, the *Cursus* stands at the end of a long development: that of the medieval commentary. The seventeenth century will be the century of the treatise, and the university will adapt to it. Nevertheless, within the “commentary” structure,

the Conimbricenses will adopt strategies fully in tune with the contemporary need to attend to the text and philological analysis. It is the strategy of the *explanatio*, which combines the scholastic goal of providing a more rigorous vocabulary to the subsequent *quaestiones* and, above all, to class disputations, and the “humanistic” goal of searching, through or beyond ancient and modern commentators, for the word of the “true” Aristotle.⁶⁵

This syncretic aspect of the *Cursus* is to be found where Góis and Couto have reproduced the text of Aristotle. The *Cursus*, in fact, was published in three successive phases and, for the reasons that we will discuss, the Aristotelian text (in translation) is omitted in some volumes. In the first phase (1591–1593), the *Physics* and the *De Coelo* display the full text, *explanatio*, *quaestiones* interspersed with individual passages, divided into articles and solutions. *Meteororum* and *Parva Naturalia* display neither the Aristotelian text nor an *explanatio*, but are structured more like a treatise than like *quaestiones*. In the Preface to *Meteororum*, Góis tackles the method issue, and tries to explain to the reader the pedagogical-didactical reason for cutting the Aristotelian text:

We decided (*for the purposes of this brevity, which we consider by all means necessary for Philosophy students, who must complete the arts curriculum in a definite amount of time*) [italics in original], we decided, I repeat, to do in this work what we have done in the books of *Parva Naturalia*, namely, omitting the *explanatio* of the Aristotelian text, and, as is our custom, also the *quaestiones* to be discussed, from both sides: among those things most frequently expressed by Aristotle, the most worthy and important ones were selected and summarized, together with others in our opinion relevant for the same purpose, all of this distributed at our discretion in chapters and categories for those who read: so that for those things, which are interesting already in themselves, the *explicatio* could result as even more interesting and pithy.⁶⁶

The *Ethics* closes the first phase in 1593 and – as we have already seen – seems a completely different product from previous versions: no text, no *explanatio*, no treatise, but *disputationes* on specific topics (*de bono, de fine, de felicitate* ...), Thomistically divided into *quaestiones* and articles.⁶⁷ The size, and the cultural weight, of each volume of the *Cursus* is manifestly different:⁶⁸ the curricular requirements, imposed by the limited time available to complete the arts course, dictated a rigorous selection of the Aristotelian text, but the Scholastic way in which the Conimbricenses resolved the didactic impasse is different depending on the specific individual texts. The *Physics* and *De Coelo* obviously have greater importance, as indeed was required by the significance of natural philosophy in the academic culture of the time. We shall see the contents and the positions of the Conimbricenses regarding the battle over interpreting the cosmos and natural phenomena. Because of the difference in size, the volumes without text will often be aggregated and published in an

anthology, leaving aside the original order of appearance of the individual volumes in Coimbra and Lisbon.

The second phase (1597–1598) consists of the *De Generatione et Corruptione* and the *De Anima*, which display, regardless of the individual treatises annexed to the latter, the Aristotelian text, *explanationes*, *explicationes* and *quaestiones*. The last phase consists of the *Dialectics* edited by Sebastião do Couto, in which portions of texts (only the *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione* are complete) have been inserted from the *Organon*. In the first volume of the *Dialectics*, Porphyry's Isagoge also presents the full text. The commentary is then structured, like to these last, according to *quaestiones* and articles.⁶⁹

The centrality of the *quaestio* in the *Cursus* is indisputable. It is still the philosophical instrument preferred by the Conimbricenses, as it already was for medieval commentaries. The *quaestio* is the teaching device of Coimbra University: it is both the instrument and the substance. Students are taught to distinguish, resolve and debate, and this is done by distinguishing, resolving and debating. In the arts curriculum, of which the *Cursus* is a reflection, the *quaestio* is the basic and essential element. Knowledge of the structure, the turns and nuances of the *quaestio* are the primary pedagogical concerns of the Jesuits. It is not, however, an end in itself, it is of service to the dispute, where the dialectical, logical and certainly also rhetorical competition find their educational scope.

Within the Conimbrican pedagogical plan, the significance of the disputation is an evolving phenomenon: if in the scholastic tradition it was the way towards a peak, that of the *summa*, compendium and resolution of all human knowledge and, as such, an end in itself, in Coimbra the disputation is one moment in a terrestrial journey within the tangle of paths and situations peculiar to human civilization. It is a circular and reversible path, which does not require a real change, but nothing more than the acquisition of a socially expendable skill. The structure of the Conimbrican commentaries, in which the alternation of *quaestiones* and texts (or even only the internal development of *quaestiones*, where the text is missing) complies more with the dynamics of a rhythm than with the static quality of an edifice, and makes one thing very clear: the written text (the printed material) is functional to something else.⁷⁰ That scholastic life, and in perspective civic life, is outside the text, and that the most important part of the *Cursus* lies precisely in what is not written, meaning in those issues emerging within disputations discussed live during classes on the strength of the arts students' dialectic creativity.

The *quaestiones* inserted in the commentaries are only the most general, or, when they are presented as specific, are but examples of what the oral disputation wants and needs to be. The *quaestio* is therefore central, but it is not all the *Cursus* comes down to: on the contrary, the *Cursus* lives on the unwritten pages and on those exercises which were performed (but not recorded) during the disputations. This is the typical curricular exigency of Coimbra, which ever since the foundation of the *Colégio Real* combines the most elaborate subtleties of Sainte-Barbe with the humanistic inspiration of Peter Ramus

and Bordeaux; it blends the observance of the traditional form of the *quaestio* with the possession of a confident dialectical ability. In this mixture, philosophical speculation acquires an empirical value, precisely because it loses the need to tell the truth, becoming exercise, becoming didactics and school. Were it not so, time would not be a category so often referred to in the pedagogical history of the *Cursus*: there is never enough time, which is why we omit now a text, now a series of *quaestiones*, now an entire volume, and so on. Time is short because the educational purposes of the Coimbra commentaries are other than “substance”. There is time, and there must be time, to discuss, to practice. Philosophy in its entirety thus becomes didactics, and this is how the modern concept of the secondary school comes into being.⁷¹

It is in this sense that the Aristotelian text becomes a constant concern for the Conimbricenses. It provides the vocabulary for the disputation, and carrying out philological work on the text is the best preparation for the device of the *quaestio*. Providing the best Aristotelian text, for the Conimbricenses, means supplying the student with words and syntax for live speech. This is the reason why Martins is not convincing: he does consider the *Cursus* “a high point in the Renaissance editing of texts”, but considers Góis and Couto to be more casual and less attentive philologists towards the Aristotelian text compared to Fonseca, supporting this opinion simply by the fact that Góis and Couto opted for the Latin translation instead of the original Greek text.⁷² On the contrary, Góis and Couto are extremely attentive towards the Aristotelian text, of which they make a wise selection among the *mare magnum* of translations available in their time. The two publish translations of Aristotle because their readers have a good knowledge of Latin, because Latin is the language of the *lectio*, because Latin is the language of philosophy in their time (a philosophy chair in Greek exists only at the *Collège Royal*). Opting for one translation rather than another is not a neutral choice: in 1592 the universe of Aristotle translations was so articulated that it offered the publisher (and the reader) profiles of Aristotle that differed from, and often contradicted, each other.

Aristotelian texts, in the thirteenth century provided for the most part by famous translators such as William of Moerbeke or philosophers such as Dominicus Gundisallinus, underwent a revision process in the fifteenth century in connection with the migration of Byzantine intellectuals to Florence. Especially with the figure of Argyropoulos, they were the protagonists of a revival of the Latin version of Aristotle. This time, however, the translation was made directly from those Greek texts which were often accompanied by glosses of the first Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias or Philoponus, which thus appeared on the European scene after centuries of oblivion. Leonardo Bruni (who worked mainly on the moral Aristotle) had already opened the way to the overcoming of the *verbum e verbo* method, typical of the previous tradition, towards the humanistic way of imposing Latin structures to the Greek original. Argyropoulos pressed the Bruni method towards paraphrasing the text: although this aroused strong criticism

on the part of professional natural philosophers, it earned him continuing popularity during the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries. He was considered “the initiator of a new method” by such authorities as Lefebvre d’Etaples and Vatable, who were ranked among the most famous humanistic translators of the sixteenth century. The tendency to latinize Aristotle reached its peak in sixteenth-century France with the abbé Périon, who made Aristotle a real *flumen eloquentiae*, abiding by a strict Ciceronian Latin. Périon was criticized for a century, and even the benevolent corrections by Grouchy, whom we have already encountered as a teacher first in Bordeaux, then in Coimbra, failed to remedy this. During the sixteenth century, the debate over the method of translation saw hardened scholastics faithful to Moerbeke opposing Ciceronian humanists intolerant towards the Arabs (but none the less also editors of new and philologically advanced editions of Averroes) and natural philosophers prepared to speculate on an original Aristotle, or at least on one who was “more authentic”. To this latter group belongs Francesco Vimercati, whose *Physics* (1550) was chosen by Góis for the Conimbricant commentary: Vimercati questioned the excessive casualness with which Périon had betrayed the sense of the Aristotelian word, and sought a better balance between Scholasticism and humanism in translation.⁷³ Moreover, Vimercati was an old acquaintance of Coimbra: he had collaborated with Antonio de Gouveia in the famous disputation with Peter Ramus in the presence of Francis I. According to Schmitt, Vimercati’s translation⁷⁴ did not become canonical, but this is proof of the care with which Góis sought the most suitable text for the Conimbricant commentary project. Within the Society of Jesus, Vimercati’s *Physics* translation was no novelty, as it was strongly suggested by Pererius, renowned professor of the Roman College and author of *De Principiis* (1576).⁷⁵

Of the other works containing Aristotle’s text, the *De Coelo* and the *De Anima* are in the translation by Argyropoulos,⁷⁶ while the *De Generatione et Corruptione* is the Vatable version, once again done in humanistic style. Couto opted instead mainly for Argyropoulos in his selection. The use of Vatable for the *De Generatione* is remarkable, because it summarizes the meaning of the *Cursus* project. The humanistic line in the translation of Aristotle’s *Peri geneeseos kai fthoras*, in fact, had corrected the traditionally accepted title “De generatione et corruptione” in “De ortu et interitu”: Vatable, successor of Argyropoulos, introduced the new title. The Conimbricenses, in their commentary, opted for Vatable’s text, which begins with “De ortu autem, ac interitu eorum”, but decided to maintain the title *De Generatione et Corruptione*, in evident continuity with the university Scholastic tradition.

As we have seen, the choice of a Latin translation does not thereby imply philological carelessness towards the Aristotelian text on the Conimbricenses’ part, but is fully consonant with the European university context, which was more sensitive to humanistic influence. The *explanationes* become in fact the occasion where not only are passages explained in terms of content, but also where the lexicon is alluded to or analysed, and in which, in various cases, investigations which are properly philological

are introduced, which do not disdain using or referring to the Greek word. Precisely the Greek text becomes the key that opens the door to foreign publishers of the *Cursus*, who possessed the necessary printing technology. From the very beginning, in fact, the individual volumes released in Coimbra and Lisbon become the object of interest for the principal European markets: Cologne, Lyons and Venice are the printing sites where the *Cursus* will have greater success, but Zeztner (who operates in Cologne and Strasbourg) and Giunta of Lyons prefer to prepare the product also offering the Greek text, with the obvious purpose of appealing to a broader public (with greater spending power) than the audience contemplated by the Coimbra University press or that of Lopes of Lisbon. From the history of the publication success of the *Cursus*, which has an extraordinary number of editions and reprints concentrated in the first thirty years after the *editio princeps*,⁷⁷ the German preference for the Scholastic speculations of the Conimbricenses emerges quite clearly. Cologne and Mainz, in particular, continue to offer the *Cursus* volumes between 1593 and 1631,⁷⁸ either publishing them individually, arranging them into groups, printing the complete collection or creating compendia or *problemata*. The Greek text is almost always present, opposite its translation. The same can be said for the Lyons editions, which sometimes did not present the Latin translation, but such editions were not as numerically significant as the German. Venetian production is smaller: it occurs essentially in three phases (1602, 1606, 1616). The Conimbrican penetration on British soil, evidenced by the *Brevissimum totius conimbricensis logicæ compendium*, is relatively late. *Per Hieronymum de Paiva lusitanum, quondam ex societate, quæ dicitur Iesu, iam autem Dei gratia reformatæ ecclesiæ filium indignissimum* was published in London in 1627 by Bellamy (who in those years published the work of the Spanish Juan Huarte de San Juan, *The triall of Wits* in Carew's translation).⁷⁹ For obvious reasons, the success of the Conimbrican commentaries overseas, where the Portuguese and Spanish colonies had asked the Society of Jesus to found colleges, differed positively: Brazil, Angola and China witnessed the circulation and the use of the commentaries.⁸⁰ We must not forget, in this overview of publication history, Fonseca's editions of the *Dialectics* and the *Metaphysics*, which, as we have seen, until 1606 compensated for the shortcomings of the *Cursus*. Their circulation was quite similar to Góis's and Couto's commentaries, being published in the same European centres and having new editions and reprints released with similar frequency. Similar to the Conimbricenses, Germany preferred Fonseca's work: this feature will be confirmed with the works by Francisco Suárez, another great metaphysician and theologian of the University of Coimbra, linked to the history of the *Cursus* by means of Baltazar Álvares, author of the treatise *De Anima Separata* contained in the commentary on the *De Anima*. He will subsequently be in charge of the publication of Suárez's posthumous work between 1619 and 1628. This historical outline is completed by the publication of the *Logica Furtiva*, that is to say the work that

Froben published in 1604 in various European locations and that immediately spread in Germany (as evidenced by the introduction of the authentic Conimbrican *Dialectics*): it had no further editions, but its history is inextricably linked to the *Cursus*.⁸¹

We shall see below the cultural influences that the *Cursus* exerted over Western thought: a simple glance at the editions, however, is enough to conclude that while in their native land the commentaries became a didactic dogma in the Colleges of the Arts (Coimbra, Évora, etc.) for almost a century,⁸² abroad they served as background for the philosophical preparation of the students in Jesuit colleges, and not only in the first three decades of the seventeenth century: John of St Thomas (Dominican student of the Coimbra *Colégio das Artes*), Descartes, Leibniz and others studied the pages written by Góis and Couto, each forming very different impressions.

The editorial success of the *Cursus* lasted, overall, about thirty years: its didactical as well as its cultural usability soon began to show signs of obsolescence and precisely on those issues that had led to its birth. The sense of novelty is well grasped by Des Chene: “If Aristotelianism could have been renewed, here was its best opportunity. Here, too, one supposes, was a model for the young Descartes”;⁸³ and yet Descartes complains, in a letter to Mersenne dated 3 December 1640, as a student, that the Conimbrican commentaries were long and verbose: meaning that they wasted the time that, on the contrary, they intended to save for the actual teaching.

Des Chene also writes:

Among the hundreds of commentaries and cursus published from 1550 to 1650, some are routine, or dogmatic, in the way that textbooks can be in any age; and all of them, routine or not, are but rarely cited, except among themselves, after 1700 or so. But the best of them represent the last efflorescence of a philosophical movement that dominated the universities of Europe for four centuries. Among the most widely disseminated were those of Jesuit authors responding to the post-Tridentine call for a renewal of Catholic teaching in the face of schism and heresy. One aspect of this was to make Aristotle more accessible and to stabilize the interpretation of his texts, scraping away layers of controversy that had accumulated since Albert and Thomas.⁸⁴

In the first decades of the seventeenth century, what had first appeared as the final solution of the lengthy speculation of a decrepit Scholasticism, namely the *Cursus*, with its new interpretation of the text-*explanatio-quaestio*-disputation system, was perceived as even more decrepit because hampered by a schema of a university that now no longer existed. Secondary school, the *Liceu* as Gomes calls it, had already cut the umbilical cord that kept it tied to higher-level courses. It probably required more agile textbooks which had superseded their bulky precursors.

Notes

- 1 A. M. Martíns, “The Conimbricenses. Introductory note to the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu*”, p. 2, accessed at www.saavedrafajardo.org/Archivos/Conimbricenses_Presentacion.pdf on 20 March 2011.
- 2 Gomes, in *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 31 provides an account of this.
- 3 “Verum haec docendi ratio, etsi longe melior, & utilior, quam illa superior habebatur, tamen ob assiduum scribendi laborem, incredibilem discipulis (ut de praeceptoribus taceam) molestiam, difficultatemque afferebat. Tempus etiam, quod in docendo ac disputando utilius poni potuisset, non sine magno incommodo in dictando consumebar.” Quoted from *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, auctore Petro Afonseca ex Societate Iesu*, apud Mathernum Cholinum, Coloniae, MDLXVII.
- 4 “Para se evitar o trabalho de escrever-se tanto como se escreve, se procure que um curso de escritos se imprima e nisto se ocupe o Padre Afonseca principalmente.” MHSI, I, p. 600.
- 5 Pedro Gomes taught two full philosophy courses at the College of Coimbra, from 1555 to 1563. One of his letters to Superior General Borgia in 1569 sees him still involved in the drafting of the *Cursus*. In 1579 he left instead for Japan, where he died in 1600. Marcos Jorge gave a complete course in Coimbra from 1556 to 1559, then taught theology at Évora and Lisbon. He died at Évora in 1571. See Martíns, “The Conimbricenses”, pp. 5–6; and J. Pereira Gomes, “Os professores de filosofia do Colégio das Artes”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 11, 2, (1955), fasc. 3–4, p. 525.
- 6 “Impresso este curso, não escrevam os estudantes senão quando o mestre quiser notar alguma coisa num lugar difficil, ou alguma coisa notável, e brevemente; e assim poderá ler então o mestre desta maneira.” Ibid.
- 7 Gomes has a different opinion: “Fonseca, então professor de um curso procurou recusar o mandato, em que a sua capacidade era posta á prova.” Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 32.
- 8 “E que entretanto se ventilariam mais as matérias, excitariam dúvidas, e tornariam mais claras todas as coisas: e que eu lhe desse uma memória para encomendar aos mestres e a alguns teólogos, que entretanto fizesse por anotar cada um no seu cartapácio as dúvidas e tudo o mais que no processo dos seus estudos lhe ocorresse.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 61, f. 72r and v. The letter is transcribed by Gomes in *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 34.
- 9 The letter makes no mention of specific tasks for Gomes.
- 10 “Ao cabo de dois ou três anos, caso procedamos como digo, e os outros mestres e teólogos ajudarem no que disse, estará a matéria tão disposta, que muito em breve se conclua todo o curso, e com a ocupação de quase não mais do que uma pessoa.” Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 34.
- 11 “Unde illud evenire necesse erat, ut nec libri omnes, qui in curriculo Philosophiae numerantur, omnino absolverentur, nec tam frequens esset, tamque diuturna, quam optabamus, disputandi exercitatio. Ut ergo & labori discipulorum consulerentur, & iactura qualiscunque erat, studiorum Philosophiae resarciretur, statuerunt Praepositi societatis nostrae, cui Regium hoc liberalium artium Gymnasium, nono ab hinc anno a Christianissimo Rege Ioanne tertio traditum est, ut ego, quod in profitenda Philosophia aliquot annos posuissem, qua possem brevitate & perspicuitate eos libros Aristotelis exponerem, qui auditoribus Philosophiae explicari consueverunt.” *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, auctore Petro Afonseca ...*, “Praefatio”.
- 12 “Fore enim existimabant, ut hac ratione, & mea diligentia, & typographorum opera, non modo discendi labor minueretur, sed aliquid etiam ad haec studia lucis & utilitatis accederet. Ego vero cum mei tenuitatem ingenij non prorsus ignorarem,

quantum obedienti fas fuit, hoc onus, quo meis humeris impar esse sentiebam, recusare conatus sum. Verum illi, in quorum ego voce Christum agnosco, studio iuvandi alios commoti, meae potius facultatis, seu (ut verius loquar) imbecillitatis periculum facere, quam ullam officij occasionem preaetermittere voluerunt. Quia igitur impositum mihi onus rejicere non possum, dabo quam diligentissime operam, ut, quod in me est, si non aliorum voti satisfecero, certe eorum, quibus meae vitae rationem commisi, iussu non desim. Interim tamen dum commentarios in Aristotelem, Porphyrijque Isagogen conscribo, has Dialecticas institutiones, cum ut fidei nostre pignus, tum vero ut necessarias ijs offero, qui intra limina Philosophiae recipi cupiunt.” Ibid.

- 13 According to Gomes, inclined towards the first theory, the cause of everything was Fonseca’s personality, “de feitio vagoroso, por meticulosidade, Fonseca não consegue avançar no trabalho comum”. *Os conimbricenses*, p. 37.
- 14 Martins, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 6.
- 15 “Etenim cum nullum sit genus auditorum Philosophiae, quibus primae Philosophiae libri quos Metaphysicae vocant, familiares esse non debeant, ut qui passim a Praeceptoribus citentur; & ad quos accuratior tractatio communium difficultatum, quae in caeteris Philosophiae libris incidunt, saepissime rejiciatur: hanc ego mihi ad scribendum, & Philosophiae auditoribus ad intelligendum facillimam viam esse iudicavi, si ea ante exponerem, quibus totius Philosophiae principia, & quasi fundamenta continentur. His enim positis ac stabilitis, caetera & ab eis facilius intelligi ... & a me expeditus & brevius explicari posse, nemo est, qui non videat.” I quote from *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo auctore Petro Fonseca Doctore Theologo Societatis Iesu*, Apud Gosuinum Cholinum, Coloniae, MDXCIV, “Auctor in Secundam Editionem”.
- 16 The last volume of the *Cursus*, dedicated to the *Dialectics*, will actually be necessitated by the release in Germany of a *Logic* falsely attributed by the editor to the Conimbricenses. The volume of 1606, by Sebastião do Couto, will be extremely brief and for all the most relevant issues will refer to the work of Fonseca.
- 17 “In explanatione eorum librorum, quibus inferiores disciplinas continentur, quod sint quasi classici, & certo ac definito temporis spatio in scholis explicari soleant, ab ijs difficultatibus discutiendis abstineremus, quae proprie essent Primi Philosophi, aut maiori auditorum intelligentia longiorive disputatione indigerent; quarum multas cernimus aetate nostra, vel in ipso Philosophiae aditu, non sine magno iuventutis detrimento a plerisque tractari. Eas enim cum alibi attingere opus esset (quod non raro usu venit) in hoc opus rejiciendas, & in eo accurate explicandas esse iudicabimus.” Quoted from the *Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae d. theologi Societatis Iesu in libros methaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Tomus Primus* ..., Apud Franciscus Zanettum, Romae, MDLXXVII, “Admonitio”.
- 18 Fonseca’s attitude towards the *Cursus* remains a mystery for historians. According to Martins, “The Conimbricenses”: “The reasons for Fonseca’s lack of success in coordinating the work leading up to the materialization of the 1561 project remain to be suitably clarified. We don’t even know for sure exactly when he gave up the writing of the text on metaphysics for the Course” (p. 6). Gomes suggests three possible theories regarding Fonseca’s estrangement from the project: “O ser vagaroso, o achar-se por demais ocupado, e o ter um plano pessoal que não coincidia com o esquema colegial proposto no início.” Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 39.
- 19 The letter, dated 29 August 1582, is published in Rodrigues, *História da Companhia*, II.ii, pp. 112–113. Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Geschichte des Molinismus*, I, Münster: Aschendorff, 1935, pp. 548–550.
- 20 Cf. ARSI, Epp. NN. 86, ff. 281–282. In this letter, in which Molina for the most part complains about real or alleged harassment by Fonseca, there is room to claim the value of his work: “todos conocen ... las glosas que he hecho en artes y theologia ... quanto mas estimadas y eopradas son de todos”.

- 21 Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 40.
- 22 Ibid., p. 42.
- 23 Clearly, the controversy between Molina and the Portuguese province was not a short-term one, if the Provincial João Alvares, in reporting the situation in Portugal to Acquaviva, still in 1593, mentions the harassment that the Portuguese Fathers were subjected to by Molina, who that year was publishing his *De iustitia et iure*. Cf. ARSI, *Lus.*, 72, ff. 82r and v.
- 24 The literature on the *de auxiliis* controversy is vast. Apart from Stegmüller's great work, which is an important reference point, we have contemporary reconstructions, *a partibus fidelium*, by the Jesuits Poussin (handwritten copies are preserved in ARSI, "Historica Societatis", nn. 143–146) and De Meyer (a.k.a Theodoro Eleutherio, *Historia controversiarum de divinae gratiae sub summis pontificibus Sisto V, Clemente VIII et Paulo V*, Antverpiae, 1705) and by the Dominican H. Serry (see *La storia de auxiliis del Ch. P. Giacinto Serry dell'ordine de' predicatori tradotta e compendiata da RAMBALDO NORIMENE*, Brescia, 1771; the original was printed in Louvain in 1700). Worthy of note are the works by T. De Régnon, *Bannes et Molina*, Paris: Houdin, 1889 and *Bannesianisme et Molinisme*, Paris, 1890. The following two appear in modern editions: Domingo Bañez, *Apología de los hermanos dominicos contra la Concordia de Luis de Molina*, Traducción, Introducción y Apéndice por J. A. Hevia Echevarría, Oviedo, 2002, and Luís de Molina, *Concordia del libre arbitrio con los dones de la gracia y con la presciencia, providencia, predestinación y reprobación divinas*, Traducción y Introducción por J. A. Hevia Echevarría, Oviedo, 2007.
- 25 I cite from *LIBERI ARBITRII cum Gratiae donis, Divina Praesentia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, CONCORDIA, ... D. LUDOVICO MOLINA, Primario quondam in Eborensi Academia Theologiae Professore e Societate Jesu, Auctore*, Ex Officina Typ. Joachimi Troгнаesii, Antverpiae, MDXCV, "Epistola Dedicatoria".
- 26 The bull *Apostolici Regiminis* by Leo X, at the end of the eighth session of the Lateran Council in 1513, warned learned Catholics to defend the immortality of the soul with rational arguments (referring back to the decree of the 1312 Council of Vienne on the soul as form of the body) against the doctrine of the double truth.
- 27 J. A. Hevia Echevarría, "La polémica de auxiliis y la Apología de Bañez", *El Catoblepas*, 13 (2003), p. 1, accessed at www.nodulo.org/ec/2003/n013p01.htm on 30 July 2007.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid. The specific answer offered by Molina to the problem of the act of predestination of man by God, in other words the concept of predestination *post praevisa merita*, did not meet the unanimous approval of the theologians of the Society. One of the less convinced was Cardinal Bellarmine, who vigorously urged the Jesuits to adopt a specific variation of the middle science doctrine, that is to say the idea that the act of predestination took place *ante praevisa merita*. This doctrine was called "Congruism" and was officially embraced in a declaration by Superior General Acquaviva in 1613. Francisco Suarez, who in 1599 had published his *Varia opuscula theologica*, focused on the *de auxiliis* topic and, agreeing with Bellarmine's ideas, also helped redirect the Society towards Congruism.
- 30 On the life of Fonseca, see S. Tavares, "Pedro da Fonseca. Sua vida e obra", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 9, 4 (1953), pp. 344–353; M. dos Santos Alves, "Pedro Fonseca e o 'Cursus conimbricensis'", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 11 (1955), pp. 479–489. For citations to the secondary literature on Fonseca's thought, see the next chapter. Here we limit ourselves to recommending J. Madeira, "Bibliografia de e sobre Pedro da Fonseca", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra*, 29 (2006), pp. 195–208, which is accurate.

- 31 “Ante annos triginta quam haec scriberemus (scribimus autem anno Domini nonagesimo sexto supra millesimum et quingentesimum), cum materiam de providentia divina, et praedestinatione in publicis lectionibus essemus ingressi; multaeque, ac graves difficultates, quae in ea occurrunt se nobis obiicerent, nulla faciliori via, et ratione putabamus explicari omnes posse, quam constituenda distinctione, quam paulo ante fecimus duplicis status eorum contingentium, quae re vera futura sunt, absoluti ec. et conditionati, asserendaque certitudine divinae cognitionis circa illa in utroque statu; prius quidem in condicionato, deinde vero in absoluto. ... Neque enim quisquam erat, qui hoc pacto libertatem arbitrii nostri cum divina praesentia, aut providentia aperte, et (ut dicitur) in terminis conciliasset.” *Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae Lusitani ... In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Tomus III, Eborae, 1604, p. 138.
- 32 “Longior fui in hac disputatione quam optarem, vereorque ne aliquarum rerum repetitio lectori molestiam attulerit. Quia tamen res est magni momenti ac valde lubrica et haec nostra ratio conciliandi libertatem arbitrii cum divina praedestinatione a nemine quem viderim huiusque tradita, ideo satius haec duxi paulo fusius explicare.” *LIBERI ARBITRII cum Gratiae donis ... CONCORDIA*, q. 23, a. 4 e 5, disp. I.
- 33 As attested by a letter of Provincial Morales to Acquaviva on 14 October 1585, Fonseca will also be one of the designated editors of Molina’s work: to the great irritation of the latter, of course. ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 164r.
- 34 See I. Rabeneck, “De Ludovici de Molina studiorum philosophiae curriculo”, *Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu*, 6 (1937), pp. 291–302. And S. Tavares, “Fonseca e a Ciência Média”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 9, 4 (1953), pp. 418–429. This interpretation is also embraced by J. A. Hevia Echevarría, in the “Introduzione” to Molina, *Concordia del libre arbitrio*.
- 35 The position of Tavares, “Fonseca e a Ciência Média”, is different; according to his reconstruction Fonseca is the creator of the doctrine and Molina the clever (but shrewd) popularizer: “Fonseca foi o primeiro a encontrar e a ensinar a Ciência Média; Molina o primeiro que sobre ela escreveu, dando-lhe o nome que ainda hoje guarda, sistematizando-a e desenvolvendo-a mais” (p. 429). On the controversy, see the numerous interventions by J. d’O. Dias, “Ainda a controvertida paternidade da chamada Ciência Media”, *Verbum*, 18 (1951), pp. 367–382; J. d’O. Dias, “Em torno do duelo Fonseca–Molina, uma argumentação suscinta”, *Verbum*, 21 (1954), pp. 37–63; J. d’O. Dias, “Fonseca e Molina. Os últimos ecos dum litígio plurissecular”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 11 (1955), pp. 64–77; and J. d’O. Dias, “Liquidação final de uma controvérsia”, *Verbum*, 22 (1955), pp. 207–228.
- 36 Cf. ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 65r. In the letter, Sebastian Morales pleads the cause of printing the *Cursus* in separate parts, in order to allow the use of the work already prepared by the newly appointed project leader. In the same letter, in fact, Morales declares that he cannot wait for the completion of Fonseca’s work, which no one knows if and when it will be finished.
- 37 “Hasersea lo que V.P. ordena, no se imprimira nada de la obra del P. Manuel de Goes hasta tener escrito sobre todo el Curso de Artes.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 112v. See A. Dinis, “Tradição e transição no Curso Conimbricense”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 47 (1991), pp. 561–581.
- 38 ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 163v. In his letter, Morales, with various arguments, stressed the importance of a rapid publication of the *Cursus*. These include, for example, the excessive freedom of subject and of opinion that Arts teachers dictating their notes could exercise. To the point that “[Coimbra] se ha perdido algo dela reputación que se tenia de los nosotros”.
- 39 “Tambien el p. Manuel de Goes desea mucho y a qua se desea tambien que se empiecen a imprimir los physicos; y per que V.P. me escrevio ultimamente que

primero acabase todo el Curso le disce que escreviese a V.P. las razones que se le offrecen para hazerlo.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 69, f. 213. “Indications were coming from Rome suggesting that he [Manuel de Góis] proceed with greater care in the revision of the texts. From extant correspondence in the historical archive of the Society of Jesus, we know that Manuel de Góis lamented the plodding pace of the entire process and the obstacles to its swift realization.” Martins, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 7.

40 Dinis, “Tradição e transição”, p. 539.

41 “Quod iam pridem optabant multi, ut communes Philosophiae commentarij manuscripti, qui in Conimbricensi liberalium artium Academia Societati nostrae commissa quotidiano excipientium labore dictabantur, reconoscerentur, auctique & locupletati mandarentur typis; id ut fieret, aliquot ante annos a Reverendo admodum Patre Nostro Generali Claudio Acquaviva constitutum erat. Sed cum res longius protraheretur, eius cura nobis demandata, cum provinciam eius nomine lustraremus, non iudicavimus tantum scholasticorum levamen diutius esse differendum.”

42 “Itaque maiori diligentia adhibita, cum pars ea, qua libri de naturali auscultatione exponuntur, opera & industria, examine etiam & correctione praestanti ingenio Magistrorum parata esset ad praelum, & reliqui deinceps commentarij diligentius perficerentur, non fuit, cur expectarentur ij, qui ad Dialecticam pertinent, ut ab eis typographica editio totius Philosophiae curriculi initium sumeret: dum enim illi excuduntur, hi recognoscentur, complementumque accipient.”

43 As evidenced by Góis’s letter to Acquaviva. See ARSI, *Lus.*, 71, f. 67. The commentaries on *Physics* began to circulate in Portuguese colleges even before being printed, in manuscript form, probably for experimental purposes. Cf. Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 46.

44 ARSI, *Lus.*, 71, f. 67: “From Alcalá they tell us that the university has asked to use [*professar*] these same books.” The slowness of the revision procedures exasperated the efficient Góis: “It seems inevitable that in this province this business cannot be successful. If *Vuestra Paternidad* does not intervene more forcefully, nothing will be done.”

45 Ibid., f. 56. The letter is addressed to Provincial João Álvares and dated 25 January 1592.

46 Martins and Gomes have a different opinions. Specifically, Gomes links the dispute between Góis and Fonseca to the problem of the collaborative nature of the *Cursus*. He wonders if the commentaries are to actually be considered a collective work or if they should be attributed only to Góis: this is to say that it was Góis who actually gave concrete form to a work which others had only outlined and of which he culturally felt to be an integral part. Gomes, *Os conimbricenses*, pp. 44–46. Martins, however, aims to characterize Fonseca with a painstaking care in proofreading, laying full responsibility on him for the editorial delays of the remaining commentaries, and to accentuate the animosity between him and the Góis, citing inconclusive hypotheses (Fonseca is never mentioned in the texts published by Góis) in support of his theory. Martins, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 8.

47 As affirmed in Góis’s letter to Acquaviva dated 4 April: ARSI, *Lus.*, 71, f. 105r.

48 Actually, one of Góis’s letters to Acquaviva informs us that the project included “os livros de caelo, Meteora, Parva naturalia, Ethica.” ARSI, *Lus.*, 71, f. 105r.

49 *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In quatuor Libros de Coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Lisbon, 1593, “Iudicium eorum, qui ad hos commentarios ex officio Sanctae inquisitionis recognoscendos constituti fuerunt.”

50 “Illud superest, ut quem laborem communium studiorum gratia, Societatis IESU Conimbricense Collegium posuit universae philosophiae edito curriculo, gratum sibi esse velit Deus, qui & coeptis aspiravit, & ad optatum exitum promovit.”

Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros De Anima, Aristotelis Stagiritae, Coimbra, 1598, p. 558.

- 51 ARSI, *Lus.*, 79, f. 396.
- 52 The same edition of the *De Anima* can be considered posthumous: it was Cosme de Magalhães who took over, and probably this was the reason why his and Alvarez's treatises were included in the volume. J. Doyle, *The Conimbricenses. Some Questions on Signs*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001, p. 16.
- 53 Sebastião do Couto, born in Olivenza (Badajoz), at the time located within Portuguese borders, had been a student in Évora. There he had studied Philosophy and begun his theological studies, which he interrupted in 1592 to move to Lisbon, called upon by Pedro Fonseca to collaborate with him. After returning to Évora, he obtained his Philosophy degree on 16 January 1596 and taught there for one year before receiving a post teaching Philosophy at Coimbra and the task of drafting the *Dialectics*. Couto, whose production was limited to the *Dialectics* and writing sermons, was at the centre of two important events for Évora University and the history of Portugal. His appointment as Vice-Rector of the Colégio da Purificação in 1609 set off a student revolt which required the intervention of both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, while at the end of the Philippine period he was among the leaders of the Évora rebel movements (1637) against the dominion of Spain, in which the people acclaimed John, Duke of Braganza, as the new King of Portugal. Three years later, encouraged by Richelieu's supportive foreign policy, Portugal won its independence from Spain and the Braganzas started the third (and last) dynasty of Portuguese kings with Joao IV. See J. F. Menderos, "O oliventino Sebastião do Couto, mestre insigne da Universidade de Évora e alma dal altercações de 1637", *Anais, Academia Portuguesa da História*, 18 (1969), pp. 17–32; Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, pp. 97–100; J. Vaz de Carvalho, "Jesuítas portugueses com obras filosóficas impressas nos séculos XVI–XVIII", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 47 (1991), pp. 651–659.
- 54 The thesis is supported by F. Stegmüller, *Filosofia e teologia nas Universidade de Coimbra e Évora no século XVI*, trans. Alexandre Morujão, Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1959, p. 98. An accurate reconstruction of the story can be found in Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 52–55. Although the texts published in five different cities belong to the same editorial operation, they do display textual differences.
- 55 This was the warning *Ad lectorem* in Couto's *Dialectics*: "Antequam Logicae in publicum evulgandae fidem multis promissionibus obligatam absolveremus, illam pro nobis mala fide bibliopolae quidam liberarunt: qui, ut cum sui oppidi nomine congruerent, Franco Furti, furtiva Dialecticae glossemata Cursus nostri Commentariis supposuerunt: scripta quidem ante annos triginta caliginoso adhuc seculo, ab uno ex veteribus magistris, verum non communi consilio, sed privata industria, ut suis auditoribus in Schola traderet, cum de typis nec somnians cogitaret." The fact that it was not a group work but an individual one, and the chronological distance of Coelho's classes, represent the negative elements with which Couto summarizes Froben's operation as totally inconsistent with the true Conimbricensian spirit. "Para os comentar, e como era usança, Couto teve que sobretudo compilar, afeiçoando à sua maneira, os cursos manuscritos preexistentes que circulavam entre Évora e Coimbra." M. Santiago de Carvalho, *Introdução a Comentários a Aristóteles do Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense (1592–1606)*. *Antologia de textos*, Coimbra: Altera, 2011, p. 6.
- 56 "Huius furti periculum fuit in illa temporis intercapedine, quae ad hanc VERAE LOGICAE CONIMBRICENSIS editionem intercessit, quam communi expectatione longius protraximus, ut tempus rerum omnium magister, & diuturnae concertationes multarum opinionum, quarum nos hoc in libro assertores profiteamur,

veritatem altius discuterent, in tanta doctorum Hominum, & librorum multitudine, quam immense temporum nostrorum faecunditas invexit." Ibid.

- 57 "We have certain indications that there were those who did not appreciate Dialectical Institutions as an introductory text for students of the College of Arts. This was not, in fact, the common way of presenting Logic outside circles influenced by Peter Ramus ... and by the humanist critique of scholastic Logic. The program of Arts aimed for an approach to Logic that would follow close upon the texts of the Organon, attempting a compromise between the exigencies of the more recent Aristotelianism and the scholastic lines of Parisian inspiration." Martíns, "The Conimbricenses", pp. 8–9.
- 58 "Ne in Topicorum, & Elenchorum labyrinthos Lectorem induceremus summam compendiose texere constituimus, & curiosos earum fabricarum aucupes mittere ad Introductionem D. Petri Fonsecae e nostra Societate, cuius doctrinam, seu primum lac Dialecticae suis studiosis haec instillat Academia."
- 59 C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A–B", *Studies in the Renaissance*, 21 (1974), pp. 228–289; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors C", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 28 (1975), pp. 689–741; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors D–F", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 29 (1976), pp. 714–745; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors G–K", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 30 (1977), pp. 681–741; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors L–M", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 31 (1978), pp. 532–603; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors N–Ph", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 32 (1979), pp. 529–580; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors Pi–Sm", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 33 (1980), pp. 623–734; C. H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors So–Z", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 35 (1982), pp. 164–256. C. B. Schmitt, *Problemi dell'aristotelismo rinascimentale*, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1985; B. Copenhaver and C. B. Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1992.
- 60 "Books of this kind became more and more complex over time. The organization of the text into chapters, sections and subsections with the accompaniment of chapter headings, marginal keywords, subtitles and summaries of each section, became more common and articulated. Between the period of *incunabula* and the end of the sixteenth century, the order of the words on the page became easier to use, and the way in which each book was organized became more evident at a glance. All this facilitated the mastery of the material and made the communication between teacher and student more productive." Schmitt, *Problemi dell'aristotelismo*, p. 69.
- 61 Doyle, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions*, p. 16.
- 62 "The paraphrase, which though used by Albert the Great in imitation of Avicenna enjoyed little favor in the Middle Ages, underwent its most important development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was especially true in Germany, where the paraphrase was used in conscious contrast to the medieval commentary as the expression of an attempt to penetrate through the medieval ideological overlay to Aristotle's true meaning." Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A–B", p. 231.
- 63 As stated by Schmitt, *Problemi dell'aristotelismo*: "The basic method of explanation used by Nifo, Pomponazzi Zabarella or by the Coimbra commentators is not radically different from the way Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan and Walter Burley commented. The aim was philosophical understanding, with the intrusion of philological or historical issues at intervals which were relatively infrequent, and usually only when they were deemed important for the debated point" (p. 41).

- 64 “The *cursus* (*summa, tractatio, institutio*), which had its origin in such works as Albert of Orlamünde’s *Philosophia pauperum* and Peter of Dresden’s *Parvulus philosophiae naturalis*, enjoyed in accordance with the textbook character of much of Renaissance Aristotelianism a great popularity, especially in Catholic schools and in France and Holland. This form came to embrace not only *cursus* for the whole of logic or natural philosophy, but also *cursus totius philosophiae Aristotelis*, often of a decidedly dogmatic stamp, *secundum veram/genuinam/authenticam doctrinam doctoris angelicisubtilis*, etc.” Lohr, “Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A–B”, p. 231.
- 65 According to Schmitt, the *adnotationes* method was quite different from the Thomistic comment: “There was an increased focus on the philological analysis of words and phrases, historical parallels were searched for, the text was illustrated more often through the use of classical authors rather than medieval philosophers, and maybe most importantly of all, the sharp scholastic *quaestio* was definitely lacking.” Schmitt, *Problemi dell’aristotelismo*, p. 69. There is however an element that contradicts Schmitt’s description, at least regarding the Conimbricant *Cursus*, which he identified with the Thomistic comment: the peculiar content of the *explanatio*. This *explanatio*, although it cannot be considered a “great innovation” as Martins enthusiastically does, nor intended “to overcome the inevitable incommensurability between the Latin text and the Greek one”, is nevertheless inclined towards the same philological direction of the humanistic *adnotationes* (Martins, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 10).
- 66 “Statuimus autem (ob eam, quam profitemur brevitatem, plane necessariam Philosophiae auditoribus, artium curriculum praefinito tempore absoluturis) statuimus, inquam, in hoc opere, quod etiam in libris Parvorum Naturalium fecimus, omissa explanatione Aristotelici contextus, ac fere etiam consuetudine nostra quaestiones in utranque parte disputandi: ex ijs, quae ab Aristotele sparsim traduntur, digniora, praestantioraque in unum seligere, & alia ad idem institutum pertinentia ijs adiungere, atque omnia arbitrato nostro in capita summatim distributa legentibus proponere: ut harum rerum, quae per se admodum iucundae sunt, & iucundior & compendiosior esset explicatio.” The effectiveness of Góis’s educational system is also detected by Des Chene: “What strikes me more, when I compare the Coimbrans’ work with that of, say, Buridan, Zabarella, or the later Jesuit textbook of Arriaga, is its readability. Góis may get bogged down in logical murk (it was Fonseca, after all, who wrote the logic commentary), but the brevity of his articles, which seldom run more than a few pages, ensures that there will not be long stretches of unparagraphed text that fatigue the eye, or multiple bouts of reply, counter-reply, and counter-counter-reply, that strain the memory.” D. Des Chene, “An Aristotle for the Universities: Natural Philosophy in the Coimbra Commentaries”, in S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster and J. Sutton (eds), *Descartes’ Natural Philosophy*, vol. I, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 42.
- 67 Góis once again tackles, in the Preface, the issue of the Aristotelian text: “Omittimus autem, ut in Meteororum & Parvorum Naturalium libris, interpretationem Aristotelici contextus: non quod eum negligendum putemus, sed quia non quid ab alijs scriptum sit, aut scribi a nobis possit, sed quid Philosophiae auditoribus, certo annorum specio eis praescripto, enarrari queat perpendimus.”
- 68 See specifically Schmitt, *Problemi dell’aristotelismo*, pp. 75–76.
- 69 On the structure of the texts, cf. Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 59–61. From the reconstruction of the structural evolution of the commentaries, Gomes concludes that: “O curso conimbricense apresenta diversas inovações: evidente modernidade quanto à esfera dos conhecimentos, alargando-se a presença do número de especialidades; uma metodologia expositivo-demonstrativa orientada para o diálogo e a participação na controvérsia; as explicações ao centro do texto, em caracteres

tipográficos mais pequenos e, em torno, os comentários questiunculares. Enfim, simplificavam-se as questões e as explanações, porque, em vez de ser o professor a ditá-las, punham-se, diante dos estudantes, as fonts originais e magistrais” (p. 61). According to Gomes, who in this embraces the thesis of D. M. Gomes dos Santos, the Conimbricenses adopted, in relation to the *quaestiones*, the method of the Franciscan (initially orthodox, then friar) Frans (Franciscus) Titelmans, professor at the pedagogium Het Varken of Louvain, whose *Compendium dialecticae ad libros logicorum Aristotelis; De consideratione Dialectica libri VI* (1533) seems to have been adopted in the College of Sainte-Barbe in the years in which Simão Rodrigues was a student. Titelmans was also the author of a *Compendium philosophiae naturalis* that circulated widely between 1530 and 1596. See D. M. Gomes dos Santos, “Francisco Titelmans OFM e as origens do Curso Conimbricense”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 11 (1955), pp. 468–478 and Lohr, “Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors So–Z”, pp. 196–197. On Titelmans and the function of manuals in Louvain teaching, see also D. A. Lines, “Teaching Physics in Louvain and Bologna. Frans Titelmans and Ulisse Aldovrandi”, in E. Campi, S. de Angelis, A.-S. Goeing and A. T. Grafton (eds), *Scholarly Knowledge. Textbooks in Early Modern Europe*, Geneva: Droz, 2008, pp. 183–204.

- 70 Lohr has a different opinion, echoed by Alison Simmons: Jesuit textbooks (not only those of Coimbra) are *unusually systematic and philosophical*, as opposed to the scholastic commentaries of the previous centuries, or to works such as Aquinas’s *Summa*, a topically but not philosophically systematic text. See A. Simmons, “Jesuit Aristotelian Education: *De Anima* Commentaries”, in J. W. O’Malley, G. A. Bailey, S. J. Harris and T. F. Kennedy (eds), *The Jesuits. Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*, University of Toronto Press, 1999, pp. 522–537; and C. H. Lohr, “Jesuit Aristotelianism and Sixteenth-Century Metaphysics”, in H. G. Fletcher III and M. B. Schulte (eds), *Paradosis: Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1976, pp. 203–220.
- 71 Gomes calls it *o liceu aristotelico: Os Conimbricenses*, p. 56.
- 72 Gomes’s position is more bland (*ibid.*, p. 59).
- 73 Cf. Schmitt, *Problemi dell’aristotelismo*, pp. 121–123.
- 74 Vimercati published translations and commentaries as follows: *On the Soul* (1543), *Physics* (1550), *Metaphysics* (1551) and *Meteorology* (1556). The publication of the *De principiis rerum naturalium* (1596) was posthumous. Various other commentaries remained unpublished manuscripts, such as those on the *De Mundo* and *De Caelo*, *Ethics* and *De Partibus Naturalium*. Cf. N. W. Gilbert, “Francesco Vimercato of Milan: A Bio-Bibliography”, *Studies in the Renaissance*, 12 (1965), pp. 188–217. And Lohr, “Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors So–Z”, pp. 217–219.
- 75 In a document dated 1564, “De modo legendi cursum philosophiae”, Benedictus Pererio writes: “The teacher who must read in a famous university ... in the first course, instead of the Greek commentaries which are very long and unclear, will be able to read Themistio and Vicomercato” (*MP*, II, p. 665). Cf. P. R. Blum, “Benedictus Pererius: Renaissance Culture at the Origins of Jesuit Science”, *Science and Education*, 15 (2006), pp. 279–304.
- 76 According to Martíns: “We are working in a field in which it will only be possible to produce a reliable study after a critical edition of the texts of the Curso Conimbricense is available. The study would be made particularly complex because, among other reasons, the Latin versions from the Renaissance frequently relied upon other versions of the epoch and even the much criticized but still utilized medieval versions.” Martíns, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 13.
- 77 Please refer to the Bibliography for a list of editions, which completes and corrects the previous efforts by Gomes and dos Santos Carvalho.

- 78 The *Ethics* will be printed once again in Cologne in 1655, the *De Generatione* in Mainz in 1650, the *Dialectics* in Cologne in 1585. Moreover, Zetzner in Cologne in 1639 will publish the first complete edition of the *Cursus* with the addition of Fonseca's work (*Cursus philosophicus Collegii Conimbricensis et Petri Fonsecae | commentariis in Aristotelis Stagiritae organum, libros VIII physicorum, de coelo, meteorologicos ...*) and a second edition will appear in 1730 (which is an isolated operation that we can now consider archaeological and antiquarian).
- 79 Although the bibliography of British publishing only records the *Compendium*, we must remember that the *Logic* was undoubtedly well known and widespread in the Oxford and Cambridge settings (cf. Doyle, *The Conimbricenses. Some Questions*, p. 20).
- 80 See Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 94–97.
- 81 In the introductory epistle addressed to the “benign Reader” one can read, more clearly than in the authentic commentaries, the praise of Coimbra and, above all, of its method: “Operae certe precium fecit Collegium Conimbricense, quod succinctis & exasciatis suis lucubrationibus nunquam satis laudandis, opus istud Logicum, si quisquam alius, maxime illustravit, & viam patefecit, ad expeditam & planam eius intelligentiam, ita ut cuilibet mediocriter saltem exercitatio, inoffenso pede stadium istud decurrendi potestas facta sit. Etsi enim multi eruditi viri de Republica literaria praeclare meriti sunt, quod omnes nervos ad hujus auctoris explanationem doctissimis suis notis intenderint, nec ego de cujusquam laboribus quicquam imminutum eam: tamen qui ex optimis Aristotelis interpretibus χρησμοθήαν [*sic*] collegerint, atque selectissime quaeque in succum & sanguinem suum converterint, nodosque intricatos majori dexteritate & judicij exquisitione dissolverint, atque in his commentariis factum, vix reperies.” *Collegii conimbricensis Societatis Iesu Commentarii doctissimi in universam Logicam Aristotelis, nunc primum editi*, Tomus Primus, ex Bibliopolio Frobeniano, MDCIIII.
- 82 Cf. Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 93–94 and 113–126, who reconstructs the compulsory adoption of the *Cursus* in Portuguese colleges, particularly the *Logic* (since the volumes of natural philosophy were clearly more prone to problems of updating), and the activity of António Cordeiro, Conimbrican professor between 1676 and 1680, who undertook a general revision of the *Cursus*, becoming the “último renovador”, as Gomes calls him.
- 83 Cf. Des Chene, “An Aristotle for the Universities”, p. 42.
- 84 Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

4 The problem of the teacher

There is a single place within the whole *Cursus* where Conimbricenses deal expressly and extensively with education: this place is in the commentary on *Topics*, when Couto has to deal with the renowned first sentence of *Posterior Analytics*: “Omnis doctrina, & disciplina ex antecedente cognitione fit” (every doctrine and every discipline comes from a previous knowledge). The Aristotelian sentence presented several pitfalls, which were made more complicated and dangerous by a long-lasting series of Scholastic *glossae* and commentaries. The first book of *Posterior Analytics* deals with the logic structure of scientific discourse, that is, the debate on conditions for knowing, arguing on first principles, on demonstrations, on mathematical reasoning. In short, on the logical legitimation for knowledge. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the very beginning of the book was still a delicate issue for Jesuit logicians, all the more so as under their influence men as Galileo Galilei exercised themselves in Aristotelian logic. Galilei’s *De Praecognitionibus et Praecognitis* dealt with the most thorny problem implied in the sentence.¹ The inheritance by Galileo of some teachings of the *Collegio Romano* was founded on certain aspects of that teaching which were peculiar to the Jesuits in relation to the most widespread Thomistic positions. Moreover, in the commentary on this section of *Posterior Analytics* (i.e. at the core of the *Topics*, where logical questions become foundations for knowledge), the Jesuits made room for an empirical attitude toward language and education, an attitude cleansed of the last residues of Platonism.

Doctrina and *disciplina* – that is to say, knowledge in its facets of action and transmission (but this is only a very general definition, to be considered in the background of the many Scholastic distinctions that we will explain later) – can only be built upon a preceding knowledge. Given this concept of precedence, its ambiguity was immediately posited. Around this ambiguity the Scholastics, with their passion for distinguishing and defining, worked and wrote abundantly. For Aristotelian commentators, the problem of precedence was the problem of regression of knowledge to its original *primum*: as knowledge was the result of a progressive acquisition provided by senses and *phantasmata* (or, at least, *non sine phantasiam* as the *De Anima* stated), man

could walk back through all the process to find a single datum, known but not through experience, beyond which there was only the void of *infinitum*. In other words, in the Aristotelian gnoseological system there was still a region of principles that were to be assumed, in order that human knowledge could be built. It was the region of first principles. It compelled Aristotle and all his commentators to confront Plato's doctrine: first principles implied perhaps reminiscence, and stood as evidence of the fact that knowledge was not an acquisitive and transmissible process, but a datum, concealed only by the weight of bodily matter. On the other hand, these first principles looked like the bedrock of the communicability of knowledge and education in the Aristotelian system: without them knowledge was without any grounds. To overcome this hurdle, Christian tradition could rely on a circumventing, less-known path, the "problem of the teacher". Only few great churchmen had taken this path, which offered a real armoury of syllogisms and images, at the fingertips of everyone who in the following centuries aimed at commenting on this famous sentence of Aristotle.

Augustine's *De Magistro* starts with a question: "Quid tibi videmur efficere velle cum loquimur?" His son Adeodatus, the other character of the *Dialogue*, answers with a sentence that will foster for centuries a misunderstanding on the real nature of this work: "Quantum quidem mihi nunc occurrit, aut docere, aut discere."

The link between language and teaching/learning proposed at the beginning of this dialogue is not by any means a negligible problem in Augustine's philosophical thought. It implies a series of analyses that compel Augustine to climb back up the series of the problems, back to the most universal ones: the relationship between signs and things, the first cause and second cause, God and man. Thomas Aquinas had a clear notion of this fact and devotes to it two articles in *Summa Theologiae* (I, Quaest. 117, art. 1–2) and a *Quaestio disputata* (*De Veritate*, Quaest. IX). Augustine and Aquinas are the two poles around which a field of orthodox opinions arose: (1) signs do not designate the thing, so they aren't able to teach: therefore no man can be teacher of another man, only God is the real teacher and the truth lies *in interiore homine*; (2) signs designate the thing, so through them it is possible to teach: therefore a man can be the teacher of another man, even if God, nevertheless, remains in an *absolute* sense the real teacher.

The underlying intention of Aquinas is to preserve the rationality of the Creation: God has created Nature giving her simultaneously the ability to go on by herself, establishing laws regulating the natural agents or *causae secundae*. For this reason, in *Summa Theologiae* this question (117) is raised immediately after that on Fate, defined by Aquinas as a product of second causes: "Fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos." Quaestio 117 affects things that pertain to human action, and their articles (1) and (2) deal precisely with *docere*.

In Article 1, Aquinas explains four arguments against the possibility that a man could be the teacher of another man: two of them are a recapitulation

of Augustine (not mentioned, however); the other two explain the illusory contradiction between *docere* and being the cause of knowledge in another man. The Augustinian source is concealed, drawing upon (arg. 1) the biblical *nolite vocare Rabbi* with Hieronymus's *glossae* (only God is the teacher of men), or discussing the problem of *signa*: the teacher proposes to the pupil some signs, words or gestures (*nutus*), but this does not provoke knowledge in the pupil, as the signs are signs of things already known by the pupil (this implies that the pupil learns nothing from the teacher), or are signs of things unknown to the pupil, therefore the pupil does not understand anything of what is told him. Aquinas uses a metaphor that will often recur in the Conimbricenses' commentary also: *sicut aliquis proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca*. Among the remaining objections quoted by Aquinas is that according to which man needs both natural enlightenment and the *species* of the thing, in order to acquire knowledge of the said thing. But a man cannot be the cause of any of these in another man, because this will actually be an act of creation; therefore a man cannot be the cause of knowledge in another man.

In order to answer these objections, Aquinas gathers the three opinions most discussed in his time. The first is Averroes's (*De Anima*, III): according to him, as there is a unique intellect common to all men, one does not teach another communicating his own species, but communicates the ability to grasp the knowledge the pupil already has, spurring him *ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua*; thus the pupil structures his *phantasmata* in a way suitable to intellectual apprehension. Aquinas thinks that this opinion is true in the sense that knowledge is identical in teacher and pupil, as far as the unity of the known object is concerned; but it is false in so far as it postulates a unique possible intellect.

The second opinion is Plato's: knowledge is innate in the soul *per participationem formarum separatarum*. Learning is not a brand-new acquisition, but reminiscence, as the pupil is spurred by the teacher to consider what he already knows. Aquinas cannot agree with this opinion as he wants to save the second causes, as he makes clear in expounding the Platonic thesis: "They thought that natural agents can dispose the soul to receive forms, which are acquired by the corporeal matter in participating separate species."²

Platonists are wrong because the possible intellect is pure potentiality in respect to understandable things, and, as Aristotle states in his *Physics*, the teacher causes science in the pupil by bringing him from potentiality to act. Aquinas explains this statement, distinguishing, among the effects caused by an external principle, the ones caused only by the said principle (as a house is caused only by art) and those caused by a principle sometimes external and sometimes internal (such as health, sometimes caused by medicine, sometimes by nature). The example of medicine inspires Aquinas to an elucidation: the external principle does not cause as primary agent, but helps the primary agent, that is the inner principle: *confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum*. The same for

knowledge, which a man acquires through his own *inventione* (internal principle) or learns from another man (external principle).

On this point is posited the central question which all Thomas's successors will debate. Aquinas, once denied reminiscence, approaches the problem of *inventio*, concerning the ability to know on one's own. To make *inventio* possible, Aristotle's commentator must deal with the troublesome issue of intellect as *tabula rasa*. Aquinas recurs to the concept of first principles, stating:

In every man there is a certain principle of science, the light of the agent intellect, through which we know by way of nature, immediately from the beginning, the universal principles of all sciences. He then applies some universal principles to particular things, of which he acquires memory and experience through the senses; and thanks to *inventio* he acquires the knowledge of things he didn't know before, going on from the known to the unknown. So every teacher, starting from the things the pupil knows, accompanies him towards the knowledge of things he does not know; as it is written in the first book of *Posterior Analytics*, "that every doctrine and every discipline comes from a previous knowledge".³

To the question "how does the teacher accompany the pupil from the *praecognita*⁴ to unknown things?" Aquinas has two answers: (1) making known to the pupil some aids and instruments, useful to the intellect in order to acquire knowledge, such as less universal sentences that the pupil is able to evaluate on the basis of *praecognita*; or providing physical examples, similar or opposite, to "take the hand" (*manuducere*) of the pupil; (2) strengthening (*confortare*) the intellect of the pupil, explaining to him the order of principles, which he couldn't grasp with his sole abilities (*virtus collativa*), to lead him to conclusions. In similar terms Aristotle states in *Posterior Analytics*: "demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire".

As a consequence, a man is the teacher of another man only as external principle, like a physician; he does not cause the knowledge as a natural principle, as Averroes held. Knowledge is not an active quality, but is a *principium* through which somebody is led (*dirigitur*) in the learning process.

To the fourth objection, Aquinas answers that the signs proposed by the teacher are universal and confused about known things, but particular and somewhat clear about unknown things. So, when somebody acquires knowledge on his own, he could not be considered as his own teacher, as in him did not previously dwell the complete knowledge that dwells in the teacher.

Quaestio XI of *De Veritate* recapitulates the themes of the *Summa*, but explaining further the objections drawing on Augustine (*De Magistro*, *In Genesim*) and generally elucidating the thesis of God as teacher of man in a far more extended version than in the *Summa*.⁵ Aquinas wants to square things up with Augustine about *docere*, which is accordingly a central issue, and in order to do that he needs to expound with utter precision the opinions of Augustine's *De Magistro*. If the man teaches, he can do it only through

signs (the gesture needs a sign in order to teach); but through signs the man cannot reach the knowledge of things, as the latter is *potior* than the former, being its goal. Augustine's conclusion is that nobody can give the knowledge of anything to anybody, so he cannot teach (arg. 2). The *subiectum* of knowledge is the intellect; but signs cannot reach intellect, as they stay (*sistunt*) in the sensory power (arg. 4). The act of teaching is like an enlightenment, therefore it can come only from the inside of man (arg. 7 and 9); it is also something like an act of creation, therefore only God, and not man, can perform it (arg. 8 and 15). Moreover, knowledge is an accident, and the accident cannot change subject: therefore it cannot be transferred from teacher to pupil (arg. 6). Knowledge is a certainty, but this *certitudo* cannot be produced in another man through signs, as they are uncertain (arg. 13), or through reliable images of the thing, as they can be produced only from the inside (arg. 11), or through the authority of truth, whose voice speaks only from the inside (arg. 17).

Presenting the fifth argument, Aquinas approaches the problem of causation: "If the knowledge in somebody is caused by another man, either the knowledge already was in the pupil, or it wasn't there."⁶ If knowledge wasn't there, as a consequence man is able to cause the knowledge in another man (and this had been denied before); if it previously was there, or knowledge is perfectly in act, and therefore it cannot be caused, or pre-exists *secundum rationem seminalem*. But seminal reasons cannot be rendered into act by the action of natural agents, as they are put in nature by God. Hence a man cannot be the teacher of another man.

Aquinas's answer is somewhat different from the one he gave in the *Summa*. He states that there is a link between the answers given to questions about forms coming into being, acquiring virtue and learning. While in the *Summa* he presented Averroes's and Avicenna's theories, here Aquinas takes Avicenna instead of Averroes. According to Avicenna, knowledge is produced in men solely through the action of *dator formarum*, external agent or active intellect that gets into action when natural agents have prepared matter to receive forms. As Gilson has demonstrated, Avicenna's theory was very popular in Parisian theology in the age of Aquinas, as it was a variation of the Augustinian theory of the exclusively divine character of causality. Aquinas then expounds the Platonic theory of the actual existence of forms, concealed in matter: the natural agent acts only to remove the obstacles to its appearance. Learning is therefore reminiscence.

The mistake that most concerns Aquinas, in both theories, is the failed recognition of second causes, as all effects produced in nature would be linked to the sole first cause. As in the *Summa*, Aquinas states the concatenation of causes, and accordingly the rationality of the creation.

But Plato's and Avicenna's theories diverge in many respects, and Aquinas suggests a *via media*. Natural forms pre-exist in matter as potentiality (not in act, as Platonists stated), and are brought into act thanks to an external agent (not only the first, as stated Avicenna). As far as learning is concerned,

For certain seeds of knowledge pre-exist in us, namely, the first concepts of understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect are immediately known through the species abstracted from sensible things. These are either complex, as axioms, or simple, as the notions of being, of the one, and so on, which the understanding grasps immediately. In these general principles, however, all the consequences are included as in certain seminal principles. When, therefore, the mind is led from these general notions to actual knowledge of the particular things, which it knew previously in general and, as it were, potentially, then one is said to acquire knowledge.⁷

But which potentiality is the one in which seminal reasons live inside us? Aquinas stated it has two ways: (1) the active full potentiality, in which the internal agent needs the external agent only to be helped and receive everything necessary to reach the act; (2) the passive potentiality, for which the internal principle is insufficient, and the passage from potentiality to act is due mainly to the external agent. Seminal reasons pre-exist in man in the first way, otherwise man could not learn. Just as man could be healed in two different ways (by nature alone or by nature *cum adminiculo medicinae*), so he can learn: the *inventio* is the acquisition of knowledge with the natural reason alone, while *disciplina* is the acquisition of knowledge with the *adminiculum* of the external teacher. The two processes are identical: the one that brings another man to knowledge follows the same path of natural reason in *inventio*. The art of teaching, according to Aquinas, imitates nature:

Now, in discovery, the procedure of anyone who arrives at the knowledge of something unknown is to apply general self-evident principles to certain definite matters, from these to proceed to particular conclusions, and from these to others.⁸

Teaching is the presentation by the teacher of signs that the natural light of the pupil is able to use as an instrument in rational construction towards the knowledge of the unknown: the teacher does not cause the knowledge (he does not infuse the intellectual light), but he causes the intelligible species that sustains the rational process.

The *docere* helps the demonstration, as Aristotle states, talking about syllogism in *Posterior Analytics*. Learning comes from a sequence of conclusions at the end of a concatenation of rational processes, starting from first principles, working as *semina quaedam* of all subsequent knowledge. The fact must not be overlooked that where Aquinas uses the image of *semina*, he feels compelled to underline the vagueness of the similitude (*quasi, quaedam, etc.*). The fundamental ambiguity of Aquinas on this point will weigh heavily on commentators or self-proclaimed disciples of Aquinas's doctrine, founding *de facto* two different schools of interpretation, which in the sixteenth century will deploy Dominicans and Jesuits in opposing armies.

Aquinas here feels deeply the conflict with Augustine, and before addressing the hypothesis of the self-taught man (can man be said to be the teacher of himself?) he tries a reconnection with Augustine's *De Magistro*, with a strange flavour of *excusatio non petita*:

When Augustine proves that only God teaches, he does not intend to exclude man from teaching exteriorly, but intends to say that God alone teaches interiorly.⁹

Henry of Ghent has been often quoted as an Augustinian enemy of Aquinas: the *doctor sollemnis* had contributed to the well-known condemnation of Averroistic and Thomistic propositions in 1277, paving the way for Bishop Tempier's condemnation of some of Aquinas's propositions. About knowledge and *docere*, anyway, the "reaction" has been lighter, and the defence of Augustine's position is almost always mixed with Aquinas's objections, thus introducing specifications that Jesuits will take for granted three centuries later in Coimbra, in the debate about the same question in *Posterior Analytics*. Henry expounds a theory of knowledge aiming at supporting the movement Gilson will call "Avicennian Augustinianism",¹⁰ against Aquinas. Brown properly states that:

Henry shows himself most unwilling to abandon the old Neoplatonic ways of thinking represented by Augustine and Avicenna. He simply cannot bring himself to abandon the "hierarchy of being" idea (neither could Aquinas, for that matter), so dear to the Neoplatonists and their followers.¹¹

Because of the influence of Avicenna and Augustine, Henry of Ghent will develop a theory that is important in order to understand some of the "movements" inside the *Cursus*. Its authors will sometimes consider Henry as a source (such as Manuel de Góis in his *De Anima* commentary), sometimes an uninteresting author, as in Couto's *Dialectica*, whose orientation towards the empirical and perceptible in the theory of knowledge made him distrustful of all sort of enlightenments.

Henry speaks about this topic in the *Summa* (Art. I, Quaest. 6: *Utrum contingat hominem acquirere scientiam alio homine docente*) and, having denied reminiscence while arguing about possible intellect in pure potentiality in respect of knowledge, makes reference to Avicenna: according to him, as already said, the act of teaching coincides with the removal of hindrances to the reception of intellect. *Docere*, as a consequence, exists only *per accidens*. According to Henry, Avicenna's thesis is right only for some intelligible forms, this is to say, those that overcome the natural forces of the soul as *credibilia* and *quae pertinent ad revelationem*.¹² According to Henry, this is not in contradiction with faith. As far as philosophical truth is concerned, Henry holds

it unacceptable that the human soul does not acquire any knowledge: it is a natural form, and therefore is perfectible.

Henry wants to avoid the thesis, refuted by Aquinas, of the creation of a soul void of instruments in order to enact its essence. It is not appropriate (*inconveniens*) to God to create a flawed creation: the soul must be endowed with a perfectibility that it can reach *naturaliter*, without need of an intervention of God, enacting with his enlightenment every intellectual act in the world. Because “*operatio animae humanae propriae naturalis non est alia quam scire aut cognoscere*”, Henry thinks that the soul can know without the help of a divine enlightenment, but only *ex puris naturalibus*.¹³

If perfectibility is not provided by the acquisition of knowledge through inferior perceptible things (as Avicenna would not admit), it is given by the becoming of soul from *sciens in potentia* to *sciens in actu*. The different possibilities of this passage (*inventio* or *disciplina*) are recapitulated by Henry, who chooses the image of medicine to describe the relationship between art and nature: when art is in relationship with nature, it does not act as a primary agent, but as *adminiculans et coadiuvans* of nature. Whether man learns by himself or from another man, the process is a concatenation of reasonings that starts from the *notitia* of principles and develops in order. In the first case, man goes on with the (infallible) deduction of near conclusions from the *notitia principiorum*, and from near conclusions (called by Henry “posterior principles”) to other conclusions, and from these to last conclusions, which are the near principles to the thing to be known. Unlike Aquinas,¹⁴ Henry gives to *inventio* the possibility to acquire the full possession of knowledge. Similar to it is the action of the teacher:

In the same way [the teacher] must act in teaching the pupil: first of all, presenting to him the first principles known in themselves; then, as he can, applying them directly to certain conclusions, and from these to others, going on until he reaches the last one, explaining all this to the pupil with verbal signs or whichever other thing, as best he can, that can signify the concepts that natural reason has ordered inside him, if he hasn’t made the wrong reasoning. This way the pupil, with the help of signs, forms in himself the concepts presented through signs.¹⁵

The teacher causes *per accidens* the knowledge in the pupil, because the signs he presents him cause *per accidens* the acquisition of knowledge. Henry of Ghent insists on the accidental aspect of causation, because the signs of words, *per se*, do not show the truth and do not lead the intellect to giving an order to concepts. But, most of all, this accidentality occurs because the discourse is like a *symbol* between

teacher and pupil, not in reason of nature but conventionally; it presents things of which concepts are formed, and therefore these things accidentally cause the doctrine *per accidens*, and so it is the teacher.¹⁶

Aquinas and Henry (who continues and renews Augustine) had opened the vast field of Scholastic interpretations of the subject. In relation to these authors, the Conimbricenses, in many of their commentaries, will find original positions not limited to the defence of either of the two. It is significant that the Coimbra Jesuits did adopt a free attitude towards any author that should have been compulsory to follow, at least in theology (as was declared in the fourth part of the *Constitutions*).¹⁷

A crowd of logicians, for three centuries, quibbled over the questions opened by Aquinas and Henry, but seldom was the “problem of the teacher” treated in as specific and systematic a way as it was in these authors. We will find traces, pieces, sometimes only shreds of Thomist reasoning in the commentaries on the *Summa*, or as an arsenal of answers to doubts about the *Posterior Analytics*, especially their first lines, or again about the third book of Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, that would have drawn more and more attention in the following years. Almost never would these shreds be able to compose a consistent body, to emphasize the importance of the subject of teaching in the larger context of knowing and learning.

One of the Jesuits who earlier tackled the question of precognitions and, more generally, of the first lines of *Posterior Analytics*, was Franciscus Toletus, one of the pupils of Domingo de Soto in Salamanca. We could say that Toletus was the founder of the Jesuit critical mainstream on the subject, and the initiator of the tradition of the *Collegio Romano* in logic. Toletus taught logic in Rome in the year 1559/1560. He drew from the course his *Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus in universam Aristotelis Logicam*, published several times from 1576 on, and the *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*, published by Giunta from 1578. Toletus’s commentaries were certainly browsed by the two subsequent generation of logicians from the *Collegio Romano*, such as Jean de Lorin (Lorinus), Paolo Valla (Vallius) and Ludovico Carbone (author of the *Addimenta* to Toletus’s commentaries), and, through their influence, Galilei, as previously stated.¹⁸ The subject was a favourite argument for the Jesuits to emphasize their difference with respect to the Dominican, at least in Thomas Cajetan’s version, the most renowned Dominican commentator.¹⁹ As Wallace stated, anyway, Jesuits “relied heavily on Thomistic authors, but as the order grew it developed its own distinctive teachings”.²⁰

The founders of the Salamanca school drew inspiration from Cajetan and from his controversies against the Aristotelian tradition of Padua (defended by Trombetta, a Franciscan Scotist). Among them there were Francisco Vitoria, Melchior Cano and the younger Domingo Bañez²¹ (involved in the dispute with Molina about *scientia media*), and above all Domingo de Soto, a chief source on science and logic for the Jesuits,²² being the teacher of Toletus.

In commenting on the first lines of *Posterior Analytics*, Toletus starts from the meaning *ex mente Aristotelis* of the expression *doctrina et disciplina intellectiva*. Toletus expounds three interpretations, rejecting two of them not because they were not true, but because they were not faithful to the author’s text in a philological sense. The first interpretation, put forward by undefined

recentiores, states that Aristotle with *doctrina* and *disciplina* meant every cognition of the intellect, simple and complex, as opposed to cognitions provided by the senses. The second is ascribed to Themistius: Aristotle means only the complex knowledge of truth. That knowledge is twofold: either it is first and immediate, therefore it does not rely on other cognitions, as in the *notitia principiorum*; or it is rational, therefore it relies on another cognition. In both cases, nevertheless, the addition of the term “intellective” is necessary to distinguish this knowledge from that, common to animals, that comes from the senses. Toletus brings the opinions of Philoponus and Aquinas in defence of Themistius’s position. This doctrine does not look bad (*spernenda*) to Toletus, and it is consistent with Aristotle’s doctrine in general; but Toletus rejects it because it looks to him like an unfaithful reading of the given text. According to Toletus, indeed, in the Greek language the term “intellectiva” means nothing different from “rational”, made *cum rationcinatione et discursu*: this is the reason for which Toletus, in the tradition of Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Robert Grosseteste and Giles of Rome, states that Aristotle in these lines spoke about the rational truth. *Doctrina* and *disciplina* are therefore the same knowledge of the thing, both in the form of the oral (or written, according to Giles) transmission from teacher to pupil, and in the form of reception by the pupil.

Toletus, in his commentary, does not devote as much space to this subject as the Conimbricenses do. Nevertheless, he raises some questions. The first question draws on the example of angelic knowledge to deny the necessity of any cognition pre-existent to *doctrina* and *disciplina*. Angelic knowledge is a doctrine but it draws not upon pre-existing cognitions, because God had infused angels with all *natural* knowledge in creating them. Moreover, humans also learn things that they didn’t know before, so they do not learn them *ex preexistenti cognitione et iudicio* (Cap. I, Quaest. I). The answer to this objection is about the acceptance of first principles. Toletus states that knowledge is a broader concept than doctrine and rational discipline: this, indeed, is only the knowledge and judgment obtained by reasoning. It is the same with first principles: the judgment through principles *per se nota* is not called “doctrine”, because man admits them without reasoning and with the sole help of natural enlightenment. The knowledge of angels is not rational, but infused by God; moreover, it comes from things without reasoning. Therefore angels’ knowledge cannot be called “rational doctrine”, that is only *ex preexistenti cognitione*.

Knowledge, says Toletus replying to another objection, coincides with doctrine, and its acquisition is provided in two ways: either through *inventio*, or *ex magistro*. The two modes aren’t different in respect to the object or the learning subject, but in respect to *modus investigandi* and *acquirendi*, and most of all in respect to the degree of easiness and self-confidence with which the subject acquires the knowledge. The road of *inventio* is full of hindrances and extremely prone to errors: the exterior teacher, as Aquinas stated, already has the perfect possession of the knowledge to be acquired

and, most of all, the perfect control of the logical order of this acquisition. Here Toletus posits the essential distinction between the road followed by the self-taught (who learns *per inventionem*) and that followed by the pupil (*eum qui discit*):

The one who searches always starts from the things he knows better, but he does not proceed from these to the unknown things, either they are earlier in the rational structure, or later; but the one who learns usually starts from the nature of the most known and earlier things, while when things are unknown to him, the teacher explains them; in neither case can we talk about knowledge, when the learner does not know the effect through the cause and the later things by reasoning through the earlier things; this is knowledge, to know things through their cause.²³

While in the pupil's act of learning causes always go before effects and *passiones*, in *inventio* "aliquando praced(u)nt effectus, ut in naturalibus, aliquando causae, ut in Mathematicis" (c. 158 v.).

The difference in the way of acquiring knowledge does not imply a structural difference in the process of knowledge: learning a discipline, the pupil must build the same chain or reasoning as the self-taught. Here, the educational problem fully corresponds to the problem of the construction of an art, its rules and its procedures. In short, Toletus must address and resolve the question of demonstration, of syllogism and of induction (in addition to enthymema and *exemplum*), the ground pillars of the scientific architecture of an art, as for example mathematics (this is the most important case for Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics*).

Induction, to which Toletus gives five different meanings (c. 144r–v), starts the process of knowledge, as it is at the origin of intellectual intuition, that through definition prompts the formulation of demonstration and syllogisms. The problem of induction, nevertheless, is presented by Toletus quoting the pages of *Meno*, in which the perception of particulars triggers the process of reminiscence. Toletus gives an interpretation of Aristotle, to further clarify its distance from Plato:

Plato said that man does not know anything new, but that knowing is remembering. Also Aristotle states that the conclusion is not known as new, but that a knowledge of it was pre-existent in the intellectual power. There is nevertheless a great difference between them, because reminiscence is a knowledge of things we knew before in the same way and in the same form, but we forgot them, and only this way did Plato think we could know new things; but that universal knowledge, or the virtual one that pre-exists, according to Aristotle does not come back, but before we knew the thing in its principle and in general, and then we learn it in particular.²⁴

The process that brings us from knowledge in general to knowledge *in particulari* is the process of demonstration. Demonstration is based on the intellectual intuition of true preconditions, the *praecognita*, i.e. the notions about the definitions of the terms in the rational process and the universal propositions that rule the process (the “dignities” and the principle of non-contradiction). Moreover, the demonstration is necessarily anticipated by the notion of subject/*datus* and predicate/*passio*. Concerning the subject, the *praecognitiones* needed in order to start the process are the *quid sit* and *an sit*. Concerning the predicate, the *praecognitio* needed is only one, namely the *quid sit*, because “whether it is” is the object of the conclusion, i.e. the thing to be demonstrated. In sum: in the process there are three *praecognita*, subject, predicate (*quaesitum*) and “dignity”, and two *praecognitiones*, “whether it is” and “what it means”.

But the definition, states Toletus, can be split in two: there is a great difference between the *definitio nominis* and the *definitio substantialis rei*. This explains the essence of the thing in all its parts, and shows the nature of the thing itself; the *definitio nominis*, instead, only applies the meaning of the name to the thing meant, without explaining its nature, remaining a blurred knowledge (not distinct, nor separated). Toletus can conclude on the meaning of the definition and of *praecognitiones* required by its knowledge in order to start the process: in every demonstration, according to Aristotle, it is necessary to pre-know what the subject means; against Cajetan, it is stated that there are many demonstrations, most of all the *propter quid* ones, in which it is not necessary to know *quid sit* the subject;²⁵ moreover, “in ipsa demonstratione, quae sit aliquando per definitionem subiecti, ipsa definitio est praecognoscenda”.

The Conimbricenses wrote a *Dialectica*, as we have seen, only as a reaction to the fake edition published by Frobenius (1604). The lack of this book was connected to the diffusion of Fonseca’s *Institutiones Dialecticae*, included for the time being in the *Ratio Studiorum*. In these *Institutiones* we do not find a particular analysis of the terms *doctrinal/disciplina*, but we find the division of first principles needed for the building of the rational process.

The propositions *known in themselves* are called by Aristotle “necessary statements” and their truth is so clear, that if you keep only the meaning of the terms, you will give them immediately your consent; and in another place they are said to be the ones that are true in themselves and not because of other things.²⁶

This principles, called axioms or “dignities”, are common to all sciences. About the statements, Fonseca thinks that *per se nota* are the ones in which the predicate is the *ratio* of the essential definition of the subject (as, for example, “man is a rational animal” or “man is corporeal substance”), or the ones in which the subject belongs to the reason of the predicate (“Homo est disciplinae capax”).

In respect to *praecognitiones* regarding subject or predicate, Fonseca makes a brief reference to Aristotle, where the shadow of Toletus's teaching is clearly visible: before making the demonstration, we must know the *quod est* of the subject, "hoc est, quod non fit aperte res impossibilis".²⁷ Regarding the predicate, Fonseca thinks that knowing the meaning of the word is enough.

The subject of the sudden consent to first principles is not treated further by Fonseca: many of the speculations and distinctions mentioned above are cut in the *Institutiones*. The treatise, according to Cassiano Abranches, was conceived in a cultural context prone to Scotism,²⁸ but look more influenced (as already seen) by Petrus Ramus, whose *Dialéctique*, written in Latin and French, had certainly been a reference text.²⁹ In a passage where he follows the Aristotelian method, Ramus wants to make clear this immediacy of the consent, or the evidence of the principle known in itself, and states: "Par soy dis-ie quand elle est immediate, c'est à dire n'ayant autre principal moyen de sa verité, ains estant de sa nature evidente & notoire soit elle scientifique ou bien opinable."³⁰

At the Roman College, conversely, the problem of immediate consent and original intuition was a favourite playground for distinctions and scholastic quibbles. The course given by Paolo Valla (Vallius) in 1588, published in 1622, is a valid example of this. In his *Logica*³¹ the elements and the use of sources are very similar to those in the Conimbricenses' *Dialectica*, with a relevant difference: Valla spoke especially to the Aristotelians of Padua, while Couto's work was plainly uninterested in them. Zabarella³² is the one, among the *recentiores*, that Valla prefers to quote, and not always as the target of an opposition.³³ The way of knowing first principles is a problem that Valla addresses having expounded Aristotle's text and explained the first questions about the usual definition of *praecognitiones*. As far as the first lines of *Posterior Analytics* are concerned, Valla distinguishes (*vel ... vel*),³⁴ as Averroes had done,³⁵ at the origin of *doctrina* and *disciplina*, a *praecognitio agens* and *dirigens*, objecting to those who think that Aristotle refers only to the *dirigens*. The *praecognitio agens*, indeed, is the one thanks to which man knows the truth of principles and *efficit assensum conclusionis*. The *praecognitio dirigens* is the one that produces the knowledge of the conclusion but limits itself to the cognition of the *quid sit* of the predicate, and of the *quid sit* and *an sit* of the subject: it is necessary to the conclusion, but it does not produce its knowledge. The distinction wanes under the eyes of the reader, as according to Valla, Aristotle here refers to both *praecognitiones* together (*simul*). *Praecognitio* is understood in many ways, and Valla traces a geography of them: (1) "si puram vim nominis consideremus", *praecognitio* is only a cognition coming before another one; (2) in respect to the acquisition of doctrine, the *inventio* is a *praecognitio*, as are the *praeludia* that the pupil knows thanks to the teacher, before knowing the thing itself; (3) every cognition upon which another draws (*sive necessaria, sive tantum ad bene esse*); (4) *praecognitiones* are postulates, definitions, "dignities" proper to mathematics, but also, in demonstrations, the

premises in respect of the conclusions; (5) *praecognitiones* are the first principles “quorum cognitio nobis a natura insita est, dummodo explicentur nobis termini, respectu omnium illarum rerum, quae ex illis inferuntur”.³⁶ Valla builds upon this geography a statement:

praecognitio is a pre-existing notion through which we are driven to acquire some doctrine and discipline, either being prompted to it, or promoting it.³⁷

So are principles that make knowledge possible and prompt the scientific demonstration, and principles are given a vast array of definitions in Aristotelian works. Valla chooses the one in the first chapter of *Physics*, where the author states principle is “unde aliquid, aut fit, aut est, aut cognoscitur”.³⁸ Among these three possibilities, Valla refers clearly to the third, and gives a further distinction. Principles are *incomplexa* or *complexa*; the first are simple things that are the cause of other things (as rationality, that is a principle of *risibilitas*); the second are certain propositions. Valla makes some distinctions among these propositions. First, some are common to all sciences (*universalissima*), others common to many sciences (*communia*), others typical (*propria*) of a science (such as “Natura est principium motus, et quietis” in physics, or “Contraria contrariis curantur” in medicine). Second, some *complexa* are known to everybody, such as “the whole is greater than each of its parts”, and some are known only to the learned, such as *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Third, some complex principles are “dignities”, that is to say, propositions known to everybody and not fit for demonstration, that everyone bound to learn must possess: “posita enim explicatione, omnia assentiuntur”;³⁹ some other complex principles are *suppositiones*, that is to say, proposition of a science that are declared by the teacher in his teaching, of which some are *petitiones* (when the truth or falseness of something is stated) and others *definitiones* (when nothing is stated).

Valla then deals with the way of cognition of the principles: regarding *incomplexa*, he goes back to Aristotle’s *Physics* and its distinction between *essendi* and *cognoscendi* principles, in order to deny the possibility of proving *a priori* the first ones (also Aristotle demonstrates them only *a posteriori*) and to deny in full the possibility of demonstrating knowledge principles, “quia talia principia sunt nobis notissima”.⁴⁰ As far as *complexa* are concerned, Valla states a point that strongly disagrees with the tradition: complex principles aren’t *insita in nobis*, & *tradita a natura*. To state the contrary means contradicting the concept of possible intellect as *tabula rasa* (“in qua nihil est omnino depictum”), which only active intellect can bring into action. Valla fiercely attacks those who think that first principles are innate *in nobis*; they are all commentators of Aquinas, and all Dominicans: Conrad Koellin (Conradus), Domingo Bañez and Cajetan. Valla states: “nullo modo sunt audiendi”. They indeed

think that nature had infused us with some habits in intellect and will; but these habits are the principles of all other things, and we acquire them with our labour.⁴¹

Habitus, states Valla, is intrinsic to man because it does not come from an act of infusion, but from the fact that the intellect, once the terms of principle are known, cannot help consenting *statim* to the principle (with the sole help of natural enlightenment). This consent is immediate because of the intuitive evidence of it: of the principle, “apparet necessitas evidenter, & ex se intellectui”.⁴² The principle is necessary (and necessarily grasped) because *a nullo sanae mentis negare possit*. It is a logical necessity, that needs only the explication of terms to be understood:

The explication of terms is not what promotes in us the consent to principles, but only a condition without which the intellect cannot consent; therefore it is not an *active* knowledge, but a *leading* one.⁴³

The explanation of the terms of the principle works as an uncovering, as the removal of natural hindrances to the comprehension of the principle (Valla comes back to the usual metaphor of a lighting source covered by something opaque), which cannot be denied without a radical self-contradiction. All this is meant only for very general principles: all the others (both the common and the typical ones) need other knowledges, or a *manuductio*, in order to obtain the consent of the intellect. These principles are known either through the senses (such as fire because of its heat), or by induction⁴⁴ or by custom and habitude (as moral principles). Their reduction to senses and experiences brings many of these first principles into the realm of mere opinions: Valla is aware of the problem, but making the list of the categories of those who deny the existence of first principles he focuses on inability or physical hindrances to correct reasoning (or to acting according to morals, as young people do), and does not address the problem in a critical way.

Valla devotes to the causes of knowledge a question (Quaestio IV, Caput I), where he limits himself to expounding the most common opinion drawn from Aristotle: the active causes of knowledge are active intellect, the teacher (*praeceptor*) and first principles. Nevertheless, the aforementioned reasoning suggests some caution in reading this short list. Active intellect, indeed, is the only one to which a role of efficient cause in the learning process could be ascribed; the teacher is *coadiuvans*, “agens instrumentarium”, and first principles have undergone a radical *reductio ad experientiam*.⁴⁵

Therefore Valla shifts the concept of first principles, and of the consent human intellect gives to them, from the realm of Platonic (or Neoplatonic or Stoic) infusion to the realm of empirical learning. A direction taken with hesitation by Toletus, but followed with more determination by Valla and by the Jesuit logicians of the end of the century, especially the Conimbricenses,

who will emphasize the transmissive (and therefore educational) side of first principles.

The logical system of Toletus couldn't get rid of the cumbersome presence of his teacher Soto, i.e. the Platonizing culture of Dominicans. The result was a confused mixture of arguments plainly drawn from a Thomist tradition full of Platonic traces, and some attempts in the direction of a more radical empiricism. Valla, and after him the younger Jesuit logicians, made the most of Toletus's mixture, emphasizing its empirical ingredients, so differentiating themselves from other Thomists: a difference that would increase over time. Other authors will draw radical conclusions from the Jesuit class, starting with Galilei:

What about the very general first principles? I answer: in these principles the precognition according to the name [*quid nominis*] is unnecessary, both because first principles can be known and understood without that precognition, as it is clear in knowledge based on research [*inventiva*], and because in first principles you can have neither active precognition, nor leading [*dirigens*] precognition.⁴⁶

The Conimbricenses, before the disagreement on logic between Dominicans and Jesuit became a real separation about ontology (with the appearance of Suárez's metaphysics), worked on a new dialectic in which there was no longer room for the infusion of first principles and their *habitus*.⁴⁷ Sebastião do Couto will draw some meaningful conclusions about the educational theme and the possibility of *inventio*: without first principles and innate *habitus*, the process of knowledge is totally included in the teacher–pupil relationship. The function of the teacher becomes essential both to the triggering and to the process of acquiring knowledge by the pupil. The external teacher, who for Aquinas was that only in a secondary, ancillary sense, is essential in Couto's *Dialectica*: he is essential also in the activation of knowledge rules, which before were somewhat left to innate intuition.

Couto accomplished the path along which, from Toletus to Fonseca and Valla, Jesuit logicians were walking in the direction of educational and gno-seological empiricism, totally freed from Aquinas's influence.⁴⁸ Góis, furthermore, had anticipated this direction in his *De Anima* commentary, even keeping unchanged the structure of *communicatio* between teacher and pupil:

The teacher transmits to the pupil the science, offering him perceivable examples, or similar things, in order to represent *phantasmata* fit for the understanding of the thing; or offering common propositions, *and principles known to him*, and then applying them to particular conclusions, and leading him by the hand to intelligible knowledge, and to the unknown notion of truth.⁴⁹

The teacher offers perceivable examples and common sentences, or principles known to the disciple, but according to Góis the latter can no longer be infused in the human soul, as it is for species in single knowledge acts.⁵⁰ Everything in man's knowledge, also principles and *habitus* that permit the consent to them, is acquired through education: "Habitus principiorum, tam quae ad contemplationem, quam quae actionem, & praxim spectant, re vera esse acquisitos a nobis per assensus cadentem supra prima principia speculabilia, & operabilia."⁵¹ Góis is aware that he has distanced himself from Aquinas, and, when he is obliged to recall him to sanction his theory, he must recur to the ambiguous expression: *idque videtur respexisse D. Thomam*.⁵²

The *Dialectica* of the *Cursus* will follow this direction.

The first question approached by Couto in commenting on the first lines of *Posterior Analytics* is that of the acquisition of knowledge and the first thesis to contradict is Platonic reminiscence. How is knowledge acquired? *Per reminiscentiam* or *per novam inventionem*?

The commentary goes on expounding the Platonic theory (art. I): the soul is endowed with the *habitus omnium scientiarum* only before the union with the body, therefore no knowledge can be acquired in this life. Then follows the list of Platonists that sustain this doctrine: Pythagoras, Alcinous, Iamblicus, Porphyry, Priscian, Lydius, Simplicius, Cicero, Macrobius and Plotinus, *Academicae disciplinae insignis assertor*, the only one of whom the doctrine is expounded. Bessarion says that the Aristotelian image of *tabula rasa* (contradicting the existence of the soul before its union with the body) is a similitude referred to senses, not to intellect: Aristotle would confirm Plato in the idea of a *tabula* full of images at the moment of birth. Iamblicus denies that the intellect is comparable to a blank slate; it is a cleaned slate where letters are half-cancelled, *quos proinde necesse sit novis quasi luminibus a phantasmatis illustrari*. Couto then speaks about the "error" of Origen: according to him, the creation of souls by God implied, for his dignity's sake, that the souls were not devoid of science; then Couto goes back to Plato's *Meno*, where *habitus scientiarum* is said to have the same nature as the soul.

The commentary offers not only authorities, but also an argumentation to support the Platonic thesis: if some science is learned *de novo*, learning can occur through *ministerium sensus*, or through *opus magistri*. Excluding the first possibility with Augustine (the senses are deceptive), Couto criticizes and then denies the second: to acquire science, natural enlightenment alone is not enough, but an intelligible species is also needed, which the teacher cannot infuse directly in the pupil. The teacher, as Augustine had stated in *De Magistro*, can only propose to the disciple external signs, *quibus interventu phantasmatum habitus a prio ortu nobis ingenti suscitentur*. Finally, the thesis is confirmed with the equalization of first principles and *habitus* of knowledge: as the first are innate, so must the second be.

After expounding the Platonic thesis of reminiscence, Couto starts criticizing it and expounding the Conimbricenses' thesis (art. II). The first argument is *ex auctoritate fidei*: the creation of souls before the body has been

condemned by the Council of Braga. In defence of the Council, the reasoning of the first part of Aquinas's *Summa* is repeated: if knowledge were innate in souls, it would not be latent; not only because they are best possessed when they are most expressed, but also because it is impossible that *scientem lateat se scire*. Those who lack a sense from birth cannot acquire any knowledge related to that sense; a blind person cannot judge on colours. To the Platonic objection – the blind cannot distinguish colours as they lack *phantasmata* – Couto answers with Cajetan (but clearly altering the example): through the perceivables of a sense, we can remember the perceivables of another: seeing sugar, we remember its sweetness.

The refutation of Plato passes through a second Thomistic argument: being the soul form of the body, the soul could neither be hindered nor perform the act of knowing, since it performed it already before entering the body. Moreover, if the knowledge of conclusions and principles were natural, the consequence would be that: (1) when asked, the one that follows the order of questions would answer as exactly as the one that does not follow it, because all things would be equally patent to both of them; (2) there would be no false opinions, because nothing false could come from ideas. At least, if learning was the same as remembering through *excitatio phantasmatum*, the acquisition of knowledge would not be so tiresome, because the impression of *phantasmata* is not so difficult.

Learning, then, for Conimbricenses cannot be reminiscence:

The conclusion of this article is as follows: the human soul is created by God and infused in the body at the same time, and at its first origin is almost a blank slate, void of any *habitus* or species. Then, as time goes by, it acquires the habits of science, mainly following the path explained by Aristotle in this work: before consenting to principles, which are the most akin to the light of intellect, and then drawing from them conclusions, either on its own and by *experimento*, or thanks to the work and care of the teacher.⁵³

In the third article, Couto contradicts one by one the arguments supporting the Platonic thesis: opposing phylologically (*ex contextu graeco*) Iamblicus's and Bessarion's argument of the half-cancelled slate, and reasoning against the thesis of *Memnon*. To the thesis of learning *ex ministerio sensu*, Couto opposes the definition of *propria inventio*: to acquire knowledge it is not necessary that things we know appear *per se* to the senses; it is enough that these known things had appeared to senses *per se*, as perceivable qualities; or by effects, as God, the intelligences, the hidden virtues of things; or by fundamentals, as relations; or by opposition, as denials for negative forms; or by its parts, as a pile of gold. As far as the deceptiveness of the senses, Couto recalls the second book of *De Anima*. To the thesis of learning *ex ope magistri*, Couto opposes his description of the discipline: the teacher does not infuse science or intelligible species *per se* and directly, but proposes to the pupil

statements and external signs (perceivables and examples) that the intellect of the pupil reproduces inside himself, or that help the mind of the pupil to represent to himself the knowledge that the teacher wants to transmit. Couto is aware that this is a thorny side of the relationship between Aquinas and Augustine: the action of the human teacher seems to have an importance that Augustine's *De Magistro* does not grant at all. So Couto states that this doctrine does not contradict Augustine's theory of God as sole teacher of man. But the recapitulation of this theory is meaningfully not drawn from *De Magistro* but from *De Utilitate Credendi*: the signs that the teacher proposes are known or unknown to the disciple. In the first case, already possessing the meaning of the sign, the disciple does not learn anything new; in the second, the sign being unknown, the pupil cannot understand it (as if somebody were to talk in Greek to a Latin-speaker). Augustine states indeed that a sign of something cannot be known, if what the sign stands for is not known. Couto answers that these signs are known in a confused and universal way, while they are explained (*declarati*) by the teacher *particulariter, & explicite*. Couto is aware that the reasoning needs further clarification, but limits himself to quotations from Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, the two main authorities for the Conimbricenses' commentary to *Posterior Analytics*.

Couto then devotes a long article (IV) to the problem of first principles, which involves a "weak" theory of reminiscence. In this article, the three most common conflicting opinions are expounded.

The first is that of Durandus (in 3. D. 33 Quaest. 1, *ad secundum*): first principles, being not conclusions because they lack a middle term, do not need an *habitus superaddito* to the intellect in order to be understood; the intellect consents to them by natural virtue, and does not keep any *habitus* after the consent. The same theory is maintained by Domingo de Soto (in *De Iustitia et Iure*) and by Medina, relying (but Medina is wrong, according to Couto) on an interpretation of Aquinas. Couto says that more recent commentators maintain a similar theory: for some principles, the less common and clear, *habitus* are necessary, while for the clearer and most common they aren't. There are two arguments supporting this opinion: (1) the *habitus* are added to faculties, making them *promptiores & faciliores*; but the intellect is naturally quick, and ready to consent to first principles, and it cannot be made quicker or readier; so one does not need the *habitus*. (2) In practical intellect, there aren't particular *habitus* for practical principles such as the consent to good and the refusal of evil; for the consent to these principles the power of intellect is enough; so, symmetrically, the *habitus* is unnecessary also to speculative intellect. This reasoning is maintained with the authority of Jerome, who identifies a natural sanctity, infused by God in all men, with the natural light, hostile to evil and prone to good.

The second opinion admits that *habitus* of principles are added qualities, but denies they are acquired with acts; they are infused in the soul at the time of creation. Couto says that this theory is maintained by Jean Viguier, Capreolus and, sometimes, by Aquinas (but contradicting himself, as we will

see later). The reasoning relies on the hierarchy of being, according to which the Divine Wisdom provided that the higher of inferior nature reaches (*attin-gat*) the lower of superior nature; the higher of man is the *habitus* of principles; therefore, if the angels possess the innate principles of their knowledges, then principles will be innate in men *praestantissimae cognitionis*. God indeed has not created nature without *principium operandi*; but the *habitus* of principles are the principles of all sciences; so it is implausible that human intellect has been generated without them.

The third opinion not only recognizes the *habitus principiorum* as distinct *re ipsa* from intellect, but maintains that they can be acquired gradually (*paulatim*). According to Couto, this is the true interpretation of Aristotle given in *Ethics*, III and VI, and in the last chapter of *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle states that *habitus* aren't innate but acquired. This thesis is confirmed by Aquinas (*Contra Gentiles*, cap. 78), Francesco Silvestri and Cajetan. Other scholars, both philosophers and theologians, do not disagree with this solution, because the stronger doubts were put forward by the Thomists (*nam de Thomistis erat maior dubitatio*).

This opinion is demonstrated in two sections. The first is based on the distinction between *habitus principiorum* and intellect. This can be proved *a posteriori* or with an argument *a priori*. The first way is the empirical observation of, for example, a man who acquired a better ability in performing something (a virtue, a science, an art), working with more pleasure than before. Therefore inside him there must be things that make his powers readier to operation: these are *habitus*. The better ability comes not only from species that concur to the apprehension of terms, but also from *habitus* inclined to consent. To the objection that this is true for principles whose evidence is for some reason partially concealed, and not for the most general ones that are self-evident, Couto answers that no principle exists whose truth cannot for some reason be concealed, as it happens for some very common principles denied by some philosophers. But the argument of the greater or lesser evidence is not convincing, most of all because it is an accidental distinction: some principles are *admittendi vel nullius, vel omnium habitus*. Principles are different from other objects because of a fundamental element: they totally lack a middle term, while objects do not. It is the same as Durandus's reasoning, but inverted. The second part, about the acquisition of *habitus* (not their innateness), follows from what was already said. If we possessed them from the start, we will always easily consent. Aquinas, in *Contra Gentiles* (cap. 83), says that we acquire through the senses the species necessary for the consent to principles, and therefore we acquire with them the *habitus*. The experience confirms the first statement, while the consequence is confirmed by the fact that nature does not give the *principium agendi* in a given order, and denies the means to action in the same order of the principle.

Couto can now answer to each reasoning presented by the initial opinions. To the first, he answers that intellect is a natural power, but among natural powers there is a distance (*latitudo*): there are some whose act is reflected

and implies judgment, such as appetitive powers (they are moved by a reason known in the object); some of them are moved by the object *simpliciter*. Moreover the power, working according to nature, does not always apply all its force. The view, and the intellect when it simply learns, are in the second degree of natural power determined only by the object; it is not the same when the intellect makes its judgment. Furthermore, among the various definitions of *habitus principiorum*, Couto declares he prefers that offered by the Scotist James Bargius: according to him it is *naturalem, quia ab ipso lumine naturali absque ullo medio propensi sumus, ut principiis assentiamur*. While intellectual power is one, it perceives some things without reasoning, others with reasoning: when it acts this latter way, it is called “ratio”; when it acts in the former, it is called “intellectus”. The *habitus* of principles are generated by non-reasoning acts.

About the second opinion, which spoke about knowledge of angels, Couto declares:

We say that God largely gave powers to men in order to provide them with all things, powers with which they could acquire this and other *habitus*, as it is beautifully explained by Galen in *De Generatione*.⁵⁴

As a conclusion, the commentary needs only to justify the position of Aquinas, often quoted as an authority for almost every opinion, but very dangerously interpreted by Silvestri and Cajetan: Aquinas, according to Couto, did not state that the habits of first principles aren’t generated by our acts (as other intellectual acts) but that they are a result, inside the possible intellect, of the representation of terms in *phantasmata* and the action of active intellect, as intelligible species do (and therefore the habits are “natural”).

After the question of the acquisition of knowledge (and the denial of reminiscence), Couto, commenting on the same passage of *Posterior Analytics*, poses a second question. The question is the approval or not of the fundamental Aristotelian doctrine on knowledge: *omnis doctrina, & disciplina ex antecedente cognitione fit*. The question will be resolved only once its parts are thoroughly explained, in order to make visible Aristotle’s real meaning: it is necessary to explain the meaning of the distinction between *doctrina* and *disciplina*; the meaning of the word *intellectiva*; at last, the concept of *cognitio antecedens*.

First of all, the distinction between *doctrina* and *disciplina*. According to Philoponus and Aquinas, *doctrina* is the knowledge of the teacher, transmitted *per vocem aut scripturam*; *disciplina* is the knowledge of the teacher as it is received by the pupil. Couto refers to the example, put forward also by Aquinas, of the transmission of heat from fire to water, on the basis of the fact that action and passion are the same motion. The example is accepted with a clarification: the heat lying in the fire produces heat in the water through a physical, direct action, while the knowledge in the mind of the teacher does not act in the same way. The teacher, indeed, does not act

per modum causae naturalis but – according to Aquinas (*Summa*, I, Quaest. 117, art. 1, *ad secundum*) and Henry of Ghent (*Summa*, art. I, Quaest. 6) – as *principium dirigens*.

As far as the term “intellectiva” is concerned, the Conimbricenses emphasize the diversity of interpretations given for the Aristotelian text, and divide the commentators into three groups: (1) according to some of them, the *notitia intellectiva* is any cognition of the intellect whatsoever, either simple or complex; of this opinion are Aquinas, Philoponus and *aliqui recentiores*; (2) according to others, who draw on a passage of Aristotle (*Met.*, I and *Eth.*, III) it is only the *notitia iudicativa*, with reasoning or not. For these authors, first principles are *notitiae iudicativae* without reasoning; (3) according to others, here Aristotle means by *notitia intellectiva* the one which is properly and commonly called “discursive”. This is the opinion of Averroes, Themistius, Philoponus, Albertus Magnus, Apollinaris, Aegidius Romanus, Paulus Venetus and Toletus. Couto agrees with this last opinion; Aristotle himself quotes as examples of *notitiae intellectivae* only the reasoning ones, as syllogism, induction, *exemplum*.

With reference to the last part of the sentence, Couto thinks that the preceding knowledge, from which the reasoning knowledge is generated, must not be also reasoning: the proof is the one of infinite regression (*infinitus processus*), put forward also by Philoponus. With the expression “preceding information”, so, Aristotle means the formal or virtual *iudicativa*, *ex qua proxime fit discursiva*, & *particulam “ex” denotare causalitatem effectivam, iuxta ea, quae tradita sunt de discursu in primo Priorum*.

In the second article the Conimbricenses reply to some questions. The first is that not every reasoning knowledge must be called *doctrina* and *disciplina*. Indeed, it is reasoning only in the knowledge acquired *per propria inventionem*; but it is not doctrine, because it does not come (*progrediatur*) from the teacher; and neither is discipline, because nobody is called pupil if not in respect to a teacher (and, in this case, there is a deep contrast between discipline and reasoning knowledge, which comes from preceding knowledge: indeed it comes *ex antecedente* either in the teacher, or in the pupil).

In the third article, Couto works on principles: if their knowledge from a preceding knowledge comes by reasoning. Couto makes two hypotheses, against the positions of Durandus and Cajetan. Against the first, he thinks that in our intellect there are *habitus* distinct from it, that prompt man to consent to principles, such as a general proposition not subject to demonstration. Against Cajetan, he thinks that *habitus* are acquired by our consents or acts. Then he questions if these acts, and the habits generated by them, are reasoning and so they fall under the classification of Aristotle “*Omnis doctrina, et disciplina*”.

A principle can be known in two ways: with an imperfect knowledge, *a posteriori*, having not yet understood the terms; or with perfect and clear information relying on a deep penetration of terms. In the first case, this is undoubtedly a reasoning knowledge, as is every other universal conclusion of

some induction. In the second, because it is *notitia principij*, it is necessary to know what sort of principle it is.

A knowledge acquired by induction is reasoning; but the knowledge of first principles is acquired through induction: so it is reasoning. Couto grounds the argument on some passages in Aristotle (*First and Second Analytics*, *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*): our intellect is very (*admodum*) limited, and in this life it relies heavily on the senses; it cannot give a firm consent to a proposition without danger of error, unless it has often experienced its truth *in singularibus*, with the aid of the senses.

This point is nevertheless controversial. Two aspects are questioned by the authors. First of all, Aristotle has shown that principles aren't known precisely, without a preceding experience (*experimentus*) or induction. Then, the principal cause of the consent to principles is not induction, by the light of intellect, with a clear penetration of the terms: other passages in Aristotle confirm this point, and with him Scotus, Aquinas and others agree.

Here we meet a problem that parallels that of learning: the anatomy of knowledge. The commentary to *Posterior Analytics* implies a theory that the Conimbricenses already tried in their *De Anima* commentary, where Manuel de Góis expounded some theses on the functioning of natural enlightenment, clearly divergent from Aquinas's views.⁵⁵ We will speak about that later. As a conclusion to the question of learning, we can state that the theoretical framework put forward by Couto allows us to see the peculiarities of the *Cursus* in the history of the "problem of the teacher", of the commentaries to *Posterior Analytics* and of the position occupied by the Conimbricenses in the cultural landscape of the Jesuits. The denial of the infusion of first principles, and the more radical denial of an *habitus* to the consent to the rules of reasoning, are good examples of the mistrust of innatism we can find in Conimbrican dialectics, a mistrust that touches also other logical problems and hits theories of language. The same mistrust that Couto expresses of the innatistic theories of knowledge and learning comes back on the theme of linguistic naturalism, where Couto shows what has been called "a healthy skepticism".⁵⁶

Couto emphasizes the function of teaching, which becomes essential both in learning the conclusions of reasoning and in the logical rules of reasoning. Little room is left for *inventio* and for the creativity of the self-taught, or *ingegno capriccioso* as Juan Huarte calls it. Knowledge comes from a teaching providing *signa* that can lead the pupil step by step in his reasoning: this is the method that Huarte himself advised for the *ingegni pecorini*, for which knowledge must be chewed and prepared by the teacher in order for them to digest it. So that discipline and doctrine could coincide in every reasoning act of the pupil's intellect, the teaching must be in (and limit itself to) strenuous exercise, *experimentum*, *opera* and endless repetition.

In this passage of Couto's *Dialectica*, the distance from Aquinas does not imply an inspiration from Henry of Ghent or Cajetan, or from the most Neoplatonic Thomism. It is not in the name of Plato that infusions of principles and *habitus* can be denied; and the intuition of principles by the *lumen*

naturalis, easily linked to the Platonic tradition, is more a transcendental than a transcendent for Couto. His *Dialectica* provides the basis for a theory of education grounded in experience, on the communication between teacher and pupil, that goes beyond Aristotelianism with a more radical Aristotelianism, void of every trace of innatism.⁵⁷ Amandio Coxito has emphasized a passage in the proemium to the *Dialectica*, where Couto states that the origin of arts lies in experience:⁵⁸ he quoted as authorities Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and a passage from *Gorgia* where Polo speaks, and, giving as an example the healing qualities of rhubarb, that "artium & scientiarum habitus experientia gigni".⁵⁹

We are far away from the theory of "sparks" of truth, left in humans after the Fall, that originate the arts according to Vives in *De Disciplinis*; here the experience is presented in inductive form, not far from the modern (post-Aristotelian) meaning of the term. With his roots in experience and in the social communication of *habitus*, learning becomes an ontological constituent of man: the Aristotelian "homo disciplinae capax" (recalled by Fonseca in his *Institutiones Dialecticae*⁶⁰ and by Couto), put forward as an example of a logical problem, becomes in the Conimbricenses' *Dialectica* the definition of human nature. Where the term "disciplina" means precisely the knowledge process started and led (learnt) by the external teacher; education is the lower common denominator of every knowledge. At the beginning, there is always a teacher.

The role assigned to the teacher by the Conimbricenses is starkly different from that of another Jesuit, Antonio Possevino, who some years before had published his *Coltura degl'ingegni*, where – in the tradition of Plato, Ficino and Pico – he sides with the self-taught, the *inventio*, the individual genius in the educational process. To affirm this theory, Possevino had to recur to the same doctrines the Conimbricenses would avoid: infusion of species, seminal reasons, linguistic naturalism, Christian kabbalah, and so on.⁶¹ However, the Jesuit from Mantua wasn't a logician, but a man of action: he founded many colleges in Europe, went on diplomatic missions to the courts of Ivan the Terrible, John of Sweden and Stephan Bathory. We would expect from him a compliance to the dominant culture, not the creation of a new one. But these bridles were too short for a horse so wild, taking to extremes the Platonic penchant of the Italian and humanistic speculation on language. Among Ficino and Pico, Alexander of Aphrodisia and Averroes, the burden of the logico-Aristotelian rules of the Portuguese was scarcely heard. But this burden will sound delicious to the ears of the *grand siècle* with its *esprit de système* (the book, as we have seen before, was used in La Flèche College) and most of all to German ears, sensitive more than others to the harmonies of dialectics and of abstract speculation.

Notes

- 1 See Galileo Galilei, *Tractatio de praecognitionibus et praecognitis et Tractatio de demonstratione*, trans. W. F. Edwards, Padua: Antenore, 1987. C. H. Lohr thinks

that the Jesuit influence on Galilei also modified his theory of movement: “L’apport jésuite en philosophie de la nature ne s’est pas limité à la production des manuels. A travers les *reportationes* des cours du Collegio Romano, Galilée a connu en philosophie de la nature les enseignement révolutionnaires des maîtres parisiens au XIV^e. Le fondateur de la théorie moderne pour la science de la nature a utilisé les travaux des jésuites non seulement dans ses notes de jeunesse sur les *Second Analytiques*, mais aussi dans ses commentaires des traités *Du ciel* et *De la génération et de la corruption*.” C. H. Lohr, “Les jésuites et l’aristotélisme du XVI^e siècle”, in L. Giard (ed.), *Les jésuites à la Renaissance. Système éducatif et production du savoir*, Paris: PUF, 1995, p. 81.

- 2 “Sicut etiam ponebant quod *agentia naturalia* solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum.” *Summa Theologiae*, Ia pars, 117, a. 1 co. All quotations from Aquinas are from www.corpusthomisticum.org, where the Leonine edition of Aquinas’s works is collected.
- 3 “Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I *Poster.*, *quod omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione*.” Ibid.
- 4 Aquinas speaks about *praecognita* in the commentary to *Posterior Analytics* (in particular Liber I, Lectiones 1–3). The problem is triggered by the exposition of the first lines of the book, and deals with the nature and order of precognition: “In praecognitione autem duo includuntur, scilicet cognitio et cognitionis ordo. Primo ergo, determinat modum praecognitionis quantum ad cognitionem ipsam; secundo, quantum ad cognitionis ordinem; ibi: est autem cognoscere et cetera.” Lectio II.
- 5 According to Edda Ducci, Aquinas’s opinion in *De Magistro* is sketched on the basis of the juxtaposition with Augustine: “contrapposizione ad Agostino, condotta con vera squisitezza, con mano leggera ma ferma”. See Tommaso d’Aquino, *De Magistro*, Rome: Anicia, 1995, p. 28.
- 6 “Si scientia in uno causatur ab alio, aut scientia inerat addiscenti aut non inerat.” *De Veritate*, Quaest. 11, q. 11, Art. 1, Arg. 5.
- 7 “Praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. In istis autem principiis universalibus omnia sequentia includuntur, sicut in quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere.” *De Veritate*, Quaest. 11, Art. 1, Resp.
- 8 “Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti inveniando est ut principia communia *per se nota* applicet ad determinatas materias et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones et ex his in alias.” Ibid.
- 9 “Augustinus in *Libro de magistro*, per hoc quod probat solum Deum docere, non intendit excludere quin homo exterius doceat, sed quod ipse solus Deus docet interius.” *De Veritate*, Quaest. 11, Art. 1, Ad 8.
- 10 See É. Gilson, *Tommaso contro Agostino*, Milan: Medusa, 2010.

- 11 J. Brown, "Henry's Theory of Knowledge: Henry of Ghent on Augustine and Avicenna", in W. Vanhamel (ed.), *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996, p. 41. The book contains also an essay by M. Santiago de Carvalho, "The Problem of the Possible Eternity of the World According to Henry of Ghent and his Historians", pp. 43–71, that makes clear the importance of this author for many cosmological and physical aspects of the *Cursus*.
- 12 Henry had already offered before an Avicennian/Augustinian solution (Art. I, Quaest. 2), where, after sharing first principles between the truths of faith and nature, sustained that the former couldn't be known by man without the divine enlightenment: "Nunc autem proculdubio verum est quod in aliquibus cognoscibilibus primorum illorum non potest cognosci aut sciri ex puris naturalibus, sed solum ex speciali illustratione divina, ut in illis quae per se et simpliciter sunt credibilia, et ideo in talibus simpliciter et absolute concedendum est quod non contingit hominem scire aliquid ex puris naturalibus, sed solum ex speciali illustratione divina." The Avicennian reading of Augustine helps Henry in contradicting those that thought divine enlightenment was necessary in all knowledge, and so placing Augustine in stark contrast with Aquinas.
- 13 Art. I, Quaest. 2, Sol. Having avoided the Thomistic trap, Henry then stated with Avicenna: "Dico autem 'ex puris naturalibus' non excludendo generalem influentiam primi intelligentis, quod est primum agens in omni actione intellectuali et cognitiva, sicut primum movens movet in omni motu cuiuslibet rei naturalis." Ibid.
- 14 In *De Veritate*, indeed, Aquinas states that only with the light of reason is it possible to know many things before unknown, but not to come at the perfect action (*perfecta actio*) of knowledge, because the inner principle of the self-taught is only in partial possession of the knowledge that must be acquired: only on the side of seminal reasons. Henry distinguishes the possibility of reaching knowledge without his sole strength and the legitimacy of the definition of "teacher of himself". With Aquinas, Henry denies the title of *doctor* to the self-taught: nevertheless it is possible that *ut aliquis in se ipso per scientiam, sicut et sanitatem aut virtutem, causet. Summa*, Art. I, Quaest. 9 ad ter.
- 15 "Eodem modo debet procedere in docendo discipulum: primo principia prima per se nota proponendo ei; deinde ea per immediata, quantum potest, applicando ad determinatas conclusiones et ab illis in ultiores consimiliter usque ad ultima, explicando hunc discursum discipulo per signa verborum vel quaecumque alia, ut melius poterit, significantia illos conceptus quos ratio naturalis interius ordinaret, si in suo discursu errare non posset. Et sic illos conceptus sic per signa propositos format in se discipulus admonitus per signa." *Summa*, Quaest. 6, Art. 1. Quoted from Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae): art. I–V*, ed. Gordon Anthony Wilson, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, p. 137.
- 16 "Sermo est sicut *symbolum* inter doctorem et discentem, non naturaliter, sed per institutionem, res ipsas praesentans de quibus formantur conceptus, et sic sunt causa doctrinae accidentaliter per accidens, et similiter ipse doctor." *Summa*, Quaest. 6, Art. 1. Quoted from *Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae): art. I–V*, p. 139.
- 17 The attitude of Góis towards the problem of intellectualism/voluntarism is a good example. As M. Santiago de Carvalho properly stated: "Vale a pena ter presente que em relação à problemática voluntarismo/intelectualismo, a posição dos nossos jesuítas não é pura e simplesmente tomista, remetendo-se eles também para o trabalho de quem, outrora, contra Tomás, havia promovido uma 'interpenetração da inteligência e da vontade', Henrique de Gand, no caso." M. Santiago de Carvalho, *Psicologia e ética no Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense*, Lisbon: Colibri, 2010, p. 142.

- 18 Discussing the influence of Toletus on Galilei through Valla's course, William Wallace says: "The influence of the notebooks dealing with physical questions and with motion on Galileo's later work is gradually being recognized among scholars. More important, it is now generally accepted that his notebook dealing with logical questions, essentially an exposition of the teaching on demonstration in the *Posterior Analytics*, guided his scientific investigations throughout his life." W. A. Wallace, "Science and Religion in the Thomistic Tradition", *The Thomist*, 65 (2001), p. 445. See also W. A. Wallace, "Duhem and Koiré on Domingo de Soto", *Synthese*, 83 (1990), pp. 239–260, and W. A. Wallace, *Domingo De Soto and the Early Galileo: Essays on Intellectual History*, Aldershot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004.
- 19 Jennifer Ashworth says: "Nous ne pouvons pas nous attendre à comprendre pleinement les logiciens de la Compagnie si nous bornons à les rapporter à Cajetan." See J. Ashworth, "La doctrine de l'analogie selon quelques logiciens jésuites", in Giard, *Les jésuites à la Renaissance*, p. 126.
- 20 Wallace, "Science and Religion", p. 445. Wallace then puts forward two renowned examples of this deviation: "These are seen mainly in the writings of Francisco Suarez and Luis de Molina, who also incorporated Scotistic and nominalist strains in their thought."
- 21 In his commentary to Aquinas's *Summa*, Bañez will devote little space to Question 117, focusing on the difference between the teaching of angels and man, and adopting a solution of the problem that will be contradicted later by Couto: "In hoc est differentia, quod cum angelus sit superioris naturae, melius disponit subiectum & ordinat respectu inferioris angeli, quam homo respectu hominis, qui est eiusdem specie." Then follows an article where Bañez poses the strange question "Utrum homines possint docere angelos", to which he answers similarly: "Manifestum est autem, quod eo modo quo inferiores angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis angelorum." See *Fratri Dominici Banes Sacrae Theologiae Salmanticae Primarii Professoris Super Primam Partem Divi Thomae ...*, Salamanca: Sanctus Stephanus Ioannes & Andreas Renaut, 1588, cc. 1649–1650.
- 22 See S. di Liso, *Domingo de Soto. Dalla logica alla scienza*, Bari: Levante, 2000; E. J. Ashworth, "Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on analogy and equivocation", in I. Angelelli, M. Cerezo (eds), *Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of Logic*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996, pp. 117–132.
- 23 "Qui invenit semper a sibi notioribus incipit, nec ab eis ad reliqua procedit ignota, sive illa sint priora sive posteriora: at qui addiscit incipit frequenter etiam a notioribus natura & prioribus, licet ei sint ignota, cum sit doctor qui ea sibi manifesta faciat, neuter tamen dicitur scire quousque effectum per causam, & posteriora natura per priora cognoscat, hoc enim est scire, rem per causam cognoscere." c. 157r.
- 24 "Plato enim dicebat non scire quicquam de novo sed scire esse reminisci. Aristoteles vero etiam docet prorsus conclusionem non sciri de novo, sed eius cognitio in virtute praecessit. Est autem inter haec duo magnum discrimen, nam reminiscentia est cognitio illius quod ante eodem modo & sub eadem forma cognovimus, oblivio tamen intercessit, & sic Plato existimabat nos scire de novo: at illa cognitio universalis, seu, virtualis quae praecessit, secundum Aristotelem non est quae postea redit, sed primo rem in suo principio & in universali scivimus, postea eam in particulari discimus." c. 156r.
- 25 As happens with astrologers, when they demonstrate that the moon eclipses for its own cause, without knowing the nature of heavens and the moon itself; and with mathematics, which demonstrates many things without knowing the nature of figures and numbers.
- 26 "Propositiones *per se notae* dicuntur ab Aristotele pronunciata necessaria adeo perspicuae veritatis, ut si terminorum modo significationem teneas, statim

- illis assentiaris; et alibi, quae non per alia, sed per se ipsa fidem habent.” See *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Autore Pedro Fonseca Doctore Theologo Societatis Iesu ...*, Cologne: Maternus Cholinus, 1586, p. 331.
- 27 Ibid., p. 333.
- 28 See C. Abranches, “Pedro da Fonseca e a Renovação Escolástica”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 9 (1953), pp. 354–374. E. C. Giacon, “O neo-Aristotelismo de Pedro de Fonseca”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 9 (1953), pp. 406–417.
- 29 Cf. E. J. Ashworth, “Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being”, in Patricia A. Easton (ed.), *Logic and the Workings of the Mind: The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy*, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1997, pp. 47–63. Both Ramus and Fonseca identify *methodus* and *ordo*, as A. Coxíto emphasized: “Os dialéticos humanistas, e especialmente os da linha de Melanchton e Ramo, tendem a considerar como sinónimos os dois termos ‘ordo’ e ‘methodus’, pondo a tónica sobre a acepção acima indicada para o primeiro.” A. Coxíto, “Método e ensino em Pedro da Fonseca e nos Conimbricenses”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 36 (1980), p. 94. “O primeiro facto a assinalar é que também este autor identifica ‘methodus’ e ‘ordo’” (ibid., p. 97). See also A. A. Coxíto, “O método em Pedro da Fonseca e no Curso Conimbricense”, in D. Ferrer (ed.), *Método e métodos do pensamento filosófico*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2007, pp. 71–78.
- 30 *Dialectique de Pierre de la Ramee*, Paris: André Wechel, 1555, pp. 83–84. See also *Petri Rami Veromandui dialecticae institutiones, ad celeberrimam, et illustrissimam Lutetiae Parisiorum academiam*, Paris: Jacobus Bogardus, 1543.
- 31 *Logica Pauli Vallii Romani, Societatis Iesu, duobus tomis distincta ...*, Lugduni: Ludovici Prost Haeredis Rouille, 1622.
- 32 In his *Opera Logica*, Zabarella devotes a book to *precognita* (“De tribus praecognitis”) in whose third edition the commentary to *Posterior Analytics*, previously printed separately (Venice, 1582), is attached. *Iacobi Zabarellae Patauini Opera Logica. Ad Serenissimum Stephanum Poloniae Regem ...*, Venice: apud Paulum Meietum, 1578.
- 33 A leading writer on Italian Averroism among the Jesuits of the *Collegio Romano* was Benet Perera. His work was “la tentative plus radicale pour formuler une nouvelle interprétation analytique des œuvres d’Aristote, une interprétation à la recherche des principes de présentation déductive de la doctrine physique dans le corpus aristotélicien. ... Parce que les principes d’Aristote n’auraient pu être de vrais principes de philosophie s’il conduisaient à des conclusions fausses, Pereira proposa aux professeurs du Collegio Romano d’aller au-delà d’Aristote dans la recherche des axiomes fondamentaux sur lesquels était fondée sa conception de la science.” Lohr, “Les jésuites et l’aristotélisme”, pp. 87–88.
- 34 *Logica Pauli Vallii*, p. 132.
- 35 Valla later makes explicit the reference to Averroes (Quaest. I, cap. III): “Ex his omnibus duplicem facit Averroës praecognitionem, alteram dirigentem, alteram agentem; prior est, quae dirigit, & iuvat ad cognitionem faciendam, non tamen illam facit; posterior vero illam efficit.” Ibid., p. 137.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 “Est praevia notitia per quam dirigimur, ad consequendam aliquam doctrinam, & disciplinam, sive ad illam dirigendo tantum, sive etiam illam efficiendo.” Ibid.
- 38 Ibid., p. 144.
- 39 Ibid., p. 145.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 “Volunt esse a natura inditos nobis aliquos habitus, in intellectu & voluntate, qui sunt principia aliorum, quos proprio labore acquirimus.” Ibid., p. 145.
- 42 Ibid., p. 146.

- 43 “Explicatio autem illa terminorum non est aliquid efficiens in nobis assensum illorum principiorum, sed tantum conditio quaedam, sine qua intellectus non potest assentiri, & ideo non est cognitio *agens*, sed *dirigens*.”
- 44 Here Valla speaks about both the principles known *per experientia*, and the ones that “habentur divisione, aut syllogismo hypothetico, aut alia via, quae adhibetur ad declarandas res naturaliter ignotas, & obscuras.” *Logica Pauli Vallii*, p. 146.
- 45 Here Valla states the efficient causality of first principles, both inside the demonstration and in demonstrative science, “quae de novo producit, & tunc dicuntur (the first principles) causa efficiens, sicut enim res se habet ad esse, ita ad cognosci, & ideo quia illa sunt causa rei in essendo, sunt etiam causa efficiens in cognitione illius eiusdem rei” (ibid., p. 149). Valla draws on the Thomist metaphor of *quaedam semina*, but he specifies that they are *minima*, because the room for seminal principles in his system is very little (only the most general ones are admitted).
- 46 “Quid dicendum de primis principiis et universalissimis? Respondeo: in talis principiis non necessariam esse praecognitionem quid nominis, tum quia prima principia possunt apprehendi et intelligi sine tali praecognitione, ut patet in scientia inventiva, tum quia in primis principiis non datur praecognitio dirigens neque agens.” Galilei, *Tractatio de praecognitionibus*, p. 4
- 47 Cf. A. Coxito, “Génese e conhecimento dos primeiros princípios. Um confronto do Curso Conimbricense com Aristóteles e S. Tomás”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra*, 12 (2003), pp. 279–303.
- 48 The fake *Logica* published by Froben also chooses this interpretation, very similar to Couto’s. With a curious shifting of Aquinas’s image, it will apply the concept of *manu ductio* of the pupil by the teacher to induction in knowledge process: “Est igitur inductio, quaedam dispositio et manu ductio: qua intellectus excitatur, et adducitur ad contemplandas naturas extremorum ex quibus (prima) principia componuntur.” And: “Cognitionem vero principiorum aliquando acquiri per discursum (ut per inductionem et experimentum) non per se, sed per accidens: quatenus videlicet his instrumentis manu ducitur intellectus, et quodammodo excitatur ipsa principia contemplanda.” See *Collegii Conimbricensi Societatis Iesu Commentarii doctissimi in universam Logicam Aristotelis*, Tomus Alter, Hamburg: Froben, 1604, p. 158.
- 49 “Magistrum vero communicare discipulo scientiam offerendo ei sensibilia exempla, aliaque his similia, quibus ille phantasmata ad rei intellectionem idonea effingat, proponendoque effata communia, et *principia illi nota*, eaque ad particulares conclusiones applicando atque ita ipsum ad intelligibiles conceptiones, & ignotam veritatis notitiam quasi manu ducendo.” *De Anima*, Lib. II, Cap. I, Quaest. 7, Art. 3, p. 83.
- 50 On this topic, see L. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. II, *Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy*, Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 289–293.
- 51 Góis, *De Anima*, Lib. III, Quaest. 1, Art. 3, p. 372. On their “naturalness”: “eatenus tamen dici naturales, quatenus eiusmodi principia per se, ac vi suorum terminorum, adeo conspicua sunt, ut eis necessario quoad speciem actus assentiamur” (ibid.). Góis compares also *speciae* with *habitus*: “Si esset nobis ingenitae species, essent quoque ingeniti habitus scientiarum ... At non ita rem habere plane indicat, quod nemo eiusmodi habitus in se experitur, sed magnum potius laborem, & difficultatem in disciplinis comparandis” (ibid., pp. 370–371).
- 52 Góis puts forward two Aquinas passages: *Summa*, Ia–IIae, Quaest. 51, art. I; and *Contra Gentes*, lib. II, cap. 78. In the first, Aquinas distinguishes the *habitus* thus: “Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui.”

- 53 “Conclusio ergo huius articuli sit, animum humanum simul a Deo creari, & in corpus infundi, esseque a prima origine quasi nudam tabulam, omni habitu, specieque destitutum. Deinde vero progressu temporis acquirere scientiarum habitus, ea potissimum via, quam tradidit Aristoteles in hoc opere, videlicet percipiendo prius principia, quae maiorem habent cum luminem intellectus cognitionem, & ex illis deducendo conclusiones aut per se, & proprio *experimento*, aut opera, industriaque magistri.” *In Universam Dialecticam, In Primum Librum Posteriorum Aristotelis*, Cap. I, Quaest. 1, Art. 2, pp. 293–294.
- 54 “Dicimus ergo Deum abunde hominibus quoad haec omnia providisse, cum eis potentias impertivit, quibus hunc, & alios habitus sibi possint comparare, quod in secundo de Generatione luculenter cum Galeno explicatum est.” *Ibid.*, Art. 4, p. 300.
- 55 Here I recall certain writings of M. A. Santiago de Carvalho, who has devoted many works to the subject: “Introdução geral à tradução”, in *Comentários do colégio conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus. Sobre os três livros do Tratado “Da Alma” de Aristóteles Estagirita*, Lisbon: Sílabo, 2010, pp. 7–78; M. Santiago de Carvalho, “Intellect et imagination: la ‘scientia de anima’ selon les ‘Commentaires du Collège des Jésuites de Coimbra’”, in M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos (eds), *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intellecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la S.I.E.P.M. (Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002)*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, vol. I, pp. 119–158; M. Santiago de Carvalho, “The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals (1577–1606)”, *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 18 (2007), pp. 531–543.
- 56 See J. E. Ashworth: “Traditional Logic”, in C. B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Krave (eds), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 143–172; and J. E. Ashworth, “La doctrine de l’analogie selon quelques logiciens jésuites”, in Giard, *Les jésuites à la Renaissance*, pp. 107–126.
- 57 The theory of knowledge in Góis’s *De Anima* is even more problematic: the function of natural enlightenment and the dynamics of active intellect recall Platonizing and Neoplatonizing trends.
- 58 Coxito, “Génese e conhecimento”, p. 303.
- 59 He goes on as follows: “Hos autem acquisitos, nova aliorum accessione paulatim augere consuevit similium rerum ad idem genus, seu materiam pertinetium animadversio in singulis disciplinis. Atque ita per incrementa profecere artes, nec quisquam idem artem aliquam incoepit, & absolvit. Quoniam autem istiusmodi acquisitionem, & profectum artium, ac scientiarum, opus ac vis rationis antecessit, recte Galenus primo de usu partium eos laudat, qui, ut Aristoteles manum quasi organum quoddam esse ante organa, dixit; ita ipsi rationem veluti quandam artem esse ante omnes artes, asseruerunt.” *Commentarii ... In universam Dialecticam*, Proemium, q. 1, art. 1, p. 8.
- 60 This fact is observed by M. Santiago de Carvalho: “[Pedro de Fonseca] ilustra a temática da predicação necessária, recorrendo a um exemplo assaz significativo para aquilo que nos interessa: ‘O homem é capaz de educação’.” And later: “‘Com efeito, se alguém negar que o Homem é capaz de educação, é lógico que negue que ele é Homem.’ Ora, sabendo nós que uma predicação necessária é aquela que, se for negada, implica a destruição do próprio sujeito, então a capacidade para se ser educado é alguma coisa que pertence à própria essência do ser humano ou emerge do fundo da sua própria essência.” Santiago de Carvalho, “Introdução geral”, p. 26. See also Santiago de Carvalho, “The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals”.
- 61 A good example, in a passage that Possevino devotes to a sort of theory of knowledge, is the recourse to Philoponus: “Percioché come i sensi servono alla

fantasia, da Platone questi sotto di lei si comprendono; l'Intelletto per quanto può conseguire apporta al discorso cose verissime e perfettissime, sì come sono gli Asiomî (o dignità), le natural'informationi, o specie, o concetti inseriti o scolpiti negli animi di tutti: dalle quali specie si formano sillogismi di attissima e fermissima ragione, ne i quali consiste la scienza; l'Opinione somministra cose credibili hor vere, hor false: onde nascono sillogismi verisimili, i quali con sé portano alcun dubbio; la Fantasia porge vane immagini, sogni, inganni, come guidata dalla somiglianza che insieme hanno varie cose, le quali per ignoranza o inavvertenza congiunge e mescola temerariamente: onde nasce confusione, per ambiguità di voce o di sentenza." Possevino, *Coltura degl'ingegni*, p. 183.

5 The problem of the cause

Among all the many possible research subjects offered by the *Cursus*, the problem of the cause is one of the most appropriate in order to shed light on a series of primary issues: the relationship between natural philosophy and metaphysics; the influence of Fonseca's doctrines; the historical position of the *Cursus* in the process of philosophical deconstruction of Aristotelian physics towards Descartes. Moreover, the educational issue had been brought to the fore by Góis's solution to the problem of the relationship between first cause and secondary causes, an age-old dilemma of Scholastic theologians. As a matter of fact, the Conimbricenses, who lacked that "Augustinian" sensitivity that we find in other Jesuits, vigorously stated the concurrence of first cause with secondary causes: this issue, of course, comes across in the serious theological dispute *de auxiliis*, addressed by Conimbricenses from the point of view of natural philosophy in the *Physics*. The rejection both of the Augustinian hypothesis and of the contrary one by Durandus (who gave autonomy to the activity of the secondary causes, drawing on the opposite scheme) means promoting secondary causes in the name of their ability to cooperate with God, without being moved by him.

Specific metaphysics

For sixteenth-century Scholastics and philosophers (Giordano Bruno may be an exception, but we should be very careful on the subject¹), posing the problem of causality meant dealing with its collocation in the context of the sciences that were accepted in that period. It also meant posing the problem of which science could legitimately study it, as they took for granted that to each subject a specific discipline corresponds. This issue is immediately complicated by the fact that, in Aristotle's texts themselves, it appears both in the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*. This is a frontier issue, concerning both the world of substance and also that of immaterial forms, and here the boundaries between sciences become blurred. Ascribing the problem of the cause to natural philosophy or to the field of metaphysics means relocating the axis of *ordo disciplinarum* and, inevitably, facing the necessary theological and religious consequences of this relocation.

Pietro Pomponazzi had clearly understood this problem, when, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, he suggested the “fideistic” solution to the problem of the immortality of the soul: his doctrine had caused an earthquake in the relationship between philosophy, theology and natural sciences with which everybody would have had to deal in some way or another. While the problem of the soul was moving from physics to metaphysics, other issues, such as the question of cause, moved towards physics.²

Philosophy thus became metaphysics, while the subject matter which had belonged to Aristotelian physics was free to become natural science. The difficulties due to the new relationship between metaphysics and natural philosophy were compounded by the necessity of explaining Aristotle’s own hesitation about the nature of metaphysics, especially about the role which metaphysics should play as first philosophy.³

The literature insists on these movements, because the aim of the discussion was, and it still is, measuring the revolutionary impact of Descartes’s thought, but also dating, and if possible backdating, the beginning of the process of secularization that led to the modern sciences. Two accurate readers of these movements were Étienne Gilson (many years ago) and Dennis Des Chene (today). They have offered a historiographical perspective that pays more attention to micro-movements, the breaks and blind alleys of a whole century, succeeding – in relation to the issues pertaining to the present research – in giving credit to natural philosophy where it is due.

The project in natural philosophy begun by Descartes and others eventually resulted in a secular and unmetaphysical physics. Although the result now bears few signs of its gestation, its earlier stages can be understood only in relation to the particular religious context that surrounded them.⁴

It is well known that every little epistemological slip of a subject always had repercussions (or it was itself a repercussion) on hot religious topics, and on the number and the overall system of sciences in general. This last issue was urgent for the Second Scholasticism, and from here comes the necessity of a *Cursus* in order to replace the traditional single commentary.

Philosophers of the Second Scholasticism excised from *Corpus Aristotelicum* the ontological part and made a philosophy of it. They read texts with a humanist background but with ontological eyes, and because of the removal of the entire discussion about method, there was no external criterion of arrangement of the philosophical field, ontology apart.⁵

From a relocation of the theme of the cause, because of its proportions and its significance, we should expect an impressive epistemological realignment.

The Conimbricenses’ contribution to this debate connects the issue of causation to natural philosophy. Unlike Fonseca⁶ or other authors such as Francisco Suárez (we are going to see how he was indebted to the *Cursus* in relation to this subject), for Conimbricenses the study of causes concerns physiology, for two main reasons: causes are perennial and overabundant (*redundantes*) sources thanks to which all natural things exist;⁷ and the wonder that arises from observation of things springs from the ignorance

of causes, and from this wonder, according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Plato's *Theaetetus*, arises the need for philosophy.⁸

This reasoning recalls that employed by Góis to define philosophy in general in the Introduction to the *Physics*. Góis listed some definitions, drawing upon the Platonic tradition but also upon Neoplatonism and Hermeticism, but he finally stated his propensity for Aristotle, who wrote in the *Metaphysics*: "Philosophia est cognitio rerum, ut sunt."⁹ Meaningfully, for Góis, "ut sunt" is equivalent to "per suas causas", but he specified: "si eas habuerint". Physics (physiology, or natural philosophy) is not only a true science, but it is philosophy *par excellence*: the classification of philosophy (physics, dialectic and ethics) accepted by Góis goes in this direction. The space for interrogation of being as such is occupied by the problem of cause, which, according to the Conimbricenses, is always grounded in the study of natural philosophy.¹⁰

This warns us about the "stone guest" in the *Cursus*: the problem of the *Metaphysics*. What theoretical meaning should we give to its absence in the *Cursus*? We can find some hints of first philosophy in the *Physics*, in particular in the Introduction (to be considered as an introduction to the whole *Cursus*). Mário Santiago de Carvalho showed very well the borders that define its field, as expounded in the volumes of the *Physics* and *De Anima*.¹¹

The hints about metaphysics, apparently consistent, defined it as a science of supernatural things, of the first cause and of the substances independent from matter (as in the case of the separated soul). Therefore, the *Cursus* is at the core of the transition of paradigms from which the history of ontology started as a science of being as such, separating itself from the metaphysical muddle of the past. Góis reflected the distinctive ambiguities (and even the contradictions) of a time of transition, but it looks clear that his hesitant attitude towards metaphysics as a science was due to his clear-cut option for the full, if not exclusive, legitimacy of natural philosophy.

Earlier, the problem of the "clear and distinct" definition of the subject of metaphysics had haunted Pererius, who devoted many chapters of his *De Communibus Principiis* to finding a solution to this problem. The actual question was the unity of the discipline or its status as a science. He divided the objects of metaphysics into three groups, confirming the traditional division:

So I state that there are three parts in Metaphysics, because it is considered in a triple manner: the first is the principal one, and almost the end of the others (thanks to it, Metaphysics is called Theology, and it is very noble), in which things separated from matter according to reality and reason are studied, as are the intelligences and God. The second part clarifies transcendent elements such as Being, the One, the True, the Good, the Act and Potency: thanks to it Metaphysics is considered universal, it has jurisdiction and domain over the other sciences. The third part includes the ten categories.¹²

Looking at this system, there were two possibilities: either saving the unity of metaphysics by discussing the hierarchical connections between the aforementioned objects, or defining (ahead of history) a fourth, or even a fifth, speculative science in addition to the three that were generally accepted (physics, mathematics and metaphysics). Pererius decided that both paths could be left open: he supported both arguments and he placed them side by side, but it was clear that the second possibility was his favourite. The unity of the discipline was guaranteed by Pererius affirming the capacity of metaphysics to include “being” as *subiectum*; the One, the Truth and the Good as “*passiones maxime communes*”; and the ten categories as accessory species. This unity was composed according to *ordo & attributio ad unum* of all those things. At the same time, Pererius affirmed that this difficulty could be solved with “more perseverance and study”: in the system of the sciences, one must necessarily be universal, different from all the particular ones and dealing with all the transcendental elements that are scattered in them. This science, dealing with being as such and about dignities and categories, does not have as subjects the intelligences *per se*. So,

two different sciences are necessary: one must deal with the most transcendental and universal objects; the second must deal with intelligences. The first should be called First Philosophy and universal science; the second Metaphysics, Theology, Wisdom, Divine Science.¹³

Therefore, Pererius proposed a bipartition of metaphysics based on the object, without inserting it inside the traditional gradation of sciences in respect to abstraction from matter, which he rejected. According to Blum:

Pererius had the merit of structuring the dichotomy between metaphysical objects, and from that moment on, the question would always have been the same: how far metaphysics could deal with the principles of being as such, and how far with the beings of higher rank.¹⁴

Góis sees being in continuity with the traditional position: in the Introduction to the *Physics*, he confirmed the tripartition of contemplative philosophy into physiology, mathematics and metaphysics, and he supports it with the gradation of abstraction. Physiology abstracts from singular perceivable matter, mathematics abstracts from common perceivable matter (*non in re, sed in ratione*) and metaphysics, finally, abstracts from the whole matter (*et in re, et in ratione simul*).¹⁵

Therefore, metaphysics deals with “the knowledge of the first cause and of intelligences, and of all the other things that neither consist of matter, nor do they include matter in its own concept”.¹⁶

To the possible doubts about the abstraction of the work of the metaphysician *in re et ratione* from matter,¹⁷ Góis replied affirming that metaphysics could be *pure* (when it deals with objects such as intelligences,

that do not have any parts that are subject to another creator) or *non pure* (when it deals with objects *coniugata materiae*). However, he claimed that a metaphysician runs into matter as an aim of his study only incidentally and accidentally: the metaphysician is entitled to allocate, according to the class, being into its own parts; therefore he runs into the concept of matter when he divides being into act and potency¹⁸ (“cuius praecipuum significatum materia est”).

More generally, according to Góis, the task of metaphysics is epistemological (as we would call it nowadays): metaphysics presides over the designation of the object of each discipline and, while doing this, it can go beyond its own specific object. Designating each discipline, the metaphysician runs (fortuitously) into the concept of matter.¹⁹ In short, when he deals with material substances, metaphysics slips down to a generic knowledge, and its rising (towards contemplation of intelligences or towards epistemology) tastes like *amoveatur*, more than promotion. Góis warned against confusing metaphysics with sacred theology,²⁰ generated by the loose connection between metaphysics and matter.

As we have already said, the Conimbricenses assigned to metaphysics a position that is inversely proportional to the significance that they gave to natural philosophy. It is not by chance that an entire question is devoted by Góis to this issue (Quaest. II): he started by expounding the opinions of those philosophers that refused to give to natural philosophy the status of a science. His reply to those arguments is very sharp, and his certainty about the scientific nature of physics leads to a rare rhetorical passage:

Even though the dignity of Physics and its perfection in deducing the rule of science was not admitted by everybody, both in the rougher age, when philosophy was still an infant and stuttering, and later, because of the sects of third-rate philosophers that clashed and argued to such an extent that they disagreed about almost everything: but later, when the obstinacy of that time vanished, Philosophy, as it emerged from the waves, docked in safe harbour; and it was clear, and established by everybody as an accomplished fact, that Physics must be embraced in the realm of sciences.²¹

In order to demonstrate that natural philosophy is fully fledged knowledge, Góis recurs to a concatenation of arguments in which two issues are linked together, not only in chronological order: the problem of causes and man's natural inclination to learning. Knowledge means knowing, of a necessary effect, its own necessary cause. This is how a natural philosopher works in his epistemological process: he knows, for example, that each body can be divided because it is a continuum; that matter, because of a natural force, cannot be united to any form because it is pure potentiality; and that man is apt to learn the disciplines because he has a rational soul.²² The objections attributed to Heraclitus, which state that it is impossible to know what is constantly in

motion, must be rejected, according to Góis: at least, it is possible to have a science of the constant of motion.

About natural philosophy, there was at the time a debate to determine its very object. Góis expounds the most common opinions: Avicenna thought that the object of physics was the *corpus mobile*, Toletus that its object was the *ens naturale* and Averroes, who was followed by others from Aquinas to Cajetan, thought that its object was *ens mobile*. According to Góis, the difference is only between words, because they all mean the same thing. However, the double meaning of the word “mobile”, as either a property/accident of natural being or the principle of aptitude for motion (i.e. substantial form and matter), make the *ens mobile* the best option. According to Góis, Scotism corrupted Thomistic opinion and had decided that the object of physics was the compound *per accidens*. On the contrary, Góis excludes from the *ens mobile* first matter and the “mentes corporae molis expertes”,²³ since they are not subject to generation. *Ens mobile* is a compound *per accidens* only in name, but it belongs to the category of substance.²⁴

There were further objections about the subject of natural philosophy and the Conimbricenses came into conflict with Cajetan’s doctrines. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the bone of contention was the *incipit* of science and a couple of passages in *Posterior Analytics*: there is no science that demonstrates its subject, it takes it for granted. Since Aristotle demonstrated the *corpus mobile* in the same work, it cannot be an assumption of physical science. Here Góis introduces a very meaningful objection through a meaningful tone: “If someone objected that in the passage quoted it the *corpus mobile* is not demonstrated, but that everything that moves is body ...”.²⁵ With Góis’s specification, which offers an interesting interpretation of “everything that moves” and solves the wrong exegesis of the Aristotelian text, Cajetan disagreed, believing that the peculiar task of metaphysics was assigning the assumptions to the various disciplines. There is no art whose assumption is complex or known *complexe* that demonstrates the connection of the parts from which the assumption comes: it is up to the metaphysician to accomplish this task. But, according to Cajetan, the physicist demonstrates the connection between mobility and object, so he cannot claim the *corpus mobile* as an assumption. Góis answers Cajetan by drawing on Aristotle’s authority: according to Aristotle, it was not unusual for philosophers to demonstrate the assumptions they deal with, as the same Cajetan admits. From a chronological point of view, this is the first occasion on which the Conimbricenses criticize Cajetan.

Among the other possible objections that Góis expounds against the *ens mobile* as object of physics, we will choose only two because they directly concern the relationship between natural philosophy and metaphysics. The first is historical, but has a corollary that also dealt with psychology and, more broadly, with the order of disciplines: pre-Socratic philosophers did not believe that substances could exist separated from matter, so they believed that physics was the first philosophy, as there was no space for metaphysics.

Aristotle confirmed: if there were no separate substances, there would not be a first philosophy. Góis replied that Aristotle meant by this that, once separate substances are removed from nature, the *ens mobile* would be the same as the matter in common; but he did not deny either substance in general, or that the concept of being concerned natural philosophy. Later, this argument was used by Góis to determine the order of the various disciplines according to their dignity, in order to demonstrate, with Aristotle, that since the object of metaphysics existed, physics had to be the second philosophy.

The second objection concerns psychology: there is a contradiction between the fact that the object of physics is *ens mobile* (for which the natural philosopher does not have to abstract from matter) and the fact that it deals with the rational soul, which does not depend on matter. Góis answers by affirming the possibility of a triple perspective on the soul: in its essence; in its condition inside the body; in its condition outside the body. The last, according to Góis, is the specific modality with which a metaphysician considers the soul. On the other hand, the first two possibilities belong to physics, because the *quidditas* of a soul, including its rational function, can be defined in respect to matter; because “ad Physicum spectat scrutari hominis essentiam, quae, nisi cognita animae natura, intelligi non potest”;²⁶ and because, in the condition of life, the soul is part of a human being, *egetque materia* to give form to it and to perform its actions.

In the Introduction to *De Anima*, Góis pinpoints that the essence and the nature of soul are the study of natural philosophy:²⁷ first of all, soul is *forma corporis*, according to the well-known Aristotelian definition, so it needs matter in its definition. Moreover, man, as an animated being, can be reconnected to the whole *ens mobile*, which is the object of physics; and the broadly accepted definition of man as *anima constans corpore, & animo ratione partecipe* was born and cultivated in the realm of natural philosophy. Unlike natural philosophy, which actually knows the *quidditas* of the soul, Góis affirmed that metaphysics deals with the soul only in its connection with the more general issue of *intellectivum, per se subsistens, & immaterialem*.²⁸

The Conimbricant commentary on *De Anima* was published bound in a volume with Baltasar Álvares’s treatise *De Anima Separata*. As highlighted by Mário Santiago de Carvalho, the idea of attaching a treatise about the condition of the separated soul was not spurious, since already in the commentary on *Parva Naturalia* (which was published in 1593, five years before *De Anima*) there was a reference to it.²⁹ The fact that it was necessary to provide an attachment was due to the subject matter: Aristotle had never dealt with anything similar.

The ultimate necessity of considering this aspect of psychology was of a theological nature: the immortality of the soul had to be proved rationally. Baltasar Álvares’s treatise also deals with other issues, but its main goal is proving the immortality of the soul. The Conimbricenses, and Álvares directly, affirm that speculation about this issue is metaphysical rather than theological; but I believe that this persistence was due more to the fulfilment of the

Apostolici Regiminis requirement, than to a true epistemological need.³⁰ On the other hand, the stature of psychology as a science was taken as twofold, between physics and metaphysics, since the Introduction, and in Baltasar Álvares's treatise there were some questions that the metaphysician should not posit (for example whether the soul is freer inside the body or outside it, etc.) because they deal with that corporeity and materiality that should be the physicist's field.

Leaving out these questions, we can focus on the question of the immortality of the soul. Even the more famous but also more controversial Pererius had explicitly reconnected the immortality of the soul with theology, when he identified the epistemological competences of psychology.³¹ Toletó did the same in his commentary on *De Anima*,³² as did Suárez and a large part of the Lutheran world.³³ Suárez, who inherited from the Conimbricenses more than is generally admitted,³⁴ even denied that reflection on the rational soul, *sive in ratione entis, sive in ratione causae*, belonged to metaphysicians:

The rational soul, because of its rationality, is a natural form which is essentially aimed at matter, and only in this sense is it the principle of its own operations, both those that it performs through the body and those it performs according to the peculiar way of men.³⁵

In the Introduction to his commentary on *De Anima*, he would explicitly state that the study of the separated soul *valde* belongs to theology, and that it transcends the limits of any natural knowledge.³⁶ At the end of his demonstration, Álvares admits to a certain extent that, being alive, the human intellect needs an extraordinary enlightenment in order to grasp the immortality of the soul.³⁷ He writes:

When we affirm that the immortality of the soul can be known through natural enlightenment, we cannot exclude any peculiar helps and enlightenments of the mind, without which, perhaps, philosophers themselves would be unable to understand it, after the fall of the first man.³⁸

The immortality of the soul is one of the *res transnaturales* that may not be understood by the intellect and, however, according to the Conimbricenses, should be one of the objects of metaphysics. Metaphysics is confirmed in its unity, against the scholars that deem it plural and threefold: (a) science of God, (b) science of intelligences and (c) science of the highest categories and of the transcendentals.³⁹ Supporting unity, Conimbricenses do not solve the problem about the division of metaphysics, which had already been posited by Pererius and Fonseca and was severely dealt with by Suárez,⁴⁰ introducing the modern concept of metaphysics as pure ontology.⁴¹ They do not solve the problem explicitly, but, from all the hints we have, it looks clear that all the *transnaturales* aspects included in the list of the objects of metaphysics make this knowledge somewhat indistinct from

a human point of view, postponing those issues to the enlightenment of revelation, and finally to theology. The study of transcendentals and the highest categories is the human side of metaphysics, but this aspect is not enough to call it “Divine Philosophy”.

At the end of the Introduction to the *Physics*, Góis faces the didactic problem of the *ordo disciplinarum* and its division into *ordo doctrinae* and *ordo dignitatis*: what is the order of priority between physics and metaphysics? What order of dignity? What is “first philosophy” and how can it be interpreted?

As J. Bachelar e Oliveira⁴² rightly stated, in Question V there is a fully-fledged “filosofia do Magisterio” in which the *ordo doctrinae* is not less important than the celebrated *ordo dignitatis*. Góis wrote three or four articles about this subject, in order to fully investigate and solve the possible objections to his theory, seemingly traditional: according to the *ordo doctrinae*, the first discipline is mathematics, then natural philosophy, ethics and finally metaphysics.

The preparatory nature of mathematics is confirmed with a historical argument: Plato, according to the *Thaetetus* and the seventh book of *Politeia*, did not admit any students who were unfamiliar with mathematics. According to Góis, this discipline was easier than all the others. Physics, indeed, is “much more difficult and more complicated, because it investigates the obscure energy of nature, it largely depends on the ambiguous and fallacious knowledge of the senses, and requires long observations and long experience”.⁴³

The habit of observation, which is a characteristic of natural philosophy, is what makes it preparatory for moral philosophy, which is the discipline that deals with mores and the governing of private and public life. It requires a *maturior iudicium* than natural philosophy, but, since Góis interpreted it mainly as a “medicine of souls”, it also requires that the cure comes after (and not before) the knowledge of what is sick or simply under the storm of juvenile passions. I believe that here we can find an additional proof that physical investigation is superior to other disciplines, since the knowledge of the soul becomes wholly comprehensible from a human point of view. It is true that soul diseases are related to matter, but the practical knowledge of healing can come only from a deep knowledge of the essence and of the functions of the soul, regardless of its disease. Psychology is, again, a natural science: “It is good that the Moral Philosopher learns from the Natural which are the faculties of the soul; as he could teach the things to which faculties should be submitted, and in which happiness is grounded.”⁴⁴

It should be noticed how Góis gets rid of a “Platonic” hindrance, that is the classic (and Ciceronian) commonplace of the preparatory nature of good mores for contemplative studies. According to Góis, it is true that moral probity strongly contributes *ad capessandas disciplinas*; however, it does not imply the priority of moral philosophy in respect of physics, because *non pauci vitij infecti scientias comparat*, and also because “moral probity cannot be achieved with the precepts of third-rate philosophers, but better and much more with personal commitment, private discipline, good examples and other means is it acquired for the purpose, all with the help of God”.⁴⁵

The lack of interest for the *dignitas* of morality, which is typically Conimbrican, is confirmed in the *Dialectica*, where Couto argues the priority of dialectics in respect to moral philosophy. Among the three reasons that made dialectics *prestantior*, Couto preferred this:

When Dialectics tries to amend the mental vices by the use of reason, it cannot succeed if it does not develop truthful forms of reasoning; and it proceeds almost only through demonstration. Quite another thing is the way moral science proceeds, which when it deals with the discipline of mores does not recur to demonstration during its search for truth. It is well known, indeed, that a concept subject to demonstration is superior to a non-demonstrative one.⁴⁶

The classical maxim of *vir bonus*⁴⁷ is overturned by the Conimbricenses: only an education made by persevering in theoretical exercises – empirical in method – can generate morality in the young student. In a few words, this is the theoretical legitimization of the Jesuit college: personal study, discipline but also emulation, under the eyes of God, always *adiuvante*, create and shape the person skilled in speaking. That only at the end, according to Góis's chronological and educational model, can attain metaphysics. Among all the disciplines, metaphysics is the last one to be learnt with the sole power of natural faculties (*ingenij facultas*). But at the end of this list in which time (not school time, but a lifetime) seems to run out, we should ask when and if human beings will actually enter a science that is so far from any human knowledge.

This is the postulate of the order of disciplines, that the last science to be taught is the one that studies abstruse things, very far from any practice of the (five) senses; and everybody knows it is metaphysics, because it contemplates transnatural things, as its very name states and Aristotle himself confirms.⁴⁸

Here Góis seems to exclude the theoretical objects of metaphysics from any possible connection with nature and any reflection on human faculties. Only in this sense can metaphysics still be considered “Divine Philosophy”; and so the text recalls the Augustinian (but also Neoplatonic and Hermetic) notion of the progressive order of disciplines, in the view of a spiritual preparation of a soul more and more capable of contemplating the supernatural world (*ea, quae supra naturam sunt agnoscenda*). Supernatural: thus can metaphysics have a place among the unrevealed human sciences, if it keeps as its objects first causes, intelligences, God, the highest categories, transcendentals or being in itself.

This clear and confused combination of objects is, on the contrary, considered by some philosophers (those Góis called *neoterici*) as the confirmation of the priority of metaphysics in respect of other sciences. It is impossible to be perfectly familiar with a thing *nisi causas, a quibus pendet, & communia eius praedicata, intelligat*. On the basis of this criticism against the unspecified *neoterici* (the marginal comment quotes Bernardi della Mirandola, as in

Pererius's and Fonseca's texts), is it possible to draw a line of continuity from Góis to Fonseca?

Fonseca had dealt with this issue in the first volume of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*: after listing the *pro utroque parte* arguments and rejecting Bernardi's theory, he made three statements in order to distinguish the priorities of the different disciplines: (1) physics and mathematics precede metaphysics *ordine inventionis*; (2) metaphysics precedes the other two *ordine exquisitae doctrinae*; (3) *absolute ac simpliciter*, physics and mathematics precede metaphysics in the doctrinal order.⁴⁹ Fonseca solved the problem of order with a distinction that made reference to *inventio* and to the degree of the accuracy of each science, but he clearly stated the priority *absolute ac simpliciter* of natural knowledge in respect to a metaphysics that had, as its objects, both things not participating in matter and the common features of all things.⁵⁰ Thanks to these objects, Fonseca could pinpoint that the priority of metaphysics in *exquisita doctrina* did not mean affirming the subordinate positions, *absolute ac simpliciter*, of the other two disciplines in respect of first philosophy.

It is clear that this issue was very important for Góis, since he was open to admit (but only as a mannerism, as we will see later) that metaphysics might precede the other disciplines, if the perfect knowledge of something was meant not as a perfection *in suo genere*, but as an unconditioned and accurate knowledge of the object in every single part of it. But he also adds, revealing his prudent critical gambling, that this admission does not contradict the previous theory, because philosophers are used to talking about perfection in its first meaning (that is to say, to talk generically); and also because the cognitive process goes from the simplest things to the most difficult, and mathematics and physics deal with simplest things and are to some extent instrumental to metaphysical knowledge.

From an epistemological point of view, the most interesting problem is discussed by Góis in order to limit the subordination of the other disciplines to metaphysics. When Pererius had faced this problem, he had suggested a similar limitation, dwelling at length on some arguments to support the plurality of knowledge against a hierarchy that threatened to deny the dignity of science to everything that was not metaphysics: "If all the disciplines were subordinate to Metaphysics, there would not be two different sciences, but there would be just one science, that is, Metaphysics."⁵¹

Pererius's reasoning revolves around the concept of epistemological subordination itself: a science is said to be subordinate to another when it receives its theories from the *subalternans* one, depending as a consequence on it *essentialiter*. The word "science" is not used univocally: the subaltern discipline is called "science" because of its essential dependence from another science.

Pererius, however, admitted some immediate and indemonstrable principles, typical of each discipline, thus excluding a universal hierarchy. This argument applied particularly to Pererius's distinction between practical sciences and speculative sciences. But when the subject of the science becomes man,

Pererius takes the opportunity to declare the mutual dependence between metaphysics and natural philosophy and give further details. Man can be considered either in absolute terms (*ac secundum omnia praedicata quae in eo insunt*) or “ut solum est res quaedam naturalis ac secundum praedicata Physica quae habet”. In the first case, if it is true that physics can reach the knowledge of man without metaphysics, the opposite is also true: metaphysics cannot reach the knowledge of man without physics. In the second case, natural philosophy can perfectly know man as its own subject matter, not “simpliciter sed Physice, non omni ex parte, sed qua est corpus quoddam natural”.⁵² Pererius’s conclusion is that physics is a perfect science in itself and that it does not depend on metaphysics.⁵³

We are not surprised by the fact that this sort of argument, which involves the structural dimension of the sciences (and therefore neither secondary nor unessential), was half-hidden by Góis in a question of a pedagogical and didactical nature; but the fact that this argument is located at the end of his reasoning is evidence for Góis’s hidden approval of it. According to Góis, the subordination of the other disciplines to metaphysics cannot help being perceived as faulty, since – as we have seen in the previous chapter – each science has its own peculiar principles that are not taken from first philosophy. Drawing on an argument by Trombetta (not by chance an opponent of Cajetan), Góis repeated that not even the immediate principles of disciplines are subject to a demonstration that can connect them to a knowledge that is superior to the discipline itself. We therefore cannot say that *Metaphysicam ordine doctrinae reliquas disciplinas simpliciter anteire*.⁵⁴

Therefore, from an epistemological point of view also, the position of metaphysics seemed to be demoted, to a cluster of objects that escape the cognitive capacity of man “in this state of life”. Góis had the constant concern of insisting on the mundane condition of speculative investigation: to the latter, metaphysics can contribute only as far as its object is specified in the formal division of knowledge, in the theory of the transcendental and, at most, to speculation on being as such. The remainder is left to the supernatural. If the point of view of the epistemologist is focused on this state of life, of course there will also be consequences for the other possible *ordo disciplinarum*, that based on the dignity of the sciences. The order of dignity is a rhetorical *topos* greatly respected by Scholasticism, so, as always, it closes the Introduction.

In this case, the superiority of metaphysics should be guaranteed by its own object, seemingly unquestionable in its religious dimension. Góis admits that “inter scientias propriis generis, illae magis eminent, quae substantias a materiis liberas, utpote in altissimo rerum gradu collocatas, quam quae materiae permixtas considerant”.⁵⁵ But the problem is not solved at all: if the problem is not the pre-eminence of the object, but the certainty and the evidence of knowledge, metaphysics (in this “state of life”) slips down to last place in the list of sciences; mathematics (and most of all arithmetic) is the most certain, then natural philosophy and, finally, metaphysics.

Since metaphysics, according to us (and it is what we are talking about), has less certainty than the other two, we can say that, even if the things contemplated by it obtain a higher level of certainty because they are outside matter and cannot change, in this state of life they can hardly be known even through lengthy study. Moreover, many of them are of excellent nature, and if we stare at them with the gaze of our mind, it will be dazzled as the eye of the bat by direct sunlight.⁵⁶

Previously, a similar classification was proposed by Pererius; as regards dignity, he had put the disciplines in descending order, from metaphysics (also called “Prima Philosophia ... Sapientia, Theologia, hoc est scientia Dei”⁵⁷), to physics and mathematics.⁵⁸ Unlike the Conimbricenses, in relation to the certainty of knowledge, he conceded a favourable distinction to metaphysics: the certainty of a science is determined either by the firmness and immutability of the object, or by the firmness of the reasons and demonstrations that every science displays. In the first case, metaphysics should be considered the most certain discipline; in the second, *maior copia est in aliis scientiis quam in Metaphysica, propter summam difficultatem earum rerum quas tractat*. Among these “other sciences”, Pererius admits the greater certainty of demonstrations and theorems in mathematics than in physics, but he also states that physics is more reliable than mathematics when it deals with substance (more certain than accidents, according to Pererius), and that it relies upon a superior type of demonstration, that is “faciens scire per proprias causas, propter quas res sunt, & per ea quae per primoque insunt in rebus quae demonstrantur, quod non facit Mathematicus”.⁵⁹

In the second book of *Dialectica*, Couto will come back to the certainty of disciplines when he has to distinguish between science and opinion. He suggests that there is an interesting division between intellect, *sapientia* and science: the reasoning style is what separates *sapientia* and science from intellect, while the double meaning of the word “science” clarifies the collocation of metaphysics as *sapientia naturalis*. It is said that knowledge is *scientia* in so far as it is *in communi* (i.e. it contains any information or habit acquired *per discursum ex causa a priori*): in this first case, according to Couto, *sapientia* and science are the same thing, distinguishing the one from the other only as species and category. In the second case, *scientia* is that in which the sole knowledge generated by inferior causes is produced; from this point of view, *sapientia* (Couto: “de qua sola agimus, & est eadem quae Metaphysica”) differs from science since it originates from superior formal reasons.⁶⁰

In explaining the nature of these formal reasons, Couto again discusses the issue of the division of sciences, answering to Pererius’s rejection of the traditional criterion of the level of abstraction from matter. Couto confirmed this criterion, but he considered it a specific distinction, operating at a lower level than the general one, determined by the different *lumina naturalia* with which the various objects of knowledge are examined. *Lumina naturalia* coincide with the principles of each science, since principles “sunt quaedam lumina adventitia nativo lumini intellectus, quibus illustrantur conclusiones”.⁶¹ As we

have seen in the previous chapter, “the light, for these principles, is the formal reason of the assent to conclusions ... and this is the reason for which, even though the native light of intellect is the same in every man, there is among men so great a diversity in sciences”.⁶²

Above these distinctions, there was the most general one, that between the sciences that originate from supernatural light and those that originate from natural light:

The first distinction among sciences is between the science that can be achieved with the supernatural light, and the one that can be achieved with natural light. The first sort can be divided in two: in one, the object can be known by the bright supernatural light, that is, the theology of the consecrated [*beatorum*]; in the other, the object can be known by the obscure supernatural light, that is, the theology of living persons [*viatorum*].⁶³

A few pages earlier, Couto had separated theology in general from metaphysics, as they use a different type of light to know their object, and had confirmed the unity (or better, the indivisibility in species) of metaphysics and physiology but not the unity of mathematics. Thus, he had posited the problem of the inner unity of a science: he chose an interpretation based on Scotus, already followed by other Jesuits, for which “scientiam totalem non esse simplicem qualitatem, sed aggregationem multorum habituum efficientium unam scientiam per ordinem ad unam abstractionem”.⁶⁴ So, he repeated that unity is a composition of different *habitus* that concur to the orderly and specific abstraction of a science in respect of the other sciences. The common denominator is represented by the order that organizes every single science according to its modes of knowing.

As a conclusion, we can say that the division operated by Pererius within metaphysics – a “first philosophy” with an ontological nature and a “divine science”, to which *per se* God, intelligences and the human soul in its state of separation should belong – was the answer (according to Lohr⁶⁵) of the Jesuits of the Roman College to the fideism of Pomponazzi.

Later, Suárez took advantage of Pererius’s teachings and, despite his refusal to give a solution to the metaphysical problem, he did nothing more than subdivide his “divine science” according to a different criterion. The final result was similar. Suárez resorted to the distinction of metaphysical reality in *ens infinitum*, *ens creatum immateriale* and *ens creatum materiale*, creating the background for the disciplines that later would be called natural theology, rational psychology and cosmology, and whose history would have ended with Kant. According to some scholars, such as Lohr himself,⁶⁶ this process of valorization for themes scientifically in crisis, such as the soul, was aimed at saving these issues from the crisis of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, based on the concept of *corpus mobile*, in order to give Catholic intellectuals a new reality plan. In the same way, it was a withdrawal to safer

positions of the Aristotelian-Catholic doctrine in the face of the combined assault of Pomponazzi's psychology and Scotus's metaphysics, with its distinction between finite and infinite being. Thanks to this process, a new space for natural sciences would have been created, as they were less compelled to be consistent with Aristotelian principles. Lohr wrote:

The formulation of an independent philosophy dealing with God, the world and man *sub ratione entis* relieved the scientists of the obligation to relate their conclusions to Aristotelian principles. It was for this reason that the professors in the arts faculties of the Italian universities in the late sixteenth century were reduced to offering simply an exegesis of the Philosopher's text and that – long before Galileo – natural philosophy was free to go its own way.⁶⁷

The necessary corollary to this assertion is that natural philosophy was left, so to speak, unarmed by Catholic forces and left to the curiosity of secular scholars.

I think that the contribution of the *Cursus*, in relation to this thesis, goes in the opposite direction. It seems that the Conimbricenses validated Pererius's metaphysical division in order to set natural philosophy free from the hindrances of the correlate religious implications. It seems that Góis chose for himself the field of physics, leaving to others all the *transnaturales* speculations, not so interesting for a scholar for whom the problem of the cause was the bedrock of human knowledge: he seemed to place himself in a field that was supposed to be freely open to nonreligious debates. The Conimbricenses, along with many other intellectuals in the Society (Pererius, Clavius and others),⁶⁸ chose to side with natural philosophy and mathematical investigation, accepting the challenge of the century and also reorganizing the Aristotelian lexicon that, according to them, still worked well inside the physical-scientific realm. To the assumed "crisis" of Aristotelian physics based on the *corpus mobile*, which Lohr identifies in the substitution of "corpus" by "ens", Conimbricenses answer by saying it is nothing more than a linguistic game: they denied that changing the word "corpus" meant changing the object of natural philosophy. According to them, a real change in the object happens when the word "mobile" is given a new meaning. Góis, specifically, either did not notice the crisis of Aristotelian physics or, more probably, considered it a lexical confusion in which the theories could anyway be reorganized. As if to say: until semantics and syntax do not change, Aristotelian physics is still the playground of science.

Behind the initial and seemingly conservative tone, the distinctions between order of dignity and order of doctrine conceal the Conimbricenses' speculative inclination for natural philosophy and mathematics.

In this context, the absence of metaphysics from the *Cursus* is significant: we must consider not only the publishing and biographical reasons, not only the curricular reasons (metaphysics was taught only in the last semester of the

arts course), not only reasons of opportunity (Fonseca's *Metaphysics* already covered this discipline),⁶⁹ but also cultural reasons that advised against the publication of a specific volume in the *Cursus*. The same principle can be applied to ethics: the ease and the brevity of the commentary on the *Ethics* correspond to a poor consideration in the *ordo dignitatis*, proposed by Góis and supported by Couto.

To the question posited by Pererius, later Góis's and then Suárez's as a disloyal disciple of the latter ("Is there a place for metaphysics among the unrevealed human sciences?"), the Conimbrican answer is no: because there is no science of things that do not have direct and immediate causes, and what does not have causes, already has its answers in revelation. However, the Aristotelian system, as language and structure of knowledge, can be maintained with a simple replacement: Aristotelian metaphysics, which had been made useless by the coming of Christianity, is replaced by ontology; and the latter in the Jesuitical variation as semantics of beings, which replaces the eternal truth of the separated substances with the historical truth of language. The result is evident if we consider the particular attention that Conimbricenses devoted to the cognitive meaning of order, which they deemed an essential element of knowledge. It guarantees both the unity of the discipline and the sequence of the sciences: it is, at the same time, an element of cohesion and diversification of man's knowledge, and of the process by which he acquires it. So it is clear that the problem of the "secularization" of modern sciences, and of a possible time stamp for it, is ill posed: the question is not the denial or the admission of the divine presence in the objects of human knowledge, but the possibility of a procedure of knowledge completely codified and transmissible, outside the fields of the ineffable and the revealed. This goal was already fully achieved with the structure of the *Cursus*.

Secondary causes, ulterior motives

Let us go back to cause. The Conimbricenses have dealt with it extensively in the *Physics*, and in the *Dialectica* Couto also shows how this choice is relevant when he gives a definition of science in itself with a paragraph in which the word "cause" appears in every proposition. The most general conclusion he draws, following the *interpretes ad ordinem mentis aspicientes* of Aristotle's definitions, is also the most interesting:

Scire est cognoscere rem necessariam per causam illius proximam, & immediatam.⁷⁰

There is no science, unless *per causam*; and cause, following a typical Scholastic distinction, must be both *in essendo* and *in cognoscendo*; that is, of a *necessary* effect the *necessary* cause, existent both in the realm of the *res* and in the realm of the intentional knowledge act. Moreover, the cause about

which science is concerned cannot be the remotest (i.e. the first cause), but the nearest and most immediate.

The structure of the cause is articulated, according to the Scholastic tradition, in many definitions, enumerations, attribution of peculiar ways of causation to the enumerated categories (the causalities) and description of the causative act in relationship to the first cause and the secondary ones. The *Cursus* deals with all these problems. At first glance in order to give a system and make the Scholastic definitions more precise, but actually with the much more ambitious purpose of drawing a brand-new framework, in which the prevalence of external causes as ways to knowledge and human free will in acting and causating could be made consistent with the existence of God and his control over creation.

Dennis Des Chene has made clear the historical main lines of the sixteenth-century Scholastic debate leading to Descartes's *res extensa*, with which the system of traditional Aristotelian physics becomes a world full of cause-effect relations aimed at efficacy and, above all, void of ends. The fact that Descartes had studied the Conimbricenses, Fonseca and Suárez at school is very important: the construction of his thought is clearly indebted to them. Indeed, as far as cause is concerned, Jesuits that had contacts with Coimbra have visible affinities, expressed through quotation or the recalling of complete paragraphs.

Here the chronology is not vital: we cannot demonstrate who owes more to another. Fonseca, Molina, Góis and Suárez have written on cause, prompted by different interests. The first in order to speak about the harmony between free will and the gifts of grace; the second, to add the exemplar cause to the Aristotelian quartet (and indicate a path, via Henry of Ghent, towards the Cartesian exit); Góis in a physiological perspective, but reconsidering very clearly the reflections of the others, is the last to give birth to modern ontology.

This variety of interests is reflected in only minimal, not substantial variations on the theme of cause; when important variations are detected, such as the prevalence of efficient cause in Suárez,⁷¹ these apparent novelties are indeed grafted on the speculative branch grown by the others. As a consequence, when attempts in the literature to connect Cartesian thought with the Scholastic are found, what is true for Suárez is true also for the Conimbricenses:

The replacement of final by efficient causes – ideas where rational agents are concerned, blind pushes where natural agents are concerned, was already occurring among the Aristotelians. ... Suárez has to exercise his subtlety in order to show that ends envisioned by rational agents are not merely efficient causes. Descartes's views here are rather the culmination of a trend than a radical departure.⁷²

Of course, if Suárez's thought is not studied on the basis of Fonseca's *Metaphysics* and its recollection in the *Cursus*, the intention of the author in

relation to secondary causes cannot be fully understood. Secondary causes, when they are rational (i.e. human), act according to Fonseca through an immediate consent of their free will and of the first cause, that is to say, God.

This is the reason why exemplar causality, as we will see later, is not redundant in regard to the other four. It specifies the *actio* of the rational agent as an image of God and elevates his action, making it able to act together with the universal without becoming a mere instrument of it.⁷³ The relationship between first cause and secondary causes is not seen as prevalence or autonomy, but as concurrence and cooperation. The same will be stated by Molina and the Conimbricenses, very clever in summarizing and repeating for their students a peculiar position that was, so to speak, highly controversial in the realm of Catholic thought.

Among the many definitions of cause, Góis prefers this: “Causa est id, a quo aliquid per se pendet.”⁷⁴ “Per se” in this formulation wants to exclude the causes *per accidens* and the conditions (*conditiones*, i.e. what is necessary to create the occasion of the things or is necessary to make action proceed directly).⁷⁵ *Pendere* is meant as “receive its being”.

The debate around the definition of cause was always heated, because the Aristotelian text (all commentators complained about it) did not give a univocal definition of the term. Góis’s definition recalls the one given by Fonseca in his commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, and he employs a verb, *pendere*, unusual in the literature. To find a prominent precursor we must go back to Ibn Gabirol’s *Fons Vitae*, who chooses this word to describe the relationship between the universe and God’s will.

Fonseca had discussed the analogy of the term “cause” and the traditional disagreement on its definition. He reported two of the best-known opinions (that from *Liber de Causis*, where cause is “id, ad quod aliud sequitur”, and that for which cause is “id, propter quod res est”) and rejected both, then presenting his opinion as the most clear. In the sentence “id a quo aliquid per se pendet”, stated Fonseca, the verb meant the necessary hierarchy of the essences implied in the cause–effect relationship,⁷⁶ while the “per se” was useful in order to exclude the causes *per accidens*.⁷⁷

To answer to some objections around the definition of “cause”, Góis recurs to this page of Fonseca’s *Metaphysics*, where “multo uberius, & illustrior explicatio tradita est”. It is nevertheless noteworthy that, in recalling Fonseca, Góis takes the opportunity to introduce the exemplar cause, declaring that he distances himself from Thomism and follows the opinion of Durandus.

Góis is here answering to the objection according to which there are causes upon which other things do not depend *per se*, and therefore the definition cannot be applied to concepts, e.g. as the sum or the whole, “first” concepts in the order of the cause and therefore not connected to everything that follows. According to Durandus, what is first is the cause of what follows only if it is first in the causality category (for example, the efficient cause requires that the superior one is the first; while the final cause requires that the superior one is

the last). To explain this concept, Góis recurs to the exemplar cause, giving a sort of first definition:

We add that what is first can somewhat be called the exemplar cause of other things, because it is like a criterion, by which the perfection of them is evaluated, for their greater or lesser proximity [to it]; on this ground, we can say that other things somewhat depend [on it].⁷⁸

As far as the word “cause” is concerned, Francisco Suárez will show how much he owed to the *Cursus*, and retrospectively to Fonseca, recalling his definition in his *Disputations* (but ascribing it to unspecified *modern authors*):

The cause is the thing upon which something depends on *per se*. I agree with this opinion; but I would prefer to describe it like this: The cause is a principle that confers in itself [*per se influens*] being to something else; instead of the category, I think it is more convenient to use the common name closer to the thing defined; this way the principle is compared with the cause; indeed being and its relative, which absolutely is equivalent to it, are far apart, the one from the other. Thanks to the particle that confers in itself [*per se influens*] the deprivation is excluded, and every other cause *per accidens*, which in itself does not bring or prompt being in other things. It is necessary to take that word “confers” [*influens*] not in its narrow meaning, as is generally done for efficient cause, but more in general, in the sense in which that verb is equivalent to “give or communicate being to other things”.⁷⁹

It has been said that with Suárez the scholastic debate on causality ends, or, on the contrary, that he opens the century of causality.⁸⁰ In both cases the century looks marked by this definition by Fonseca, certainly very influential upon the later developments of the concept of cause. Fonseca’s choice, which will later be the Conimbricenses’ and Suárez’s, was in favour of the concept of cause as dependence, indicating that the relationship of causality was conceived as a relationship between different essences and so extrinsic.

To catch this shifting from intrinsic to extrinsic in natural philosophy, and the final development that Descartes gives to it, it is necessary to go back to Aristotle.

If a general definition of “cause” was missing, and Aristotle had assumed its many analogies without gathering in a clear statement this flowering of terms, in the *Metaphysics* he focused on their number, and decided they were four: formal, material, efficient and final. Nevertheless, there was a great debate in the Middle Ages and later about the interpretation of Aristotle’s classification. Many scholars stated that the cause was, after all, only one (often the formal one); others wanted there to be three causes; others made further distinctions, multiplying indefinitely the original four.

Avicenna, commenting on Aristotle, introduced the grouping of causes as intrinsic (formal and material) and extrinsic (efficient and final); he confirmed the four causes but only as a tribute to tradition. Avicenna himself divided the material cause into intrinsic and extrinsic, bringing the number of causes to four. Moreover, the efficient cause had two faces: physical (as principle of the movement) and metaphysical (as principle of being). In this latter sense the efficient cause was all the more extrinsic: it produces a being different from its essence. But the concept of “production” was further defined by Avicenna: the cause does not produce on the effect a passage from not being to being (this is ruled out by Avicenna), but is a cause “upon which the *existence* of something depends continuously”.⁸¹

Of course, Avicenna had a traditional Peripatetic idea of necessity and he assumed the existence of matter. So, the movement in the world was generated by a mechanism of intermediate causes between the first cause and the last effects, and this mechanism presented a double problem to Christian philosophy, grounded on the concept of free creation and so contrary both to the existence of something not controllable by God, and to the absolute necessity of causal relationships.

Aquinas had found a solution that declared itself in disagreement with Avicenna’s thought, but indeed was consistent with its essential elements. The very fact that Aquinas did not deny the determinism of causes was the reason for the condemnation of many of his propositions in 1577. Tracing an order of causes in three degrees according to their perfection and stability, Aquinas had also tried to order the accidental nature of events and of their effects; nevertheless, Aquinas had explicitly denied that causes, such as for example the intelligences, were *causae essendi*, and had left to God alone the power of producing being. So he criticized Avicenna but simultaneously almost agreed with him, at least partially. On the problem of how many causes there were, Aquinas was faithful to the four causes in many works, e.g. in *Contra Gentiles* (“Omnis causa vel est material, vel forma, vel agens, vel finis”⁸²), while Albertus Magnus had spoken of five causes.⁸³

Avicenna had doubled the material cause, Albertus the efficient cause; Henry of Ghent recurred to a typical Augustinian theme, God as exemplar cause, to make it the fifth among Aristotelian causes. Henry distinguishes between exemplar and formal cause and said that the divine exemplar causality is able to confer essential being on things, leaving to God’s will the capacity of conferring actual being on things, in a contingent and mundane way. Henry of Ghent’s theory will be very influential on Fonseca and the Conimbricenses, whose reflections tried (not too consistently) to oppose his exemplarism. Fonseca opposes in his *Metaphysics* the idea of the five causes, as established by Henry of Ghent, but his theory emphasizes the autonomy of *causa exemplaris*. As Cassiano Abranches states:

Pedro da Fonseca admite cinco géneros de causas, poi defende a irreduzibilidade da causa exemplar a qualquer outro género de causas. Mas o

peso da Tradição e o respeito à letra de Aristóteles move-o a não afastar do modo antigo de falar, dizendo que os géneros de causas são quatro: final, eficiente, formal e material.⁸⁴

According to Fonseca, there are many good reasons to follow the traditional division of causes: the symmetry between effects and causes, some Aristotelian passages as authorities, the relationship between *res naturales* as compounds and the sorts of causes and, last but not least, Aristotle's definitions. According to him, Fonseca says, the material cause is made evident by the fact that matter is *primum subjectum, ex quo aliquid ita sit* (and he adds: "ut non per accidens insit"); form is *ratio quidditatis*; efficient is the *primum mutationis principium*;⁸⁵ the ens is *id, cuius gratia aliquid sit*.

Fonseca's disagreement with Henry's more radical theory is resolved by Fonseca himself stating that it is necessary to find a harmony between the great systems that have a different consideration of *causa exemplaris*: the Platonic (for which exemplar cause and idea are the same, and the only real cause) and the Aristotelian. He thinks that it is unacceptable to exclude exemplar causes from the range of causes, saying it is not a cause *per se*, but *per accidens* (as happens in art). Indeed every effect, which comes from a cause acting through the intellect, depends *per se* on some exemplar.⁸⁶

So the exemplar cause must be posited in a new relationship with one of the usual causes. Fonseca restructures the formal cause, dividing it into two species, intrinsic and extrinsic, and saying that the latter is the exemplar cause. He rejects the reduction of exemplar cause to final cause, as Alexander of Aphrodisia stated; and also Scotus's reduction of exemplar cause to efficient cause, formulated against Henry of Ghent and followed (according to Fonseca) by many authors. These authors think that, "As the natural form is superior to natural agents, so the intellectual form (which we call exemplar, or idea) is superior to intellectual agents."⁸⁷

According to Fonseca, the distinction between exemplar and efficient cause comes directly from the distinction between the two sorts of causalities. As is well known, the Scholastic tradition extended (and partially defined) the analogy of the term "cause" to the specific modes of operation of the category of causes on effects. To every category of cause a mode of operation (causality) corresponds.

The mode of exemplar cause, according to Fonseca, is not a *principium efficiendi*,⁸⁸ but a sort of *imitatio passiva*, concurring to the action as extrinsic principle, *terminans*. The causality of exemplar cause is being imitated, a principle that lacks a direct and immediate influence on the object.⁸⁹ Of course, given the principle of imitation and the extrinsic nature of the cause in respect to its effect, the problem Fonseca must resolve is the distinction between exemplar cause and Platonic idea "qui primus exemplarem causam videtur invenisse, eam vocavit Ideam, Formam, & Speciem".⁹⁰ According to Aristotle, indeed, the Platonic idea looks the same as formal cause, and he never uses the expression "exemplar cause", so it looks probable that formal

and exemplar cause are the same. Fonseca tries to clear the tangle with a manifold solution: find a place for exemplar cause inside the formal one; distinguishing it from the traditional meaning of formal cause; state the *Concordia Platonis & Aristotelis* precisely on this question, where, instead, they look irreconcilable.

Fonseca admits that exemplar cause is an idea, but he makes a distinction between real forms and intelligible forms, thus dividing in two kinds Platonic ideas and the same formal cause:

All Philosophers and Theologians, when they talk about true ideas, think that ideas are the principal forms, and that real forms enter the matter imitating them; in effect the exemplars, that are so *per se* and by their own nature, are true ideas, but not in the Platonic meaning.⁹¹

As a consequence, the definition given above of form as *ratio quidditatis* must include two specifications: the reason (*ratio*) of *quidditas*, that is the definition of formal cause, not only includes the real and informing form, but also the intelligible, i.e. exemplar, one.⁹²

The Platonic idea is transformed by Fonseca into principal form, *ratio prototypa* of the essence of the thing. On the other hand, the real or informing form also belongs to *ratio quidditatis*, but in the traditional sense, because its union with matter completes (*absoluit, ac complet*) the *quidditas* of the thing.

Thus Fonseca's framework is clear: according to their categories, the causes are still four (two extrinsic and two intrinsic); but if we count the number of their species, there are five (intrinsic: material and inner formal; extrinsic: efficient, final and exemplar formal). With this solution he thinks he has reconciled Plato and Aristotle and, above all, found an agreement between himself and Henry of Ghent, to which the closing of the passage is dedicated:

Nobody should contradict what has been told by Henry of Ghent, outstanding among the ancient Scholastics, who wrote in Quodlib. 9 that the categories of causes, including the exemplar, are five; but we should support the hypothesis for which the exemplar is a sort of principal category, and does not substitute for either the efficient cause or the inner formal.⁹³

This mediation by Fonseca will be found also in the *Cursus*, which confirms the number four⁹⁴ as established by Aristotle, recalls the *auctoritates* (Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Simplicius and Avicenna) and takes from Avicenna the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causes. Anyway, the quartet of causes does not look very sound here, as it did not in Fonseca, because Góis says that exemplar cause is difficult to locate and further explanations are necessary. These explanations make manifest the lineage of Góis's exemplar cause theory from Fonseca and, very explicitly, from Henry of Ghent. Exemplar cause is true cause according to Góis, directly and not *reductitie* connected to formal cause, of which it is

a distinct species, independent from informing form. The two species are divided, as proposed by Fonseca, into real forms and intelligible forms, and, Góis states, the causality of intelligible forms precedes the causality of real forms: the passive imitation, a modality of exemplar cause as we have seen, always precedes the real form of the created thing. The intelligible form leads, in its intelligibility, the project of the maker, and this theoretic anticipation always precedes the actual form of the achieved thing. Exemplar cause is indeed the prototypical reason of the essence of the thing, of which it is exemplar; the form inducted by the agent is indeed a certain participated similarity of the exemplar, which informing the matter completes its essence.⁹⁵

The prototypical function of the *exemplar* is a point that must be further discussed, unless the Platonic opinion is accepted in full. This is one of the main reasons why Pererius had excluded the exemplar cause constituting a category in itself; on the other hand, he repeated that even Aristotelian theory did not imply the independence of exemplar cause, because both the form that the natural agent imitates in its action, and the one that the intelligent agent grasps before making a thing, belong to efficient cause (as its instruments).⁹⁶ The exemplar cause implies an opinion about Idea (*sive exemplar*, as Pererius, Fonseca and the Conimbricenses stated) as form. Pererius recalls that, among the Platonists, Simplicius had distinguished the *quidditas* of things according to their participation: the *forma naturalis* is what is participated, and what *a quo sive similitudinem sit participatio, & cuius particeps efficiatur forma quae inducitur in materiam*.⁹⁷

Góis recalls the threefold relationship between form and matter, but drawing upon the distinction proposed by Aquinas in *De Veritate*:

The idea is a form imitated by something, from the purpose of the agent determining its own *ens*. To understand well, it is necessary to consider that form, as far as this aspect is concerned, must be divided in three: form “from which”, “of which” and “to which”.⁹⁸

The form *a qua* is the principle of the action generating the effect. The form *ex qua* is the one of which the thing is made. While the form *ad quam* is actually the exemplar, i.e. that on whose similarity a thing is made. It is clear that the exemplar is something intellectual and, according to Góis, refers itself mainly to the agent *per intellectum*, i.e. the maker (and what is true for God will also be true for the human maker). The exemplar or idea is not, in the maker’s intellect, either art or species, but concept: the question is if the exemplar is a formal or objective concept. Góis thinks that the exemplar is an objective concept, because it dwells in the maker’s intellect not like the image of a thing to be imitated, but like the thing itself *menti obiecta*. The example chosen by Aristotle is that of the physician, and the same goes for Góis: the health of the body comes from the concept of health dwelling in the mind of the physician (“quod in medici animo insidet”) as exemplar to be imitated.

Aristotle does not think that this concept is an image of health, but health itself as it is *obiecta* in the mind of the physician.

But the discussion and the examples chosen by Góis to connect the possibility to imitate the exemplar to the objective reason rather than formal reason focus on the theological problem posited by the Platonic theory of the eternity of the ideas, which is thus solved by Henry of Ghent:

This *ratio* of the divine essence, for which its essence is *ratio* in order to know things different from itself, it is the possibility of being imitated by other things that we call idea. ... And as a consequence, the idea is, in its formal reason, nothing more than the possibility of being imitated through intellectual reflection about divine essence.⁹⁹

Scholars who think that the exemplar coincides with *ratio formalis* state that if the creatures invented by God (Góis takes the examples of man, eagle and lion) were ideas, he would find in them the *ratio formalis*, and as a consequence he could not act without them. On the contrary, Góis thinks that divine ideas are not the creatures thought by him; nevertheless, they are the objective reasons that constitute God's essence, conceived by God as capable of being imitated by created things. Between human mind and divine mind, i.e. between the two similar figures of the maker, there is a great difference: for both the idea must be the *ratio obiectiva*, but God's idea is not *res*, the thing that God establishes to make, while it is *res* for the human maker.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, in the human mind the objective concept is *res ipsa artefacta*, while the formal concept is its mere image. There is a difference between the representative being of the thing to be made, and being that “*artifex intueatur, & imitando exprimat*”.

This difference is very important. Upon it depends the possibility for man to act independently as a secondary cause. The exemplar cause, indeed, proposed by Fonseca and recalled with more detail in the *Cursus*, is a fifth cause that cannot be considered a category because it does not apply to all natural agents, but only to the rational ones. But it is the core of a shift in the relationship between God as first cause and humans as independent makers of their own world, secondary causes that concur with a continuous godly action in order to act.

It is likewise important that this shift comes from the view of the *exemplar* or idea not as a formal principle of the accomplished thing, but as *terminus*, project or purpose of the creative human. That is to say, as in Catholic theology, that it is typical of the rational being to act according to the ideas conceived in the mind, and these ideas are the exemplar cause of the accomplished effects. The passive possibility of being imitated, which is the mode of exemplar cause, excludes the main feature of Platonic ideas, their actuality. This way, the idea is “humanized”, and it becomes the purpose of action and creation. Consistently, Góis specifies how far it can be considered more or less perfect than its effect: actually, when we speak about the *exemplar* conceived by man, its perfection – which in other causes is always greater than

those of the effects, as Aristotle rules – can in many cases be less than that of its effect: the effigy of Alexander by Apelles is of course inferior to the real Alexander as far as natural nobility is concerned, but things cannot be different under different perspectives.

Sometimes there are artefacts, such as a house, imitating which the maker directs his hand; but everybody knows that the formed artefact sometimes can result in the same or greater perfection than those of the one which the maker wanted to imitate.¹⁰¹

The shifting is confirmed by the fact that the five causes go towards a reinforcement of the extrinsic in relation to the intrinsic ones, a reinforcement that in Fonseca and Góis has more complex and articulated features than in the later primacy of the efficient cause. There is a direction in this five-angled geometry, so often dismissed as weak and uninteresting, heading straight to the core of the new Cartesian physics (and, as a consequence, metaphysics): the relationship between exemplar cause and efficient cause proposed by Fonseca and recalled by Góis makes more extrinsic the relationship between natural beings, like man and nature, and the laws ruling them. In the extrinsic context, immediately there is place for all that is empirical, subject to measure, quantity and reproduction; the place of efficient cause, as Descartes will call it.

Góis, once the function of material cause has been established, goes on finding the different declinations of causality. As we have already seen, indeed, to every category of cause a causality corresponds which must not be taken for the simple cause–effect relationship. Causality is the immediate basis of that relationship, i.e. something is under the jurisdiction of the cause and concurs to the production of the effect. From the distinction between the two declinations of causality Góis deduces the peculiarity and the centrality of the efficient cause in respect of the others. The causality in all causes, except the efficient one, is not an indeterminate being, mediating between cause and effect and different from both; but it is a certain mode of what is called “cause”.¹⁰²

Causality has, according to Góis, two meanings: it can be a mode of the thing, called *influxum*, or it can be *actio*. While all the other causes act according to the first meaning, the efficient cause is the only thing that performs the *actio*. This is meaningful from a historical perspective, because – as we have already seen – *influxum* is the word used by Suárez to further specify his definition of cause, taken from the *Cursus* and Fonseca. Here the influence is excluded from the acting of efficient cause, whose action is enough to obtain the effect without the need of any changing, included a modal one, of the being that causes. Góis is interested in God’s acting, as it is actually efficient cause, because it creates or makes something, and it does not need any “mode” or “influence”, otherwise we should admit that God could undergo

a change of mode when he begins to have that actual absolute mode he did not have before.¹⁰³

Totally different is the causality of final cause, paired to the efficient cause by being extrinsic,¹⁰⁴ but attacked with vigour at the end of the sixteenth century. Góis speaks about it at the end of the commentary to the seventh chapter, and he even considers the possibility that final cause may not be a cause. He recalls many traditional distinctions about the ends and repeats the example of God as final cause of everything, to reinstate not only the existence of final cause, but also its primacy, both in the logical and in the hierarchical order. As far as the logical order is concerned, Góis says that the end precedes the agent, the matter and then the form. In the *Ethics*, Góis states that if we take the expression *propter finem* literally, all natural agents act *propter finem*. But if the *ens* is that to whose achievement the agent directs its action – and this is the most clear-cut definition of the word – the action *propter finem* is limited to rational creatures.¹⁰⁵ He concludes that all beings act for an *ens*, but the irrational and free ones, such as animals and plants, are metaphorically described as the arrow thrown at its target, and as instruments used by God: “Unde opus naturae, dicitur opus intelligentiae.”¹⁰⁶ But even if it is defined as relevant, final cause (weakened in the general debate and by Góis’s choice in favour of the efficient cause and the collocation of exemplar cause in the extrinsic ones) is also undermined in its natural grounds in the *Cursus*.

The problem arises very clearly when the causality of final cause must be defined. Góis had previously stated that the *ens* is what thanks to which something is. There the verb “be” of course represents a movement (*feri*). Final cause and efficient cause are symmetrical in relation to movement. And symmetrical will be the solution proposed by Góis to describe its causality:

It must be considered that the motion is twofold: one in a proper sense, for actual and true actions, as when fire heats water; the other in a figurative sense, as it is said that “moves” the one that, inducing love in another person, draws this person to himself.¹⁰⁷

The first, *vera & germana actio*, is the typical mode of efficient cause. The second, that of final cause, is a *motio metaphorica* that does not fit well in the framework of natural inquiry. Góis admits these difficulties, and offers a series of conclusions aimed at separating the causality of the ends of natural agents from that of God, which cannot be influenced by metaphorical motions and, least of all, by appetites for things external to him.¹⁰⁸ So, the causality of final cause applies only to created agents, because it is the thing thanks to which the known thing moves the appetite: but the *motio metaphorica* operates this way only *per translationem*. As Des Chene said: “Speaking of the action of ends as metaphorical opens one avenue to solving the problem of the non-existence of ends. If one could make sense of metaphorical action, perhaps one could make for them a reasoned exception to the rule that causes must exist to act.”¹⁰⁹

The Conimbricenses noted the problem and made a distinction in relation to this mode of existence of the end: one thing is intelligible and objective existence, the one in man's mind, another thing is actual existence, *in rebus ipsis*. Góis must necessarily admit the actual existence of the end, as he did for the exemplar cause, but dividing the *esse reale* in two meanings: (1) as actual and positive being, independent from the intellect; (2) in the broader meaning including all being, both the actual and positive and the intelligible “quod quoquo modo est possibile obtineri, vel saltem tanquam possibile, aut non impossibile offertur appetitui”. In this second meaning, of course, the existence of end referred to its being cause must be understood.

In the *Cursus* we thus find the same extension of *esse reale* that we can find also in Fonseca, and that includes future existence (the future contingents), potential or possible existence and even seemingly possible existence.¹¹⁰ This enlargement implies a narrowing of the *motio metaphorica*, or better, of the physical realm of the ends. The *esse reale*, following Góis's enlargement of meaning, implies the knowledge of the futures and the possible, where we must mean by “possible”, *de facto*, again what can possibly be thought. So we could admit that an end can be void of *esse reale* and anyway operate as cause *secundum esse reale*. But the inclusion of what can be thought (all ends) in the *esse reale* – always thinking it, inconsistently, as independent from the mind – and the application to it of a mere metaphoric motion, narrows the realm of final causes to rational and willing natural agents. We are a short step from the declaration of inexistence of the ends:

Since the Aristotelians themselves agree that the cognition of an end is a *conditio sine qua non* for its being a cause, the Anti-Aristotelian need only argue that the cognition is not just a condition of, but the cause of the volition that was said to result from the metaphorical movement of the will by ends, and that the cognition of an end will have been efficiently caused by the end. Though there is still reason to talk of ends, final causality is eliminated in favour of efficient causality.¹¹¹

Because they have articulated causes and causalities this way, Conimbricenses are obliged to conclude accordingly about the relationship between first cause and secondary causes, the most heated question in theological debate at the time of the publication of the *Cursus* and well exemplified by the aforementioned dispute *de auxiliis*.

Góis could choose between two opinions. One, very common in the thirteenth century, especially among Augustinian theologians (William of Auvergne, for example) emphasizes the role of first cause denying the independence and consistency of secondary causes. The other, proposed by Durandus, gives their own role to secondary causes, and considers a creation unable to operate in a rational way without further divine help not appropriate to a rational God. Góis, under the influence of Fonseca and of Luís Molina's *Concordia*, supports the theory of the concurrence of causes, rejects

every univocal interpretation and opens the door to many conclusions regarding the relationship between man and God, marked out by free will, as typical of Jesuit tradition.

About the ancient question of the conservation of the being of things, it is not surprising that Góis takes a path already trodden by Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, but most of all by Bonaventura, stating that things cannot maintain their being without God's will: "creaturae cessante Dei concurs in nihilum recident".¹¹² It is not surprising, because it is necessary in order to state the necessity of a concurrence of first cause with secondary causes in the action of natural agents. Indeed, Góis distinguishes two modes of God in maintaining things in their being: either *immediate*, by his direct action, or *mediate*, by means of an effective virtue given by him to things. The conservation of some creatures,¹¹³ such as the angels, or the natural effects produced directly by God (more similar to miracles than to the usual behaviour of nature), are of the first category; the conservation of natural things is of the second ("alias, concurrentibus etiam causis secundis, in suo esse [Deus] tuetur").

Góis makes reference to Bonaventura in order to reject the theory, popular in the cultural context of Bonaventura himself, for which secondary causes actually do not make nothing, as they are at best the instruments of the first cause. Góis looks at this theory, supported by Ibn Gabirol and strongly rejected by Aquinas, with particular indignation. In the question "Utrum causae secundae re vera aliquid agant, aut non", he does not even expound his position before going ahead with a strong refutation of the theory of Gabirol. The text here follows, with further details, that of Fonseca (*In Metaph.*, Lib. V, Cap. II, Quaestio VII, Sect. II). The Jesuit aversion to this topic is easy to understand: if Gabirol's theory is accepted, there is no more room for science and free will,¹¹⁴ the cultural standpoints of the Society and especially of Coimbra College.

We must answer that God acts very perfectly, but it does not mean that God does not admit the collaboration of other efficient causes, because he would not admit everything depending on them; nor that he is not able to produce without them the same effects; but God grants to the causes this dignity, and this concession does not imply any weakness or defect in his power.¹¹⁵

This is the exposition of the Conimbricán doctrine against the "reductio causarum ad primam". A. J. Freddoso has expounded all the possible positions on it, calling *occasionalism* the theory according to which only the first cause operates; *mere conservatism* the one for which God's action restricts itself to the conservation of things; and *concurrentism* the intermediate solution.¹¹⁶ Góis rejects the "occasionalist" position of Avicenna but also, more mildly, the "conservative" one of Durandus. Durandus stated¹¹⁷ that God, once the secondary causes were created, endowed them with the power to act independently ("causas secundas per se effecta sua producer"), without the

necessity of God's influence in order to operate. Góis quotes many authorities in support of his theory, behind which there is Molina and almost certainly also Fonseca; the concurrence of first with secondary causes is guaranteed not only by the conservation of being by God, but also by a specific act different from the act of conservation.

This concurrence of God with secondary causes is nothing new in the philosophical and theological debate, but its modality in the *Cursus* is new and follows Fonseca's and Molina's line. They find themselves in antithesis to Aquinas: according to him and his commentators, all secondary causes, before operating, receive from God a certain influence and motion that is like an "intentional being" of the divine virtue, by which actions are induced to act.¹¹⁸

Aquinas's theory, recalled by Bañez against Molina, was that secondary cause – man – must wait for a physical motion by God, and so the first cause is not only first *in essendo*, but also *in operando*. God's action for the conservation of being was not a sufficient condition to speak about a concurrence of God with secondary causes. A further *elicit* action by God was needed to start causation. But, Thomists said, in this case the secondary cause is like an axe, made by the ironsmith with the ability to cut wood, but that needs the action of the carpenter in order to operate. Molina, in the *Concordia*, had answered that expecting from God and *excitans* action in order to start the causation was morally unacceptable. The consequence would have been that God started the vicious acts also. The axe, adds Góis, is something different from the beings endowed by the virtue *ad operandum*. The axe is an instrument, while these are secondary causes.

The key is the immediateness of divine intervention. A different interpretation of the immediate act is the reason for the split between Thomists and Jesuits (the future "Molinists").

The philosophical problem for the concurrentist is to formulate a satisfactory metaphysical characterization of this complementarity – a characterization that will not dissolve into occasionalism by rendering the secondary causes's immediate contribution superfluous and that will not dissolve into mere conservatism by rendering God's immediate contribution superfluous.¹¹⁹

Molina had been very clear on the subject,¹²⁰ but his answer to Durandus's thesis is very recurrent in the *Cursus*. Molina summarized Durandus's arguments in favour of conservatism in these terms: God causes the effects of secondary causes not *immediate*, but through the secondary causes themselves and so *mediate*, in the same way in which, as first cause, he gives them being and the ability to operate, and maintains them; God's action is different from that of second cause and is superfluous, with the exception of conservation; the order of agents is the same as that of ends, but there cannot be two *immediati & perfecti* ends of a thing, but only many partial ends. Molina believes Durandus is wrong when he thinks that there cannot be any effect in nature if God does not immediately maintain his influence in the category of the efficient cause.¹²¹

Molina also established a standpoint in his theory: what is necessary for the conservation of a thing, must *a fortiori* be necessary for the production of the thing. Nothing can be produced by the secondary cause, without a simultaneous and immediate intervention of the first cause. The problem was to define the modality of this concurrence well, to avoid the unnecessary multiplication of agents in single acts. Disputation XXVI of the *Concordia* focuses on this problem, answering to Aquinas's thesis, considered wrong by Molina: according to Aquinas, indeed, the general concurrence of God with the action of secondary causes is an *influxus in causas*, i.e. giving to secondary causes the forms and virtues apt for action. The example chosen is again that of the axe. The theory of immediacy is advanced by Molina (and Góis) against Durandus, Aquinas and Thomists like Bañez. To all these authorities Molina had to answer, adding a supplement at the end of Disputation XXVI.

Molina objects to Aquinas with a distinction between two classes of instruments: those that do not own the virtues for operating, like the axe and other tools, and those that own the virtue for operating (the seed) or are the virtue itself (fire and other natural virtues). This second class of instruments, according to Molina, does not need a further motion from the first cause. Moreover, if Aquinas's theory is accepted, the consequence would be that God does not concur *immediate immediatione suppositi* to the acts and effects of secondary causes, but only *mediate*, according to Durandus's thesis, already rejected. According to Molina:

God, with a general concurrence, acts with it in the same operation, and by means of that operation produces his end and effect. So we can say that God's general concurrence is not an influence on the secondary cause, as this cause produced its effect only moved by him, but it is an influence "with" the cause, immediate in its action and effect.¹²²

He thus opposes to the *influxus in causam secundam* the *influxus (immediate) cum causa secunda*, and according to Molina this concept is not so far from Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas's passage. The reference to Cajetan is important because it is a confirmation of the latter as orthodox Thomist from the Jesuit perspective. Molina states, indeed, that Cajetan "modum loquendi Divi Thomae servat".

The concurrence of causes is a participation of two partial causes, one of which is universal (the divine influence) and the other particular (the action of secondary cause). This simultaneity and partiality, for which, according to Molina, the duplication of causes for a sole effect is not superfluous, implies that there is no succession in time of the two parts. If one occurred before the other, as Aquinas states, as a consequence the first cause would move the second cause to action and, through it (*mediate*) would produce the effect. On the contrary, Molina states that God's general concurrence with the secondary causes is "immediatus immediatione suppositi in actiones & effectus":¹²³

it concurs simultaneously and immediately in the production of act and its effects.

This means that the general mode of divine concurrence in causation does not *determine* the effects, which are instead determined by the particular influence of the second cause. Indeed, it is always the particular cause that determines the influence of universal cause on the species and effect of action, when the universal cause concurs, not as particular, but indeed as universal.¹²⁴

This reflection is very important because it reveals the concept about which Molina cares most, as Fonseca and the Conimbricenses did. Man's free will is stated and, at the same time, God's responsibility for vicious acts is ruled out. "If the cause was free, it would be up to it to influence in order to produce an action or another ... or this artefact instead of another, or withdrawing any influence, so that no action would occur."¹²⁵

Of course, this point will trigger the Dominican reaction, well exemplified in Bañez's work, because of the Pelagianism implied in this doctrine. Molina, to avoid this accusation, speaks about this topic in many *Disputationes* (XXIX–XXXIII), anticipating the objections and saying that there is a *latis-simum discrimen* between the concurrence in the "natural" actions of secondary causes, including those of free agents, and the concurrence in the "supernatural" actions of man, that is, the disposition to receive justifying grace. According to Molina, indeed, in natural operations the concurrence of God with secondary causes does not imply any priority, logical or chronological, between the two modes of action, the one depending on the other. About the disposition to justifying grace, which is a supernatural operation, we cannot say that man's free will concurs in the same way as the secondary cause in natural acts: the first cause acts with a particular *auxilium*, the prevenient cause (which will be mocked by Pascal in the *Provinciales*), by means of which God raises and helps free will towards the supernatural operations of believing, hoping, loving and repenting, as it is necessary for salvation.¹²⁶

Unlike God's concurrence to natural acts, the prevenient cause is "*a certain motion* that raises and anticipates free will, and makes it able to cooperate further, with its free influence, to the supernatural acts by means of which, close or from afar, we are disposed to the grace *gratum faciens*".¹²⁷

The distinction aims at anticipating the answer to a thorny theological question, but will not persuade opponents, according to whom Molina did not sufficiently justify the difference of relationship between the first and secondary cause in natural and supernatural acts. In the first, the free-willing man acts with immediate concurrence *immediatione suppositi*, i.e. with an act where there is no priority between the concurrents (God and man); in the second, the free-willing man disposes himself to grace after the motion of prevenient grace, caused in him by God. Molina had to speculate a lot to establish a clear-cut definition of prevenient grace, whose function is sometimes the same as sufficient grace, which the disputants of *de auxiliis* could not define after a long quarrel.

Here we should talk about divine prescience in Molina's *scientia media*, but this will drive us too far from the *Cursus* and its physiology. But it must be taken into account when Góis speaks at length about mediation and immediacy, introducing further distinctions in the dyads "mediation/immediacy" and "virtue/suppositus",¹²⁸ and focusing on the immediate concurrence of God with secondary cause.

Fonseca himself had supported this idea with many arguments,¹²⁹ such as:

- 1 the argument of perfection: the immediate concurrence of the first agent, i.e. God, to the *actio* does not bring to him any imperfection; on the contrary, it brings to him a most high perfection, increasing the dependence from him of agent creatures (the secondary causes);
- 2 the argument of the conservation in being: as the agents concurring to the conservation in being of the effects concur also to their production, God concurs immediately to produce all the effects of agent creatures, and by consequence all their actions;
- 3 the argument of essential subordination: because every created agent is essentially subordinated to the first agent, i.e. God, it is necessary that God acts immediately with every created agent.

The same concept will be expressed by Góis in the *Physics*: "Respondemus Deum cum quovis agente creato operari immediate immetiatione virtutis, & suppositi."¹³⁰ The same expression will recur in Suárez, who will devote *Disputatio XXII* to the concurrence of first cause with the secondary ones, and will conclude the argument of immediacy in the same way as Fonseca and Góis,¹³¹ establishing a "Conimbrican" line on the subject of cause.¹³² The variations introduced by Suárez into the Portuguese Jesuits' theory (including Molina) are minimal, and we can say that, in relation to cause, the doctrines by Fonseca, Molina, Góis and Suárez have an identical impact on their contemporaries. The young Descartes¹³³ was among them: he would have been a bored but attentive reader of all these authors. The thesis of Helen Hattab, for whom in the Cartesian system "the laws of nature are the secondary and particular causes of particular motions and changes in motion", cannot be supported without emphasizing its connection with the *Cursus*, where the concurrence of first and secondary causes is thoroughly studied.¹³⁴ The persistence of this subject in the text does not only want to reposition it in the exegesis of Aristotle's *Physics*, but to ennoble human action as the subject of knowledge. The help of first cause frees man from including the last end in his knowledge and action, and thus prepares the deactivation of the final cause. The Conimbricenses try to fill the void with the insertion of exemplar cause, but actually, with the rejection of occasionalism, man claims his ability to gain a full knowledge of the world, because it is caused by rational and voluntary actions that depend on an interior model inspired by God, but are not determined, only promoted by God. The physics of the *Cursus* points to a new direction, under the reassuring garments of a systematic Scholasticism

seemingly devoid of any thought: an overturning of the universe upon the network of human decisions that will be developed by Descartes, without having himself provoked any paradigm shift.

Hazards and probabilities

The problem of the last end comes back in the commentary on the *Ethics*, where the Conimbricenses repeat the concurrentist plot that explains movement in the *Physics*: secondary causes neither move nor do anything if the first does not concur; in the same way, created and secondary appetible things will not move anything, if the last end does not move.¹³⁵

The necessary condition so that “ulterior motives” can move human action is their concurrence with the last end, here being the same as the highest Good, whose existence in every man’s action is guaranteed – according to Góis – by the same argument by which the prime mover is proved: the unacceptability of the *regressus ad infinitum*. This is the reason why man’s action is always aimed at the last end, even if unwittingly:

In order to be inclined to the highest good, it is not necessary to actually think about it, nor to direct explicitly one’s own actions to it: it is enough to desire something good, or appears to be good, because it participates somehow in the highest good.¹³⁶

It is clear, as a consequence, that the morality of action will depend on the concept of good, and it is well known that the history of the Society is closely connected to this variable and nuanced interpretation. The Conimbricenses state that the formal reason of good is convenience (*convenientia*),¹³⁷ because what is good is desired on the basis of its being (or considered) convenient to man. Appetibility is a quality of being good, as visibility is of colour. The most important principle is the participation of particular goods in the highest good, recalling the natural tendency of all appetites to the latter:

Because in all things the inclination to good is innate, and every action aims at a good thing; and in every good thing there is a participation of the highest good; as a consequence all things, at least in their intentions and implicitly, are inclined to the highest good.¹³⁸

Góis rejects the identification, dating back to Diogenes, of *bonum* and *absolutum*, because the formal reason of good implies a relationship of convenience that cannot be established with what is already perfect. Therefore, the relativity of good and the alignment of every particular good to the highest are the reasons for which, according to Góis, evil cannot be desired in itself, but as it takes some appearance of good.¹³⁹ About man’s will, Góis says that, as the intellect inclines to good, and when he says something false, it is because it has some appearance of truth, so man’s will “neither embraces

anything that does not look good, nor rejects anything that does not look evil”.¹⁴⁰ The inclination to good is therefore innate, notwithstanding there are some raised appetites (*elicit*), such as love, hope and other affections of the soul, by which the intellect pushes man towards the desired things.

The innate appetite is a disposition infused by God thanks to which man is inclined to what is convenient to him. It can be classified as natural, sensible and intellectual: the first concerns all beings, because it is that innate appetite by which every thing (*absque ulla notitia*) inclines to what is convenient to it; the second concerns animated beings, because it is the same as the first but implies knowledge through the senses. It is the same as irascible and concupiscible appetite. The third is will, and concerns only rational beings, because it implies intellectual knowledge. Every appetite inclines to good, repeats Góis; and this does not contradict the Trent doctrine according to which concupiscence, or sensible appetite, is a sin. Concupiscence is inclined to a good that looks desirable to it, but that is not according to the “right reason” and divine law.¹⁴¹ In this case, we either deny man’s action being aimed at the last end (and this is deemed impossible by Góis), or we also include “perverted” appetites aimed at mundane goods, in the difficult but unavoidable path towards virtue. The problem that ensues is not only moral relativism – man acts always following *appearances* of good, and it is thus justified – but also, more generally, cognitive relativism.

The reasoning followed by the Conimbricenses in order to outline man’s happiness is very similar to Aristotle’s and to the most familiar commentaries on *Nicomachean Ethics*. Happiness is not the possession of mundane goods as they are accessory and accidental, and it is not the possession of bodily goods as they are common to man and animals. Happiness (*beatitudo*) is defined, in line with Aristotelian tradition, as the possession of the goods of the soul, consisting in its operations and potentialities; or, even better, the higher happiness is the exercise of the proper functions of the soul, in their actuality. In his analysis of the word *beatitudo*, Góis looks interested in subjects that could not be addressed in the Aristotelian texts, having become core subjects in the sixteenth-century theological debate: the worthiness of man’s actions and the superiority of charity among theological virtues.

Beatitudo is supernatural or natural. But the supernatural happiness man can reach in this life is different from the one he can reach in the afterlife. Góis recalls the Thomist concept of the intuitive (purely intellectual) contemplation of God against the Scotistic idea of the act of loving God *clare visum*, and against Bonaventura’s theory, where the intellectual act of Thomists and the love of Scotists are mixed. Góis does not exclude that a supernatural happiness can be reached in this life, but it cannot be the supernatural knowledge of God or the gift of wisdom. It is rather an actual exercise of charity, which is the form of other virtues, as the supreme happiness “comes from the worthy actions, some raised, some imposed by charity”.¹⁴² According to Mário Santiago de Carvalho, this statement implies that Góis takes a remarkable position: “A sua proposta evidenciará o compromisso crítico de uma

teologia das bem-aventuranças e, portanto, de uma theologia da caridade e do *homo viator*, com uma teologia da visão intelectual.”¹⁴³ The focus is on worthy action, which in post-Tridentine theology means the correct use of free will in order to gain salvation. The worthy actions imply God is a “reasonable” judge, whose sanction can be easily predictable by man, at least by analogy. On the subject of “merit” as a problem, Scholastics would discuss this at length, distinguishing between *de congruo* et *de condigno* and speculating on the margins of God’s rational-moral obligation to reward the creature that freely acted well. This is very different from Lutheran and, above all, Calvinist theology, where the only “merit” was the sacrifice of Christ as cause of the salvation of a few men, whose fate was predestined, as were their acts, aimed at the building of the divine project, *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. The Conimbricenses here simply focused on the theological virtue, charity, opposed to *sola fide*, the supernatural happiness man can reach in this world.

If we consider the particular position of the Jesuits in the theological geography of Catholicism, the Conimbrican emphasis on charity is not a surprise: it is a consequence of the emphasis on free will that we can find in the major Portuguese philosophers and theologians. This subject was very controversial at the time of the composition of the *Cursus*.

Charity, however, is a supernatural virtue, and *beatitudo* is the higher form of happiness. As far as natural happiness is concerned, it can be the practical side of the contemplative. But contemplative happiness, which should coincide with the contemplation of God and separate substances, is not possible in this life. As in other commentaries on metaphysics within the *Cursus*, in the *Ethics* contemplation is the most noble of the operations of speculative intellect, but in this mundane life, with natural faculties (we do not speak about the afterlife, which we expect and in which we hope to participate in divine happiness) we do not see God in the most perfect way.¹⁴⁴

Practical happiness, according to Góis, is the same as *prudentia*, which is not a virtue among the others, but is their *regula* and “inter eas principatum obtinet”.¹⁴⁵ What is Góis’s definition of *prudentia*? He says: “Prudence is the attitude in acting *according to true reason* about things that are good or evil for the man” (italics in original).¹⁴⁶ Prudence is a practical habit, distinguished from science and wisdom, i.e. from contemplative acts, but also from *ars*, which does not apply to *actio* but to *effectio*.

The problem (and the main feature) of Góis’s definition lies in the expression “vera cum ratione”, because the field of application of prudence is contingency: contingents are by nature some false and some true, and on them human intellect can easily err. Góis recalls again the distinction between practical and speculative truth. The truth in which the intellect adjusts itself to the known thing (the traditional theory of *adaequatio rei et intellectus*) is speculative and its condition depends on the object. The truth in which reason adjusts itself to the right appetite, i.e. not fooled by the good appearance of the things desired, is practical. The practical and contingent habit, if it inclines to any object whatsoever, can nevertheless conform to truth, if it

adjusts itself to right appetite, regardless of the conformity (of the habit) to the object in itself and according to its nature.¹⁴⁷

In practical wisdom the intellect does not need to adjust itself to the thing; because, for example, the *mediocritas* needed to follow the virtue of temperance does not correspond to a fixed and immutable quantity of food, but must be determined according to circumstances, and does not depend on conformity to the object but to the right appetite, which drives the prudent man securely in the alert evaluation of the circumstances of his actions.

As charity is the most important of the supernatural virtues, so prudence has the primacy among natural virtues. Therefore, it does not decree the end of other virtues (as does *synderesis*, or natural reason), which is in the same relation to prudence as the knowledge of principles to science. Prudence is instead connected to the means of action; it considers them (“consultare & inquaerere”); it selects them according to the end (“iudicare, quaenam e medijs inventis ad finem adipiscendum magis conducat”); directs other moral virtues (“praecipere et imperare”) as they can find the means most adequate to their proper ends.¹⁴⁸

Góis does not only distinguish the acts of prudence, but also its parts, i.e. what concurs to its perfection (*partes integrantes*), its field of application (*partes subiectae*) and habits, which, if present, make perfect the exercise of the three acts of prudence (*partes potentiales*).¹⁴⁹ As far as the integral parts are concerned, Góis recalls the list proposed by Aquinas in the *Summa*, which in the context of the *Cursus* looks like an ideal Table of the Law of Jesuit psychology. Five integral parts concern the cognitive act (the research and selection of the means to the end): memory, intelligence, *docilitas*, diligence, reason. Three integral parts concern the application of prudence, and they are *providentia*, *circumspectio*, *et cautio*.¹⁵⁰ Memory recalls past means, intelligence investigates present ones; docility is a habit, learned *per disciplinam*, of listening and learning easily other people’s sentences; while diligence is the ease of the subject in finding (*per inventionem*) the most adequate means. Here, in the three integral parts about application, the resonance of Jesuit values is easy to hear:

In order to understand rightly, [reason] needs three things, i.e. providence, circumspection and caution. Providence, in order to dispose and order things as it is proper to the end. Circumspection, in order to monitor the circumstances in business with caution and diligence. Caution, in order to thwart and remove the hindrances that could occur.¹⁵¹

These are the typical values of the politician, whose knowledge cannot but be practical and – as Huarte would have said – imaginative. The fields of application of prudence are the private and domestic (*oeconomicus*), the military, the royal, proper to the prince, and the generally political, which subjects can perform also.¹⁵²

According to the Conimbricenses, the *Nicomachean Ethics* looks at the politician, because it establishes an axiology for him that is occupied in the management of the Republic, an axiology that, founded on *mediocritas* (and Ignatius states how the Jesuits were attentive to this value), does not however overlook the concurrence of material goods to the realization of the good life.¹⁵³

Aristotle in the first book of *Ethics*, cap. 8, states that for happiness, not the general but the politician's, external goods are required as instruments to safeguard the Republic, practice charity and repel attacks; and also similar gifts. This is true: because he will say nobody obtains political and external happiness, if he has no goods to this end.¹⁵⁴

The value of *mediocritas* is easy to understand from the Aristotelian point of view, where the excesses to avoid are very clear and logically opposed. It becomes questionable when one of the excesses to avoid is no longer a vice, but a virtue. This is the case, very important for the politician, with justice, which should be the middle term between avarice in giving back what is due and prodigality. To solve the problem, Góis gives a political declination of the concept of justice as the principal value of active life, except prudence: "Justice is that virtue that gives to everyone what is due to him."¹⁵⁵ From this perspective, justice coincides with the *aequalitas* of the man who has juridical relations with other citizens. As there are two kinds of *aequalitas*, commutative and distributive, so there will be two kinds of justice, which will change its way of being *media*: distributive justice is that of the governor that gives with equality according to the merits of everyone (*remunerativa*) or inflicts punishment on the guilty (*punitiva*) and obeys geometrical proportion; commutative justice is concerned with buying and selling, and obeys arithmetical proportion.

It is clear that behind the internal distinctions of distributive justice Góis finds the problem of divine justice in salvation, where the proportions are about rewards or punishments larger by far than those administered in human justice. Divine justice is enforced upon man's acts, and in order to respect geometrical proportion, must be concerned only with "merits", i.e. good or evil human acts, performed without constraint. The question is again that of free will. The goodness or viciousness of every man's act, Góis says, dwell formally in the inner motion of will and dwell materially in the object, that is, in respect to the act, the extrinsic formal cause,¹⁵⁶ i.e. the exemplar cause. It is the case of money desired by an individual, which is not good or evil in itself, but in relation to his greater or lesser convenience with the *recta ratio et lex divina*.

As goodness and viciousness are essential differences in human actions, Góis thinks that there are actions *in singularibus* indifferent to moral good and evil. The merit or fault that the supremely righteous God will judge dwells in the freedom of wilful act and, second, in the goodness or viciousness of the object desired by the individual (as exemplar cause of his action);

anyway, the composition of these factors in the moral act should, according to Góis, take into account a third factor: the circumstances. The goodness and viciousness of human actions also depend upon the circumstances: in every case they enhance or lessen goodness and viciousness, and often bring about different species.¹⁵⁷

The insertion of this factor, which appears accidental in the constitution of moral acts, is typical of Jesuit ethics well beyond the *Cursus Conimbricensis*. The criterion of divine judgment (and also the human criterion, i.e. of the confessor who must judge the confession of the sinner and administer the sacrament of reconciliation), instead of being stiff and rigid, in the Calvinistic way, should mould itself on the plasticity of human action, where the intention of the sinner, the moral qualities of the object of desire, the external circumstances modifying the species of action should all be taken into account. All this is the necessary premise to the probabilistic developments of seventeenth-century ethics, and also a philosophical symptom of the affirmation of casuistics in moral theology. But there is more than the justification of Jesuit morals. The implicit hint is that the world of phenomena, the earthly world (the *real school* of men, according to Possevino) does not know any *recta ratio*, but only the ungovernable entropy of the countless destinies of human beings, that we can only try to grasp with the help of *scientia media* and navigate cautiously. Therefore not only is the world of secondary causes without any law and admits no absolute criteria, but also the first cause, from which all other causes descend, is becoming dangerously uncertain.

Góis argues the theme of circumstances much more concisely than Molina, and thinks that circumstances (“which surround human actions as they were the extrinsic part of their substance or essence”¹⁵⁸) that have an influence on moral action are of three sorts. Of the first sort are those that enhance or lessen goodness or viciousness: so, according to Góis, the quantity of stolen money is a circumstance that determines the gravity of the theft in itself.¹⁵⁹ Of the second sort are the circumstances that introduce in the same act a goodness or viciousness different according to the species: e.g. a different weapon does not change the seriousness of a homicide, but theft adds to the homicide a different species of viciousness. Of the third sort are the circumstances that introduce a difference of species in moral act, implying a *specialis ordo conformitatis vel difformitatis ad rectam rationem, & legem Dei*. The divine judgment on man’s moral acts has been strongly “humanized”. In this dispute within the *Cursus* there is no reference to the supernatural intervention of grace, as if the moral realm was entirely human, and God would leave secondary causes to play freely inside it for their salvation (or damnation). Human psychology is symmetrical to the action of God as creator, where intellect and will alternate; it is a psychology that tries to find answers to the relationship between human freedom and divine omnipotence/omniscience. Human acts are said to be free because they come from free will, interdependent with intellect: we answer that every human acts comes from free will; therefore, it

is proved that formal freedom comes solely from will, even if the root of freedom lies in the intellect.¹⁶⁰

Acts can be called “human” in two ways: either as operations of particular human faculties, such as rationality, or as actions over which the individual has full and free dominion. Thus, freedom is connected with the determination of individual freedom, but Góis pinpoints that freedom “is about something we choose with cheer: the choice goes towards the good, and whatever is the object of will, formal freedom concerns the will”.¹⁶¹ So the question shifts towards a clearer definition of the relationship between will and intellect in relation to freedom, because Góis considers free (or *deliberata*) the will that is preceded by intellectual deliberation.¹⁶² This complicates the framework, because a will determined by an intellectual deliberation does not look absolutely free, but is undoubtedly conditioned by the intellect. The problem is very old: Augustinians and Thomists, Scotists and Occamists discussed at length which of the two aspects, will or intellect, was pre-eminent in God: each of the two options determined a different centre of gravity for theology (and for the sciences connected to it).

Góis chooses the will. He states that will gives the initial impulse to intellect so as it acts, performs its own function (“the will, as its proper exercise, moves the intellect, as the other faculties do as human acts”¹⁶³). That impulse, therefore, acts only generally, and implies an intellectual reaction that specifies the determination to perform a particular act: so the act in itself will be performed by a second intervention of will, which must not be confused with the initial one. The same thing is stated in the commentary on *De Anima*, where the Conimbricenses discuss the problem of dignity in the relationship between intellect and will. The will, sustained by an old Augustinian tradition, had received further support from Henry of Ghent, Bonaventura, Scotus and, of course, Occam. On the other side, the Thomistic choice of intellect had been supported by Durandus and Capreolus. The Conimbricenses, faithful to the Ignatian mandate of Aquinas’s primacy, recur to *ordo dignitatis* to overcome the impasse: as far as dignity is concerned, the intellect is nobler than will.¹⁶⁴

A similar argumentation can be found in Couto’s *Dialectica*. The affirmation of the greater nobility of the intellect does not imply a slavish Thomism: the sequence towards human action will also be overturned in the *De Anima*, even if in soft terms. The text goes on redefining the roles of intellect and will in the direction of concurrence, as they were form and matter of the moral act. The will moves giving orders, governing, leading, as if it was a sort of queen: but a blind queen, because she lacks intellectual light; while the intellect is the emperor, who fixes and enforces the laws of the will.¹⁶⁵

Analyzing further the relationship between intellect and will, the Conimbricenses establish a clearer definition of the concurrence of the two faculties in the production of a single moral act, offering what looks like an inversion of the roles, almost as far as the chronological and logical order is concerned. Being compelled to uphold the distinction of the two faculties against the Neoplatonic and Areopagitic theory of their identity, they

state: “the will actually ... moves the intellect, and the intellect directs the will”.¹⁶⁶ In the concurrence of the two faculties, will not only acts first, but without it the intellect would remain inactive, while the will without intellect will act anyway, even if at risk of doing bad.

The primacy of will in respect of the intellect does not imply a primacy of will in respect of the other faculties of the soul. The relationship between will and these others is explained in the *Cursus* through the same structure of the relationship between first cause and secondary causes in the *Physics*, as further evidence of the symmetry of the moral microcosm of the soul and the physical macrocosm. The will does not move the other faculties in applying them, does not act *per previa motio* on them,¹⁶⁷ but, as happens with first cause, concurs to the action of the other faculties:

The will moves the other faculties concurring with them as more universal cause; so the action emanates from the faculty with which the will concurs, and with which the will itself forms a sole and identical cause. This statement is proven most of all by the analogy with the relationship between the other universal and particular causes, most of all between God and the secondary causes: as the will goes towards good in general, as the other faculties towards the particular goods; so it acts in respect of the other faculties as universal cause acts in respect of the secondary ones.¹⁶⁸

The analogy with the causes is an indication to read the relationship between human will and intellect as similar to what happens in God. But the *Cursus* generally skirts the issue, avoiding discussing a theological question. Nevertheless, as we have already seen with reference to morals, it is possible to state that the theological doctrine of *scientia media*, even implicitly, underlies the argumentation of the Conimbricenses, emphasizing the presence and influence of Molina and Fonseca on the College of Arts.

In the *Physics*, Góis briefly deals with the question of God’s freedom. To answer this question, he is obliged anyway to recall the traditional distinction, in the realm of God’s knowledge, between *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and *scientia visionis*: “It is necessary that all things, being in God, have being, but they do not exist necessarily in themselves; as a consequence, not every thing that God wants is necessarily wanted, while every thing God knows is necessarily known.”¹⁶⁹ This sort of knowledge, Góis says, is that of simple intelligence (*abstractiva*), antecedent to every act of God’s will: with simple intelligence God understands things in their essence. If it is the knowledge of vision (or *de notitia intuitiva*), “that is inclined to things as they exist at a certain distance of time”,¹⁷⁰ God knows things not by absolute necessity, but *necessitate hypothesis*, i.e. “assuming his free will, which bring things to being in nature”.¹⁷¹

The oncoming definition of God’s freedom gives us interesting indications about the consistence of human free will in relationship with God’s knowledge,

or the thorny problem of *de auxiliis* around the creation of individuals by God *pre* or *post previsa merita*. The real problem is the core of *scientia media*, which, as we have already seen, is a third mode of knowledge relative to future contingents and, especially, to the free behaviour of man; this mode of knowledge neither invalidates divine omniscience nor the consistence of the creature as “secondary cause” of his own salvation. In this context, the human mind must keep as far as possible a sort of objective unpredictability, otherwise Lutheran-Calvinistic predestination would be admitted. The solution of *scientia media*, according to which God creates man *ante praevisa merita*, allowed Molina (and later Fonseca) to save both instances.

Amandio Coxito has well defined the terms of the question in the context of the *Cursus*: “Um ponto básico de doutrina que importa destacar é o que respeita ao livre arbítrio, que é entendido como un poder do homem que não é eliminado pelo poder finalista do universo, nem pela presciência divina, nem a sequer pela graça enquanto ajuda extraordinária de Deus concedida gratuitamente.”¹⁷² We can find in the text some traces, though scarce, of the acceptance of Molina’s theory by Góis, when, speaking about the necessity of creation, he distinguishes between the freedom of God and man:

You must understand that free will is different for us and God: we indeed want freely, not only in the sense of desiring or not desiring one or another object, but also because we are able to inhibit or change the very act of willing. God instead performs a sole, simple and unchangeable act of will, and that act is by itself free and indifferent to this or that habitude, differently from what happens with creatures: he always owns both the immutability of liberty and the immutable liberty. So divine will is more free, and in a nobler way, than ours. Our will can choose this or that act; and this implies imperfection and mutability; while the divine will perseveres in the same act, is indifferent to the chosen objects, but not to its own act as far substance is concerned.¹⁷³

The imperfection of human free will assumed by the text is what had been celebrated by Pico in the *Oratio* and which other early Jesuits, such as Possevino in his *Coltura degl’ingegni*, went on stating as a trademark of the Society. Imperfection is the guarantee of the existence of a field in which fallen man can decide about a moral object, can pursue it or resist it, and – this is the radical difference from a “reasonable” God – can change opinion, persevere or give up the elicited act. The extension of freedom becomes thus very radical, perhaps too much so for orthodox anti-Pelagians, but, as we have already seen in discussing moral questions, the purely human portion of knowledge, the disciplines of the *Cursus*, leave a margin of “human” ambiguity. It seems no coincidence that this subject is lacking in the *De Anima*, where it was more expected. So let us go back to the subject of will.

The weight of human freedom brings, as a consequence, the idea that human will is not totally corrupted and that original sin has not *de facto* damaged it.

This statement is the prelude to another element, necessary for the complete description of a moral act of which human freedom is the core: human virtues are not natural if not in coincidence with voluntary acts. Góis pinpoints that the naturalness of virtues can be seen in two ways: the first, for which what is convenient is natural to the natural inclinations of man, such as the cognition of truth; the second, for which what is not voluntary is natural, “for example that actions that are innate and congenital by nature, from our primeval origins, as the instinct of feeding”.¹⁷⁴

Góis does not accept that it is right to apply the concept of virtue to the second meaning, as doing so would deny the merit of human actions, coming from a free act of will. Expounding the first meaning, he speaks about the educability of man, having stated the stereotypical considerations on naturalness, for man, of living according to reason. He says that man is by his own nature a perfectible being, because the virtues are not given as perfect in him, but only as seeds or germs (recalling implicitly the concept of seminal reasons). It is said that in man virtues are not induced by nature as perfect and complete, but like inklings and roots, which should be brought to the act with the exercise of discipline and virtuous actions.¹⁷⁵

While the natural virtues are reduced to seminal virtues, subject to improvement, the ampler range of acquired virtues, all the more subject to education, covers all the virtues and moral habits of the prudent man, who is the most moral one. Virtues are learned through acts to which moral habits are associated. Being acquired by learning, they are like the knowledge (and its habits) that we have seen before as the result of the pupil–teacher relationship, a relationship that is the core of Jesuit culture and of the *Cursus Conimbricensis* in particular. Góis stated in his Introduction: the subject of the whole moral science is man, because he acts freely and it is possible to cultivate in him good mores, and obtain human happiness.¹⁷⁶

Human happiness is a result of education, both in the rational and ethical aspects. Moral science, with reference to the latter, aims at “teaching to live honestly, transmit the rectitude of mores and guiding to happiness”;¹⁷⁷ and because man can be educated either for himself or in the community, or in respect of domestic life or in respect of the political context, so moral science is divided into *ethica sive monastica, oeconomica, politica*. A division that fits perfectly the system of dominant classes at the time (clergy, wealthy bourgeoisie, court intellectuals) and that provides for three different systems of truth criteria. As fallen, humanity would not have any chance unless following pale inklings, “seeds” of a truth washed away by the waves of practical mundane morals, and, having no direction, could shape its own liberty only in a doctrinal school: Conimbrican ethics fully accept this paradox. This acceptance could result, as far as human psychology is concerned, in everything from tragic awareness to the advantageous solution of practical atheism.

But education remains a problem, as they are aware of having to teach not so much “values” as some codified social abilities. The Jesuit solution comes from the enthusiasm of the militancy and the creativity of the Society

in dealing with new challenges. And it perhaps comes also from the illusion of one day controlling, with a further refinement of dialectical and psychological weapons, the unpredictable aspects of history and the human soul, too.

After several centuries, the “Jesuit solution” lost its propelling energy and left behind only the formal structure of the system: the belief that there is no knowledge outside that which is provisionally functional at given social exigencies, which found legitimacy in that knowledge and its institutions. At the end, education was reduced to the legitimacy of the institution that administered it. At the time, the Jesuit order had the good idea of undergoing its own suppression. But we should ask ourselves: how many “modern” and “secular” educational systems have reduced themselves as such? The *Cursus* triggers these and other questions, and a close scrutiny reveals that it is not a closed page of history, but one of the hidden sources of Western culture.

Notes

- 1 Here we cannot give an account of the immense literature on Giordano Bruno. Among the many Italian critical editions, I follow M. Pieri (ed.), *Bruno Nolano*, vols I–II, La Finestra: Lavis, 2011.
- 2 P. R. Blum, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie. Typen des Philosophieren in der Neuzeit*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998.
- 3 C. H. Lohr, “Metaphysics”, in C. B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye (eds), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 605.
- 4 D. Des Chene, *Physiologia. Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*, Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press 1996, p. 3. Des Chene also states: “The philosophy of nature, in fact, was a kind of clearinghouse in which physics, metaphysics, and theology could meet and negotiate their claims, much less needed now that those disciplines have gone their own ways” (ibid.).
- 5 Blum, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie*, p. 171.
- 6 Cf. *In Metaph.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Sect. II, pp. 241–242. Here Fonseca marks his difference from the Conimbricenses with two statements: (1) “Dicendum est tamen, proprium re vera esse Metaphysici, de causis, ut causae sunt, agere, neque ad alium artificem spectare” (p. 241); (2) “Metaphysicus enim cum sit primus artifex, & communis omnium scientiarum, ut ita dicam, Architectus; non tantum de causis rerum materiae expertum, sed omnium omnino rerum, quoad eius dignitas, & officium permittit, agere debet” (p. 243).
- 7 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Art. I., p. 259. According to Mário Santiago de Carvalho, the Conimbricenses try to draw their own concept of Nature: “Se quiséssemos indicar desde já a tónica deste tratado teríamos de destacar precisamente a apertada ligação epistemológica e ontológica entre causalidade e natureza.” M. Santiago de Carvalho, “As palavras e as coisas. O tema da causalidade em Portugal (séculos XVI e XVIII)”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra*, 36 (2009), p. 229.
- 8 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Art. I., p. 259ff.
- 9 *Physic.*, Proemium in octo libros, p. 5.
- 10 Another emerging question is the relationship between cause and nature, defined by Mário Santiago de Carvalho as “a tónica deste tratado”. Santiago de Carvalho, “As palavras”, p. 229. See also A. Coxito, “Natureza, Arte, Acaso e Finalidade na *Física* do Curso Conimbricense”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra*, 23 (2003), pp. 39–68.

- 11 Santiago de Carvalho, *Psicologia e ética*, ch. 6, “Uma metafísica do intelecto”, pp. 159–178.
- 12 *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. VI, p. 22: “Ego sic statuo, tres partes esse Metaphysicae, ac proinde triplicem esse considerationem eius; Una est principalis, & quasi finis caeterarum (propter quam talis scientia dicitur Metaphysica, Theologia, & omnium nobilissima) in qua tractantur res seiunctae a materia secundum rem & rationem, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentiae & Deus: Altera est pars in qua declarantur transcendentia, ut ens, unum, verum, bonum, actus, potentia; propter quam partem, Metaphysica dicitur universalissima, & habere ius & imperium in caeteras scientias: Tertia pars eius complectitur decem praedicamenta.”
- 13 *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, p. 23: “necesse est esse duas scientias distinctas inter se; Unam, quae agat de transcendentibus, & universalissimis rebus; Alteram, quae de intelligentiis. Illa dicetur prima Philosophia & scientia universalis; haec vocabitur proprie Metaphysica, Theologia, Sapientia, Divina Scientia.” Pererius distinguishes also between the science of the intelligences and that of God: “Non solum autem non est absurdum ponere quartam scientiam speculativam; sed etiam qui poneret quintam quandam, hoc est scientiam Dei, secundum ea quae possunt de eo naturaliter cognosci, distinctam a scientia intelligentiarum, is *iudicio nostro non pessime sentiret*” (ibid., p. 25). Cf. Lohr: “In his [Pererius’s] conception only divine science deals with reality separate from matter; first philosophy deals with the ultimate principles of all reality, both material and immaterial. The former is a particular science, the latter, a universal one.” Lohr, “Metaphysics”, p. 606.
- 14 Blum, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie*, p. 171.
- 15 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. I, Art. III, p. 8.
- 16 Ibid., p. 9: “in cognitione primae causae, & intelligentiarum, atque aliarum rerum, quae neque in materia consistunt, neque illam in suo concepto includunt”.
- 17 “cum non solum ea tractet, quae omnino extra materiam consistunt; sed etiam transcendentia, summaque genera, quorum nonnulla partim insunt, partim non insunt in materia, ut substantia, & qualitas; alia penitus in materiam sunt immersa, ut situs & habitus: imo cum ipsam quoque materiam primam contempletur.” *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. I, Art. V, p. 11.
- 18 Góis insists on the relationship between incidentality and matter: “Itaque, ea, quae nulla ex parte extra materiam coherent, non nisi obiter & quasi ex accidente tractat Metaphysicus” (ibid., pp. 11–12).
- 19 The metaphysician never meets the things connected with matter “nisi forte prout ei, ut communi omnium artificum praesidi ex officio incumbit scientiarum Rempublicam constituere, ac tueri, & unicuique disciplinae propriam, ac peculiarem materiam, in qua insistat, designare. Hac enim ratione pro suo iure, & dignitate extra metas proprii obiecti formalis libere excurrit” (ibid., p. 12). This is the meaning of the metaphysics *non pure* (cf. also ibid.).
- 20 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. I, Art. VI, p. 15.
- 21 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. II, Art. II, p. 18: “Etsi Physicae dignitas, & ad obtinendam scientiae rationem perfectio, non satis olim in confesso fuerit, sive rudiori seculo, infante adhuc & balbutiente Philosophia, sive etiam postea, adeo per se dissidentibus & pugnantibus Philosophantium sectis, ut nihil fere inter eos ulla de re conveniret; tamen postea quam emortua illorum temporum pervicacia, Philosophia quasi e fluctibus emersa portum tenuit; plana omnino res habita fuit, & omnium confessione consensuque firmata, Physicam in coetu scientiarum esse collocandam.”
- 22 Góis adds that the inclination of man towards education is as certain as the mathematical rule of the triangle; and because what is demonstrated in mathematical disciplines is understood with true and perfect science, the same must be so for physics, as between mathematics and physics “par conditio sit”. Ibid., p. 19.

- 23 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. IV, Art. I, p. 31.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. IV, Art. III, p. 35.
- 27 *De An.*, Proem., Quaest. Unica, Art. II, p. 8.
- 28 The two problems are posited by Mário Santiago de Carvalho like this: (1) “In termos práticos ou metodológicos, tudo isto equivale a perguntar se Aristóteles é biólogo da *psyché* ou psicólogo e metafísico da alma”; (2) “a verdadeira discussão não seja entre uma física e uma metafísica, mas sobre a maneira como tal divisão se pode inscrever numa psicologia mais radical ou radical. Escusado será dizer que Aristóteles é, por este lado, claramente ultrapassado.” Santiago de Carvalho, “Introdução geral”, pp. 93, 95.
- 29 Santiago de Carvalho, “Uma Metafísica do Intelecto”, p. 175. See also Santiago de Carvalho, “Introdução geral”, esp. B2, “O Lugar da *scientia de anima*”, pp. 79–140.
- 30 This is also the opinion of Martíns, “The Conimbricenses”, p. 20.
- 31 “Sed ea ratione ut est immaterialis, per se subsistens, habens multa cum intelligentiis communia, eam separabilem esse secundum rem a materia, neque cognitionem eius, qua talis est, Physicam esse, sed partim Metaphysicam, partim Theologicam.” *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. X, p. 37. Blum draws from other passages this conclusion: “Pererius has to admit that psychology is mixed of three disciplines: metaphysics for the separability of the intellectual soul, physics for its action in the body, and revealed theology. Why the soul is partly treated by theology is obvious. Pererius gives three theological aspects of the rational soul: the ultimate goal of the soul and the means of achieving it, i.e. beatitude; the question of the state of the soul after death ...; the immortality of the soul. Especially the third point ‘cannot be known in a natural way’.” P. R. Blum, “Benedictus Pererius: Renaissance Culture at the Origins of Jesuit Science”, *Science & Education*, 15 (2006), p. 288.
- 32 Cf. D. Des Chene, *Life’s Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 19.
- 33 Santiago de Carvalho, “Uma Metafísica do Intelecto”, p. 176. Cf. also Des Chene, *Life’s Form*, p. 19.
- 34 Cf. T. Aho, “The Status of Psychology as Understood by Sixteenth-Century Scholastics”, in H. Heinämaa and M. Reuter (eds), *Psychology and Philosophy. Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, p. 59. Joaquim de Carvalho stated a connection between Suárez, the Conimbricenses and Pedro Fonseca in “Pedro Fonseca, precursor de Suarez na renovação da metafísica”, *Actas del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía*, Mendoza, Argentina, March–April 1949, vol. III, pp. 1927–1930.
- 35 *Disput. Met.*, I, Sect. II, n. 19: “quia anima rationalis, etiam ut rationalis est forma naturalis habens essentialem ordinem ad materiam, et ut sic est principium suarum operationum, etiam earum quas per corpus exercet, etiam secundum eum peculiarem modum quo ab homine exercentur”. In order to solve this problem, Suarez recalls Tolet, *Comm. in De Anima*, Proem., q. 2; then he supports the reduction to physics of the problem of the soul: “Nunc breviter dicitur huius animae considerationem remittendam esse in postremam et perfectissimam partem philosophiae naturalis. Primo, quia scientia de homine, ut homo est, physica est; eiusdem autem artificis est de toto, et de essentialibus eius partibus considerare. Deinde, quia, licet anima habeat esse subsistens et separabile a materia quantum ad actuale coniunctionem, non tamen quantum ad aptitudinem, nec quantum ad ordinem ad materiam, et consequenter neque quantum ad perfectam cognitionem tam essentialis, quam proprietatum et operationum eius; omnis autem cognitio per materiam physica est. Non est ergo dubium quin cognitio animae, quantum ad substantiam eius, et proprietates per se illi convenientes, et modum seu statum existendi vel

operandi quem habet in corpore, ad physicum pertineat. De statu vero animae separatae, et modo operandi quem in eo habet, considerare, putant aliqui ad metaphysicum per se pertinere; quod est probabile, quia secundum eam rationem videtur omnino fieri abstractio a materia, et nihil de anima, prout in illo statu cognosci posse, nisi per analogiam quamdam et proportionem ad reliquas substantias immateriales; nihilominus tamen, quia ad perfectionem scientiae spectat integre atque complete subiectum suum considerare, commodius haec omnia in philosophia tractantur, maxime quia haec consideratio animae et statuum eius, quasi in partes divisa, et in diversis scientiis tradita, prolixitatem parit et confusionem; et ideo in discursu huius operis a consideratione animae rationalis, tam coniunctae, quam separatae, abstinemus. Praesertim quia etiam de angelis propter eandem causam perpauca dicturi sumus, quia integra eorum consideratio et contemplatio a theologis merito iam usurpata est, quam totam huc traducere alienum esset a naturali scientia, et consequenter a nostro instituto; res autem obiter attingere aut imperfecte tractare, aut nullius, aut parvae utilitatis esset. Atque eadem fere ratio est de cognitione Dei, quamvis, quia de Deo plura possunt naturaliter cognosci quam de intelligentiis, et quia eius cognitio naturalis magis est ad perfectionem huius scientiae necessaria, nonnulla de ipso dicemus, quatenus vel a philosophis tacta sunt, vel ratione naturali inveniri possunt.” *Disput. Met.*, I, Sect. II, n. 20.

36 Cf. Des Chene, *Life's Form*, p. 19.

37 Cf. E. Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, in Schmitt *et al.*, *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, pp. 485–534.

38 *De Anima. Tract. de An. Sep.*, Disp. I, Art. 3: “Cum naturali lumine cognitam esse immortalitatem animae asserimus, non excludere nos peculiaria quaedam auxilia et illustrationes mentium, sine quibus fortasse id assequi non potuerunt philosophi post primi parentis lapsum.”

39 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. I, Art. II, p. 7.

40 Blum, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie*, pp. 171–172.

41 The scholarly literature on Suárez is abundant. On the specific themes here discussed see Costantino Esposito (ed.), *Disputazioni metafisiche I–III*, Milan: Bompiani, 2007 (Introduction and Addenda); Costantino Esposito, “Existence, relation, efficiency. Le nœud Suarez entre métaphysique et théologie”, in V. Carraud and C. Esposito (eds), *L'existence*, = *Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica*, 3 (2003), pp. 139–161; and Costantino Esposito, “Heidegger, Suárez e la storia dell’ontologia”, in C. Esposito and P. Porro (eds), *Heidegger e i medievali*, = *Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica*, 1 (2001), pp. 407–430. See also M. Forlivesi, “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics from the Later Middle Ages to the Early Modern Age: The Ancient and Medieval Antecedents”, *Medioevo*, 34 (2009), pp. 9–59; M. Forlivesi, “‘Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare’. Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi, and Trombetta Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics”, *Quaestio*, 8 (2008), pp. 219–278; M. Forlivesi, “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts”, *Quaestio*, 5 (2005), pp. 559–586.

42 J. Bachelar e Oliveira, “Filosofia Escolástica e Curso Conimbricense. De uma teoria de Magistério à sua sistematização Metodológica”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 16, 2 (1960), p. 130. See also p. 132: “Esta vasta e sólida arquitectura da orgânica das Disciplinas caracteriza, intrinsecamente, a visão Conimbricense do conjunto do edifício do Saber. Determina não somente a contextura externa da obra mas o seu próprio processo metodológico interno. Confere-lhe sobretudo o seu cunho específico de ‘Curso’, um dos primeiros e talvez no seu conjunto, o mais eficiente e universal para a Disciplina geral dos Estudos Filosóficos.”

43 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. V, Art. I, p. 37: “cum reconditam naturae vim scrutetur, & a vaga, atque errabunda sensuum notitia, magna ex parte pendeat, longi

- temporis observationem, ac experientiam requirit, proindeque multo est difficilior, & operosior.”
- 44 Ibid.: “Praeterea oportet Moralem Philosophum a Naturali sumere quae sint animae facultates; ut quae, quibus subditae esse debeant, & in quarum actione beatitudo posita sit, edoceat.”
- 45 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. V, Art. III, p. 40: “morum probitas non solum Philosophantium praeceptis; sed etiam, ac multo magis, privato studio, domestica disciplina & aliorum exemplo, alijsque ad id appositis medijs, accedente divina ope, adipiscitur.”
- 46 *In Univ. Dial.*, Quaest. Proem., Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 19: “Dialectica cum mentis in discurrendo vitia emendare curet, idque praestare non possit, nisi minime fallaces argumentandi formas perficiat; ubique fere per demonstrationem procedit, quod multo secus accidit in scientia Morali, quem cum morum disciplinam curet, minus indagandae veritatis studio ad demonstrationem attendit: compertum vero est notitiam demonstratione comparatam perfectiorem esse non demonstrative.”
- 47 Couto puts rhetoric after morals, but dubiously: “Rhetorica tamen praecipuo studio incumbit in externum sermonem: qui cum inferior sit subiecto scientiae Moralis, in inferiori etiam dignitatis loco Rhetoricam collocate.” Ibid., p. 20.
- 48 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. V, Art. I, p. 38: “doctrinae ordo postulat, ut quae scientia res maxime abstrusas, & a sensuum consuetudine remotas considerat; ea postremo loco addiscatur: ita vero sese habere Metaphysicam nemo ignorat; cum circa transnaturalium rerum contemplationem occupetur, ut vel ipsum eius nomen indicat, testaturque Aristoteles.”
- 49 *In Lib. Met.*, Lib. II, Cap. III, Quaest. V, Sect. IIII, pp. 428–430. See also p. 429: “Atque haec est omnium communis sententia: neque unus, aut alter ex Recentioribus huic assertioni repugnat, nisi quia non videntur distinxisse ordinem doctrinae in ordinem inventionis, & accuratae disciplinae, & cum viderent, Metaphysicam esse hoc posteriori modo primae doctrinae ordine, crediderunt absolute, ac simpliciter dicendum, esse eam ordine doctrinae primam.”
- 50 *In Lib. Met.*, Lib. I, Proem., Cap. VI, p. 25.
- 51 *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. XIV, p. 48: “Si omnes scientiae subalternantur Metaphysicae, non dabuntur duae aliquae scientiae per se primo diversae, sed una tantum erit scientia, nempe Metaphysica.”
- 52 *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. XV, p. 50.
- 53 It is the same for other disciplines: “Verum si prorsus accedamus ad contemplandam propriam vim & rationem subalternationis, plane intelligimus ... neque Physicam, neque ceteras doctrinas proprie subalternari Metaphysicae.” *De comm.*, Ibid., p. 51.
- 54 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. V, Art. III, p. 41.
- 55 *Physic.*, Proem., Quest. V, Art. IIII, p. 42. The same expression in Couto’s *Dialectica*, Proem., Quaest III, Art. II, p. 19.
- 56 *Physic.*, Proem., Quaest. V, Art. IIII, p. 44: “Quod vero Metaphysica, prout in nobis est, (sic enim de illa in praesentia loquimur), minorem, quam priores duae, certitudinem habeat; ex eo concluditur, quia res, quae sub illius contemplationem veniunt, licet in se spectatae altiore certitudinis gradum obtineant, videlicet materiae atque omnis mutationis expertes: tamen in hoc vitae statu vix longo studio percipiuntur, earumque nonnullae adeo excellentis naturae sunt, ut in ijs mentis nostrae acies perinde ac noctuae oculus in solis splendore hebescat.”
- 57 *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. XVI, p. 51.
- 58 “Etenim Physicus disserit de substantiis & corporibus naturalibus, in quibus sunt stirpes, animantes, homo & caelum, quibus rebus nihil est infra intelligentias excellentius atque nobilius; Mathematicae autem disciplinae in sola cognitione accidentium occupantur.” *De comm.*, Lib. I, Cap. XVI, p. 52.

- 59 Ibid., p. 54.
- 60 *In Univ. Dial.*, II, X “In capite XXVI De scientia et opinione”, Quaest. I, Art. I, p. 490.
- 61 *In Univ. Dial.*, II, X “In capite XXIII De scientiarum unitate et distinctione”, Quaest. Unica, Art. I, p. 480.
- 62 “hoc principiorum lumen est formalis ratio assentiendi conclusionibus ... & hinc est, ut quanvis lumen nativum intellectus in omnibus hominibus, idem sit; nihilo-minus tanta in eis scientiarum diversitas reperiatur”. Ibid.
- 63 Ibid., p. 479: “Unde prima scientiarum distinctio est in eam, quae habetur ex lumine supernaturali, & eam, quae lumine naturali comparatur. Prima rursum secatur in duas; alia, qua res, cognoscitur lumine supernaturali claro, & est Theologia beatorum; alia qua cognoscitur sub lumine supernaturali obscuro, & spectat ad viatorum Theologiam.”
- 64 Ibid., p. 482.
- 65 Lohr, “Metaphysics”, in Schmitt *et al.*, *Cambridge History*, p. 617.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid., p. 605.
- 68 On Pererius, see Blum, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie*, p. 170.
- 69 “It is well known that [Fonseca] did not accomplish the task [write the commentary in *Metaphysica* for the *Cursus*], so the *Logica* became more and more ‘metaphysic’, and Metaphysics continued to shrink.” Ibid., p. 173.
- 70 *In Univ. Dial.*, II, “In capite II De scientia, et demonstratione”, Quaest. I, Art. II, p. 349.
- 71 This difference has been emphasized by E. Elorduy Maurica, “Influjo de Fonseca en Suárez”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 11 (1955), pp. 507–519. Cf. also A. J. Freddoso, “Suarez on Metaphysical Inquiry, Efficient Causality, and Divine Action”, in Francisco Suarez, *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999, pp. xi–cxxi
- 72 Des Chene, *Physiologia*, p. 394.
- 73 Cf. A. M. Martins, “A causalidade em Pedro da Fonseca”, *Veritas*, 54 (2009), pp. 112–127.
- 74 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Art. I., p. 260.
- 75 Ibid., pp. 260–261.
- 76 “Necesse est ut sit diversae numero essentiae ab eo, a quo pendet; quo pacto nulla res ad se ipsa affecta esse potest.” *In Metaph.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Sect. III, p. 244. Fonseca was preoccupied mostly with the Trinity.
- 77 “Addita est particula, per se, ut rejiciantur causae per accidens, cuius generis est privatio, quae non nisi ratione materiae, cui accidit, potest dici causa rerum naturalium; itemque ea omnia, quae vocantur causae sine quibus non, ut locus, & tempus, quia non sunt re vera causae, sed alia ratione ad rem efficiendam necessaria.” Ibid.
- 78 “Addimus tamen id, quod ita primum est, posse utcumque vocari causam exemplarem aliorum, quatenus est veluti mensura, cuius maiori, minorive propinquitate eorum perfectio aestimatur; secundum quam considerationem alia quoquo modo pendere dicenda sunt.” *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Art. III, p. 262.
- 79 *Disputatio XII*, Sectio II: Utrum sit aliqua communis ratio causae, et quae-nam et qualis, Quaestionis resolutio: “Causa est id a quo aliquid per se pendet. Quae quidem, quod ad rem spectat, mihi probatur; libentius tamen eam sic describerem: Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud; nam loco generis existimo convenientius poni illud nomen commune quod propinquius et immediatius convenit definito; hoc autem modo comparatur principium ad causam; nam ens et illud relativum id, quod absolute positum illi aequivalet, remotissimum est. Per illam autem particulam, per se influens, excluditur privatio, et omnis causa

per accidens, quae per se non conferunt aut influunt esse in aliud. Sumendum est autem verbum illud influit non stricte, ut attribui specialiter solet causae efficienti, sed generalius prout aequivalet verbo dandi vel communicandi esse alteri.” Later, Suarez explains some aspects of his epistemology, clearly disagreeing with the Conimbricenses: “Ad declarandum vero amplius hanc partem definitionis, advertendum est, si philosophice ageremus de solis causis et principiis naturalibus seu quae naturali lumine cognosci possunt, sufficienter videri causam definitam illis verbis et distinctam ab omnibus principiis quae verae causae non sunt; quia tamen nostra physica et metaphysica deservire debet theologiae, talem oportet causae definitionem tradere quae Patri aeterno, ut est principium Filii, vel Patri et Filio, ut sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti, non conveniat, et hoc est quod facessit nobis negotium, nam persona produciens videtur principium per se influens esse in aliam personam, atque ita videtur illi convenire tota definitio causae, cum tamen causa non sit, ut ex recepta sententia theologorum constat.”

- 80 Cf. V. Carraud, *Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz*, Paris: PUF, 2002. This is the opinion of Carraud on the subject: “En développant un immense traité *de causis* affranchi de la forme du commentaire de la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote, Suarez mène à son apogée l’empire déjà séculaire de la *causa* sur le *principium*, c’est-à-dire de la problématique de la cause comme ce par quoi l’existence est produite sur celle du fond comme ce de quoi advient l’être; désormais la primauté n’est plus accordée à la question de la forme, c’est-à-dire de l’essence, en tant qu’elle fonde l’étant en s’autodéployant, mais à celle de l’efficience en tant qu’elle effectue l’existence en lui demeurant extrinsèque” (pp. 103–104).
- 81 P. Porro, “Cenni sulle principali trasformazioni del concetto di causa nel Medioevo”, in R. Kirchmayr, E. Manganaro Favetto, P. A. Rovatti and M. Sbisà (eds), *Esercizi Filosofici*, 6 (2002) [Università degli studi di Trieste, 2003], pp. 91–101; É. Gilson, “Avicenne et les origines de la notion de cause efficiente”, in *Atti del convegno internazionale di filosofia*, Florence: Sansoni, 1961, pp. 121–130; Gilson, *Tommaso contro Agostino*; É. Gilson, “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”, *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 29 (1962), pp. 7–31.
- 82 *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. III, Cap. 10, n. 5. See also *Sententia lib. Metaph.*, Lib. V, Lect. 2, n. 13 and Lect. 3, n. 1; *In Physic.*, Lib. II, Lect. 11, n. 1.
- 83 Albertus states it in *Metaph.*, Lib. V, Tract. 1, n. 3, pp. 212–216. Cf. Porro, “Cenni sulle principali trasformazioni”, p. 97. E. W. Dunphy, *St. Albert and the Five Causes*, Paris: Vrin, 1967. Albertus did not double the material cause, but the efficient one. The Conimbricenses, strangely enough, affirmed that Albertus had remained faithful to the four causes.
- 84 C. Abranches, “A Causa exemplar em Pedro da Fonseca”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 14, 1 (1958), p. 9.
- 85 “Si igitur ab agente primum oritur actio; non dubium est, quin ab eo per se pendeat effectus. Sublata enim prima actionis origine, ne intelligi quidem potest, quomodo aliquid fiat per se.” *In Metaph.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Sect. IIII, p. 246.
- 86 *In Metaph.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Sect. V, p. 248: “Omnis enim effectus, qui sit a causa agente per intellectum, pendet per se ab aliquo exemplari.”
- 87 “quod praestat forma naturalis agentibus naturalibus, id praestat forma intellectualis (quam vocamus exemplar, sive ideam) agentibus per intellectum”. Ibid.
- 88 “... quasi ab eo, ut tale est, influxus oriatur, sed esse id, ad quod agens agendo respicit”. Ibid., p. 250.
- 89 Abranches, “A Causa exemplar”, p. 7.
- 90 *In Metaph.*, Lib. I, Cap. VII, Quaest. I, Sect. V, p. 249.
- 91 “Omnes quotquot Philosophi, ac Theologi de veris ideis loquuntur, asserunt, ideas esse principales formas, & quarum imitatione formae reales inducantur in

- materiam; exemplaria vero, quae per se, & suapte natura talia sunt, nihil aliud sunt, quam verae ideae, tametsi non tales, quales Plato extimabat.” Ibid., p. 250.
- 92 “Ratio quidditatis, quae est definitio formalis causae, non modo formam realem, atque informantem, sed etiam intelligibilem, sive exemplarem complectitur.” Ibid.
- 93 “Nec vero quicquam pugnare cum ijs, quae dicta sunt, Henricum Gandavensem ex veteribus Scholasticis egregium auctorem, qui Quodlib. 9 scribit quinque esse causarum genera adiuncto exemplari; sed potius ea ratione favere, quatenus facit exemplar principale quoddam genus, neque illud ad causam efficientem, aut ad formalem internam revocat.” Ibid., p. 251.
- 94 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. II, Art. I, p. 263.
- 95 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 271: “prototypa ratio essentiae rei, cuius exemplar est, forma vero inducta ab agente est participata quaedam illius similitudo, quae materiam informando, essentia complet”.
- 96 Pererius says: “Sicut forma quae est in agente naturali pertinet ad caussalitem efficientis, nec facit diversum genus caussae, sic Idea quae est in agente per Intellectum non facit quintum quoddam genus caussae separatum ad illis quatuor, sed pertinet ad completam rationem caussalitem effectivae qua est in agente per Intellectum.” *In Comm.*, Lib. VIII, Cap. I, p. 449.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. III, Art. I, p. 266: “Idea est forma, quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis determinantis sibi finem. Quae, ut intelligatur, advertendum est formam, quod ad rem praesentem attinet, tripartito dividi; scilicet in formam a qua, ex qua, & ad quam.”
- 99 *Quodlibet IX*, Quaest. II: “Illa autem ratio in divina essentia, secundum quam sua essentia est ratio qua cognoscit alia a se, nihil aliud est quam imitabilitas qua ab aliis imitetur, quam vocamus ideam. ... Ut secundum hoc idea nihil aliud sit de ratione sua formali quam respectus imitabilitatis ex consideratione intellectus in ipsa divina essentia.”
- 100 “Cuius discriminis ea ratio est, quia in essentia divina, quae est primum divinae intellectionis obiectum, continentur, ac relucent omnia, quae effici possunt; proindeque necesse est ut Deus in quovis opere faciendo ad eam principaliter respiciat, eandemque primaria ratione imitetur. In artifice vero creato non ita res habet.” *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 268.
- 101 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. V, Art. I, p. 273: “Nonnunquam, est aliquod artefactum, ut domus, ad cuius similitudinem artifex manum dirigit, nemo autem ignorat artefactum, quod exterius effingitur, alias perfectius, alias aequae, aut minus perfectum evadere, quam id, quod artificii ad imitandum propositum fuit.”
- 102 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. VI, Art. I, p. 276: “Caussalitas in omnibus causis, praeterquam in efficiente, non est aliqua entitas media inter causam, & effectum ab utroque distincta; sed est modus quidam eius, quod denominatur causa, idem re ipso.”
- 103 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. VI, Art. II, pp. 278–279: “quia est propria causa efficiens dum creat, aut aliquid efficit, & tamen haud ei tunc talis modus, sive influxus convenit, alioqui admittendum esset cadere in Deum, aliquem mutationis modum, cum nempe habere inciperet modum illum realem absolutum, quem antea non habebat”. But there is another reason to deny that efficient cause works *per influxum*: if men, agent causes, operated this way, as a consequence moral acts would be good or evil not because of our actions (determined by free will), but because of the *influxum*, to which *statim sequitur actionem*.
- 104 “Omne quod habet finem, habet etiam causam efficientem. Rursus quod nulli rei causa efficiens conveniat, cui non etiam finis competat.” *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. IX, Art. II, p. 286.

- 105 *In Eth.*, Disp. II, Quaest. II, artt. I and II, pp. 15–17. Góis says: “Omnia agentia, dum operantur, intendunt aliquod bonum, ad quod vel se ipsa dirigunt, vel ad auctore naturae diriguntur: operari autem hoc modo est propter finem operari” (p. 16).
- 106 Ibid. See also Des Chene, *Physiologia*, pp. 189–191.
- 107 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XXI, Art. I, pp. 333–334: “Animadvertendum est ... duplicem esse motionem, unam propriam, quae sit per veram, & germanam actionem, ut cum ignis aquam calefacit; aliam impropriam, & translatitiam, cuiusmodi est ea, qua movere dicitur id, quod sui amorem iniicendo allicit, trahitque ad sese.”
- 108 Góis pinpoints the correct meaning of God acting *propter finem*: “non quidem propter finem operantis; quasi ipse fine perficiatur, aut ad aliquem finem ordinetur, ut res creatae; nec quasi desiderio finis agat; cum ei nihil desit, proindeque desiderare, nihil possit; sed quia externas suas actiones, & opera ad finem destinat amore suae bonitatis comunicandae”. *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XXII, Art. II, p. 341.
- 109 Des Chene, *Physiologia*, p. 190.
- 110 Ibid., p. 193.
- 111 Ibid., p. 191.
- 112 The passage continues thus: “Quare recte D. Bonaventura ... comparavit esse creaturarum in ordine ad primam causam cum figura impressa in aquam a sigillo, & cum pondere, quod in aere manu tenetur: ut enim sublato sigillo confestim figura in aqua evanescit, & amota manu pondus ruit, ita si vel momento conservantis Dei concursus abesset a rebus creatis, confestim omnes ad nihilum abirent.” *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. X, Art. II, pp. 289–290.
- 113 “Quia licet rebus a sui ortus primordio ea contulerit, quae ipsarum incolumitas requirebat, easdem nihilominus per se, intimoque illapsu conservat in suo esse.” Ibid., p. 291.
- 114 The occasionalist doctrine, according to Fonseca, “vertit funditus omnem rationalis creaturae libertatem, cum ex ea sequatur, creaturam rationalem non agere, sed agi: quo etiam nihil indignius humana natura ab homine dici potest. Ita tollitur de medio meritum omne, omnis culpa, omnis iusta laus, ac reprehensio, quae non debentur nisi bene, aut male agentibus: quodque horrent autres, sit Deus author peccati, quod nescio quo pacto non advertunt catholici, qui opinionem hanc verisimilem faciunt.” *In Metaph.*, Lib. V, Cap. II, Quaestio VII, Sect. II, p. 88.
- 115 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XI, Art. III, pp. 296: “Respondetur convenire Deo perfectissimum agendi modum, sed hunc non in eo consistere, ut Deus non admittat consortium aliarum causarum efficientium, cum eas non admittat, quoad ab illis dependeat; vel quod absque earum ope se solo eadem effecta producere non possit; sed ut ipsis eam dignitatem impertiat; quae agendi ratio nullum arguit potentiae defectum, aut imbecillitatem.”
- 116 A. J. Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects”, accessed at www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/pitfall.htm on 10 June 2016.
- 117 *In Sent. Theol. Petri Lombardi Libri Quatuor*, Lib. II, Dist. I, Quaest. II, pp. 107–109.
- 118 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XIII, Art. I, pp. 302: “omnes causas secundas antequam operentur accipere a Deo influxum quendam, & motum, qui sit quasi esse intentionale virtutis divinae, quo ad promendas actiones excitentur”.
- 119 Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence”, p. 8. See also A. J. Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”, in T. V. Morris (ed.), *Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 74–118.

- 120 *Concor.*, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII, Disp. XXV, pp. 105–108.
- 121 *Concor.*, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII, Disp. XXV, p. 107: “quoniam nullus omnino effectus esse potest in rerum natura, nisi Deus suo influxu eundem in genere causae efficientis immediate conservet”.
- 122 *Concor.*, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII, Disp. XXVI, p. 109: “sic Deus concursu quodam generali immediate influat cum ea in eandem operationem, & per operationem seu actionem terminum illius atque effectum producat. Quo fit ut concursus Dei generalis non sit influxus Dei in causam secundam, quasi illa prius eo mota agat, & producat suum effectum, sed sit influxus immediate cum causa in illius actionem & effectum.”
- 123 *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 124 *Ibid.*, p. 111: “Semper namque particularis causae est determinare influxum causae universalis ad speciem actionis & effectus, quando universalis causa, non ut particularis, sed ut universalis causa concurrit.”
- 125 “Si causa libera sit, in ipsius potestate est ita influere ut producat potius haec actio quam illa ... nempe hoc artefactum potius, quam aliud, vel etiam suspendere omnino influxum ne ulla sit action.” *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 126 *Concor.*, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII, Disp. XXIX, p. 122: “qua Deus liberum arbitrium ad opera supernaturalia credendi, sperandi, diligendi, ac poenitendi, ut ad salutem oportet, evehit & coadjuvat”.
- 127 “*motio quaedam*, qua liberum arbitrium excitatur & praevenitur, potensque redditur, ut ita adjutum libero suo influxu cooperetur ulterius ejusmodi supernaturales actus quibus proxime aut remote ad gratiam gratum facientem disponatur.” *Ibid.* For the *gratiae gratisdatae*, see the Introduction to Possevino, *Coltura degl’ingegni*, esp. pp. 72–81.
- 128 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XIV, Art. I, pp. 305–306.
- 129 *In Metaph.* Lib. V, Cap. II, Quaest. IX, Sect. II, pp. 106–109.
- 130 *Physic.*, Lib. II, Cap. VII, Quaest. XIV, Art. II, p. 306.
- 131 “Simpliciter ergo dicendum est Deum agere cum omnibus agentibus creatis immediatione virtutis et suppositi.” *Disput. Metaph.*, XXII, 17.
- 132 See for example S. Manzo, “Causalidad eficiente y concurso divino en las Disputationes Metaphysicae de Francisco Suárez y en el comentario conimbricense a la Física de Aristóteles”, *Patristica et Mediaevalia*, 32 (2011), pp. 51–66.
- 133 Cf. Vincent Carraud, “Descartes et le principe de raison suffisante”, *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, 53, 3 (1997), pp. 725–742.
- 134 Des Chene’s theses on the subject have triggered a debate: H. Hattab, “The Problem of Secondary Causation in Descartes: A Response to Des Chene”, *Perspectives on Science*, 8, 2 (2000), pp. 93–118; S. Menn, “On Dennis Des Chene’s *Physiologia*”, *Perspectives on Science*, 8, 2 (2000), pp. 119–143; D. Des Chene, “On Laws and Ends: A Response to Hattab and Menn”, *Perspectives on Science*, 8, 2 (2000), pp. 144–163; H. Hattab, “Conflicting Causalities: The Jesuits, Their Opponents and Descartes on the Causality of the Efficient Cause”, in D. Garber and S. Nadler (eds), *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 1–22; A. Pessin, “Descartes’ Nomic Concurrentism: Finite Causation and Divine Concurrence”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41, 1 (2003), pp. 25–49; H. Hattab, “Concurrence or Divergence? Reconciling Descartes’ Physics with his Metaphysics”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 45 (2007), pp. 49–78. See also W. A. Wallace, “Causes and Forces in Sixteenth-Century Physics”, *Isis*, 69, 3 (1978), pp. 400–412.
- 135 “ut causae secundae non movent, aut quicquam agunt, nisi concurrente ac movente prima, ita creata & secundaria appetibilia non movebunt, nisi movente fine ultimo”. *In Eth.*, Disp. II, Quaest. III, Art. I, p. 18.

- 136 “ut quis in summum bonum tendat, non opus esse de eo cogitare, vel ad ipsum actiones suas actu explicito dirigere: sed sat esse appetere aliquid bonum, vel quod boni speciem habeat, cum id omne necessario summum aliquo modo participet”. *In Eth.*, Disp. II, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 19.
- 137 In the perspective of formal reason, according to Góis good is “id, quod cuique conveniens est”. *In Eth.*, Disp. I, Quaest. I, Art. II, p. 7.
- 138 “nam cum omnibus rebus ingenita sit inclinatio ad bonum, omnisque actio in bonum feratur: & omne bonum sit quaedam summi boni participatio: consequens est, ut omnia, saltem virtute, & implicite in summum bonum tendant”. *Ibid.*
- 139 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 140 “non amplectitur nisi id, quod ei tanquam bonum obijcitur, nec repudiat nisi id, quod ipsi proponitur sub specie mali”. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 141 “Sicque adhuc ratum manet appetitum esse inclinationem ad bonum, accepta late boni appellatione, sive id a recta ratione deflectat, sive non.” *In Eth.*, Disp. I, Quaest. I, Art. III, p. 9.
- 142 “maxime sit per actus meritorios, quos partim elicit, partim imperat charitas”. *In Eth.*, Disp. III, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 27.
- 143 M. Santiago de Carvalho, “Metamorfoses da ética peripatética”, in *Psicologia e ética*, p. 134.
- 144 “nec in hoc statu (nulla habita ratione alterius vitae, ad quam tendimus, & in qua supernaturalem beatitudinem nos adepturos speramus) secundum naturae vires perfectiori modo Deum possidemus”. *In Eth.*, Disp. III, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 28.
- 145 *Ibid.*
- 146 “Prudentia est habitus agendi *vera cum ratione* circa ea, quae homini bona, aut mala sunt.” *In Eth.*, Disp. VIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, p. 78.
- 147 “Practicus vero quamvis tendat in obiectum contingens possit nihilominus esse veritati consentaneus, si recto appetitui adaequetur, quicquid sit de conformitate ad obiectum secundum se & ex sua natura spectatum.” *In Eth.*, Disp. VIII, Quaest. I, Art. II, p. 79.
- 148 *Ibidem.*
- 149 These habits are: “Eubulia: ad bene iudicandum de ijs, quae lege aliqua definita sunt, Synesis: ad ferendum vero iudicium de ijs, quae non sunt lege aliqua determinata, & tamen in praxim veniunt, in quibus maior occurrit difficultas, Gnomi.” *In Eth.*, Disp. VIII, Quaest. II, Art. III, p. 82.
- 150 *In Eth.*, Disp. VIII, Quaest. II, Art. II, p. 81.
- 151 “Et vero haec, ut recte percipiat, tribus indiget, nimirum providentia, circumspectione, & cautione. Providentia, ut res futuras ad finem accomodate disponat & ordinet. Circumspectione, ut negotiorum circumstantias caute diligenterque attendat. Cautione, ut impedimenta, quae accidere possunt, declinet, ac removat.” *Ibid.*
- 152 “In ipsis vero subditis dicitur politica, qua prudenter se gerunt Principi obtemperando communis boni gratia. Sed ut subditis erga principem, ita & in alijs erga eos, a quibus reguntur, sua etiam prudentia necessaria est.” *In Eth.*, Disp. VIII, Quaest. II, Art. III, p. 82.
- 153 Cf. M. Santiago de Carvalho, “Metamorfoses da ética peripatética”, in *Psicologia e ética*, pp. 107–140. For passions, cf. M. Santiago de Carvalho, “Des passions vertueuses? Sur la réception de la doctrine thomiste des passions à la veille de l’anthropologie moderne”, in J. F. Meirinhos (ed.), *Itinéraires de la raison. Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Brepols, 2005, pp. 379–403.
- 154 “Re vera tamen Aristoteles I. Lib. Ethic. cap. 8 censuit ad felicitatem non quaecumque sed, hominis politici & qui in Reipublicae luce versatur, requiri externa bona, tanquam instrumenta ad defendendam Rempublicam ad beneficentiam exercendam, ad propulsandas iniurias, aliaque munera eiusmodi. Qua sententia

- vera est: etenim nemo externam & politicam felicitatem obtinere dixerit eum, qui bonis ad haec praestanda destitutus sit." *In Eth.*, Disp. III, Quaest. IV, Art. II, p. 31.
- 155 "Iustitia est virtus quae suum cuique ius tribuit." *In Eth.*, Disp. IX, Quaest. I, Art. I, p. 83.
- 156 *In Eth.*, Disp. V, Quaest. I, Art. I, p. 42.
- 157 "Bonitatem & malitiam humanarum actionum pendere etiam a circumstantijs: quandoquidem hae tamen bonitatem & malitiam augere, & minuere, atque interdum ad diversam speciem trahere solent." *In Eth.*, Disp. V, Quaest. II, Art. II, p. 47.
- 158 "quod circumstant actiones humanas quasi extrinsecus se habentes ad earum substantiam sive essentiam". *In Eth.*, Disp. V, Quaest. II, Art. I, p. 45.
- 159 "Enim vero cum, exempli gratia, alter furto accepit mille aureos: alter quadrantem: quantitas pecuniae in priori furto reddit illud notabiliter grave: in posteriori minime." *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 160 "respondemus omnes actus humanos proficisci a libera voluntate, quod ex eo ostenditur, quia etsi radix libertatis sit in intellectu, formalis tamen libertas a sola voluntate est". *In Eth.*, Disp. IV, Quaest. I, Art. II, p. 33.
- 161 "qua aliquid, ut libet eligimus: electio autem fertur in bonum, quod cum sit obiectum voluntatis, consequens est ut formalis libertas pertineat ad voluntatem". *Ibid.*
- 162 "Ulla actio dicatur a libera voluntate proficisci, quae a voluntate intellectus deliberationem sequente elicitur, aut imperator." *Ibid.*
- 163 "Voluntas quoad exercitium movet intellectum, sicuti & reliquas potentias quoad actus humanos." *In Eth.*, Disp. IV, Quaest. II, Art. I, p. 34.
- 164 "Iam vero quod actiones intellectus sublimiores sint, ostenditur, quia tametsi voluntas alias potentias, ipsamque vim intellectricem quoad exercitium actu & hac parte praecise spectatu intellectu voluntati cedat; tamen intellectus alium movendi modum altiore vendicat; cuius merito voluntatem sibi subiectam habet, eamque simpliciter dignitate vincit." *De An.*, Lib. III, Cap. XIII, Quaest. II, Art. II, p. 425.
- 165 "Movet enim ordinando, regendo, imperando, ut ita sit quidem voluntas Regina, sed caeca, intellectuali egens luce, ipse vero intellectus sit imperator, qui voluntati leges figit, atque refigit." *Ibid.*
- 166 "voluntas vero ... movet intellectum, & intellectus dirigit voluntatem". *De An.*, Lib. III, Cap. XIII, Quaest. III, Art. II, p. 428.
- 167 "Quia talis motio superflua omnino est, cum absque illa possit voluntas potentias movere: quo in *Physicis* ex professo tractavimus, com ostendimus causam primam non excitare agentia naturalia ad suas actiones, praecedente aliqua motione, ut plerique D. Thomae sectatores arbitrati sunt. Est enim quoad hoc par ratio in Deo, quatenus cum causis secundis concurrit, & in voluntate, ut cum potentijs." *In Eth.*, Disp. IV, Quaest. III, Art. I, p. 36.
- 168 "Voluntas movet alias potentias concurrento cum illis tanquam causa universalior; ita ut ex potentia, cum qua voluntas concurrit, & ex ipsa voluntate fiat una integra causa, a qua una eademque numero actio manat. Huius pronuntiati veritas ostenditur, primum ex analogia, quae est inter alias causas universales, & particulares, praesertim Deum, & causas secundas: quandoquidem voluntas, ut fertur in bonum in commune, aliae vero potentiae in bona peculiaris, ita sese habet ad alias potentias, ut universalis causa ad particulares." *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.
- 169 "Cum omnia prout in Deo sunt, necessario esse habeant, non autem prout sunt in se ipsis: inde est, quod Deus non quaecunque vult, necessario vult, esto quaecunque scit, necessario sciat." *Physic.*, Lib. VIII, Cap. II, Quaest. V, Art. I, p. 730.
- 170 "quae tendit in res prout in aliqua temporum differentia existent". *Ibid.*
- 171 "hoc est supposita libera sua voluntate, qua eis esse in rerum natura confert". *Ibid.*

- 172 A. A. Coxíto, "A filosofia no Colégio das Artes", in *Historia da Universidade em Portugal*, I.ii, 1537–1771, p. 751.
- 173 "Intelliges aliter sese habere in nobis, aliter in Deo arbitrij libertatem: nos enim ita libere volumus, ut non solum in hoc, vel illud obiectum ferri, aut non ferri; sed ipsum volendi actum, quoad suam positivam entitatem mutare, aut inhibere valeamus: Deus vero licet uno simplicissimo & incommutabili actu in res feratur, eiusmodi tamen actus ad hanc vel illam habitudinem, quam erga creaturas habet, ex sua natura indifferens est atque adeo liber: itaut nec ei libertas immutabilitatem, nec immutabilis libertatem adimat. Sicque divina voluntas nobiliori modo, quam nostra, arbitrij compos est. Nostra enim est in potestate ad hunc vel illum actum eliciendam; quod mutabilitatem, & imperfectionem importat: at divina sub eodem actum perseverans, indifferentiam quidem habet circa obiecta a se distincta, non tamen circa suum actum quoad substantiam consideratam." *Physic.*, Lib. VIII, Cap. II, Quaest. V, Art. I, pp. 730–731.
- 174 "quo pacto ea, quae nobis a primaeva origine, & ex principiis naturae innata sunt, & congenita, naturalia dicuntur, ut vis nutriendi". *In Eth.*, Disp. VII, Quaest. III, Art. I, p. 65.
- 175 "dicuntur inesse homini virtutes a natura, non perfecte & complete, sed inchoatione quadam, & tanquam in radice, e qua accedente disciplina & studiosarum actionum exercitatione in actum prodeant". *Ibid.*, pp. 65–66. More generally, virtues are natural to man "quia id, quo unumquodque secundum naturae suae gradum perficitur, est illi secundum naturam conveniens, homo autem secundum gradum suae naturae virtutibus acquisitis perficitur & excolitur".
- 176 "Subiectum totius Moralis scientiae est homo, ut libere agit, & ut potest bonis moribus excoli, humanamque felicitatem obtinere." *In Eth.*, Proem., p. 3.
- 177 "honeste vivendi docere, probitate morum informare, atque ad felicem statum perducere". *Ibid.*

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